"But the district court may not weigh evidence or
make credibility judgments on a motion to dismiss. The district court’s substantive
analysis of evidence has no place in the motion to dismiss stage and is alone
sufficient to justify reversal. Still, additional errors in the district court’s opinion
further require reversal."
"To the extent there may be reason to doubt the credibility of
President Trump’s letter, that credibility judgment cannot be made at the motion to dismiss stage. Ramirez v. Escajeda, 921 F.3d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Iqbal does
not allow us to question the credibility of the facts pleaded[.]” (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679)).
Here,
President Trump is explaining what he would have done in a counterfactual situation
made relevant for the first time by a Supreme Court decision that issued after he left
office. Under the district court’s reasoning, a sitting President would have to make
a public, contemporaneous statement for every action he would like to take but
cannot take because of some limitation on his authority. And here, President Trump
would have had to do so with no prior notice of that requirement. This would be an
exercise in absurdity, not a basis for denying relief for constitutional harms.
"Second, the district court created and imposed on Plaintiffs new, heightened
evidentiary standards for stating a claim for a remedy under Collins."
"The Supreme Court—unlike the district
court—did not impose an additional, heightened requirement for a “concrete plan”
or “clear path” to execute the President’s intent. ROA.1518–19."
"Third, the district court improperly based its analysis on a policy judgment
that Plaintiffs’ relief would be too sweeping or invasive to the current
Administration. The district court held that Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and
injunctive relief exceeded the scope of the court’s mandate because Plaintiffs’
request for injunctive and declaratory relief “would require the Court to exercise
sweeping administrative duties based on the unachieved policy preference of a prior
Administration, impeding the current Administration’s own ability to effectuate its
policy preferences through the appointment of a new FHFA director.” ROA.1521.
For one, this broad policy consideration is again wholly outside the bounds of the
district court’s limited inquiry at the motion to dismiss stage. For another, the district
court’s reasoning fails on its own terms. Separation of powers cases of course often
carry significant policy implications. And a presidential Administration may have to
take actions it might otherwise not take in order to remedy a constitutional violation
that occurred during a prior Administration. "
