FOFreddie, I am answering your prior question #3 here (before #2 …which I am
Still examining).
“3. Doesn"t this part of the Collins Opinion directly conflict with the District Court Opinion in Bhatti regarding the scope of 4617(f)?”
For clarity the two cases discussed here are
(1) the Fifth Circuit appellate panel case in Collins v Yellen on 10/12/23, and
(2) the US District Court case in Minnesota cited as Bhatti v. FHFA, 646 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010–11 (D. Minn. 2022).
Both cases were decided after Collins v Yellen 2021 at SCOTUS.
The Fifth Circuit appellate panel court in Collins on 10/12/23 did weigh in explicitly on the scope of 4617(f). But It’s important to note that they did so after accepting the constitutional claims as-is (note: the two courts’ conflict truly lies here), and also because 4617(f) was a point of contention between the parties. That is, the USG had raised 4617(f) as a defense to all claims, and the shareholder plaintiffs had rebutted. The Collins panel then at this point was obliged to evaluate 4617(f). The evaluation invoked USSC precedent, some nicely analogous Fifth Circuit precedent, and reading Collins v Yellen 2021 (SCOTUS) in context; all that considered, the court held (to the surprise of few I think) that 4617(f) does not bar the court house doors to constitutional claims.
In contrast, the Bhatti District court over in the Eighth Circuit (in MN) never actually reached the question of whether 4617(f) bars constitutional claims, because the Court opined first that Removal claims can only be pursued as APA claims. In this rather novel claim scenario (it would be a true case of first impression) there is nothing unlawful about the powers exercised, thus 4617(f) could surely bar those APA claims.
If you are also wondering whether Bhatti plaintiffs might ultimately have some success on an appeal (because of the Bhatti’s court unusual reliance on Thomas’ concurrence from SCOTUS) I would say I humbly doubt it. Why? Because the MN US district court took pains to stake out alternative reasons for dismissal: (1) failure to state a claim, and alternatively (2) failure to show harm — thus not surviving a motion to dismiss. The latter aligns with the basis for dismissal in Collins on appeal 10/12/23: both courts opined that the claims were simply too speculative. So any appeal that would find a Bhatti error (in the recasting of the Removal claims as APA claims) would IMO likely be harmless non-reversible error.
To wit, here is part of the Bhatti alternative rationale verbiage:
“Even if the type of claim that Collins seems to contemplate is properly considered a constitutional claim, plaintiffs have failed to state such a claim. . .Finally, the Court notes that, even if plaintiffs had stated the type of claim contemplated in Collins, the nature of their claim is far too speculative to survive a motion to dismiss.”
This is very similar to the closing remarks chosen by the Fifth Circuit panel in the Collins Removal claim (Section IV):
“ That level of uncertainty and speculation cannot survive a motion to dismiss, so the dismissal of plaintiffs' removal claims was proper.”
That’s pretty much it for your question - I hope I covered it.
