Some more facts or fiction..as Pakistani press sees it..
So far apart, the two presidents — George W. Bush of the USA and Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, could not be as perilously close since September 11. Their sudden convergence at the crossroads of history is nothing less than a deus ex machina—hard to conceive and harder to contrive. That the head of the world's sole superpower would stoop to win over the head of a 'failed' state was beyond anybody's wildest dreams.
History, said St Augustine, is the unfolding of the Divine Will. How else could one explain the meltdown of the Twin Towers and the air invasion of the Pentagon? The shocking outrage, viewed in disbelief on TV the world over, paved the way to Bush-Musharraf detente and a US-Pak joint stand against the global threat from an invincible enemy. Osama bin Laden, supposed to be behind the catastrophe, remains, at best, the prime suspect.
After Osama, the other individual engaging Bush's personal attention is Musharraf. Osama as the 'prime suspect' and Musharraf as the prime pillar and mainstay of Bush's Operation Enduring Freedom: one the most wanted terrorist, the other easily the most eagerly sought-after leader in the global hunt for perpetrators of the appalling outrage.
It should be said to Musharraf's credit that considering the stunning magnitude of the happening, he did not hesitate for a moment to pledge his country's full cooperation to Bush.
No quid pro quo, no reward, even remotely mentioned, even if naturally expected. Musharraf's decision, duly endorsed by his senior commanders, was timely and mature. In his telecast on 13 September he urged all countries to join the common cause and 'concerted international effort' to fight terrorism "in all its forms". A loaded statement pitting him face-to-face with the jehadi elements in his own country. It had a wide enough margin of being misinterpreted as a reflection on the ongoing freedom struggle in Kashmir and a volte face, almost a betrayal of Taliban Afghanistan. Pakistan would be either for or against the Taliban, much as Bush insisted on leaving Pakistan little freedom to choose.
Pakistan struck a balance between the two mutually inimical choices as best as it could in circumstances of unparalleled gravity. It opted for siding with America without alienating the Taliban.
To his Pakistani critics, Musharraf's loud response was 'Pakistan comes first, and everything else afterwards.' He spoke of 'some religious scholars' as 'inclined to take emotional decisions' and reminded them of Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) hijrat from Makkah to Madina in the face of the challenge from the Kuffar (dissenters) of Makkah. That was strategy at the highest level, enabling the Muslims to garner their forces and conquer Makkah eight years later.
Even greater than the risk of incurring the wrath of the jehadis within Pakistan, were the 'designs of our neighbouring country' — India. Without hesitation, India offered 'all' their facilities, 'all' their bases and their logistical support to America gratuitously to upstage Pakistan. India's grand design was to have Pakistan declared a 'terrorist' state, put it on the wrong side of the US and thus harm its "strategic assets"...'
India might have been straining on to join forces with America against the Taliban to topple their government and have it replaced by an anti-Pakistan regime. Musharraf's two-word message to India was 'Lay off'. Pakistan Armed Forces and every Pakistani citizen, he said, was 'ready to offer any sacrifice in order to defend Pakistan and secure its strategic assets...' In practical terms, its conventional and nuclear-missile structures. Kahuta and the strategic structures around would almost certainly have been the target of a joint US-India invasion of Afghanistan.
In an extreme contingency like that, Pakistan could do no better than it did by unhesitatingly choosing to stay on the right side of the world community. It was practical politics and diplomacy, at its best, for the slightest hesitation on Pakistan's part would have given India its best chance to snatch the initiative and isolate Pakistan.
Pakistan's initiative earned it America's instant gratitude and appreciation. Both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell extended their personal thanks and compliments to President Musharraf. For the first time since 1989 in the aftermath of the American displeasure over Pakistan's refusal to roll back its nuclear programme, and the imposition of sanctions under the Pressler Law, no American president had expressed such cordiality and goodwill for his Pakistani counterpart. A most welcome development, even if against the gruesome background of the disaster that shook the world on 11 September.
President Bush's personal confidence, along with the Administration's, in President Musharraf's dramatic emergence as a strong and stable leader remained unshaken until about the last week of September. At that point, some re-thinking appeared to have crept into their earlier assessment and perception. On September 24, while talking to reporters at the White House, Bush said he had 'consulted' with America's allies to make sure that President Musharraf's government remained stable. He went on to add (and I quote): "We have also talked to our other friends about how to make sure that Musharraf's presidency is a stable presidency in that part of the world."
Now, who might be the 'other friends' and what might have been the provocation behind Bush's personal advice (consultation) to his allies to shore up Musharraf's government? The element of anxiety underlining Bush's observation is too obvious to miss. What might have happened, through the first fortnight after the horrific happenings in New York and Washington, to worry Bush and to make him express it in so many words before a group of Press reporters?
President Bush's remarks coincided (fortuitously, to be sure) with a statement of Ms Benazir Bhutto appearing in the Washington Post about the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Since I have not seen the text of Benazir's statement as yet, I choose to withhold my own comment on that. What would appear to have provoked President Bush to react to the talk of democratic restoration in Pakistan would be Musharraf's (Pakistan's) stability as his one preferred choice at this critical juncture.
Bush gave 'opposite vibes' in stressing the need for maintaining 'political stability' in Pakistan. "We are mindful," he went on to add that, "every action we could take has consequences," in an indirect reference to the growing protest by religious extremists.
Such demonstrations of the bearded crowds hitting the streets raising pro-Osama/Taliban and anti-American slogans could be looked at in more ways than one: as a wonderful photo opportunity for the young zealots seemingly forming the bulk of the protestors as much as the ventilation of real anger and fury within. See and interpret it as you will.
What is to be noted about the TV coverage, is that every such demonstration looks many times its size on the screen. Especially the angry faces of the young and old in close-up, appear incomparably more menacing than in real life. The CNN and BBC coverage of these events may well have overawed TV viewers in Europe and America with the street power of surging zealotry of the protestors to create certain doubts about the sustained stability of the Musharraf government. But that would be hardly reason enough for Bush openly to talk about the necessity of shoring up the Musharraf government in consultation with his allies and friends. There must be something deeper than meets his eye to shift the US focus from expressions of camaraderie to those of concern.
Iqbal Latif
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