Fannie Mae-No Politics (FNMA)

[Robert from yahoo bd]

Pg. 20: "Because of the CFPB’s structure,
accountability and transparency have fallen by the
wayside. “[S]elf-funding … effectively makes the agency
accountable to nobody.” Thomas Arning, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: A Novel Agency Design
with Familiar Issues, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
153, 169 (2018).
So those outside the cloistered community of the
Bureau are kept effectively powerless. “[T]here is
minimal leverage that Congress,” and by extension the

States, “can bring to bear to influence the agency.”

Roberta Romano, Does Agency Structure Affect Agency

Decisionmaking? Implications of the CFPB’s Design for

Administrative Governance, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 273, 299
(2019) (explaining that the CFPB is the most insulated
agency among those with similar regulatory objectives).
The States and the public must depend on voluntary
disclosures and a couple semi-annual reports to learn what
the agency is up to."

"But depending on a self-interested CFPB to do the right thing is a “curious

assumption,” especially when the Bureau has “lack[ed]

transparency in much of its decision-making.” (More on

that below.) Adam C. Smith & Todd Zywicki, Behavior,

Paternalism, and Policy: Evaluating Consumer

Financial Protection, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 201, 236-

37 (2015). It’s hardly a surprise, then, that the Court has

already observed how the Bureau’s “financial freedom”
“makes it even more likely that the agency will slip …
from [the control] of the people.” Seila Law LLC v.
CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2204 (2020) (cleaned up). It already
has."

"Remember how the Bureau is
led by a single Director who the President may remove
and replace at any time. So unlike a multi-member
commission, the Bureau’s “priorities may fluctuate with
the party of the appointing President,” and Congress has
no means to pull it back. Kruly, supra, at 1742. At the
same time, the only ostensible check on the Bureau’s
budget—other than the soaring cap—is the Director’s finding that the money is “reasonably necessary to carry
out the authorities of the Bureau.” 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1).

That provision provides the Bureau a financial incentive to
expand faster and farther, no matter whether those
efforts aid market improvement or stability. James V.
DeLong, New Wine for A New Bottle: Judicial Review in
the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REV. 399, 421 (1986) (“[A]n
agency is subject to strong internal incentives to attempt
to expand its budget.”). Aggressive, inconsistent, and
unaccountable are not words we usually associate with the
quiet prudence of a financial regulator."

http://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-448/270624/20230707162906708_FINAL%20CFPB%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf