Replies to post #302908 on Fannie Mae-No Politics (FNMA)

[obiterdictum]

No. The government's motion to dismiss was granted based on two reasonings. First, the judge did not find in the plaintiff's allegations made in the complaint a plausible illegal exaction claim. Second, the judge deemed that the plaintiff could not show that he had a cognizable property interest necessary for making a valid takings claim because of the regulatory scheme governing the potential entrance of Freddie Mac into conservatorship established in 1992 and well before the plaintiff entered the employment agreement. See the decision details via the link below.

This decision was made on the basis of the quality of the civil suit presented without the need to conduct discovery. The plaintiff's attorneys did not make a case able to stand in court. For example, examine the content of the judge's concluding footnote:

10 Given the Court’s determination that plaintiff has no cognizable property interest in the severance compensation under his employment agreement, the Court need not reach the question of whether his takings claim is precluded by the Supreme Court’s decision in Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923), and its progeny. Nonetheless, the Court is unpersuaded by the government’s argument that no takings occurred here, because the FHFA’s actions merely frustrated plaintiff’s employment agreement. Def. Mot. at 23-24. The Federal Circuit recently held in A & D Auto Sales that government action may give rise to a takings where the effect of the government action is direct and intended, rather than collateral or unintended, or where the action affected a general class. See A & D Auto Sales , 748 F.3d at 1154. Here, the FHFA’s directive specifically directed that Freddie Mac not pay the severance compensation under plaintiff’s employment agreement. See Compl. at ¶ 53. And so, plaintiff’s rights under this agreement were not merely frustrated by the government’s actions. Rather, those rights were directly and intentionally terminated by the FHFA’s actions. The Court is equally unpersuaded by the government’s argument that plaintiff’s takings claim should be dismissed because he fails to allege that the FHFA’s actions were authorized. See Def. Mot. at 11-13; Compl. at ¶ 70. To the extent that plaintiff’s complaint is defective for this reason, the appropriate remedy is to amend the complaint, rather than to dismiss his claim. See RCFC 15(a).

Fairholme's case cannot be decided in this manner, that is, on the basis of the "insubstantial" allegations made by the plaintiff without the need or use of discovery and within a regulatory scheme that made it possible for the Government to make a taking of his severance compensation with impunity. Fairholme's claim will prove to be substantial through discovery and the regulatory scheme (HERA 2008) clearly mandated to preserve and conserve the assets of the regulated entities in conservatorship and to return them to the private sector from when they came.

The two cases are dissimilar and not comparable point for point.

Source:
PISZEL v. USA, 1:14-cv-00691, No. 27 (Ct. Fed. Cl. Jun. 12, 2015)
https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/Court_Of_Federal_Claims/1--14-cv-00691/PISZEL_v._USA/27/