According to SM in his 2016 interview with Maria B., he said, "the NWS was used to fund Obamacare". "Maria, we've got to get theses companies out of government control."
BUT FOR the NWS we would likely be OUT OF THE CONSERVATORSHIPS! The Executive Privilege and National Security exemptions to Discovery prevent the Plaintiff Shareholders from knowing WHY the Executive Branch implemented the NWS and took so much CASH from our companies and transferred it into the Treasury's coffers for NOTHING in return. Sadly, we may never know the truth.
The US Constitution says that the "Power of the Purse" belongs to the US Congress EXCLUSIVELY.
Why keeping the power of the purse with the US Congress (and not a federal agency under the control of POTUS) is Constitutionally Important, yesterdays WP, by George Will:
"Stanford Law professor Michael McConnell, formerly a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit says: The spending power vested in the legislative branch is "the foundation stone of all separation-of-powers law." "
"During the 2008 financial crisis, President George W. Bush bailed out the auto companies with funds Congress had made available only for "financial institutions," justifying it because the companies engaged in financing sales. (By this reasoning, the Magnificent Eleven note, Bush could have bailed out "virtually every other large sector of the economy.") When Congress voted against funding a portion of the Affordable Care Act, President Barack Obama's Treasury Department provided $7 billion. President Donald Trump "repurposed" some military appropriations to build the border wall that Congress had explicitly voted not to build."
From the Amicus Brief on the February 28th student loan forgiveness lawsuit filed by:
On Writs of Certiorari Before Judgment
to the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Eighth and Fifth Circuits ___________
BRIEF OF MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL,
WILLIAM P. BARR, JOHN COGAN,
MITCH DANIELS, CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH,
C. BOYDEN GRAY, JAMES C. MILLER III,
JOHN MICHAEL “MICK” MULVANEY,
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, JOHN B. TAYLOR,
AND PETER J. WALLISON AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
ARGUMENT ........................................................ 6
I. The Framers Designed the Power of the
Purse as a Check on Tyranny ....................... 6
A. The Common Law Evolution of the
Power of the Purse .................................. 7
B. Congress’s Exclusive Power of the
Purse ........................................................ 11
II. Executive Encroachment on the Power of the
Purse Threatens Constitutional Order ........ 13
A. Presidents Have Repeatedly Usurped
Congress’s Spending Authority .............. 13
B. Spending Statutes Must Be Strictly Con-
strued to Safeguard Separation of Pow-
ers ............................................................ 19
III. Congress Did Not Authorize the Student-
Loan Forgiveness Program ........................... 22
CONCLUSION .................................................... 29
"In recent decades, Presidents of both parties have in-
creasingly resorted to loose constructions of congres-
sional appropriations laws to justify spending without
congressional action—even when Congress has explic-
itly rejected the very spending in question. This has
gotten to the point that the fundamental principle of
the congressional power of the purse is in peril."
"In short: the power to set national
policy comes with the power of the purse."
"These “structural details” are “not simply matters of
etiquette or architecture.” Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Hum. Servs., 799 F.3d 1035, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en
banc). Instead, their “ultimate purpose” is “to protect
the liberty and security of the governed.” Metro. Wash.
Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991). To that end, the
Constitution guarantees that “the legislative depart-
ment alone has access to the pockets of the people.”
The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison)."
"(“Were the executive power to determine the
raising of public money … liberty would be at an
end.”). In fact, the “separation of purse and sword” be-
came “the Federalists’ strongest rejoinder to Anti-Fed-
eralist fears of a tyrannical president.” Chafetz, Con-
gress’s Constitution, supra, at 57; see Alexis de Tocque-
ville, Democracy in America 114 (Harvey Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 2002) (“[T]he struggle
between the president and the legislature can only be
unequal, since the latter, if it perseveres in its designs,
can always master the resistance opposed to it ….”). So
when Patrick Henry warned that a President of “am-
bition, and abilities” could “easily become king,” Mad-
ison responded that the “purse is in the hands of the
representatives of the people” who “have the appropri-
ation of all moneys.” 3 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitu-
tion 58-59, 393 (Jonathan Elliot 2d ed., 1891)."
