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Saturday, May 28, 2005 9:48:42 AM
Good morning stockrocker...Hope you are hungry because I am going to give you and any others a lot to chew on!(LOL) Here goes,,,ENJOY
May 19, 2005 (FinancialWire) The group set to demonstrate in front of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission June 6 before heading to Capitol Hill and then to New York, may have a new target: Annette Nazareth, director of market regulation at the SEC, who, despite what some say is a Marie Antoinette attitude towards victims of industry lawbreakers, seems in line to be appointed to become a Commissioner.
Nazareth was quoted in February in the New York Times (NYSE:NYT) as “doubting” that threshold companies such as Overstock (NASDAQ: OSTK), Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia (NYSE: MSO) or Novastar Financial (NYSE: NFI) were being “manipulated,” and that victims of illegal naked short sales are simply people who want their “stocks to go up.”
She said those who complain of their losses to illegal trading activity have an attitude that “it’s a criminal conspiracy when stocks move the wrong way, and the government should do something about it.”
“What is criminal,” said one who believes Nazareth’s appointment, so far championed by U.S. Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Harry Reid (D-NV), would be disastrous for small investors who someday expect justice and a fair playing field in the markets, “is that someone could be in a position of authority at all with this kind of anti-investor attitude.”
National Counterfeit Conspiracy Days are scheduled in Washington, DC on June 6, and in New York City June 7 by a group planning a film to highlight the national financial scandal known as StockGate. Its website is http://www.counterfeitconspiracy.com
The film project, said to be a “Michael Moore”-type docudrama, is planned by Fuego Entertainment of Miami.
The group is organizing the citizen lobbying effort June 6, beginning at 11:30 a.m., in front of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission building, followed by lobbying on Capitol Hill.
“After we make our United Voice heard on Capitol Hill, we are headed to New York City by busloads to make that same voice known to all the world from the hub of the financial district where cameras from all over the world have a constant eye on what’s happening,” the organizers stated.
“Our busses will depart Washington D.C. on June 7th at 7:30am to head to NYC. We will be protesting on Times Square at 2 p.m. After an afternoon on Times Square we will head back to D.C.”
In other recent StockGate developments, Senator Richard Durbin has joined Senator Robert Bennett in complaining about the ineffectiveness of Regulation SHO, and a Global Links (OTC: GLKC) shareholder, Dennis Smith, was told in an email by Wells Fargo (NYSE: WFC) that it can not provide delivery of Global Links certificates because it and E*Trade Group (NYSE: ET) are hopelessly short. And the individual who started the controversy, Robert Simpson, has said he has also been unable to get delivery from Oppenheimer Holdings (NYSE: OPY).
In his communication to SEC Chair William Donaldson, Sen. Durbin also contested the claim by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., a unit ot the New York Stock Exchange and NASD, that it has no responsibilities under Regulation SHO.
Overshadowing all of this, of course, is the admitted tampering with the media by the DTCC in curtailing distribution of FinancialWire via Yahoo (NASDAQ: YHOO) via Investors Business Daily and the Dow Jones (NYSE: DJ) MarketWatch, and its suspected interference in the mysterious “postponement” of a DTCC expose on General Electric’s (NYSE: GE) Dateline NBC.
Senator Durbin’s letter to Donaldson appears to sharply contest the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp.’s contention that it has no role in Regulation SHO.
“I am writing to request information regarding the June 23, 2004 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) short sale regulation, designated Regulation SHO. On March 9, 2005, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a hearing on Regulation SHO, in which Chairman Bennett spoke with you about the regulation’s effects on the illegal practice of naked short selling. I thank you for your testimony and I hope that you can follow up on some of my concerns not fully addressed by the Banking Committee hearings.
“I appreciate the efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to control abusive short selling practices. As a result of Regulation SHO, the names of firms with large amounts of unsettled shares are published on the Threshold Security List daily. This list assists individual investors in making informed decisions about potential manipulation of the market, and gives regulators and investigators a centralized list of firms with significant numbers of undelivered shares. However, it has come to my attention that Regulation SHO may not be curtailing abusive naked short selling practices.
“Several of my constituents have contacted me since the SEC introduces Regulation SHO. They have raised concerns about potential loopholes in settlement regulations. During your recent testimony before the Banking Committee, Chairman Bennett asked you about the ability of brokerage houses to shuttle unsettled shares every 13 days in order to avoid settling the borrowed shorted shares. Due to time constraints at the hearing, the committee did not receive a complete answer. This issue is worthy of a full response.
“Additionally, my constituents have expressed concern about SEC enforcement of Regulation SHO. While the Threshold Security List publicizes securities that might have been manipulated, I am concerned that some securities repeatedly appear on the list. What steps is the SEC taking to investigate trading practices that result in vast quantities of unsettled shares, and to punish those people who violate SEC naked short selling regulations? What is the SEC doing to ensure that the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) is complying with Regulation SHO, and what actions does the SEC undertake when the DTCC identifies large quantities of shares that have not been delivered?
“It is important that the SEC identify abuses and prevent manipulative naked short selling practices that undermine faith in the market. Thank you for your attention to this matter. I look forward to your timely response,” Senator Durbin concluded.
Wells Fargo had written to Smith:
“The other broker/dealer who is short shares of your security is E*Trade. Though this type of activity makes it difficult to issue physical certificates, it is legal and within regulations.
“There is no definite date by which E*Trade would have to purchase the shares. In many cases, a broker/dealer will sell shares they don't hold hoping that the price will fall. If it does fall, the broker/dealer will buy the shares at that time, and deliver those newly acquired shares, making a profit. If the stock price continues to rise, the broker/dealer will eventually buy the shares and deliver them to prevent any additional losses.
“According to our trading desk, E*Trade was the only broker/dealer offering shares of GLKC yesterday. This has been the case since you originally requested your certificate. Anybody who has purchased this security in that time period has likely purchased the shares from E*Trade.
