Measured Reciprocal Policies to Resolve DPR Korea's Nuclear Crisis:
Reviving the 4-Party Peace Talks
(March 2003)
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(This is a CARE Korea working paper of the Institute for Strategic Reconciliation, part of which was published in the Korea Times and JoongAng Daily, the leading Korean daily newspapers in January and February, 2003. The ISR is the first U.S. think tank established in 1998 by Asian Americans for international conflict resolution and reconciliation research, and international relief and development programs. The views expressed in this article are personal opinions of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the Institute for Strategic Reconciliation.)
by Young Chun, President and Research Director
The Institute for Strategic Reconciliation, Inc. (ISR2020.ORG)
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The withdrawal of DPR Korea (DPRK) from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has opened the dangerous new world for East Asia and Pacific nations. As of March 2003, DPRK is not retreating any further in its strategy for national survival based on nuclear development. What are the Bush Administration's foreign policy options for DPRK as Washington prepares for war with Baghdad including the use of strategic weapons?
First of all, Washington's option is "benign neglect," representing a stance of continuous, deliberate neglect of DPRK. In fact, since the arrival of the Bush Administration 2 years ago, Washington has deliberately been using this policy of "benign neglect." In the first year, Washington concentrated on a general evaluation of its foreign policy with DPRK without any action. The following year, the terrorism of September 11 and the war on Afghanistan took Pyongyang out of Washington's horizon of interest.
President Bush's Washington has been critical of implementing the 1994 "DPRK-U.S. Geneva Agreed Framework," signed during the Clinton Administration. The basic accord is unfortunately being nullified under the Bush administration. Following U.S.'s refusal to continue its energy supplies to DPRK, Pyongyang evicted 2 on-site inspectors who had been monitoring the Yongbyun nuclear facilities, the "Silicon Valley" of DPRK's nuclear technology. In doing this, Pyongyang signaled that it will no longer allow external parties to observe DPRK's nuclear facilities, which has recently been restarted. The larger crisis remains to be seen. That is, once DPRK restarts its plutonium reprocessing facilities, Washington can no longer deal with DPRK in terms of its policy of "benign neglect."
Indeed if left alone, Pyongyang will be able to produce at least six nuclear weapons by this summer. Responding to such a regional threat represented by Pyongyang's nuclear development, Seoul and Tokyo cannot help but entering the nuclear race for their national security; China would accelerate its build-up of military muscle for Asian security; Taiwan would spearhead its defensive posture against China by introducing more modernized weapons from U.S. The DPRK nuclear crisis coming after reprocessing of plutonium will be not only an Asian military crisis, but also an event that could very well spark the 3rd World War when regional interests of Beijing and Washington clash around the "nuclear valley" of DPRK. This scenario represents the end of the efficacy of Washington's "benign neglect."
The second plan of the Bush Administration involves a policy of "military pressure." Hawks in Washington's National Security Council see the impending nuclear crisis in DPRK as being very similar to the crisis nine years ago. In March 1994, DPRK refused to allow IAEA inspections of its 5-megawatt Yongbyun nuclear facilities. Within three months, Pyongyang declared its intention to withdraw from the IAEA. Unyielding to accept Pyongyang's production of nuclear weapons, Washington, at that time, was waiting for President Clinton's executive order for a carefully orchestrated bombing of the Yongbyun nuclear valley.
How different is the current crisis as of March 2003? The Bush Administration is going forward with a "policy of one at a time" in dealing sequentially with the war on Iraq and the DPRK nuclear threat. Doesn't the Pentagon have the capacity to rush into wars with both Iraq and DPRK at the same time? The U.S. used about 70% of its military force in the first large-scale war on Iraq a decade ago. When Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced that the U.S. could be involved in two wars, he must have meant the capability of the U.S. to engage in a full-scale war in one place and a limited war in another place.
