Fannie Mae-No Politics (FNMA)

[clarencebeaks21]

The new test for Removal of principal officers was laid out recently (in principle) in Seila Law by Roberts. In Collins, Alito’s opinion set it as controlling precedent.

This put an end to the old idea of trying to classify principal officers’ power by their functions (executive, quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial). To wit, in Seila, Roberts acknowledged *explicitly* that that old approach simply “does not track” how agencies are designed. (IMO the new test is neat also because it still retains the ad hoc balancing of functions *but relegates it to cases of inferior officers*.)

The test is simple, it asks: does a for-cause removal restriction apply to the head of a single-head agency, or, to the officials who lead a multimember agency?
Such restrictions are prohibited for a single-head, but allowable for multiple officials.

Congress can thus choose political accountability (at will single-head) or structural protections (e.g., FTC board) as a means of controlling agency power. But it cannot choose neither (See CFPB, FHFA).