“You are free to sell the shares anytime. When E*Trade acquires shares, they would be delivered to the current owner. However, a certificate cannot be issued until the shares are actually received.
Pink Sheets head Cromwell Coulson has asked the SEC to publish short positions on all over the counter and bulletin board stocks, and that request is currently in a comment period.
The request for rulemaking, which Coulson has told companies traded on the Pink Sheets, is needed “to make regulators turn on the lights and protect investors from the menance of hidden short selling in the OTC market,” is at http://sec.gov/rules/petitions.shtml
In an email to Donaldson, Coulson had said “I believe that it is very important to require the disclosure of short positions because the lack of transparency is allowing promoters to defraud investors by blaming all selling on naked market maker short selling. Disclosure and transparency can easily remedy the issue.”
In other news on the naked short-selling front known as “StockGate,” adding to what TheStreet.com founder James Cramer calls the “Hedge Fund Relief Act,” the termination of the Uptick Rule, is the fact that those using illegal naked short selling in the past have been granted a kind of amnesty for acts before the first of 2005. The SEC just “grandfathered” those illegally-begotten gains and resultant counterfeit shares into the system, so these windfall gains are now available to downtick with reckless abandon on downticks.
The “grandfathering” admission is at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm
In the same document, the SEC has inexplicably stated that not all forms of illegal naked short selling, the equivalent of counterfeiting shares in public companies, are actually “illegal.”
The DTCC actions in the StockGate mire are the most serious, if not notorious since the agent of two SROs, the New York Stock Exchange and NASD is also peopled by some 21 directors whose companies, such as Merrill Lynch & Co. (NYSE: MER), State Street Corporation (NYSE: STT) and Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS), are unlikely to support the DTCC in what attorney Marshal Shichtman, Esq., has termed “strong-arm” tactics.
The DTCC has admitted it has engaged in an act of censorship of this newsletter in squelching its redistribution by Investors Business Daily, and via Investors Business Daily, to Yahoo Finance, a portal owned by Yahoo! (NASDAQ: YHOO), and it is a suspect in the sudden and so far unexplained “postponement” of a widely anticipated expose by Dateline NBC.
In a wide-ranging letter to the DTCC, Robert J. Shapiro has charged statements made by Larry Thompson, DTCC Deputy General Counsel, were “inaccurate or misleading,” and asked the DTCC to correct the record and respond to his comments and questions.
Shapiro is chair of Sonecon LLC, a private economic advisory firm in Washington, D.C., who served as U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs from 1998 to 2001, Vice President and co-founder of the Progressive Policy Institute from 1989 to 1998, and principal economic advisor to Governor William J. Clinton in the 1991-1992 presidential campaign.
He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and has been a Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, and the Brookings Institution.
Shapiro currently provides economic analysis to the law firms of O’Quinn, Laminack and Pirtle, Christian, Smith and Jewell, and Heard, Robins, Cloud, Lubel and Greenwood, on issues associated with naked short sales, which he noted includes “matters raised in an interview published by @DTCC with DTCC deputy general counsel Larry Thompson.”
He asserts the following in his letter:
Thompson begins by asserting that “the extent to which [naked short selling] occurs is in dispute.” While this statement may be narrowly correct, objective academic analysis has established that naked short selling has been a widespread practice and one which, when allowed to persist, can pose a threat to the integrity of equity markets. A recent study by Dr. Leslie Boni, then a visiting financial economist at the SEC, analyzed NSCC data and found that on three random days, an average of more than 700 listed stocks had failures-to-deliver of 60 million-to-120 million shares sold short – naked shorts – that had persisted for at least two months. In addition, over 800 unlisted stocks on any day had fails of 120 million-to-180 million shares sold short that also had persisted for at least two months. The total number of naked shorts, including those that had persisted for less than two months, was presumably considerably greater.
Regarding the extent of naked shorts, Thompson has provided closely-related additional information: “fails to deliver and receive amount to about $6 billion daily…including both new fails and aged fails.” Thompson minimizes this total by comparing it to “just under $400 billion in trades (emphasis added) processed daily by NSCC, or about 1.5% of the dollar volume.” By most people’s standards, a problem involving hundreds of millions of shares valued at $6 billion every day is a very large problem. Moreover, the $6 billion total substantially underestimates the actual value of all failed-to-deliver trades measured when the trades actually occurred. Most of the $6 billion total represents uncovered or naked short sales, many of which have gone undelivered for weeks or months with their market price being marked-to-market every day. As a stock’s price falls, the market price of naked shorts in that stock also declines, reducing the total value of the outstanding failures-to-deliver cited by Thompson.
In other respects, Thompson’s comparison to the “$400 billion in trades processed daily by NSCC” seems disingenuous and misleading, because that $400 billion total covers not only U.S. equity trades which can involve most of the failures-to-deliver at issue, but many other transactions also processed by the NSCC. The value of all equity transactions on U.S. markets in 2004, for example, averaged $82.3 billion/day. If Thompson is correct that the daily value of fails-to-deliver averages $6 billion, that total is equivalent to 7.2 percent of average daily equity trades or nearly five times the 1.5 percent level suggested by Thompson. Furthermore, the DTCC reports on its website that on a peak day, “through its Continuous Net Settlement (CNS) system, NSCC eliminated the need to settle 96 percent of total obligations.” Assuming that CNS nets out the same proportion of trades on other days, $384 billion of the $400 billion in daily trades cited by Thompson are netted out, leaving only $16 billion in daily trades that require the actual delivery of securities. The $6 billion of fails-to-deliver securities existing on any day are equivalent to 37.5 percent of the average daily trades that require the delivery of securities, or 25 times the 1.5 percent level cited by Thompson.