Neither a war on Iraq nor a war on DPRK could be indeed restricted to a limited war. What is more, the war on terrorism is diffusing Washington's military force. Finally, compared to the situation 9 years ago, Washington has little room to do the heavy lifting, as Seoul seeks to improve inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation under the policy of engagement with the North and more so under Roh Moo Hyun's new peace-focused administration, and as Tokyo maintains its survival policy based on a refusal to be a victim of a possible U.S.-DPRK war. The time has passed that the White House insists on furthering its own national interests, apart from considering the interests both of Seoul, a strong ally of Washington, and China emerging as a super power of the 21st century. Thus, Secretary of State Colin Powell's repeated statement to Pyongyang, that the U.S. has no plans to attack DPRK, is hardly surprising.
The third plan of the Bush Administration, espoused by the hardliners on DPRK, is "tailored containment of DPRK." Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld are supporters of this plan. This plan, as part of an isolation policy on DPRK, includes cutting off the DPRK coast from arms exports and suspending international economic aid to DPRK. However, history tells us that despite Washington's fifty-year of isolation policy towards DPRK after the Korean War, the DPRK regime has not collapsed. DPRK's humanitarian crisis since 1995 has not caused implosion of the DPRK regime. DPRK's collective society instead demonstrated solidarity and resilience, particularly when other nations were increasing pressure, and DPRK survived as a nation based on "the self-governance ideology" and "independent military-force-first policy."
It is well known that Washington's "tailored containment of Cuba" was not successful in ousting Castro from power. On the other hand, an open policy towards the former Soviet Union, once called an "evil empire," led to its dismantling; Washington policy of economic openness and free trade with China led to the incorporation of China into the international society. If a "tailored containment policy on DPRK" comes to greater specificity this year, Pyongyang would no doubt "view the economic blockade towards DPRK as a declaration of war," and it could brace itself for an all-out military campaign on the Korean peninsula and Japan as well.
In sum, in spring of 2003, Washington's persistence in "benign neglect" of DPRK will aggravate the nuclear crisis. The second plan, "military pressure" from Washington, may sink Japan as well as the entire Korean peninsula to seas of war. The third plan, "tailored containment of DPRK," will instigate an all-out war with Pyongyang. Therefore, a policy of "diplomatic battle via continuous dialogue and negotiation" represents the most realistic option for Washington to resolve the present crisis peacefully. The following three diplomacy strategies are suggested:
· Above all, to accomplish a full-scale diplomacy policy, the basic framework of the U.S.- DPRK Geneva accord must be revived. Washington and Pyongyang have been able to sustain a positive relationship prior to the Bush administration because they have complied with the crux of the Geneva agreement. Washington may now take a strategy that could bring Pyongyang to dialogue by applying a "tailored engagement policy" based on an "reciprocal rules." That is to say, Washington should ask Pyongyang to transfer the unsealed 8,000- spent fuel rods, which could be used for a rapid production of nuclear weapons, to a third country. It is a matter of course that DPRK should allow the IAEA to monitor all of its nuclear facilities, and DPRK should accept the results of inspection. The goal is to dismantle DPRK's nuclear development program. Washington should make the past of DPRK's nuclear development program transparent, and completely prevent the future of its nuclear development.
In response to these actions, Washington should reciprocally and simultaneously guarantee DPRK's entry into the international financial community, by eliminating the economic containment policy towards DPRK. The United States should provide DPRK with energy supplies to offset the loss of energy due to the delayed completion of its light water reactors, a key element in the basic framework of Geneva. That is to say, the agreed, now aborted, heavy oil shipment to DPRK of 500,000 tons per year should be increased to about 3 million tons per year for the next several years until completion since the light water reactors were not built by 2003, the year targeted in the Geneva agreement. President Bush should document his promise not to start a pre-emptive war with nuclear weapons, and thus guarantee the security of the DPRK as a sovereign state. In this reciprocal exchange, Washington would bring peace to East Asia by eliminating Pyongyang's nuclear development program and sustain nuclear nonproliferation regime. On the other hand, Pyongyang would gain desperate economic and political support for its national survival and security and be incorporated into the international community.