"President Obama followed a similar playbook after
Congress specifically refused to appropriate funding
for a provision of the Affordable Care Act authorizing
reimbursement of certain costs to health insurers par-
ticipating in the Affordable Care Act exchanges. See
42 U.S.C. § 18071.4 Despite the lack of any appropria-
tion, and notwithstanding Congress’s vote against
such an appropriation, Treasury began to make ad-
vance section 1402 payments to insurers. United
States House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F.
Supp. 3d 165, 174 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated in part sub
nom. United States House of Representatives v. Azar,
2018 WL 8576647 (D.D.C. May 18, 2018).
Contradicting its initial request of section 1402
funds, the administration claimed that it was permit-
ted to make these payments under the permanent ap-
propriation in 31 U.S.C. § 1324. Yet that permanent
appropriation was limited to “refunding internal reve-
nue collections,” such as the section 1401 individual
tax credit for insurance premiums. Id. § 1324(a). The
House successfully sued to halt the unauthorized
spending, with the district court holding the expendi-
ture unlawful and unconstitutional. House of Repre-
sentatives, 185 F. Supp. at 174-79 (“A law may be con-
strued to make an appropriation out of the Treasury …
only if the law specifically states that an appropriation
is made ….”). By that time, some $7 billion of unappro-
priated money had been taken from the Treasury,
never to be returned."
"4 President Obama took this action after Congress rejected a
number of his administration’s proposals, in response to which
the President pledged to use his “pen” and “[]phone” to “take ex-
ecutive actions where Congress won’t.” Barack Obama, Remarks
by the President and First Lady at the College Opportunity Sum-
mit (Jan. 16, 2014)."
"President Trump also determined to spend money
that Congress had not appropriated. In July and Au-
gust 2020, Congress debated whether to extend the en-
hanced unemployment benefits provided by the
CARES Act. Unable to agree on an amount—Demo-
crats wanted a $600 enhancement; Republicans pro-
posed $200—Congress deadlocked. See Jake Sherman
& John Bresnahan, White House Eyes Executive Or-
ders to Upend Virus Negotiations, Politico (Aug. 4,
2020). Yet the administration went ahead with a $400
enhancement by diverting funds appropriated to the
Federal Emergency Management Administration’s
Disaster Relief Fund into a new Assistance Program
for Lost Wages. See Donald J. Trump, Memorandum
on Authorizing the Other Needs Assistance Program
for Major Disaster Declarations Related to Corona-
virus Disease 2019 (Aug. 8, 2020)."
"Presidents have
sought to circumvent Congress’s appropriations power
by hanging plainly unauthorized executive policies on
the slenderest of statutory reeds—and future presi-
dents will continue to do so absent clear guidance from
this Court.
This is plainly not the manner in which our consti-
tutional order is designed to function. "
"Yet recent standoffs between Congress
and the President have increasingly ended not with
the President acknowledging his constitutional limits,
but rather with the President circumventing the Ap-
propriations Clause under the guise of statutory inter-
pretation."
"So long as the “the controversy involves tax-
ing, spending, borrowing, impositions on liberty or
property, going to war, suspension of habeas corpus, or
any other delegated powers, congressional authoriza-
tion is a necessary precondition.” McConnell, supra, at
281. And such authorization, to protect against usur-
pations of authority, must be construed narrowly."
"Every year, Congress intervenes
in agency rulemaking by using appropriations riders
that prohibit action on certain subjects, mandate con-
sideration of particular proposals, or set conditions for
action."
"If the President could use far-fetched interpre-
tations to circumvent Congress’s power of the purse,
that last line of defense would be breached."
"Eventually, the Administration hit upon a theory
that almost no one had predicted: use of the HEROES
Act, a 2003 statute passed in the wake of 9/11 “to sup-
port the members of the United States military and
provide assistance with their transition into and out of
active duty and active service,” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1098aa(b)(6). "
