Fannie Mae-No Politics (FNMA)

[Robert from yahoo bd]

Haven't read the D.C. Circuit decision nor the other federal circuit decisions that decided it was okay to bypass the Congressional Appropriations Oversight Process.

This is from the 5th Circuit Appealate Panel Decision that references those cases: pg. 34-36:

"The Bureau also contends that because every court to consider its
funding structure has deemed it constitutionally sound, we should too.15 But
carefully considering those decisions, we must respectfully disagree with
their conclusion. Those courts found the constitutional scale tipped in the
Bureau’s favor based largely on one factor: a handful of other agencies are
also self-funded. For instance, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that “Congress
has consistently exempted financial regulators from appropriations: The
Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the National Credit Union Administration,
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency all have complete, uncapped
budgetary autonomy.” PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 95.
Such a comparison, focused only on whether other agencies possess a
degree of budgetary autonomy, mixes apples with oranges. Or, more
accurately, with a grapefruit. Even among self-funded agencies, the Bureau
is unique. The Bureau’s perpetual self-directed, double-insulated funding
structure goes a significant step further than that enjoyed by the other
agencies on offer. And none of the agencies cited above “wields enforcement
or regulatory authority remotely comparable to the authority the [Bureau]
may exercise throughout the economy.” All Am. Check Cashing, 33 F.4th at
237 (Jones, J., concurring); see also William Simpson, Above Reproach: How
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Escapes Constitutional Checks &
Balances, 36 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 343, 367–69 (2016).16 Taken
together, the Bureau’s express insulation from congressional budgetary
review, single Director answerable to the President, and plenary regulatory
authority combine to render the Bureau “an innovation with no foothold in history or tradition.” Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2202. It is thus no surprise that
the Bureau “brought to the forefront the subject of agency self-funding, a
topic previously relegated to passing scholarly references rather than front-
page news.” Charles Kruly, Self-Funding and Agency Independence, 81 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1733, 1735 (2013).
We cannot sum up better than Judge Jones did:
[T]he [Bureau]’s argument for upholding its funding
mechanism admits no limiting principle. Indeed, if the
[Bureau]’s funding mechanism is constitutional, then what
would stop Congress from similarly divorcing other agencies
from the hurly burly of the appropriations process? . . . [T]he
general threat to the Constitution’s separation of powers and
the particular threat to Congress’s supremacy over fiscal
matters are obvious. Congress may no more lawfully chip away
at its own obligation to regularly appropriate money than it may
abdicate that obligation entirely. If the [Bureau]’s funding
mechanism survives this litigation, the camel’s nose is in the
tent. When conditions are right, the rest will follow.
All Am. Check Cashing, 33 F.4th at 241 (Jones, J., concurring). The Bureau’s
funding apparatus cannot be reconciled with the Appropriations Clause and
the clause’s underpinning, the constitutional separation of powers."

Footnote 15 See, e.g., PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 95–96; CFPB v. Citizens Bank, N.A., 504 F.
Supp. 3d 39, 57 (D.R.I. 2020); CFPB v. Fair Collections & Outsourcing, Inc., No. 8:19-cv-
2817, 2020 WL 7043847, at *7-9 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2020); CFPB v. Think Finance LLC, No.
17-cv-127, 2018 WL 3707911, at *1-2 (D. Mont. Aug. 3, 2018); CFPB v. Navient Corp., No.
3:17-cv-101, 2017 WL 3380530, at *16 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017); CFPB v. ITT Educ. Services,
Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 896-97 (S.D. Ind. 2015); CFPBv. Morgan Drexen, Inc., 60 F. Supp.
3d 1082, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

Footnote 16: Neither is the Bureau’s structure comparable to mandatory spending programs
such as Social Security. The Bureau self-directs how much money to draw from the
Federal Reserve; the Social Security Administration (SSA) exercises no similar discretion.
Compare 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1) (creating Bureau funding mechanism) with 42 U.S.C. § 415
(setting parameters for Social Security benefit levels). Quite to the contrary, SSA pays
amounts Congress has determined to beneficiaries whom Congress has identified. See 42
U.S.C. § 415 (identifying amounts); 42 U.S.C. § 402 (identifying eligible individuals). The
Executive Branch’s power over “automatic” Social Security spending is therefore purely
ministerial. Furthermore, Congress retains control over the SSA via the agency’s annual
appropriations. See, e.g., Social Security Administration, Justification
of Estimates for Appropriations Committees | Fiscal Year 2023
(2022), https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY23Files/FY23-JEAC.pdf. Other benefits
payments, including Medicare and Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, are administered similarly by
agencies subject to annual appropriations set by Congress.