Shareholders are misinterpreting Collins vs Yellen:
Scotus has NOT ruled out compensation from the government, but instead leaves this to the lower courts to decide, and to the plaintiffs to file additional lawsuits to seek such relief. Instead of this being a loss, there were VERY GOOD THINGS IN SCOTUS, tho not to the degree many had hoped. In short, what seems, at first glance to be a "loss" may actually ultimately be just what shareholders need to win.
In pertinet part:
(a) The threshold issues raised in the lower court or by the federal parties and appointed amicus do not bar a decision on the merits of the shareholders’ constitutional claim. Pp. 17–26.
(i) The shareholders have standing to bring their constitutional claim. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561. First, the shareholders assert that the FHFA transferred the value of their property rights in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Treasury, and that sort of pocketbook injury is a prototypical form of injury in fact. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U. S. ___, ___. Second, the shareholders’ injury is traceable to the FHFA’s adoption and implementation of the third amendment, which is responsible for the variable dividend formula. For purposes of traceability, the relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiffs’ injury can be traced to “allegedly unlawful conduct” of the defendant, not to the provision of law that is challenged. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751. Finally, a decision in the shareholders’ favor could easily lead to the award of at least some of the relief that the shareholders seek.[color=red][/color] Pp. 17–19.
(ii) The shareholders’ constitutional claim is not moot. After oral argument was held in this case, the FHFA and Treasury agreed to amend the stock purchasing agreements for a fourth time. That amendment eliminated the variable dividend formula that caused the shareholders’ injury. As a result, the shareholders no longer have any ground for prospective relief, but they retain an interest in the retrospective relief they have requested. That interest saves their constitutional claim from mootness. P. 19.
(iii) The shareholders’ constitutional claim is not barred by the Recovery Act’s “succession clause.” §4617(b)(2)(A)(i). That clause effects only a limited transfer of stockholders’ rights, namely, the rights they hold “with respect to the regulated entity” and its assets. Ibid. Here, by contrast, the shareholders assert a right that they hold in common with all other citizens who have standing to challenge the removal restriction. The succession clause therefore does not transfer to the FHFA the constitutional right at issue. Pp. 20–21.
(iv) The shareholders’ constitutional challenge can proceed even though the FHFA was led by an Acting Director, as opposed to a Senate-confirmed Director, at the time the third amendment was adopted. The harm allegedly caused by the third amendment did not come to an end during the tenure of the Acting Director who was in office when the amendment was adopted. Rather, that harm is alleged to have continued after the Acting Director was replaced by a succession of confirmed Directors, and it appears that any one of those officers could have renegotiated the companies’ dividend formula with Treasury. Because confirmed Directors chose to continue implementing the third amendment while insulated from plenary Presidential control, the survival of the shareholders’ constitutional claim does not depend on the answer to the question whether the Recovery Act restricted the removal of an Acting Director. The answer to that question could, however, have a bearing on the scope of relief that may be awarded to the shareholders. If the statute does not restrict the removal of an Acting Director, any harm resulting from actions taken under an Acting Director would not be attributable to a constitutional violation. Only harm caused by a confirmed Director’s implementation of the third amendment could then provide a basis for relief. In the Recovery Act, Congress expressly restricted the President’s power to remove a confirmed Director but said nothing of the kind with respect to an Acting Director. When a statute does not limit the President’s power to remove an agency head, the Court generally presumes that the officer serves at the President’s pleasure. See Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316. Seeing no grounds for departing from that presumption here, the Court holds that the Recovery Act’s removal restriction does not extend to an Acting Director and proceeds to the merits of the shareholders’ constitutional argument. Pp. 21–26.
Further..
That does not necessarily mean, however, that the shareholders have no entitlement to retrospective relief. Although an unconstitutional provision is never really part of the body of governing law, it is still possible for an unconstitutional provision to inflict compensable harm. The possibility that the unconstitutional restriction on the President’s power to remove a Director of the FHFA could have such an effect cannot be ruled out. The parties’ arguments on this point should be resolved in the first instance by the lower courts.
