Tornado Alley (PROG)

[livefree_ordie]

Here are a few I was able to find in 10 minutes but I am sure if I worked at it there would be much more out there. Just wanted to show you that money does exist going to these nations from our Country. You folks must all live under rocks or something to not know any of this goes on, makes me wonder about your credibility too as you deem me not credible. Seems a tad ironic. I would actually say the opposite what have any of these Countries out of the 100 plus where illegals have come into our Country paid to the United States for their presence or in other aid from those Countries you had me find? I will be you that I know that answer without even looking for it. Oh well.

SOX FAN found a few areas where money has flowed to these nations over the years. Thanks taxpayers. Time to get our money back.

https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/sep-22-2022-the-us-announces-nearly-376-million-additional-humanitarian-assistance-for-people-affected-by-ongoing-crisis-in-venezuela

For Immediate Release
Office of Press Relations
[e-mail]
Thursday, September 22, 2022
Press Release
Today the United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development, announced nearly $376 million in additional humanitarian assistance for people affected by the Venezuela regional crisis. The humanitarian toll from this political and economic crisis in Venezuela remains dire. More than 7.7 million people in Venezuela need immediate humanitarian assistance and more than 6.8 million Venezuelans have fled their home country in search of better opportunities and livelihoods, resulting in one of the largest migrant and refugee crises in the world.
USAID Assistant to the Administrator Sarah Charles and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Janine Wynne made the announcement on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly. Consistent with U.S. commitments under the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, the additional humanitarian funding, which includes more than $194 million through USAID and more than $181 million through the U.S. Department of State, will provide essential support for vulnerable Venezuelans inside Venezuela, as well as urgently needed assistance for migrants, refugees, and the generous host communities across the region.
USAID funding inside Venezuela will provide critically needed food and nutrition assistance and help rehabilitate water and sanitation infrastructure in vulnerable communities and at health facilities. It will also provide essential medical and hygiene supplies to keep people healthy alongside support to ensure the continuity of healthcare services, and provide specialized protection support to help safeguard Venezuelans from violence and exploitation. Across Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, USAID funding will provide hot meals, food vouchers, and direct cash assistance to Venezuelan migrants and refugees so they can purchase food and other urgent necessities from local markets.
The United States remains the largest single donor for the response to the Venezuela regional crisis. Since Fiscal Year 2017, the United States has provided nearly $2.7 billion in total humanitarian, development, economic, and health assistance for the Venezuela regional crisis, including over $2.3 billion in humanitarian assistance and approximately $356 million in development assistance for those in need inside Venezuela and across the region.
Humanitarian aid is critical to ease people’s suffering, but it cannot address the underlying conditions that caused Venezuela’s protracted crisis. The United States supports Venezuelan-led negotiations as the best path toward a peaceful restoration of democracy and fundamental freedoms of all Venezuelans. Only a peaceful, political solution can address the corruption, political repression, failed policies, and gross economic mismanagement at the root of this crisis.
For the latest updates on USAID’s humanitarian assistance for the Venezuela regional crisis, click here.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-policy-remittances-cuba-what-are-some-viable-options
U.S. Policy on Remittances to Cuba: What Are Some Viable Options?




