In the Lamberth's ruling, Lamberth based some of his dismissal argument on the "ripeness" of the Plaintiffs' claims. He based that argument on the definition of ripeness found in Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81).
“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all."
In the Perry instance, Lamberth is referring to the "ripeness" of the
1. the Plantiffs' liquidation preferences claim
2. the Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and breach of implied covenant claims regarding liquidation preferences and
3. the Plaintiffs' claim of an unconstitutional taking of liquidation preference rights.
In all three Plaintiff claims, Judge Lamberth asserted that these claims are not ripe for adjudication since liquidation has not yet occurred. Since liquidation has not occurred (in a receivership), then there has been no issuing of assets according to the liquidation preferences so we can see what the actual losses are, there is no breach of contract and implied covenant since there are no actual losses to demonstrate that fact and no unconstitutional taking of liquidation preference rights since there are no actual fruit of such a taking to examine.
Share price losses are summarily dismissed as derivative.
In sum, Lamberth said that there is nothing to decide regarding these claims since they are based on events that have not yet occurred - These claims, among others, are "not ripe." Lamberth states: "Thus, the plaintiffs’ liquidation preference claims are not fit for a judicial decision until liquidation occurs.
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