Sino-Forest Corporation (SNOFF)

[Sibware]

C.B. sued. Malicious as per Statement of Claim.

http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SinoForestvMuddyWaters.pdf

Initial fee for a lawyer in that type of lawsuit is $5M
Add to that that the lawyer will have to go to China a couple of times during the next 7 years of the trial,GEEZ...
Good chances are that they will settle...WEEEEEEEEE
I just wish that C.Block has a foundation of his own.
If not i suggest starting one The Dead Block Funds.

Alternate analysis from another board

$4 billion from Block and 100 hedge funds equals $16 per share.
http://www.cs.uwaterloo.ca/~shallit/libel3.html
At 14K per hectares and 900 hectares thats $50 per share.
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/10684.htm
The Standard of Proof
13. While the standard of proof in administrative proceedings is the civil standard of the balance of probabilities, Staff conceded that, this being an alleged violation of subsection 76(1) of the Act, it could only discharge its burden by clear and convincing proof based on cogent evidence.
14. This standard of proof was recently affirmed in Investment Dealers Association of Canada v. Boulieris (2004), 27 O.S.C.B. 1597 (O.S.C.) at paras. 33 and 34, affirmed [2005] O.J. No. 1984 (Div. Ct.) where the Commission considered the standard required for proving a serious complaint against a person. The Commission noted in that case that the standard of proof and the nature of the evidence which is required to meet that standard, are integral to the duty of administrative tribunals to provide a fair hearing.
15. We accept, as a matter of a fundamental fairness, that reliable and persuasive evidence is required to make adverse findings where those findings will have serious consequences for a respondent.
The Use of Hearsay Evidence
16. Early in the hearing, an issue concerning hearsay evidence arose from the manner in which Staff chose to lead its evidence.
17. Staff did not call as witnesses anyone who had been employed at ATI during the period of Q3-2000 or at any other time. The three witnesses that Staff did call were Jody Sikora, a Staff investigator, Keith Patterson, an expert on the income tax implications that flowed from donations of shares to charities and Konstantino Papageorgiou, a market analyst who at the relevant time followed technology stocks, including ATI.
18. Mr. Sikora, during the course of his investigation, with the assistance of an order issued under section 11 of the Act, obtained documents from ATI and other sources. Those documents included e-mails sent to and by senior sales and other executives of ATI. K.Y. Ho was a recipient of many of these e-mails and also authored some of them.
19. Staff introduced into evidence through Mr. Sikora several large books of these documents. Objection was taken by the Respondents' counsel to the admissibility of many of these documents on the basis that they were hearsay evidence and that the authors of the documents could have and should have been called by Staff.
20. Staff relied on subsection 15(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedures Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 22, (as amended) (the "SPPA") as the basis for permitting the introduction of this hearsay evidence. It provides:
15(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), a tribunal may admit as evidence at a hearing, whether or not given or proven under oath or affirmation or admissible as evidence in a court,
(a) any oral testimony; and
(b) any document or other thing,
relevant to the subject-matter of the proceeding and may act on such evidence, but the tribunal may exclude anything unduly repetitious.
21. There are numerous rationales for permitting tribunals to accept hearsay evidence under this provision. Generally, those rationales focus on the fact that administrative tribunals are expected to be less formal and less contentious than court proceedings and, accordingly, the evidentiary requirements for admissibility may or should be less stringent.
22. Tribunals have a discretion under subsection 15(1) of the SPPA as to what evidence they will admit. In exercising that discretion, a tribunal must have regard to the complaint before it. The more serious and contentious the complaint, the more a tribunal in exercising its discretion under subsection 15(1) of the SPPA, must have regard to the rights of the person who is the subject of the complaint.
23. Insider trading is a serious violation of the Act. The mere allegation of insider trading can have significant adverse repercussions for a respondent. The finding of insider trading can have consequences that are even more severe.
24. The courts have determined that the discretion under subsection 15(1) of the SPPA must be exercised so as not to infringe the Rules of Natural Justice. In Lischka v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1982), 37 O.R. 2nd, 134 (Div. Ct.), Justice Galligan in giving the judgment of the court stated at page 135:
It is my opinion that the evidence of the police officer, albeit from a technical point of view hearsay and opinion, was admissible because of the provisions of s. 15(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedures Act , R.S.O. 1980, c. 484. I am not prepared to say that there could be no case in which admission of hearsay and opinion evidence could not amount to denial of natural justice even though its admission is authorized by s. 15. I do not think that this is one of those cases.
25. However, Re B and Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1987), 59 O.R. 2nd, 417 (Div. Ct.), was such a case. In that case, hearsay evidence had been admitted pursuant to subsection 15(1) of the SPPA. After referring to the above dictum, Craig J., stated at page 421:
It is our view that in the circumstances mentioned, where the appellant was denied the right to cross-examine the alleged victim, the admission of the hearsay evidence did amount to a denial of natural justice; the hearing in this case fell below the minimum requirement of fairness.
26. The concerns raised by the Respondents focus on this fundamental issue of fairness. While it is for Staff to determine the form and substance of the evidence it will present, it is incumbent upon the Panel to be satisfied that both the nature and the form of that evidence is such that a respondent has a fair hearing.
27. The Panel's ruling at the time was to admit the books of documents into evidence. However, it was indicated in the ruling that the ultimate weight to be given to the hearsay documents would involve considerations of both natural justice and reliability.
28. In considering the issue of reliability, regard must be had for the fact that many of the e-mails included in the books of documents are expressions of the opinions and concern of some ATI executives as to whether the Q3-2000 forecasts would be met.
29. Without the authors of those e-mails being called, the opinions or expressions of concern expressed in those e-mails could not be tested by cross-examination and it is not known what facts were or were not considered by them at the time the e-mails were sent. By reason thereof, in considering the ultimate reliability of such evidence, little weight can be given to those e-mails sent by persons who were not called as witnesses.
30. With that background, we will now turn to the specific issues.