Critical Questions by Daniel F. Rundeand Hiromitsu Higashi
Published September 15, 2021
As a political and humanitarian crisis continues to unfold in Cuba, the United States’ policy on Cuban-bound remittances is once again brought to heated debate. The economic embargo on Cuba, albeit conducive to regime change as per traditional assessment, can lead to profound humanitarian consequences, as it cuts off the financial lifeline of many Cuban households. It is therefore both useful and imperative to evaluate U.S. policy on remittances to Cuba and explore potential solutions.
Q1: What are remittances and what is their impact on development?
A1: Remittances are when migrants living abroad send money or goods back home to relatives or friends. These transfers help families buy essential goods and services, such as food and medicine. For better-off households, these transfers may be used to finance small businesses and entrepreneurial activities. They also help pay for imports and external debt service and, in some cases, have been used by countries, such as Israel and India, as collateral to issue bonds (known as “diaspora bonds”) and other types of financing. Studies conducted by the World Bank have found that remittances have reduced the share of impoverished individuals in the population.
Q2: What is the size of remittance flows?
A2: Although it is hard to estimate the true value of remittances since these transfers often occur via informal channels, global remittances have been on a steady rise over the last two decades, and provide a more stable flow of funds than foreign direct investment (FDI). They also tend to be countercyclical, rising in levels during times of crisis.
In 2019, remittances peaked at $719 billion and, despite the Covid-19 pandemic, remained high in 2020 at $702 billion, with $540 billion going to low- and middle-income countries. In 2020, countries whose receival of remittances had the highest impact on their GDP included Tajikistan (36.3 percent), Nepal (30.1 percent), and Kyrgyzstan (28.9 percent). In Latin America and the Caribbean, Haiti remains the top recipient, with remittances representing 22.9 percent of its GDP.
For many developing countries, remittances today represent the largest source of external finance. In 2020, they stood at $702 billion, while foreign aid reached $161 billion and FDI reached $859 billion. Remittances are especially important for poorer countries, as they can represent over a third of the GDP. They also contribute to resilience—that is, the household’s capability to avoid, withstand, and recover quickly from a financial shock—in times of economic or humanitarian crisis.
Q3: How and how much does Cuba receive in remittances?
A3: More than 90 percent of the Cuban remittance-sending diaspora is settled in the United States. By 2019, there were over 1.3 million Cuban-born persons living in the United States, making Cubans and Cuban Americans the third-largest diaspora from the Americas—surpassed only by Mexico and El Salvador.
There are two ways that Cuban migrants send remittances back home: by hand-carrying cash (the “informal” way) and by using payment service providers (the “formal” way). Hand-carrying is done by either the senders themselves or money mules, which make up 45 percent of remittances sent. The rest is left to payment service providers—most notably Western Union—that wire money to recipients in partnership with Cuban state-sanctioned institutions.
Remittances constitute a substantial part of Cuba’s gross national income. Cuba does not publish figures on remittances and is not a member of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Inter-American Development Bank, which provide credible statistics. There are estimates produced by research groups, but these vary significantly. For example, Manuel Orozco of the Inter-American Dialogue reported $1.53 billion in remittances in 2019, while the Havana Consulting Group reported $3.72 billion.
Despite these disparities, remittances constitute Cuba’s third-largest source of dollar reserve after the service and tourism industries. To put it in perspective, Cuba’s GDP was $103 billion in 2019, with net official development assistance inflow of $499 million and remittances of $2–$3 billion annually. In comparison, throughout 2019, Haiti received $3.3 billion in remittances, Honduras $5.4 billion, El Salvador $5.6 billion, Guatemala $10.6 billion, and Mexico $39 billion.
It should be noted that analyzing the contribution of remittances to Cuba’s GDP is limited given that only some components of Cuban GDP are expressed in purely dollar amounts, with an exchange rate of USD 1 = CUP 1, whereas all other components are handled at the official exchange rate established by the Central Bank of Cuba, USD 1 = CUP 24. Therefore, if the latter exchange rate is used, Cuban GDP is calculated at about $20.5 billion rather than $103 billion. Of this $20.5 billion, $6.6 billion corresponds to remittances (in cash and in merchandise), $6.4 billion corresponds to the salary of medical personnel hired abroad, and $7.5 billion corresponds to the rest of the economy (including tourism and the rest of the exportable items).
Q4: What is the impact of remittances on Cuba?
A4: Remittances play an important role in Cubans’ well-being—even more so in times of crisis. Over two-thirds of all Cubans on the island receive and rely on assistance from families abroad. Entities that receive remittances include Cuban households, religious organizations, U.S. students in Cuba, and independent nongovernmental organizations and certain individuals such as rights groups and activists. Remittances are essential for Cubans to purchase basic necessities or pay rent. They even serve as working capital for private entrepreneurs to cover business expenses. Without remittances, Cuban businesses lose clients able to purchase their goods or services.
