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Fleets Turn to Small Ships for New Conflicts

Jun 30, 2009



By Paul McLeary

During a speech at the U.S. Naval War College in April, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates cited the value of developing a viable force of small warships that are better suited to face current threats in the littorals than vessels designed for blue-water operations.

“You don’t necessarily need a billion-dollar ship to chase down a bunch of teenaged pirates,” he told a group of Navy officers. “The size of the ship in such cases is less important than having Navy Seals on board. To carry out the missions we may face in the future—whether dealing with non-state actors at sea or near shore, or swarming speedboats—we will need numbers, speed and ability to operate in shallow waters.”

The Navy has been working on projects like the Global Fleet Station, a forward operating base at sea capable of surging military forces and humanitarian aid to shore. One example is the Africa Partnership Station, spearheaded by the USS Nashville (LPD-13), an Austin-class amphibious transport dock, which ran from February to May off the west coast of Africa. This is one of the ways the Navy is trying to meet the needs of what analysts and Pentagon leaders call an “era of persistent conflict.”

The need to build up littoral or brown-water assets is an idea that has been kicking around for several years, with many in the Pentagon and elsewhere recognizing the need for the Navy to operate close to shore for counterinsurgency, policing or humanitarian missions. This need is especially acute when considering an estimate by the United Nations Conference on Environment that about half the world’s population lives within 60 km. (37 mi.) of a shoreline, and “many of the world’s poor are crowded in coastal areas.”

The Global Fleet Stations, however, are built around existing vessels, most of which were designed for blue-water service and confronting large peer threats. To have a viable presence in the littorals, and to avoid using billion-dollar ships to chase down boatloads of pirates, police offshore oil platforms and train local coast guards, the Navy will have to look beyond its current fleet to new vessels that are better suited for such missions.

These include smaller, faster and less-expensive platforms like the Joint High-Speed Vessel, M80 Stiletto, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the amphibious San Antonio-class Landing Platform Dock (LPD). While most of these ships bear a resemblance to the larger blue-water vessels, they have a number of design features and capabilities that increase their effectiveness in littoral operations.

The USS Freedom LCS, for example, built by Lockheed Martin, is a 3,000-ton vessel with a semiplaning steel monohull, 12-ft. draft and top speed above 45 kt. It adapts to different operational needs by changing mission modules, containers with specialized electronics and equipment that provide a virtual plug-in capability for such operations as mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and surface warfare. The ship can also carry two SH-60 Seahawk helicopters and an MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV, and launch and recover manned and unmanned boats off the side and stern.

The Navy’s second LCS, the USS Independence, built by General Dynamics and slated for delivery this fall, is different in design, but shares the same ability to carry helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and, with a 14-ft. draft, bring operations close to shore.

In the Navy’s 2010 budget request, sent to Congress in May, the service called for three more LCS (Gates wants 55 of the ships), two Lewis and Clark-class T-AKE 1 auxiliary dry cargo ships (which are key for the frequent resupply smaller ships require) and one more Joint High-Speed Vessel.

But the big question is: How will these smaller ships be used once they hit the water in large numbers? Cdr. Henry J. Hendrix put forward one idea in the April issue of Proceedings magazine. He calls for the creation of “Influence Squadrons” composed of “an amphibious mother ship (an LPD-17 or cheaper commercial ship with similar capabilities), a destroyer to provide air, surface and subsurface defensive capabilities, an LCS to extend a squadron’s reach into the brown-water environment and provide some mine-warfare capabilities, a Joint High-Speed Vessel to increase lift [capabilities], a coastal patrol ship to operate close in and an M80 Stiletto to provide speed and versatility.”

Hendrix sees the need for 16 such squadrons to operate in the littorals of Africa, Asia and Latin America, training local coast guards, providing humanitarian assistance and spreading U.S. military influence. Naval analyst Raymond Pritchett is a proponent of the idea, which he says builds “layers of capabilities to do some nation-building along the coast . . . without having to establish a footprint on land.”

The investments, particularly when it comes to ships like the small, fast, stealthy M80 Stiletto, are minimal, and the idea would be to give many of these vessels away. The Stiletto, designed as an experimental craft for the Pentagon’s now-defunct Office of Force Transformation by M Ship Co. of San Diego (DTI November/December 2005, p. 14), is an 88-ft. vessel with twin M‑shaped hulls that improve speed (50-60 kt.) and minimize wave shocks. It has a 40-ft. beam and draft of only 3 ft. when fully loaded. The ship has seen action on drug-interdiction missions in South America, but the Navy has no plans to buy more.

The LCS is a great ship for UAVs, Pritchett says, “but I think the Navy is going to have to build something smaller,” something, he adds, that is about 600 tons and costs around $100 million, “basically a small gunfighter [that’s] not really built for major war activity.”

Many navies have, of course, been operating in the littorals. They have developed an array of platforms and technologies that work well in these waters. The Italian navy, for example, operates eight 1,300-ton Minerva-class corvettes and four 1,500-ton Cassiopea-class ships for coastal patrol. Each Cassiopea is powered by two diesel engines, has a top speed of 20 kt., crew of 60 and a combat management system, armament and sensor suite.

Italy recently built four 1,500-ton Bettica-class light frigates, which entered service in 2002. These have stealth design and a top speed of 25 kt. Italy adopted the basic design for the Sirio littoral patrol vessels from Fincantieri, which are similar to the Bettica-class ships but have a less-powerful propulsion system and top speed of 22 kt. The idea was to obtain as much commonality as possible from a single, flexible design to reduce operating, training and nonrecurring costs. The approach was well received in the international market: Sirio has been chosen by the Turkish navy in a buy of four ships that are under construction, while the Bettica class has been selected by the UAE for ASW corvettes.

The Italian navy is considering a new class of vessels to replace the Minerva and Cassiopea ships by around 2020. Concepts call for a 2,000-ton frigate with a combined diesel and diesel powerplant capable of 30 kt., and the ability to add weapons and sensors as needed. If plans come to fruition, they will yield a more modular and scalable design than other second-line combat vessels.

The Italian coast guard operates littoral patrol vessels, including the 350-ton Saettia class, capable of 25 kt. These ships have also done well in the international market, being selected by Malta (a 450-ton version) and the Iraqi navy (a 500-ton variant) for patrol missions in areas like the central Mediterranean and northern Persian Gulf. The vessels can also double as main navy ships.

Italy’s experience shows that the littoral ship is not restricted to a specific class, size or type.

One of the biggest issues about building a littoral force is the commensurate need for a new set of capabilities for operations to be safe, effective and connected with the firepower of the blue-water force. Since the ships will be close to shore, situational awareness is vital due to the threat from shore-based rockets. In 2006, for example, a subsonic C-802 antiship cruise missile fired by Hezbollah hit an Israeli corvette off Lebanon, killing four sailors. Weapons like the Chinese-made C-802, which delivers an explosive payload of up to 165 kg. (363 lb.) as far as 120 km. (75 mi.), along with the threats posed by swarming attacks from small, high-speed boats like those used by Iran, or suicide attacks, loom as major threats to a small, light force near shore.

To counter this, ships in the littorals will need an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance screen to detect fast-developing threats. The Israeli ship, for example, was reportedly operating without all of its electronic support measures activated.

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