· However, it is very difficult for Washington and Pyongyang, who appear to be preparing for actual war beyond war of words, to engage in dialogue or negotiations face to face. Hence it is important to take advantage of diplomatic networks in Seoul, which is pursuing a relationship of cooperation with Pyongyang, and in Beijing, which stands as a friendly nation to DPRK. There is nothing more critical to DPRK's survival as a nation than Beijing's economic-military-political aid. At the same time, Beijing does not want the Korean peninsula -- not to speak of DPRK, which lies just below its national boundaries -- to come under Washington's terms. This is because if DPRK collapses, the country that would be impacted the most is not South Korea but China. Washington is regarded as a military threat by Beijing, but for economic benefit, Beijing has maintained positive relations with Washington. This is a strategic shift China has demonstrated over the past 20 years. If human psychology dictates that we listen to the advice of those we trust, then for Pyongyang, Beijing is the only trustworthy friend state. It is time for Seoul to muscle up its diplomatic relations with Beijing, which has been ambivalent to Washington's request for helping defuse the crisis on the Korean peninsula. Beijing cannot ignore Seoul, as South Korea has become increasingly a closer strategic partner to China than Washington, which doesn't buy Beijing's national interests in the Taiwan issue.
Therefore, it is urgently critical that Seoul-Washington and Beijing-Pyongyang renew quadripartite peace talks. The function of the 4-party peace talks, in which China, U.S., Republic of Korea, and DPR Korea participate, should be revived and enhanced. Reviving the quadripartite peace talks will provide Washington and Pyongyang with reasons for "dialogue and/or negotiation." Washington, which "refuses to compensate for wrongdoing," bears the obligation to accept Beijing and Seoul's invitation to the peace of Northeast Asia in a multilateral mode. Pyongyang, which claims "sovereign national existence on nuclear foundation," bears the obligation to enter into the bilateral peace talks with Washington through a multilateral mode of talks involving Seoul and Beijing.
Using this opportunity of the renewed 4-party talk, the White House should appoint a senior U.S. policy coordinator for DPRK to attend the quadripartite peace talks, showing its resolve to handle the DPRK's nuclear crisis. During the Clinton Administration, this position was strategically well assumed by Wendy Sherman. This position was forfeited during the Bush administration, while it was implementing a policy of "benign neglect." It is time for a senior U.S. policy coordinator for DPRK to open a way to resolve the nuclear crisis peacefully, as Washington is tied up with preparations for the war on Iraq.
The more we wait without diplomatic actions of bilateral talks, the sooner Washington and Pyongyang are likely to engage in serious battles beyond the interception in airspace near the Korean peninsula. South Korean citizens can be used as hostages no longer of the nuclear confrontation between U.S. and DPRK. Even republican hawks on the Hill, the allies of hawks in the National Security Council, are challenging the White House to immediately engage in the bilateral talks with Pyongyang. Isn't it past time that Pyongyang and Washington should engage in direct diplomatic negotiations to prevent a nuclear arms race in Asia? Time is really running out.
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(Young Chun, social psychologist and survey research methodologist by training at the University of Michigan and the University of Maryland, has his research done in the past 15 years mostly in public opinion formation and change, negotiation strategies, survey research methods, and international policies toward DPR Korea.
Chun has published and/or presented 82 papers since 1989 on public opinion, survey research methodology, and negotiations with DPRK in leading academic literature (e.g., The Journal of Business and Economic Statistics), books (e.g., Business Survey Methods published by John Wiley), or national/international academic conferences including American Association for Public Opinion Research, American Sociological Association, American Statistical Association, American Educational Research Association, International Conference on Improving Surveys, International Conference on Establishment Surveys, and World Association for Public Opinion Research. Chun's columns or commentaries regarding the issues of the Korean peninsula have appeared in CNN, National Public Radio, Congressional Quarterly as well as leading Korean news media.
Chun is the president of the Institute for Strategic Reconciliation, the first think tank established in 1998 by Asian Americans for international conflict resolution and reconciliation research, and relief and development programs in conflict regions. He chairs the Washington North Korea Forum, the meeting place of governmental and nongovernmental senior representatives for discussing policy options around the Korean peninsula from 1999 to present. Prior to the current think tank research and studies of his, Chun worked as Behavioral Scientist at the U.S. Department of Labor (1991 - 1999), and as a Survey Statistician at the U.S. Department of Commerce (1999 - 2000). Chun has also worked as international consultant for issues of humanitarian crisis in DPRK in the past eight years. Chun has visited DPR Korea several times to run and monitor humanitarian programs in public health.)
