Fannie Mae-No Politics (FNMA)

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See page 38 of Selia

It has long been settled that “one section of a statute may
be repugnant to the Constitution without rendering the
whole act void.” Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees, 179 U. S. 472, 490 (1900) (quoting Treasurer of Fayette Cty. v. People’s & Drovers’ Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503, 523, 25 N. E. 697, 702 (1890)). Because a “statute bad in part is not neces-sarily void in its entirety,” “[p]rovisions within the legisla-tive power may stand if separable from the bad.” Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 289–290 (1924).
“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional
flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem,
severing any problematic portions while leaving the re-mainder intact.” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 508 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even in the absence of
a severability clause, the “traditional” rule is that “the un-
constitutional provision must be severed unless the statute
created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not
have enacted.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U. S. 678,
685 (1987). When Congress has expressly provided a sev-erability clause, our task is simplified. Ee will presume “that Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally of-fensive provision . . . unless there is strong evidence that
Congress intended otherwise.”
Id., at 686.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf