Shi'i Iraqi MP expects arrests of known figures; defends Al-Sadr
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21 February 2007 (BBC Monitoring)
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[Interview with Dr Haydar al-Abadi, member of the Political Bureau of Al-Da'wah Party and member of the Iraqi National Assembly, by Mina al-Uraybi, "during his visit to London;" date not given: "Al-Da'wah Party's Political Bureau Member Haydar al-Abadi Tells Al-Sharq al-Awsat: The Security Plan Is Not the Last Chance for the Iraqis, But Is Probably So for the Americans; Al-Sadr Feels He Is Pursued, and the Americans Want to Embarrass Him"]
[Al-Uraybi] Are you satisfied with the political experience in Iraq since the fall of the former regime?
[Al-Abadi] We have to look at the political experience from the realistic and methodological angles. When we look at the results from the realistic angle, the results, after four years, are certainly not satisfactory. This evokes sadness. The Iraqi situation now is not good. We have daily killing and bombing and a hateful sectarian strife, which has regrettably hit the country. From the methodological aspect, the work that we embarked on; that is, the political process, was the only choice for the Iraqi people on the national level. The country was afflicted with occupation. This occupation was not with the permission of the Iraqi people. There was a US strategy, part of it related to Iraq and another part was larger than Iraq. The Iraqis found that their country was not under their own administration. It became under a foreign administration. They had to take back administration to get rid of the occupation. The only method on which the Iraqi political forces agreed is for the Iraqi people to determine their own fate. This had to happen through elections. Today, we have a constitutional Council of Representatives and a constitutional national unity government. We had no other way. The other ways that claimed to be fighting the occupier drowned the country in a bloodbath and are destroying everything the Iraqis are building on the pretext of fighting the occupier. They are heading towards complete chaos. Today, we are closer to the departure of the occupier from our land than the situation was four years ago. This may have been delayed due to the ongoing violence in Iraq. After the success of the second elections, terrorism has reached a dead end. All their attempts to stop the political process have failed. Al-Qa'idah had no choice but to leave Iraq, and this was suggested in some documents that we obtained, or to make one last attempt, which was the criminal action in Samarra to strike the Iraqis in the heart. The bombing of the two shrines (of Imam Al-Hadi and Imam Al-Askari) caused a reaction, whose motives I can understand. Yet, it is not understandable for this reaction to be as destructive. Regrettably, the Samarra bombing made people lose their minds. On the other hand, we hold the US forces partially responsible because they did not do anything. They allowed things to deteriorate to the point of no return. When displacement first started, it was programmed and studied by groups that wanted to take control of certain Shi'i and Sunni areas. These groups used sectarianism in a hateful manner to advance certain political interests. I chaired a committee in the Iraqi parliament on the displaced, and we reached some key decisions to stop this process. We prepared a plan to enable their return, but regrettably the Iraqi and US security forces failed to deal with this file properly. What we have inherited now are years of killing and displacement.
Extremist elements pose a threat to Iraq. Extremism today is out to cancel the other. However, tomorrow, it will seek to cancel people from its own component. There is a vision now, which is one of the results of the political process, to eliminate the elements of this extremism. This does not mean killing people; it means changing them and preventing the daily killing and destruction. There should be a firm position. The Baghdad security plan is the key to this solution. It is not only a security plan. It is a political, economic, and development plan. Some political parties that did not get a share in the recent elections are taking part in the plan. Also, former Ba'thist sides, which turned against the Ba'th Party, are taking part in the plan. There is awareness that the plan is the key to Iraq's progress.
[Al-Uraybi] Can you explain to us how these parties, which are not part of the government, are taking part in the plan?
[Al-Abadi] The Baghdad security plan has several aspects. The security aspect is handled by the government forces. The economic aspect is a partnership between the government and the private sector. There is another aspect, which is the political/social aspect, in which government and other parties are involved. Here, it is difficult to distinguish between the political aspect and the social aspect. There are social and political activities. Take Al-Ghazaliyah, for example. Al-Ghazaliyah has parties, armed groups, and social components, some of which have loyalty to a certain party, while others do not have this loyalty. This led to the idea of involving these elements in the Baghdad security plan. I know some Ba'thist figures, who are not Saddamist. They believe in the principles of the Ba'th Party and argue that Saddam hijacked the Ba'th Party. We have no problem with the Ba'th as an ideology. We have a problem with the Ba'th that was led by Saddam to exclude others by means of physical liquidation.