Thompson tries to explain the large numbers of shares that go undelivered – in most cases arising from naked short sales -- by citing problems with paper certificates, inevitable human error, and the legitimate operations of market makers. This also seems misleading or disingenuous. Regarding problems with paper certificates, the DTCC estimates that 97 percent of all stock certificates are now kept in electronic form. Nor can human error or legitimate market-making operations explain the high levels of failures-to-deliver that persist for months – on any day, an average of 180 million-to-300 million shares have gone undelivered for two months or longer – as documented by Dr. Boni’s analysis of NSCC data.
Thompson also disparages the attorneys who represent companies that have been damaged or destroyed by massive naked short sales, and their shareholders, by claiming falsely that the cases in this matter have almost all been dismissed or withdrawn. The legal firms that I advise -- O’Quinn, Petrie and Laminack; Christian, Smith and Jewell; and Heard, Robins, Cloud, Lubel and Greenwood – have not lost any motions against the DTCC or its affiliates and currently have one case against the DTCC pending in Nevada and another case against the DTCC pending in Arkansas. In addition, on February 24, 2005, these attorneys were granted an order by the New York Supreme Court ordering the DTCC to produce trading records involving two companies they represent, including records from the Stock Borrow program, which may establish whether large-scale naked short sales were used to manipulate and drive down the stock price of those two companies.
Thompson also asserts that the plaintiffs suing the DTCC for damages associated with the handling of naked short sales rely on “theories [that] are not an accurate reflection of how the capital market system actually works.” This assertion is inaccurate. There is no dispute about how the capital markets work -- nor any doubt that naked short sales have been used to manipulate and drive down the price of stocks, as seen in numerous death-spiral financing cases. The issue here is the DTCC’s role in allowing or facilitating such stock manipulation through its treatment of extended naked short sales.
In explaining the DTCC’s role in these matters, Thompson rejects the claim that the NSCC’s Stock Borrow program allows the same shares to be lent over and over again, potentially creating more shares than actually exist or “phantom” shares. By Thompson’s own account, shares borrowed by the NSCC to settle naked short sales are deducted from the lending member’s DTC account and credited to the DTC account of the member to whom the shares have been sold. Therefore, those same shares become available to be re-borrowed to settle another naked short sale and, if that happens, to be re-borrowed again and again to settle a succession of naked short sales. Throughout this process, the actual short sellers may continue to fail-to-deliver the shares to cover their shorts and, as Dr. Boni’s analysis of NSCC data found, the underlying failure can age for months or even years. The process which Thompson describes is one in which shares can be borrowed and lent over and over again, introducing more shares into the market than are legally registered and issued. If any ambiguity remains, Thompson can clarify it by responding to the following query: Once a share that has been borrowed through the NSCC Stock Borrow program is delivered to the purchaser, is that share restricted in any way so it cannot be lent again?
It is important to note that the Stock Borrow program is used when continuous net settlement cannot locate the shares to settle. As a consequence, Stock Borrow is usually called into play when there are relatively few shares available for borrowing. These are propitious conditions for market manipulation: Unscrupulous short sellers undertake large-scale naked short sales involving stocks for which few shares are available for trading and lending, relying on the Stock Borrow program to borrow the limited available shares, again and again, at sufficient levels to drive down the market price of the shares.
Thompson notes that of approximately $6 billion in outstanding failures-to-deliver existing on any day, “the Stock Borrow program is able to resolve about $1.1 billion … or about 20% [18 percent] of the total fail obligation.” In this statement, Thompson raises very serious questions about the integrity and operations of the NSCC and DTCC, which he can clarify by responding to the following queries: If the Stock Borrow program “resolves” only 18 percent of total fails, what is the disposition of the remaining 82 percent of outstanding fails? When failures-to-deliver occur that are not resolved through Stock Borrow, does the NSCC credit the undelivered shares to the member representing the buyer, creating genuine “phantom shares”? Finally, how many shares do the borrowing brokers, clearing firms and other participants in the Stock Borrow program owe the NSCC on a typical day, and what is their total value?
In a related matter, Thompson tries to distance the DTCC from charges that shares held in restricted accounts – for example, cash accounts, retirement accounts and many institutional accounts – are improperly lent through the Stock Borrow program by claiming that responsibility for segregating restricted shares from lendable shares falls to the “broker and bank members” of the DTCC, while responsibility for monitoring or regulating their performance in this matter falls to the stock exchanges and the SEC. As a trust company, the DTCC cannot hold that it has no role, duty or responsibility to ensure the probity of its operations. Thompson could address this issue by responding to the following queries: What procedures does the NSCC have to ensure that shares held in members’ accounts for possible loan through the NSCC Stock Borrow program are unencumbered by regulatory or legal restrictions from being pledged or assigned and eligible to be borrowed? On any given day, how many participants in the Stock Borrow program have lent shares that exceed their lendable shares, in what numbers and of what value?
Thompson also tries to distance the DTCC as far as possible from the naked short selling that generates most of the extended failures-to-deliver: “We don’t have any power or legal authority to regulate or stop short selling, naked or otherwise. We also have no power to force member firms to close out or resolve fails to deliver … we don’t even see whether a sale is short or not.” In fact, the DTCC chooses to not distinguish short sales from long sales, chooses to not regulate or stop extended naked short sales, and chooses to not force member firms to resolve protracted naked short sales.
First, Regulation SHO requires that all transactions be clearly marked short or long. If the DTCC and NSCC do not know whether sales are short or long as Thompson contends, they choose to not know. Second, the NSCC has a clear responsibility and adequate means to stop naked short sales of extended duration, with no legal barrier that would prevent them from so doing. As a trust company with an acknowledged duty to provide investors certainty in the settlement and clearance of equity transactions, the DTCC chose to carry out that duty by assuming the role of counterparty to both sides of every equity transaction, through the operations of the NSCC’s CNS system and the Stock Borrow program. By allowing short sellers to fail-to-deliver shares for months or even years, the NSCC clearly fails to provide certainty in settlement to the buyers, sellers and issuers of securities. Since it is widely known that extended naked short sales have been used to manipulate stock prices in cases of death-spiral financing, and the NSCC created the Stock Borrow program to address failures-to-deliver that prominently include naked short sales, the NSCC and DTCC share a responsibility with the SEC and the stock exchanges to protect investors by resolving extended fails.
