Zeev's Turnips Talk Politics (ZTTP)

[hap0206]

ergo -- A report from Iraq -- doesn't look like a quagmire to me
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Monday, April 5, 2004 2:01 p.m. EDT

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U.S. Central Command Background Briefing
STAFF: Let me see if we're up. Are we up?

STAFF: Okay, sir. I think that you want to start with a few comments, and then we'll get right into the questions.

SR. CENTCOM OFFICIAL: You bet. This has been an interesting weekend. It's pretty calm right now over there. I just got off the phone with our Forward Operations Center -- fairly calm in all the areas that we're operating.

The obvious beginnings of this were earlier, or late last week when Fallujah kicked off. And sometimes in that whole business it's forgotten we lost five soldiers the same day we lost the contractors, about 21 kilometers north of Fallujah, to a mine on a -- I think an M- 113 -- but then the tragic events within Fallujah that made the news.

We are currently, as I think you know, conducting operations in and around Fallujah. I won't say we've locked the city down, but we've established a cordon around the city to monitor trafficking going in and out, and are beginning to conduct operations to go seek out those that committed which are tragic acts, not just as determined by the coalition and the U.S. folks that are over there, but by most Iraqis as well. That is not how Iraqis act, and that represented a very small portion of Fallujah, albeit Fallujah has been a pretty active town for some time now. It is a strong Saddam stronghold and has been since the beginning. And we will get that under control.

The events of the weekend surrounding Muqtada Sadr are concerning to us. They are Shi'a, and Sadr is a more or less minor cleric within the Shi'a religion. He has been more or less marginalized by most of the Shi'a community, and those that surround it, from both the Ayatollah in Lebanon as well as those that he seeks guidance and help from in Iran. But he does have a very strong following amongst a minor group, probably about 3,000 members of a militia force called the Mahdi Army, that he uses to protect himself and some of his other leaders, and then uses as he sees fit, whether it's establishing the Shiriah (ph) court or protecting a mosque from outside activities. Most of his following, I think, as far as those folks that are not involved with the Mahdi Army, come from those Shi'a members who recall with fondness and with reverence his family name, his father and others that have the Sadr name, at least two grand ayatollahs in the family, and he has a following that directly revolves around that.

This started in An Najaf with a large demonstration that got out of control. We don't think it was initially intended, at least by the demonstrators, to get out of control, but somewhere amidst the crowds that were out there, some snipers started firing at coalition members and it did get out of control.

Ultimately they went to our Joint Coordination Center that was established to work coordination between the police and the Civil Defense Corps and the coalition in preparation for the Arba'in activities that will be going on over the next week, and they also attacked a compound that housed the folks from the Spanish brigade there.

The El Salvador quick response team or force counterattacked, and we did lose one El Salvadoran during that effort. But they relieved the pressure on those facilities and ultimately -- I won't say brought calm, but ended the attacks there.

Sadr City in Baghdad was the location, as you know, for several police station takeovers, and we lost several soldiers -- actually, eight -- in retaking those in very violent attacks. And actually, they did a very good job of going back in and restoring some level of order after apparent Mahdi Army folks had gone in and taken over four of the police stations.

There were a number of other demonstrations around the country, in An Nasiriyah and a couple of other areas; but all told, probably the number of demonstrators and followers were less than about 10,000.

A great deal of violence, mostly committed by an outlaw militia group, the Mahdi Army, and directed by a cleric who, as we see it, is attempting to gain some power, which he has not had up to now, and to gain more influence as we run up to the turnover of sovereignty.

And I'll leave it with that and open the floor for any questions.

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040405-0580.html