[Al-Uraybi] There is a problem in Iraq, which is that authority in it is in the hand of those who take up arms, including the militias and armed men. How do we return to a political reality that is not based on weapons?
[Al-Abadi] This is a serious thing. Weapons should be for protecting the homeland and citizens. They should not be exploited for political goals or suppressing the other. We opposed Saddam because he did injustice to everybody. In the days of the opposition, we even used to say that Saddam was fair in his injustice, since he did injustice to everybody, including the sons of Al-Ramadi, Diyala, and Mosul, the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi'is. He did injustice to every area in Iraq. He used to justify anything to stay in power. This approach constituted exclusion by force.
Iraq was not democratic before Saddam, but this level of suppression and violent exclusion did not exist in Iraq in the past. The armed groups that possess weapons in order to impose their viewpoint are as dangerous [as Saddam] and are headed in the same direction. These armed groups want to suppress the other by force and physical liquidation. We think that this is more dangerous to new Iraq, whether for the Kurds and the Arabs. This ideology was embodied, in its highest meaning, in the takfiris [those who hold other Muslims to be infidel], Al-Qa'idah, and the groups of the former regime, and so they became the number one enemies of Iraq. But those who believe in eliminating others by force also became number two enemies of Iraq, and so those who carry out actions and those who react to these actions became a danger to Iraq. Consequently, any person who possesses these weapons is a danger to Iraq. There is a consensus on this at the National Assembly and among the political parties. This was expressed by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who said that he will not look at the background of any person who takes up arms, but that he will only look at whether this person abides by the law or not.
We have a problem with the impression (in the Iraqi street). The Shi'is have the impression that the security agencies are infiltrated by the takfiris. They have evidence of this, represented in the daily car bombings in the Shi'i areas. The Sunnis have the impression that there are huge infiltrations of the security forces by the militias to kill Sunnis. We call this an impression. In the world of politics, an impression is sometimes more powerful than the truth. The government should change this impression and tell the citizen that it stands by him. It should also win the confidence of citizens and face all criminal elements.
This step will cause troubles for the government. We expect large-scale arrests of known figures from this or that party in the near future. This is a test to the government. I hope this plan [Baghdad security plan] will succeed. But this is not the last chance for the Iraqis. It might be the last chance for the Americans, but this is our homeland, and we will not escape from the homeland. If the security plan encounters problems in the beginning, we will learn from them; and if we fail in one of its stages, we will overcome the failure.
The second option is to leave the citizen at the mercy of the criminal elements, and this is unacceptable. This might be the last stage for the Americans who are alien to Iraq and who have their own strategy. We, the Iraqis, cannot leave our country to the elements that are hostile towards Iraq.
[Al-Uraybi] There are many reports about the involvement of Al-Mahdi Army in the killing in Iraq. How are you going to confront it?
[Al-Abadi] Al-Sadr Trend is a political movement. It started as a popular trend. By nature - because it started out as a popular movement - there is a kind of lack of discipline in it. Al-Sadr Trend is a new trend in Iraq that was not allowed by the former regime. Iraq is in a state of huge disorder and undisciplined democracy. We are still in the early stages of building democratic institutions. Faced with this situation, it is difficult for us to hold the trend accountable for violations in it. This trend was treated unjustly in the early stages of its establishment, and it was excluded from political/social circles. So far, respect has not been restored for elements in this trend, which suffers from poverty and which was excluded from the fields of study and work. Our mission, as Iraqis, is to try and save those people.
As for Al-Mahdi Army, it is a group that emerged in a confrontation with the US forces, and there was a bloody struggle between them. The US side was unreasonable. It probably helped draw the trend into fighting. The US view of the trend was that they [its members] are extremists who can be eliminated. They [the Americans] did not imagine that they [members of the trend] had a popular agenda. Its armed wing is also undisciplined. That is why it was infiltrated. The proof of this is that Al-Sayyid Muqtada [al-Sadr] has said clearly that he is not responsible for all actions of Al-Mahdi Army and that he condemns them [some members of Al-Mahdi Army] and is not satisfied with those who do not obey him. He has provided the government with a list of the names of persons who carry out actions that contravene conscience and shari'ah. He has lifted his protection on them. Today, Al-Sadr Trend says that if the government has evidence against any element, it can arrest him in accordance with the laws.
[Al-Uraybi] What is your information on the whereabouts of Al-Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr. Has he really left Iraq?
[Al-Abadi] The Americans want to embarrass Al-Sayyid Muqtada and Al-Sadr Trend with this operation and to force him to appear and, consequently, expose himself to danger. Al-Sayyid Muqtada feels that he is probably pursued [by the US forces]. This feeling is justified. The US side has carried out such operations in the past, and not everybody on the US side is wise. The second point is that they want to bring him down. And if he does not appear, they want to tell his masses that this man fears for himself and has escaped. We do not have information whether he is in Iraq or not. We have not met with him and have not heard that anyone has met with him during the past three weeks. Whether this [escape] is true or not, there is no problem with his departure from Iraq, since he feels that his life is in danger. If he is outside Iraq, this does not mean that will not return to it. And if he is in Iraq, there is no problem with this because this is his country.
[Al-Uraybi] Is the strategic alliance between Al-Da'wah Party and Al-Sadr Trend still in place?
[Al-Abadi] We have strategic alliances with all the parties in Iraq, including the Unified Iraqi Coalition [UIC] and Al-Tawafuq [Front], especially the [Iraqi] Islamic Party [IIP]. We have an agreement on all details of the political plan and reconciliation. There might be disagreements on other details, and on the personal level between the prime minister and Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. We regret the fact that the Iraqi political file should be captive to personal relations. We should avoid this. We have strategic alliances with the Kurds and secular blocs.
Concerning the strategic alliance with Al-Sadr Trend, yes [it exists] as a realistic thing. As a result of the first vote on the premiership, the UIC split into two groups. The first group voted for Adil Abd-al-Mahdi. The second group, including Al-Sadr Trend, voted for Ibrahim al-Ja'fari. However, this does not apply to Nuri al-Maliki, since everybody voted for him unanimously except for Al-Fadilah Party, which objected to quickly abandoning the nomination of Al-Ja'fari. This was not an objection to Al-Maliki, since Al-Sadr Trend did not decide to nominate Mr Al-Maliki.
[Al-Uraybi] Several weeks ago, we heard about a move by what was called then the "moderate forces" in Iraq to set up a new movement that groups the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution [in Iraq, SCIRI], the Kurdistan Alliance, and the IIP, but Al-Da'wah Party refused to join this movement. What is the reason for this refusal?
[Al-Abadi] The main idea was that we have a Council of Representatives and a political process, and there is a majority that is convinced of the political process and a minority that is not convinced of it. The minority has perhaps joined the political process enthusiastically, but without an adequate vision. Some others have perhaps joined the political process with a view to obstructing it from within. Consequently, political blocs at the Council of Representatives have said "we should ensure the success of the work of the Council of Representatives," especially after Al-Sadr Trend suspended its work in the council, creating fears that other small trends would suspend their work. For this reason, an alliance was formed between the groups of the blocs that are convinced of the political process. Regrettably, some people have portrayed this as a political issue and they formed an alliance between political forces by the name of "moderate forces" to counter the extremist forces. We considered this a major flaw in the political process, because when the political forces are classified in this manner, what should we call the others? There are forces that cannot be classified as extremist. Why should the Iraqis be classified on a moderate basis? We viewed this as part of political ploys that pose a danger to the security of Iraq and that return us to square one. The idea of a five-way alliance is now over.
[Al-Uraybi] What is the latest on national reconciliation?