Third, the DTCC and NSCC have the clear capacity to force member firms to resolve the extended failures-to-deliver of their customers by purchasing shares on the open market and deducting the cost from the member’s account. A 2003 study by Dr. Richard Evans and others provides evidence that forced buy-ins by any party occur very rarely. They found that a major options market maker who failed to deliver all or a portion of shares sold in 69,063 transactions in 1998-1999 was bought-in only 86 times or barely one-tenth of 1 percent of the fails. Thompson can clarify investors’ understanding of their operations by responding to the following query: What proportion of shares that are persistent fails-to-deliver, of one month or longer, are ever bought in?
Thompson acknowledges that the DTCC and NSCC know precisely how many failures-to-deliver exist for each stock and the precise duration of each of these fails. Yet, the DTCC refuses to disclose this information even to the issuer of the stock in question, which Thompson justifies by citing “NSCC rules” prohibiting such a release of data based on “the obvious reason that the trading data we receive could be used to manipulate the market, as well as reveal trading patterns of individual firms.” This response is both disingenuous and revealing. We know now, for the first time, that the DTCC has full knowledge of the extent of protracted, large-scale naked short sales in all particular cases. We also know now that the DTCC has had this information for at least a decade, since Thompson also notes that “fails, as a percentage of total trading, hasn’t changed in the last 10 years.” Yet, based on the DTCC’s own rules, it allowed these abuses to persist and fester. The DTCC and NSCC can change their rules at any time. Moreover, in this case, those rules are unjustified. Data documenting outstanding short sales in each stock are currently issued publicly, so further data on how many of those short sales are naked would not reveal additional information about the trading patterns of individual firms or in any way empower manipulators. In fact, the DTCC could substantially disarm manipulators by both publicly reporting naked short sales in each issue and pledging to force buy-ins of all naked short sales that persist for more than a limited period.
Surely, if large-scale, extended naked short sales have effectively created “phantom” shares, companies have a responsibility to their shareholders and the right to secure this information from the organization which manages the settlement of short sales. At a minimum, the DTCC should respond to requests by issuers for data on extended failures-to-deliver in their own stocks, both in the past and currently, so they can take steps to resist stock manipulators or bring them to account for past manipulation.
Thompson also claims that the DTCC did not create or manage the Stock Borrow program to serve its own financial interest, insisting that the service generates less than $2 million a year in direct fees to the DTCC and that all DTCC services are priced on a “not for profit” basis that seeks to match revenues with expenses. Without further information, these responses beg the question of whose private financial interest has been served by the Stock Borrow program, especially as the DTCC is owned by the stock markets, clearinghouses, brokerage and banking institutions that use its services. Thompson and the DTCC can clarify this serious matter by responding to the following queries: Do DTCC participant/owners receive interest or other payments through or from the Stock Borrow program for lending the shares of their customers and, if so, how much have they received for these activities over the last 10 years? Further, do DTCC participant/owners receive any dividend, interest or other payments or distributions from the DTCC or its subsidiaries?, Shapiro concluded.
In a recent editorial, Investrend Information head Gayle Essary questioned whether the board and principal shareholders would “be party to shenanigans that lead to the censorship or disabling of any media” that he says is “un-American activity.”
The DTCC’s letter to Investrend’s counsel, Marshal Shichtman, Esq., is posted at http://www.investrend.com/Admin/Topics/Articles/Resources/349_1113403487.pdf
Essary said that the arrogance the DTCC expressed in its censorship efforts shows that the entity has “become too large, too encompassing, too powerful, too unresponsive to those it serves, primarily the investing public, and too unresponsive to the Congress under whose auspices it should be operating.
“First, it is time to unconflict it, with real public representations on its board,” he said, and second, “it is time to break it up, with its various duties provided by smaller agencies under separate unconflicted boards.”
DTCC board members include Michael C. Bodson, Managing Director, Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MWD); Gary Bullock, Global Head of Logistics, Infrastructure, UBS Investment Bank (NYSE: UBS); Stephen P. Casper, Managing Director and Chief Operating Officer, Fischer Francis Trees & Watts, Inc.; Jill M. Considine,Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer, The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC);
Also, Paul F. Costello, President, Business Services Group, Wachovia Securities (NYSE: WB); John W. Cummings, Senior Vice President & Head of Global Technology & Services, Merrill Lynch & Co. (NYSE: MER); Donald F. Donahue, Chief Operating Officer, The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC); Norman Eaker, General Partner, Edward Jones; George Hrabovsky, President, Alliance Global Investors Service; Catherine R. Kinney, President and Co-Chief Operating Officer, New York Stock Exchange; Thomas J. McCrossan, Executive Vice President, State Street Corporation (NYSE: STT); Bradley Abelow, Managing Director, Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS); Jonathan E. Beyman, Chief Information Officer, Lehman Brothers (NYSE: LEH); and Frank J. Bisignano, Chief Administrative Officer and Senior Executive Vice President, Citigroup / Solomon Smith Barney's Corporate Investment Bank (NYSE: C), Eileen K. Murray, Managing Director, Credit Suisse First Boston (NYSE: CSR); James P. Palermo, Vice Chairman, Mellon Financial Corporation (NYSE: MEL); Thomas J. Perna, Senior Executive Vice President, Financial Companies Services Sector of The Bank of New York (NYSE: BNY); Ronald Purpora, Chief Executive Officer, Garban LLC; Douglas Shulman, President, Regulatory Services and Operations, NASD; and Thompson M. Swayne, Executive Vice President, JPMorgan Chase (NYSE: JPM).