In order for remittances to be sent from the United States to Cuba, Western Union partnered with Financiera Cimex (Fincimex), Cuba’s largest commercial conglomerate. Fincimex was owned by Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), which is led by the Revolutionary Armed Forces. The military holding company GAESA controls a significant share of the Cuban economy, spanning from hotels, car rental companies, and gas stations, to almost all retail chains on the island. As a result, research shows that for every $1 of remittances sent via Western Union and later spent in GAESA shops, the military gains 74 cents, 61 cents of which comes directly from store sales.
Although a substantial amount of remittances flow into the country each year, this money often fails to reach its intended recipients and is instead diverted by the government and the military. Instead of hard cash, citizens are given electronic dollars, which can only be used at government-owned (GAESA) stores with exorbitant prices. Therefore, remittances need to reach Cubans in the form of actual dollars, such as through innovative financial technology (fintech) companies and digital wallet applications. As of 2019, about 6 million Cubans (or 53.3 percent) had cellphone subscriptions, so a digital wallet may be a viable option to combat the issue of remittance theft. The Biden-Harris administration can play an important role in setting the stage for the success of fintech companies, helping Cuban citizens regain control over their remittances. Cryptocurrencies may also be a potential option, though the emerging nature of such technology means the public may be unfamiliar with and unable to use them.
Q5: What is the U.S. policy on remittances to Cuba?
A5: The United States primarily regulates Cuba-bound remittances through amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), issued by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control in 1963. There are two main types of policy that affect remittance flows: restrictions on traveling and restrictions on remittances per se.
Although the Obama administration saw gradual lifting of economic sanctions (culminating in a historic state visit to the island in 2016), the Trump administration reversed Obama’s decisions by reinstating restrictions on traveling and remittances. In September 2019, the Trump administration limited remittances to $1,000 per person per quarter. In October 2020, the Treasury amended the CACR to prohibit the processing of remittances through any entities on the Cuba Restricted List, which includes both Fincimex and GAESA. This move caused Western Union to close its 407 branches and suspend operation in Cuba in November 2020. In January 2021, in its final days, the Trump administration redesignated Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Q6: What are the implications of maintaining this policy? What are other options to consider?
A6: During his presidential campaign, then-candidate Biden promised to reverse Trump’s Cuba policy, but presently the Biden-Harris administration has not implemented any policy so far. The interagency review of the Trump-era Cuba policy coordinated by the White House National Safety Council is still in progress. The anti-government protests that started in Cuba in July 2021, however, further complicated the matter by leading the Biden administration to impose new sanctions on the regime.
Against the ongoing protests, current policy enacts a massive toll on many Cuban families’ survival. The reduction in income also impacts the activities and functioning of civil society organizations such as rights groups. Restrictions on remittances are part of the U.S. embargo, which has cost Cuba more than $130 billion over six decades. Additionally, corruption and economic mismanagement by the Cuban government, along with adherence to a restrictive economic framework, have kept finances out of the hands of Cuban citizens and funneled them to the government and the military, leading to underfunded social and development programs. However, Cuba is still listed in the “high human development” category of the Human Development Index, as it offers free high-quality education and healthcare and boasts robust inclusion and participation of women.
The current administration must first decide whether to accept the role of the Cuban military, while the Cuban government decides whether to maintain the role of the Cuban military. Ultimately, channeling remittances directly to Cubans rather than through military-controlled companies may be essential to ensuring that remittances reach their intended recipients. Some alternatives that the Biden-Harris administration could consider include:
• Direct corresponding banking—opening accounts between U.S. and Cuban banks under agreements to enable direct electronic transactions from remittance senders to receivers. However, this option is currently limited as it would violate the embargo (and require Cuba to be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism). Moreover, U.S. banks have shown unwillingness to enter into business with Cuban banks (even during the Obama era when restrictions were eased) given the unstable economic conditions and undemocratic environment on the island.


