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Russian Losses In Georgia Said To Be Worse

Jul 10, 2009



David A. Fulghum/Washington

Douglas Barrie/London

New reports out of Russia contend that Russian forces lost eight or more aircraft - some of them to their own weapons -- during the war with Georgia last year, despite repeated official claims that only four were lost.

These shootdowns all occurred on Aug. 8, 2008 - the first day of the battle. Two Russian airmen were captured and exchanged. Another five (one by fratricide) were killed. Officially, Russia acknowledges losing only three Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft and a supersonic Tu-22M3 Backfire from the Black Sea Fleet.

But that is only about half of the actual losses, say editors of Moscow Defense Brief, published by the Center for Analysis of Strategy and Technology (CAST). Other losses they claim to have identified include an Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance aircraft, also on Aug. 8; an Su-25 on Aug. 9; an Su-24M Fencer frontal strike aircraft on Aug. 10 or 11; and possibly a Mi-24 attack helicopter on an unspecified date. Another three Su-25s were damaged but returned to base - indeed, pictures of the latter appeared on the Internet while the war was underway.

Russia's Interfax news agency and the British Broadcasting Corp. quoted deputy chief of the General Staff, Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, as saying Russia has already provided full disclosure of their losses during the conflict and has nothing new to add. He further denied "Russian air force planes were shot down by our own air defenses" or that there was a "total absence of co-operation between the Russian army and air force," which led to them conducting separate, uncoordinated campaigns.

Nevertheless, U.S. intelligence officials tell Aviation Week that while the Russian air force is believed to have advanced capabilities for detecting enemy air defenses and attacking them, they have largely failed to field and train with the capability. Soon after the conflict, former Russian air force commander Anatoly Kornukov blamed Russian intelligence for poor analysis of the Georgian air defenses, lamented a lack of effort to attack them, and said inappropriate aircraft, like the strategic Tu-22M, were used for a tactical mission.

The new CAST analysis credits the two Su-24 losses to Georgian shoulder-fired air defense missiles; the Su-25 to friendly fire from a similar Russian-wielded missile; and three Georgian Su-25s to other Russian man-portable missiles. Russian officials say their four recognized losses fell victim to relatively sophisticated, Buk-M1 (SA-11) surface-to-air missiles fielded by the Georgians. The Russians have fielded the Buk-M2 (SA-17) and are selling them to Syria. The Georgians were trained by Ukrainians who also may have supervised their use in combat, the Moscow analysts say.

The report further refers to a sale by Israel's Rafael missile company to Georgia of a Spyder short-range SAM that uses Israel's advanced Python 5 and Derby air-to-air missiles in a surface-to-air role, much as the U.S. exports ground-fired versions of its Aim-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile.

After their initial losses, the Russians regrouped and destroyed both of Georgia's S-125 Neva-M low-to-high altitude (SA-3) SAM battalions, most of the military and civilian radars, and the Buk-M1 and Osa-AK/AKM (SA-8B)low-altitude SAMs. After the Russian counterattack, air defenses were limited to shoulder-fired missiles (SA-7, SA-14 and SA-16). The Georgian radar network included the Ukrainian-supplied 36D6-M mobile, 3-D radar (which as been used with the S-300P, or SA-10 SAM, system), Kolchuga-M passive electronic monitoring radar system and Mandat electronic warfare (jamming) system. The network was connected to the NATO air situation data exchange through Turkey, which allowed Georgia to receive data directly from the unified air-defense system, the CAST analysis says.

A realistic analysis of the Russia/Georgia conflict "should serve as a stimulus for the cardinal modernization of the Russian armed forces [and impel] the Russian air force [to] devote greater attention to the suppression of enemy air defenses [and renew] tactics, electronic weapons and increased military training in these areas," the CAST analysis says.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/GEORG071009.xml&headline=Russian%20Losses%20In%20Georgia%20Said%20To%20Be%20Worse&channel=defense