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May 19, 2005 (FinancialWire) The group set to demonstrate in front of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission June 6 before heading to Capitol Hill and then to New York, may have a new target: Annette Nazareth, director of market regulation at the SEC, who, despite what some say is a Marie Antoinette attitude towards victims of industry lawbreakers, seems in line to be appointed to become a Commissioner.
Nazareth was quoted in February in the New York Times (NYSE:NYT) as “doubting” that threshold companies such as Overstock (NASDAQ: OSTK), Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia (NYSE: MSO) or Novastar Financial (NYSE: NFI) were being “manipulated,” and that victims of illegal naked short sales are simply people who want their “stocks to go up.”
She said those who complain of their losses to illegal trading activity have an attitude that “it’s a criminal conspiracy when stocks move the wrong way, and the government should do something about it.”
“What is criminal,” said one who believes Nazareth’s appointment, so far championed by U.S. Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Harry Reid (D-NV), would be disastrous for small investors who someday expect justice and a fair playing field in the markets, “is that someone could be in a position of authority at all with this kind of anti-investor attitude.”
National Counterfeit Conspiracy Days are scheduled in Washington, DC on June 6, and in New York City June 7 by a group planning a film to highlight the national financial scandal known as StockGate. Its website is http://www.counterfeitconspiracy.com
The film project, said to be a “Michael Moore”-type docudrama, is planned by Fuego Entertainment of Miami.
The group is organizing the citizen lobbying effort June 6, beginning at 11:30 a.m., in front of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission building, followed by lobbying on Capitol Hill.
“After we make our United Voice heard on Capitol Hill, we are headed to New York City by busloads to make that same voice known to all the world from the hub of the financial district where cameras from all over the world have a constant eye on what’s happening,” the organizers stated.
“Our busses will depart Washington D.C. on June 7th at 7:30am to head to NYC. We will be protesting on Times Square at 2 p.m. After an afternoon on Times Square we will head back to D.C.”
In other recent StockGate developments, Senator Richard Durbin has joined Senator Robert Bennett in complaining about the ineffectiveness of Regulation SHO, and a Global Links (OTC: GLKC) shareholder, Dennis Smith, was told in an email by Wells Fargo (NYSE: WFC) that it can not provide delivery of Global Links certificates because it and E*Trade Group (NYSE: ET) are hopelessly short. And the individual who started the controversy, Robert Simpson, has said he has also been unable to get delivery from Oppenheimer Holdings (NYSE: OPY).
In his communication to SEC Chair William Donaldson, Sen. Durbin also contested the claim by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., a unit ot the New York Stock Exchange and NASD, that it has no responsibilities under Regulation SHO.
Overshadowing all of this, of course, is the admitted tampering with the media by the DTCC in curtailing distribution of FinancialWire via Yahoo (NASDAQ: YHOO) via Investors Business Daily and the Dow Jones (NYSE: DJ) MarketWatch, and its suspected interference in the mysterious “postponement” of a DTCC expose on General Electric’s (NYSE: GE) Dateline NBC.
Senator Durbin’s letter to Donaldson appears to sharply contest the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp.’s contention that it has no role in Regulation SHO.
“I am writing to request information regarding the June 23, 2004 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) short sale regulation, designated Regulation SHO. On March 9, 2005, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a hearing on Regulation SHO, in which Chairman Bennett spoke with you about the regulation’s effects on the illegal practice of naked short selling. I thank you for your testimony and I hope that you can follow up on some of my concerns not fully addressed by the Banking Committee hearings.
“I appreciate the efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to control abusive short selling practices. As a result of Regulation SHO, the names of firms with large amounts of unsettled shares are published on the Threshold Security List daily. This list assists individual investors in making informed decisions about potential manipulation of the market, and gives regulators and investigators a centralized list of firms with significant numbers of undelivered shares. However, it has come to my attention that Regulation SHO may not be curtailing abusive naked short selling practices.
“Several of my constituents have contacted me since the SEC introduces Regulation SHO. They have raised concerns about potential loopholes in settlement regulations. During your recent testimony before the Banking Committee, Chairman Bennett asked you about the ability of brokerage houses to shuttle unsettled shares every 13 days in order to avoid settling the borrowed shorted shares. Due to time constraints at the hearing, the committee did not receive a complete answer. This issue is worthy of a full response.
“Additionally, my constituents have expressed concern about SEC enforcement of Regulation SHO. While the Threshold Security List publicizes securities that might have been manipulated, I am concerned that some securities repeatedly appear on the list. What steps is the SEC taking to investigate trading practices that result in vast quantities of unsettled shares, and to punish those people who violate SEC naked short selling regulations? What is the SEC doing to ensure that the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) is complying with Regulation SHO, and what actions does the SEC undertake when the DTCC identifies large quantities of shares that have not been delivered?
“It is important that the SEC identify abuses and prevent manipulative naked short selling practices that undermine faith in the market. Thank you for your attention to this matter. I look forward to your timely response,” Senator Durbin concluded.
Wells Fargo had written to Smith:
“The other broker/dealer who is short shares of your security is E*Trade. Though this type of activity makes it difficult to issue physical certificates, it is legal and within regulations.
“There is no definite date by which E*Trade would have to purchase the shares. In many cases, a broker/dealer will sell shares they don't hold hoping that the price will fall. If it does fall, the broker/dealer will buy the shares at that time, and deliver those newly acquired shares, making a profit. If the stock price continues to rise, the broker/dealer will eventually buy the shares and deliver them to prevent any additional losses.
“According to our trading desk, E*Trade was the only broker/dealer offering shares of GLKC yesterday. This has been the case since you originally requested your certificate. Anybody who has purchased this security in that time period has likely purchased the shares from E*Trade.