[Al-Abadi] Political reconciliation is a cornerstone of our policy in Iraq. Without it, violence cannot be eliminated. This is a fundamental thing, and we are eager to go ahead with it. But it is not up to the required level and it requires further efforts. The government is enthusiastic, but it [reconciliation] cannot succeed without the enthusiasm of all political sides. The prime minister has sent envoys to Cairo, Amman, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries that I do not want to mention. The envoys have met with Ba'thist groups and other groups that are far from the Ba'th. The only party they did not meet with is Al-Qa'idah. The common denominator is that all of them say that they want a role in the political process. But the problem is that we should determine who is behind the violence in Iraq and to absorb those people. We should determine who is responsible for the acts of violence. So far, this has not been determined. Some of them claim that they represent the armed groups, but they turn out to be small, non-influential groups. Another problem is that some of the groups make impossible requests, such as cancelling the political process so that we will go back to square one, and this is impossible.
[Al-Uraybi] What is the latest on amending the Iraqi constitution and when do you expect to finish this process?
[Al-Abadi] We are discussing changing the constitution. This is a constitutional matter, since the constitution includes a paragraph on amending the constitution. However, Al-Tawafuq Front has so far not presented a list of the required amendments and real ideas in order for us to move to the next stage. There are paragraphs that cannot be reversed, like federation, since federation is now a fait accompli. We have federation in Kurdistan, and it should be applied to the rest of the country. The second thing is that the identity of Iraq is a democratic identity and is for everybody. The rest of the paragraphs are subject to discussion, as part of national controls. We have held between 10-12 meetings to discuss amending the constitution. The United Nations is actively involved in this issue. We have sent a parliamentary delegation to Spain and Germany to examine the federal experience of the two countries. We have sent another delegation to India and Malaysia to examine their federal system. Therefore, it is possible to amend federation in Iraq. We expect a list of the proposed constitutional amendments to be presented to the National Assembly by May 2007.
[Al-Uraybi] Will there be ministerial changes in the near future?
[Al-Abadi] The prime minister is now ready for a cabinet change. He is waiting for the Council of Representatives to return from its annual recess to present the ministerial changes, which will not include broad changes. The problem faced by the prime minister is that he has not managed to reach an agreement on the changes with the political blocs. With the commencement of the Baghdad security plan, it is not possible to replace the ministers in charge of security files; that is, the ministers of defence, interior, and national security. When these ministers are not replaced, this cannot be considered a broad cabinet reshuffle. In view of the recent development, represented in the commencement of the Baghdad security plan, those ministers cannot be replaced, even if they made mistakes. This might be done next May. The current ministerial changes will include replacing the ministers of Al-Sadr Trend. Al-Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr has presented [a list of] nominees to the prime minister. There are also changes of ministers of the Iraqi List, led by Dr Iyad Allawi. So far, there has not been another ministerial change in the UIC, since the Kurds have refused to change their ministers.
Regrettably, there is now early talk about the cabinet reshuffle. This is a flaw. The early talk about the reshuffle makes the government lose its credibility. It has caused an unnecessary clamour.
[Al-Uraybi] There seemed to be coolness between Prime Minister Al-Maliki and US President George Bush, especially with Al-Maliki's strong statements towards the US President. Are these disagreements over?
[Al-Abadi] There are internal Iraqi and American political considerations. We in Iraq are concerned with having good relations with all countries, especially the United States. We do not want to create a crisis without any reason. Before the last US [midterm] elections, the US President was convinced of the [political] process in Iraq. But after the recent elections and the victory of the Democrats, the internal US political considerations changed and the US President had to make statements to satisfy his domestic audience. We were caught in the middle, and this is something on which we cannot keep silent. The prime minister told the Americans: I also have internal considerations. There are big US mistakes in Iraq. We have criticized them because at a time when they send forces to Iraq, they disagree on them, and this affects us. The US army either withdraws its forces and ends the issue, or the Americans send the forces and end the issue. The Iraqi issue cannot be captive to the domestic US situation. The Americans know this now, but I think there is still a feeling of bitterness between the two sides. There are constant contacts between the Iraqi and US leaderships and there is a convergence of interests between the two sides. A safe Iraq is in Washington's interest. For us, the Iraqis, this is our country and its stability is in our interest.
Source: Al-Sharq al-Awsat website, London
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