King Ranch Of Texas, 67th Largest Certified Claimant
Case 1:21-cv-00594 https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/38743238/KING_RANCH,_INC_v_EMPRESA_AGROPECUARIA_NUEVITAS_et_al
they too are being represented by same as Exxon
Steptoe & Johnson LLP
1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
READ THIS HERE >>> LINK To Complaint whole thing very good read
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/563a4585e4b00d0211e8dd7e/t/6093e8dab30c6f27fca0fd65/1620306139500/merged_77320_-1-1620300797.pdf
Quote:
56. King Ranch has never settled the outstanding certified claim or received any payment from any entity with respect to the principal or interest due on its certified claim.
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996
57. Section 302 of the Act provides the following civil remedy:
SEC 302: (a) Civil Remedy.—
(
1) Liability for trafficking.--(A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person that, after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the effective date of this title, traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property for money damages . . . 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1).
58. Section 302 implements a key purpose of the Act, which is to permit U.S. nationals to bring claims against Cuban ministries and state-owned enterprises that engage in unlawful trafficking. For example:
a. Congress found that trafficking in property confiscated from U.S. nationals benefits “the current Cuban Government” and “undermines the foreign policy of the United States.” 22 U.S.C. § 6081(6).
b. Regarding remedies, Congress found that “[t]he international judicial system … lacks fully effective remedies” thereby permitting unjust enrichment “by governments and private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the property.” Id. § 6081(8).
c. Congress further recognized the U.S. Government’s “obligation to its citizens to provide protection against wrongful confiscations by foreign nations and their citizens, including the provision of private remedies.” Id. § 6081(10).
59. Given these findings, Section 302 of the Act unsurprisingly includes Cuban governmental entities within its scope.
60. Specifically, the definition of a “person” who may be liable for trafficking includes “any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” as defined by the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(1), (11).
61. A person is liable for trafficking in confiscated property under the Act “if that person knowingly and intentionally—
i. sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,
ii. engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or
iii. causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person, without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the property.” 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13).
62. Since King Ranch has never authorized any person to engage in the activities covered by the Act’s definition of trafficking with respect to the Confiscated Property, Section 302 provides King Ranch with a private right of action against any person—including Cuba’s stateowned enterprises—that has trafficked in the Confiscated Property.
The Act’s Presumption in Favor of Certified Claims
63. Section 302(d) of the Act mandates a presumption in favor of King Ranch’s certified claim:
There shall be a presumption that the amount for
which a person is liable . . . is the amount that is certified
[by the FCSC under the International Claims Settlement Act of
[1949]. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(2) (emphasis added).
64. The Act’s presumption in favor of certified claims extends not only to the amount of liability, but also to the claimant’s ownership and entitlement to treble damages. According to Section 303(a)(1), which deals with the “conclusiveness of certified claims,” in any action
brought under Title III, “the court shall accept as conclusive proof of ownership of an interest in property a certification of a claim to ownership of that interest that has been made by the [FCSC
under Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949].” 22 U.S.C. § 6083(a)(1) (emphasis added).
65. Under Section 302(a)(3) of the Act, “[a]ny person that traffics in confiscated property for which liability is incurred” shall be liable for treble damages if a U.S. national owns a certified claim to that property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3)(A) & (3)(C).
66. Congress intentionally conferred these entitlements on certified claims. The utilization of the certified claim process was viewed as a positive feature of the Act.
The Conference Report from the Committee of Conference states that “courts shall give a strong presumption to the findings of the FCSC.” The Conference report continued: The committee of conference recognizes the importance of a decision by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in certifying a claim and, accordingly, believes that no court should dismiss a certification in an action brought under [Title III]. The committee of conference also notes the recognized special expertise of
the FCSC in determining the amount and validity of claims to confiscated
properties overseas. H.R. Rep. 104-468, at 63 (1996).
67. Under the text of the Act and in accordance with the intent of Congress, King Ranch’s certified claim is entitled to (i) a presumption of accuracy with regard to its amount; (ii) be treated as conclusive proof with regard to King Ranch’s ownership of the Confiscated Property;
and (3) a judgment on the claim that includes treble damages.
DEMAND FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that judgment be entered in its favor and against Defendants:
a. Awarding Plaintiff actual damages in the amount of $3,216,084.97;
b. Awarding Plaintiff pre-judgment interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 1, 1960, as set forth in the FCSC’s award;
c. Awarding Plaintiff treble damages pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(3);
d. Ordering Defendants to pay Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a);
e. Awarding Plaintiff post-judgment interest; and
f. Granting all other relief at law or in equity that the Court deems just and proper.
Date: March 5, 2021 Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Steven K. Davidson
Steven K. Davidson (DC Bar #407137)
Jared R. Butcher (DC Bar #986287)
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
1330 Connecticut Ave NW
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: 202-429-3000
Facsimile: 202-429-3902
sdavidson@steptoe.com
jbutcher@steptoe.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
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