Saturday, September 15, 2001 10:22:48 AM
Experts Weigh Risks of Air, Ground Campaigns in Afghanistan
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-091401defense.story
By PAUL RICHTER, Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON -- As the Bush administration began weighing strikes against terrorist havens in Afghanistan, defense officials and military experts said Thursday that major operations in the rugged terrain could require months of preparation and would probably entail U.S. casualties.
Because of a primitive infrastructure and the hostility of many Afghanis, a major ground campaign would require a lead time long enough to allow several divisions of troops and their supplies to reach the region, experts predicted. An assault by special operations forces would probably lead to some U.S. casualties because of the difficulty the units would face trying to wend their way across the rugged, heavily armed region, they said.
And an air campaign, though easier in several respects, would have marginal value unless the U.S. forces had the kind of timely intelligence that it has often lacked about Osama bin Laden, experts said.
One military officer, noting that Afghans had defeated powerful intruders for more than 1,000 years, said the country "may be the worst place on Earth to do one of these things."
Pentagon officials said that over the past several years they have drafted various plans for possible operations in Afghanistan because of their concerns about bin Laden and other terrorist groups in the country. And U.S. intelligence has some familiarity with the region because of the aid the U.S. government offered Afghan rebels in their fight against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
Yet they acknowledged that any effort would be hindered by a shortage of usable airfields, poor roads and faulty communications and utilities. Even the difficulty of local dialects will make it tougher for ground forces to make their way through the country.
Another major obstacle to a military campaign is America's poor relationship with most of Afghanistan's neighbors.
State Department officials, including Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, have spent long hours this week trying to convince the Pakistanis to cooperate with the new counter-terrorist effort. But though the Pakistanis have sought to appear cooperative, experts predicted that it would be difficult to persuade them to allow the United States to open any staging base in their country for a military effort in Afghanistan.
"I have to believe they would be very unenthusiastic" about permitting use of their territory as a base for a military strike, said Teresita Schaffer, a South Asia specialist and former U.S. ambassador, even though the Pakistanis are under strong pressure now to help the United States against terrorism.
Experts said they believed that the U.S. government's first choice would be to have Pakistan pressure the Taliban into forcing withdrawal of bin Laden's network from Afghanistan. If that effort were to fail, U.S. special forces could be sent to Afghanistan seeking to kill or capture bin Laden and other key figures in his network.
But experts said the long distances involved and rugged terrain would raise risks for the special forces and the helicopters that would carry them.
"You're taking chances with those long distances and possible maintenance problems," said retired Marine Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni, the last commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East. The capabilities of special forces units are better than they were in 1980, when President Carter's commando mission to rescue Iranian hostages failed. Yet, he added, "you face the same sort of circumstances."
Military experts said that if the Pentagon does not want to go with a small special forces unit to try to track down individual terrorists, the next best choice would be to go with a very large force, of perhaps several divisions. That is needed, they said, so that the troops would have all the force protection and logistic support needed in the difficult environment of Afghanistan.
"You can go small, or you can go big, but you don't want to have a force that's in-between," said retired Army Lt. Col. Ralph Peters. "You've got to support yourself and protect yourself."
But experts universally insisted that none of these approaches would make sense unless the United States is able to get intelligence-- possibly with the aid of allies-- that is accurate and timely.
When the U.S. forces struck Bin Laden's camps with cruise missiles in 1998, U.S. intelligence indicated he was there. But by the time the missiles were fired, bin Laden had moved on, adding to the impression that the strikes were a meaningless gesture.
"You don't want to use forces like this unless you've got very, very good intelligence," Zinni said.
:=) Gary Swancey
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-091401defense.story
By PAUL RICHTER, Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON -- As the Bush administration began weighing strikes against terrorist havens in Afghanistan, defense officials and military experts said Thursday that major operations in the rugged terrain could require months of preparation and would probably entail U.S. casualties.
Because of a primitive infrastructure and the hostility of many Afghanis, a major ground campaign would require a lead time long enough to allow several divisions of troops and their supplies to reach the region, experts predicted. An assault by special operations forces would probably lead to some U.S. casualties because of the difficulty the units would face trying to wend their way across the rugged, heavily armed region, they said.
And an air campaign, though easier in several respects, would have marginal value unless the U.S. forces had the kind of timely intelligence that it has often lacked about Osama bin Laden, experts said.
One military officer, noting that Afghans had defeated powerful intruders for more than 1,000 years, said the country "may be the worst place on Earth to do one of these things."
Pentagon officials said that over the past several years they have drafted various plans for possible operations in Afghanistan because of their concerns about bin Laden and other terrorist groups in the country. And U.S. intelligence has some familiarity with the region because of the aid the U.S. government offered Afghan rebels in their fight against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
Yet they acknowledged that any effort would be hindered by a shortage of usable airfields, poor roads and faulty communications and utilities. Even the difficulty of local dialects will make it tougher for ground forces to make their way through the country.
Another major obstacle to a military campaign is America's poor relationship with most of Afghanistan's neighbors.
State Department officials, including Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, have spent long hours this week trying to convince the Pakistanis to cooperate with the new counter-terrorist effort. But though the Pakistanis have sought to appear cooperative, experts predicted that it would be difficult to persuade them to allow the United States to open any staging base in their country for a military effort in Afghanistan.
"I have to believe they would be very unenthusiastic" about permitting use of their territory as a base for a military strike, said Teresita Schaffer, a South Asia specialist and former U.S. ambassador, even though the Pakistanis are under strong pressure now to help the United States against terrorism.
Experts said they believed that the U.S. government's first choice would be to have Pakistan pressure the Taliban into forcing withdrawal of bin Laden's network from Afghanistan. If that effort were to fail, U.S. special forces could be sent to Afghanistan seeking to kill or capture bin Laden and other key figures in his network.
But experts said the long distances involved and rugged terrain would raise risks for the special forces and the helicopters that would carry them.
"You're taking chances with those long distances and possible maintenance problems," said retired Marine Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni, the last commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East. The capabilities of special forces units are better than they were in 1980, when President Carter's commando mission to rescue Iranian hostages failed. Yet, he added, "you face the same sort of circumstances."
Military experts said that if the Pentagon does not want to go with a small special forces unit to try to track down individual terrorists, the next best choice would be to go with a very large force, of perhaps several divisions. That is needed, they said, so that the troops would have all the force protection and logistic support needed in the difficult environment of Afghanistan.
"You can go small, or you can go big, but you don't want to have a force that's in-between," said retired Army Lt. Col. Ralph Peters. "You've got to support yourself and protect yourself."
But experts universally insisted that none of these approaches would make sense unless the United States is able to get intelligence-- possibly with the aid of allies-- that is accurate and timely.
When the U.S. forces struck Bin Laden's camps with cruise missiles in 1998, U.S. intelligence indicated he was there. But by the time the missiles were fired, bin Laden had moved on, adding to the impression that the strikes were a meaningless gesture.
"You don't want to use forces like this unless you've got very, very good intelligence," Zinni said.
:=) Gary Swancey
:=) Gary Swancey
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