Oh man that was a mistake by me. I meant to reply to "toogood" because he was posting just about every 5 minutes yesterday spamming with untrue statements and directly to cotton. I got so tired of trying to explain why he was wrong in his accusations to be nice and help him understand the LBHI balance sheet and the LBIE and other subsidiaries rolled up into a consolidated LBHI balance sheet in Lehman's accounting practices as explained in the 2011 LBHI CH 11 336 page Examiner report. Repo 105 was covered in the accounting practices as well with specific examples of this and I did my best to be nice but then I had to delete his nonsense posts so much I just couldn't keep track of who I was trying to reply to and I mistakenly hit your post I see.
This is a misunderstanding and an error on my part. I took a mod position here because I've read just about the entire way LBHI and it's subsidiaries operated from the Examiner report to better understand how the bankruptcy is going to be playing out and it's very important to me to know these things. Long story short - there's a good chance LBHI had a LBI or LBSF asset transfered from their US book (likely a US Treasury bond/bonds as assets for collateral) to LBIE which due to the opinion they got by Linklaters legal firm in the UK was the only broker-dealer (the UK based subsidiary of LBHI) and those US assets were inter-company repo txn between the US books to the UK LBIE books with no record of liability in the books or fees charged. LBIE would then record the "Sale" of the US Treasury ($50B in a guess based on my reading) and buy it back from a counterparty such as UBS or Barclays as mentioned in the section on Repo 105 in the CH11 Examiner Report published in 2011. The report shows the legal reasons this txn is allowed to be a sale and LBIE gives up full control to the counterparty receiving cash which immediately goes to LBHI once it hits LBIE because LBIE books are rolled up into LBHI statements. For accounting purposes this is not a financing transaction (like a repo) but considered a true sale and LBHI would be able to get away with LBIE and thus LBHI's reports to not include a liability, just the "cash" asset. A period of 7-10 days later LBIE would buy the US Treasury back for the amount of cash with some assistance given by LBHI and the asset would return to LBHI's balance sheet immediately but also if coming from LBSF or LBI because the asset was US-based there would be another inter-company repo txn recorded between LBIE and the US-based LBSF or LBI, all the while none of this would change the balance sheet of LBHI which was being monitored more closely in mid-2007 thru 2008 until finally LBHI couldn't get these txn cleared by their US-based clearing houses because of disputes over the value of their other assets they started to mix into regular repo txns and a credit downgrade too in 2008 that made Citi and JPMorgan Chase call for more collateral in cash.
The part of being "off the books" was mentioned in a part that sometimes due to the time diff in NY and London, the Repo 105 "off the books" status of assets held by counterparty banks like UBS could mean the LBIE and it's electronic system for accounting for assets might not receive the asset transfer in time for it to hit LBIE's accounting by the time LBHI has to have the asset back on it's balance sheet to make up for the cash it paid out from LBIE and assistance from LBHI at 5% of the total value of the asset to have it transferred back into LBIE's books and control of LBHI. When they missed it could mean a hole in the balance sheet. When Sep 15 2008 came and 1 AM had LBHI filing CH 11 word broke to the UK and the LBIE and other subsidiaries that needed the operating cash from most likely Repo 105 being in transfer but not yet on the balance sheet and CH 11 freezing LBHI and it's subsidiaries operations, the UK govt forced the LBIE and UK subsidiaries into administration before London opened. Therefore there may very well be an off-the-books US AAA rated Govt Bond (Treasuries) worth >$50B out there which is like a cash equivalent it is extremely liquid and as soon as LBHI and LBIE are not still in CH 11 and administration states where they are not out as ongoing concerns and operating independently (able to receive the $50B US Govt Bond in thier system and immediately on LBHI balance sheet) these processes all do matter from the very fact the diff in time and the non-opening of London and then obviously LBHI in CH 11 means there's probably tens of billions out there, just not made it onto the balance sheet at LBHI for reasons of LBHI PT ongoing, LBIE v AGFP litigation ongoing and the nature of the consolidated balance sheet reporting as well as legal Repo 105 txns. It is not illegal, just innovative. I got off track in my apolgies. But I tried to explain all this to "toogood" and he continued to spam down everyone's posts and continue to accuse cotton of sharing LBIE and LBH PLC PwC UK quotations with the group as irrelevant because he doesn't look at the src's I gave, listen to the fact he is wrong and I lost track.
I spent all day trying to keep this forum clean and truthful. He really is adamant on being right even though he is spewing false statements at cotton and I won't let this place become inaccurate if someone is targeting a user who is within the scope of relevant info tied to the fate of these securities.
He won't stop.
I had a barrage of replies of his to delete and tried about everything to get him to stop being selfish and making it about him being right when he won't even read simple explanations after he won't read the sources and he doesn't seem to be here to appreciate the fact I am trying to help him understand the correct way to look at this all.
Again I am sorry I made you feel targeted with that - it was a tired and silly mistake I made and if it happens again I assure you it won't be on purpose. I did ignore him though so I can't even see his spam.
Mellon