“You are free to sell the shares anytime. When E*Trade acquires shares, they would be delivered to the current owner. However, a certificate cannot be issued until the shares are actually received.
Pink Sheets head Cromwell Coulson has asked the SEC to publish short positions on all over the counter and bulletin board stocks, and that request is currently in a comment period.
The request for rulemaking, which Coulson has told companies traded on the Pink Sheets, is needed “to make regulators turn on the lights and protect investors from the menance of hidden short selling in the OTC market,” is at http://sec.gov/rules/petitions.shtml
In an email to Donaldson, Coulson had said “I believe that it is very important to require the disclosure of short positions because the lack of transparency is allowing promoters to defraud investors by blaming all selling on naked market maker short selling. Disclosure and transparency can easily remedy the issue.”
In other news on the naked short-selling front known as “StockGate,” adding to what TheStreet.com founder James Cramer calls the “Hedge Fund Relief Act,” the termination of the Uptick Rule, is the fact that those using illegal naked short selling in the past have been granted a kind of amnesty for acts before the first of 2005. The SEC just “grandfathered” those illegally-begotten gains and resultant counterfeit shares into the system, so these windfall gains are now available to downtick with reckless abandon on downticks.
The “grandfathering” admission is at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm
In the same document, the SEC has inexplicably stated that not all forms of illegal naked short selling, the equivalent of counterfeiting shares in public companies, are actually “illegal.”
The DTCC actions in the StockGate mire are the most serious, if not notorious since the agent of two SROs, the New York Stock Exchange and NASD is also peopled by some 21 directors whose companies, such as Merrill Lynch & Co. (NYSE: MER), State Street Corporation (NYSE: STT) and Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS), are unlikely to support the DTCC in what attorney Marshal Shichtman, Esq., has termed “strong-arm” tactics.
The DTCC has admitted it has engaged in an act of censorship of this newsletter in squelching its redistribution by Investors Business Daily, and via Investors Business Daily, to Yahoo Finance, a portal owned by Yahoo! (NASDAQ: YHOO), and it is a suspect in the sudden and so far unexplained “postponement” of a widely anticipated expose by Dateline NBC.
In a wide-ranging letter to the DTCC, Robert J. Shapiro has charged statements made by Larry Thompson, DTCC Deputy General Counsel, were “inaccurate or misleading,” and asked the DTCC to correct the record and respond to his comments and questions.
Shapiro is chair of Sonecon LLC, a private economic advisory firm in Washington, D.C., who served as U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs from 1998 to 2001, Vice President and co-founder of the Progressive Policy Institute from 1989 to 1998, and principal economic advisor to Governor William J. Clinton in the 1991-1992 presidential campaign.
He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and has been a Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, and the Brookings Institution.
Shapiro currently provides economic analysis to the law firms of O’Quinn, Laminack and Pirtle, Christian, Smith and Jewell, and Heard, Robins, Cloud, Lubel and Greenwood, on issues associated with naked short sales, which he noted includes “matters raised in an interview published by @DTCC with DTCC deputy general counsel Larry Thompson.”
He asserts the following in his letter:
Thompson begins by asserting that “the extent to which [naked short selling] occurs is in dispute.” While this statement may be narrowly correct, objective academic analysis has established that naked short selling has been a widespread practice and one which, when allowed to persist, can pose a threat to the integrity of equity markets. A recent study by Dr. Leslie Boni, then a visiting financial economist at the SEC, analyzed NSCC data and found that on three random days, an average of more than 700 listed stocks had failures-to-deliver of 60 million-to-120 million shares sold short – naked shorts – that had persisted for at least two months. In addition, over 800 unlisted stocks on any day had fails of 120 million-to-180 million shares sold short that also had persisted for at least two months. The total number of naked shorts, including those that had persisted for less than two months, was presumably considerably greater.
Regarding the extent of naked shorts, Thompson has provided closely-related additional information: “fails to deliver and receive amount to about $6 billion daily…including both new fails and aged fails.” Thompson minimizes this total by comparing it to “just under $400 billion in trades (emphasis added) processed daily by NSCC, or about 1.5% of the dollar volume.” By most people’s standards, a problem involving hundreds of millions of shares valued at $6 billion every day is a very large problem. Moreover, the $6 billion total substantially underestimates the actual value of all failed-to-deliver trades measured when the trades actually occurred. Most of the $6 billion total represents uncovered or naked short sales, many of which have gone undelivered for weeks or months with their market price being marked-to-market every day. As a stock’s price falls, the market price of naked shorts in that stock also declines, reducing the total value of the outstanding failures-to-deliver cited by Thompson.
In other respects, Thompson’s comparison to the “$400 billion in trades processed daily by NSCC” seems disingenuous and misleading, because that $400 billion total covers not only U.S. equity trades which can involve most of the failures-to-deliver at issue, but many other transactions also processed by the NSCC. The value of all equity transactions on U.S. markets in 2004, for example, averaged $82.3 billion/day. If Thompson is correct that the daily value of fails-to-deliver averages $6 billion, that total is equivalent to 7.2 percent of average daily equity trades or nearly five times the 1.5 percent level suggested by Thompson. Furthermore, the DTCC reports on its website that on a peak day, “through its Continuous Net Settlement (CNS) system, NSCC eliminated the need to settle 96 percent of total obligations.” Assuming that CNS nets out the same proportion of trades on other days, $384 billion of the $400 billion in daily trades cited by Thompson are netted out, leaving only $16 billion in daily trades that require the actual delivery of securities. The $6 billion of fails-to-deliver securities existing on any day are equivalent to 37.5 percent of the average daily trades that require the delivery of securities, or 25 times the 1.5 percent level cited by Thompson.
