The management of UDF could be good at actual management of investing
opportunities (can not really make a case either in absence of data),
but they did not explain their business model to the investors. that
was seized upon by Hayman (who I believe had a combination of analyst
who did not understand what he/she were reading and a boss with too
much ego and no self doubt).
What I am looking for at this point (beyond a legal resolution) is an
explaination for the fact that when I roll forward the numbers from
q3 2015 until q4 2020, there are > $100M that should have been created
from interest and are just not in the balance sheet right now. I
assumed quite high management fees (regardless of the fact that most
of the time activity should have been quite low) and reasonable legal
fees. the balance sheet numbers did not include what was the value of
lands in their joint ventures / partnerships. it had equity there, but
how much was the original land value and how much was it depreciated
by. I also do not know if there were any write offs during the five
years. I know about one. is the trust paying legal fees for all
entities and what is the pay back formula? I would assume that such
an expense would entitle the trust to more than 100% of the expense
from the other entities (for example, for value lost by unitholders
who sold as a result of misinformation by Hayman).
I know its a dumb question, but why would the trust not put a counter
bid to nexpoint? if nexpoint can offer $1.1, let the trust put a bid
offer of $2. the balance sheet is now out there and it should be
allowed for the trust to do so. they have $41M of cash as of q4 2020
and cash should continue to grow. buy as much as you can your own
units and when you go public again, sell it at a secondary. if
someone insists on selling low, buy it and remove it from the market.
Anyway, only my two cents.
AI