• Other forms of transfers—instead of money, consider precious metals and gold. Cryptocurrencies and digital wallets (fintech) remain a remote possibility, despite concerns for volatility, a lack of offers to exchange local currency for cryptocurrency, poor Cuban digital infrastructure, and governmental control over the internet.


• A conditional remittances fund—remittances would be allowed, but the money would flow into a special fund which would only be spent on U.S. exports, such as agricultural and medical products.
Daniel F. Runde is senior vice president, director of the Project and Prosperity and Development, and William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Hiromitsu Higashi was an intern with the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development.
Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
MORE CUBA ITEMS
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/oct/18/us-cuba-emergency-relief-funding-hurricane-ian-victims
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-rolls-out-revised-cuba-policy-easing-some-trump-era-restrictions-remittances-2022-05-16/
NICARAGUA AID
https://www.usaid.gov/nicaragua/history
History
Breadcrumb
1. Home
2. Nicaragua
3. History
The United States Government (USG) has provided approximately $2.5 billion in development assistance to Nicaragua, mainly through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Since its establishment in 1962, USAID has helped transform the lives of Nicaraguan families by funding programs that promote democratic practices, education, economic development, infrastructure, and natural resources, while providing humanitarian and life-saving assistance when most needed.
Economic Growth
USAID played a vital role in the economic stabilization efforts of the early 1990s. With cash transfers totaling over $507 million, USAID helped curb rampant inflation, pay off debts to multilateral institutions, and fund $36.3 million on programs to generate employment. USAID has also provided millions of dollars in loans to farmers, entrepreneurs, and business owners, resulting in the creation of thousands of jobs. USAID programs invested over $27 million in employment generation projects and funded the electrification project in the Caribbean Coast.
Health
USAID invested over $140 million in health projects that included family planning, maternal and child health, immunization assistance, and decentralization of health services. Assistance in these areas was met with such ringing success that in 2006 USAID started planning for Nicaragua’s graduation from the health program, indicating that health outcomes in Nicaragua had improved significantly and that these improvements could be sustained. The Agency continues its HIV/AIDS prevention activities in the country.
Education
USAID created educational programs, provided new textbooks and school materials, led teacher training, and built new schools to reach students in remote rural areas. USAID programs have also helped approximately 150,000 children and youth complete primary and basic secondary school through 7,290 scholarships and over 5,400 youth trained and certified in different technical trades. USAID’s education program in Nicaragua’s Southern Autonomous Region of the Caribbean Coast has provided scholarships and vocational training in this area. USAID has also contributed to higher education in Nicaragua by helping establish INCAE Business School, ranked among the top ten business schools in the world.
Infrastructure and natural resources
The U.S. government funded the construction of many of the country’s major roads, including the iconic Inter-American Highway, the road from Managua to Granada, and the road from Leon to Chinandega. USAID also funded environmental education and awareness campaigns and helped establish reserves and protected areas, including the Miskito Cays Reserve, the Bosawas Reserve, the Chacocente Wildlife Refuge, and the Mombacho Volcano.
Democracy and Governance
USAID has played an important role in supporting democracy, good governance and rule of law. In the 1990’s, USAID’s support allowed the creation of financial management systems for the national and municipal governments and helped modernize and create various State institutions. It also supported a comprehensive judicial reform to include a new Criminal Code for complex crimes such as corruption, organized crime, and human trafficking. USAID has been active for every national and municipal election in Nicaragua since 1996, always striving to increase citizen and civil society participation, coordinate with election management bodies, electoral observation and support voter education. USAID has also been supporting civil society organizations’ initiatives aiming to increase transparency and accountability. Currently, USAID works with local partners to support democratic practices, human rights, civil society, and independent media.
Humanitarian Assistance
When an emergency strikes, USAID provides support to people on the ground, responding and bringing humanitarian relief. After the 1972 earthquake devastated Managua, USAID was instrumental in the recovery process by providing over $80 million to reconstruct the capital city to build 8,000 housing units, install 4,560 household water connections, and repair 60,000 household electric connections. After Hurricane Mitch, USAID provided $103 million in emergency assistance to repair damaged infrastructure, restore livelihoods, and provide health services and food aid. To address Nicaragua’s current humanitarian needs in the wake of two devastating hurricanes and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, between 2020 and 2021, USAID has provided over $17 million to implement water, sanitation, and hygiene community projects, provide food and disinfection kits to vulnerable populations, and carry out programs to protect vulnerable populations.