Lehman Brothers Financial SA (LEHNQ)

[real777mellon]

This is a great post. I agree with you too. So what I think we also need to factor in after I read the Examiner full 336 page report on Repo105 from 2011 (yes I went deep) - the fact Lehman was everyone's counterparty or rather a global intermediary with a lot of different trades in Agency MBS, Treasuries, and CMBS and had an illiquid asset problem since late 2007 into the CH 11 in Q3 2008 - a lot of disputes were already coming due to the fact Lehman was hiding their Repo 105 operation from it's quarterly LBHI filings although in a way that followed both Linklaters (a main major legal firm in London) that allowed the Repo 105 to run thru LBIE as a "sale" and not a true repo txn, The US not offering any opinion on if Repo 105 was allowed or not when they asked the FASB (i believe) and when doing this txn where "off the books" US-based assets were sold off the LBI books by moving them via transfer to LBIE (which is rolled up in LBHI reports and consolidated with all other Lehman subsidiaries) then LBIE would "sell" to a counterparty that would buy these illiquid assets (RMBS, CMBS, maybe CRE itself) that LB's didnt want to sell at a loss and for 7-10 days the counterparty would hold these assets with LBIE "buying" them back but also in the 7-10 period the cash LBHI got the instant LBIE sold these assets to counterparties - they would pay down liabilities and also not have any cash either on their asset side of the books. The report would then look like LBHI had reduced it's leverage on its balance sheet and then after 7-10 days and a report where the credit rating agencies looked at the deleveraging as a positive (so not downgrading their credit) - LBHI's books would take back on the assets that disappeared off the books, qualified as "true sale" under a SFAS 140 rule that the asset had to be investment grade - so perhaps only the Agency MBS and Treasuries would be off the books and thru the UK where linklaters gave the opinion to legalize thru LBIE broker dealer and also called this action a "sale" and not a repo - Lehman avoided credit ratings agency downgrades for a longer period than not especially after the Bear Stearns Companies being bailed out and given a sweet deal to JPMC - the balance sheets of Lehman began to be questioned as people couldn't figure out how they were reducing leverage on their balance sheet. They also used the FAS 157 mark to market FASB implimentation for valuing illiquid assets to "mark" their illiquid assets higher than their clearing houses/cp's for repo txns and daily operating money used for LBHI's LBIE LBIE and other global broker dealers dialy. I think that the solution is that some repo105 repurchase of assets either Agency MBS or UST in a value of $50B+ that was generally what repo105 was used to move off the books from the final hours in 2008 might be in between already being repurchased by LBIE from the counterparty and appearing on the books again at LBIE and thus consolidated into an LBHI report being somehow stucks since Sep 15 2008. Or not yet "cleared" by one of the repo105 UK clearing banks or even a US/EU bank. It's impossible to know. But I think that they didn't pay CDS specifically for AGFP when the situation turned to favor Lehman's (LBIE) 28 CDS agreements and bw $465-$5.7B there's something that is missing in Lehman's secretive and now publicly reported by the Examiner in 2011 (esp in repo105) that maybe solve how to value the illiquid CMBS, CRE, RMBS, and other assets that no one claimed they could value based on the market by the time Lehman was due to be paid by AGFP in 2009.

I know that's a lot I just wrote but I think surely there's a lot of public info, and a lot of legal procedures going on that will shape the entire future and not only recover our money for holding these 4 DST issued Trust PFD shares - but also for the fate of ISDA agreements. Right now, if the appeal wasn't filed for the first appeal upholding the subjective valuation done by AGFP and not via the ISDA 1992 swap agreement the two parties entered into in 2005 - then ANY CDS seller can use this case as precedent to reneg on the ISDA and just not pay a dime for a CDS buyer and premiums paid by the buyer and essentially just make CDS (derivatives contracts) a place where the seller of the insurance can just scam anyone in the end. We can't lose the case LBIE v AGFP because it would wreck the entire ISDA swaps agreement contracts between parties and also render it irrelevant bc if the seller of CDS was triggered to pay up in a market shift - they just can say well LBIE v AGFP upheld in favor of AGFP and their subjective non ISDA methodology to value the position and the payout to their CDS buyer and the CDS seller gets to keep the premiums you paid, owes you nothing, and wants $20 million from you.

That just cannot happen. Somethings going on here. It's fishy. But I think it ends well.

I think Repo105 ties into the fact that the AGFP dispute by LBIE is not finished yet but LBIE will win. Quinn Emmanuel is the most feared opposition firm by all legal firms in NYC for the 5th year straight. They claw and claw and win a lot. I am confident this is a planned process a drip drip drip

I read all of this, that money could be off the books for whatever reason due to the CH 11 and 2 UK administrations esp LBIE happeing just before CH 11 was filed early Monday Sep 15 2008 EST: https://www.jenner.com/a/web/obFa233r8auoB6xdtZXE7C/4k1Wwn/VOLUME%203.pdf