Thompson tries to explain the large numbers of shares that go undelivered – in most cases arising from naked short sales -- by citing problems with paper certificates, inevitable human error, and the legitimate operations of market makers. This also seems misleading or disingenuous. Regarding problems with paper certificates, the DTCC estimates that 97 percent of all stock certificates are now kept in electronic form. Nor can human error or legitimate market-making operations explain the high levels of failures-to-deliver that persist for months – on any day, an average of 180 million-to-300 million shares have gone undelivered for two months or longer – as documented by Dr. Boni’s analysis of NSCC data.
Thompson also disparages the attorneys who represent companies that have been damaged or destroyed by massive naked short sales, and their shareholders, by claiming falsely that the cases in this matter have almost all been dismissed or withdrawn. The legal firms that I advise -- O’Quinn, Petrie and Laminack; Christian, Smith and Jewell; and Heard, Robins, Cloud, Lubel and Greenwood – have not lost any motions against the DTCC or its affiliates and currently have one case against the DTCC pending in Nevada and another case against the DTCC pending in Arkansas. In addition, on February 24, 2005, these attorneys were granted an order by the New York Supreme Court ordering the DTCC to produce trading records involving two companies they represent, including records from the Stock Borrow program, which may establish whether large-scale naked short sales were used to manipulate and drive down the stock price of those two companies.
Thompson also asserts that the plaintiffs suing the DTCC for damages associated with the handling of naked short sales rely on “theories [that] are not an accurate reflection of how the capital market system actually works.” This assertion is inaccurate. There is no dispute about how the capital markets work -- nor any doubt that naked short sales have been used to manipulate and drive down the price of stocks, as seen in numerous death-spiral financing cases. The issue here is the DTCC’s role in allowing or facilitating such stock manipulation through its treatment of extended naked short sales.
In explaining the DTCC’s role in these matters, Thompson rejects the claim that the NSCC’s Stock Borrow program allows the same shares to be lent over and over again, potentially creating more shares than actually exist or “phantom” shares. By Thompson’s own account, shares borrowed by the NSCC to settle naked short sales are deducted from the lending member’s DTC account and credited to the DTC account of the member to whom the shares have been sold. Therefore, those same shares become available to be re-borrowed to settle another naked short sale and, if that happens, to be re-borrowed again and again to settle a succession of naked short sales. Throughout this process, the actual short sellers may continue to fail-to-deliver the shares to cover their shorts and, as Dr. Boni’s analysis of NSCC data found, the underlying failure can age for months or even years. The process which Thompson describes is one in which shares can be borrowed and lent over and over again, introducing more shares into the market than are legally registered and issued. If any ambiguity remains, Thompson can clarify it by responding to the following query: Once a share that has been borrowed through the NSCC Stock Borrow program is delivered to the purchaser, is that share restricted in any way so it cannot be lent again?
It is important to note that the Stock Borrow program is used when continuous net settlement cannot locate the shares to settle. As a consequence, Stock Borrow is usually called into play when there are relatively few shares available for borrowing. These are propitious conditions for market manipulation: Unscrupulous short sellers undertake large-scale naked short sales involving stocks for which few shares are available for trading and lending, relying on the Stock Borrow program to borrow the limited available shares, again and again, at sufficient levels to drive down the market price of the shares.
Thompson notes that of approximately $6 billion in outstanding failures-to-deliver existing on any day, “the Stock Borrow program is able to resolve about $1.1 billion … or about 20% [18 percent] of the total fail obligation.” In this statement, Thompson raises very serious questions about the integrity and operations of the NSCC and DTCC, which he can clarify by responding to the following queries: If the Stock Borrow program “resolves” only 18 percent of total fails, what is the disposition of the remaining 82 percent of outstanding fails? When failures-to-deliver occur that are not resolved through Stock Borrow, does the NSCC credit the undelivered shares to the member representing the buyer, creating genuine “phantom shares”? Finally, how many shares do the borrowing brokers, clearing firms and other participants in the Stock Borrow program owe the NSCC on a typical day, and what is their total value?
In a related matter, Thompson tries to distance the DTCC from charges that shares held in restricted accounts – for example, cash accounts, retirement accounts and many institutional accounts – are improperly lent through the Stock Borrow program by claiming that responsibility for segregating restricted shares from lendable shares falls to the “broker and bank members” of the DTCC, while responsibility for monitoring or regulating their performance in this matter falls to the stock exchanges and the SEC. As a trust company, the DTCC cannot hold that it has no role, duty or responsibility to ensure the probity of its operations. Thompson could address this issue by responding to the following queries: What procedures does the NSCC have to ensure that shares held in members’ accounts for possible loan through the NSCC Stock Borrow program are unencumbered by regulatory or legal restrictions from being pledged or assigned and eligible to be borrowed? On any given day, how many participants in the Stock Borrow program have lent shares that exceed their lendable shares, in what numbers and of what value?
Thompson also tries to distance the DTCC as far as possible from the naked short selling that generates most of the extended failures-to-deliver: “We don’t have any power or legal authority to regulate or stop short selling, naked or otherwise. We also have no power to force member firms to close out or resolve fails to deliver … we don’t even see whether a sale is short or not.” In fact, the DTCC chooses to not distinguish short sales from long sales, chooses to not regulate or stop extended naked short sales, and chooses to not force member firms to resolve protracted naked short sales.
First, Regulation SHO requires that all transactions be clearly marked short or long. If the DTCC and NSCC do not know whether sales are short or long as Thompson contends, they choose to not know. Second, the NSCC has a clear responsibility and adequate means to stop naked short sales of extended duration, with no legal barrier that would prevent them from so doing. As a trust company with an acknowledged duty to provide investors certainty in the settlement and clearance of equity transactions, the DTCC chose to carry out that duty by assuming the role of counterparty to both sides of every equity transaction, through the operations of the NSCC’s CNS system and the Stock Borrow program. By allowing short sellers to fail-to-deliver shares for months or even years, the NSCC clearly fails to provide certainty in settlement to the buyers, sellers and issuers of securities. Since it is widely known that extended naked short sales have been used to manipulate stock prices in cases of death-spiral financing, and the NSCC created the Stock Borrow program to address failures-to-deliver that prominently include naked short sales, the NSCC and DTCC share a responsibility with the SEC and the stock exchanges to protect investors by resolving extended fails.
Third, the DTCC and NSCC have the clear capacity to force member firms to resolve the extended failures-to-deliver of their customers by purchasing shares on the open market and deducting the cost from the member’s account. A 2003 study by Dr. Richard Evans and others provides evidence that forced buy-ins by any party occur very rarely. They found that a major options market maker who failed to deliver all or a portion of shares sold in 69,063 transactions in 1998-1999 was bought-in only 86 times or barely one-tenth of 1 percent of the fails. Thompson can clarify investors’ understanding of their operations by responding to the following query: What proportion of shares that are persistent fails-to-deliver, of one month or longer, are ever bought in?
Thompson acknowledges that the DTCC and NSCC know precisely how many failures-to-deliver exist for each stock and the precise duration of each of these fails. Yet, the DTCC refuses to disclose this information even to the issuer of the stock in question, which Thompson justifies by citing “NSCC rules” prohibiting such a release of data based on “the obvious reason that the trading data we receive could be used to manipulate the market, as well as reveal trading patterns of individual firms.” This response is both disingenuous and revealing. We know now, for the first time, that the DTCC has full knowledge of the extent of protracted, large-scale naked short sales in all particular cases. We also know now that the DTCC has had this information for at least a decade, since Thompson also notes that “fails, as a percentage of total trading, hasn’t changed in the last 10 years.” Yet, based on the DTCC’s own rules, it allowed these abuses to persist and fester. The DTCC and NSCC can change their rules at any time. Moreover, in this case, those rules are unjustified. Data documenting outstanding short sales in each stock are currently issued publicly, so further data on how many of those short sales are naked would not reveal additional information about the trading patterns of individual firms or in any way empower manipulators. In fact, the DTCC could substantially disarm manipulators by both publicly reporting naked short sales in each issue and pledging to force buy-ins of all naked short sales that persist for more than a limited period.
Surely, if large-scale, extended naked short sales have effectively created “phantom” shares, companies have a responsibility to their shareholders and the right to secure this information from the organization which manages the settlement of short sales. At a minimum, the DTCC should respond to requests by issuers for data on extended failures-to-deliver in their own stocks, both in the past and currently, so they can take steps to resist stock manipulators or bring them to account for past manipulation.
Thompson also claims that the DTCC did not create or manage the Stock Borrow program to serve its own financial interest, insisting that the service generates less than $2 million a year in direct fees to the DTCC and that all DTCC services are priced on a “not for profit” basis that seeks to match revenues with expenses. Without further information, these responses beg the question of whose private financial interest has been served by the Stock Borrow program, especially as the DTCC is owned by the stock markets, clearinghouses, brokerage and banking institutions that use its services. Thompson and the DTCC can clarify this serious matter by responding to the following queries: Do DTCC participant/owners receive interest or other payments through or from the Stock Borrow program for lending the shares of their customers and, if so, how much have they received for these activities over the last 10 years? Further, do DTCC participant/owners receive any dividend, interest or other payments or distributions from the DTCC or its subsidiaries?, Shapiro concluded.
In a recent editorial, Investrend Information head Gayle Essary questioned whether the board and principal shareholders would “be party to shenanigans that lead to the censorship or disabling of any media” that he says is “un-American activity.”
The DTCC’s letter to Investrend’s counsel, Marshal Shichtman, Esq., is posted at http://www.investrend.com/Admin/Topics/Articles/Resources/349_1113403487.pdf
Essary said that the arrogance the DTCC expressed in its censorship efforts shows that the entity has “become too large, too encompassing, too powerful, too unresponsive to those it serves, primarily the investing public, and too unresponsive to the Congress under whose auspices it should be operating.
“First, it is time to unconflict it, with real public representations on its board,” he said, and second, “it is time to break it up, with its various duties provided by smaller agencies under separate unconflicted boards.”
DTCC board members include Michael C. Bodson, Managing Director, Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MWD); Gary Bullock, Global Head of Logistics, Infrastructure, UBS Investment Bank (NYSE: UBS); Stephen P. Casper, Managing Director and Chief Operating Officer, Fischer Francis Trees & Watts, Inc.; Jill M. Considine,Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer, The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC);
Also, Paul F. Costello, President, Business Services Group, Wachovia Securities (NYSE: WB); John W. Cummings, Senior Vice President & Head of Global Technology & Services, Merrill Lynch & Co. (NYSE: MER); Donald F. Donahue, Chief Operating Officer, The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC); Norman Eaker, General Partner, Edward Jones; George Hrabovsky, President, Alliance Global Investors Service; Catherine R. Kinney, President and Co-Chief Operating Officer, New York Stock Exchange; Thomas J. McCrossan, Executive Vice President, State Street Corporation (NYSE: STT); Bradley Abelow, Managing Director, Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS); Jonathan E. Beyman, Chief Information Officer, Lehman Brothers (NYSE: LEH); and Frank J. Bisignano, Chief Administrative Officer and Senior Executive Vice President, Citigroup / Solomon Smith Barney's Corporate Investment Bank (NYSE: C), Eileen K. Murray, Managing Director, Credit Suisse First Boston (NYSE: CSR); James P. Palermo, Vice Chairman, Mellon Financial Corporation (NYSE: MEL); Thomas J. Perna, Senior Executive Vice President, Financial Companies Services Sector of The Bank of New York (NYSE: BNY); Ronald Purpora, Chief Executive Officer, Garban LLC; Douglas Shulman, President, Regulatory Services and Operations, NASD; and Thompson M. Swayne, Executive Vice President, JPMorgan Chase (NYSE: JPM).
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