Fannie Mae (FNMA)

[obiterdictum]

I wouldnt know how to answer your question as I am not versed enough in the rules of civil procedure.

How about the level of understanding of case management and judicial discretion?

Could you answer your question?

Yes.

I will note that none of the courts addressed whether or not an article I Judge is less independent than an Article III Judge and whether or not that has any bearing on hearing a Tucker Act complaint. And as you say that was the main contention of Mr. Sammons.

That is so, and this is one reason the question was raised here.

Mr. Sammons was keen on having his complaint heard in an Article III court, where he believed the judges are more independent than Article I judges. On that account, Mr. Sammons resisted the jurisdictional direction given in the Tucker Act to put his case in the US Court of Federal Claims. Mr. Sammons did not present a cogent argument about judicial independence and a possible differential treatment of his complaint if handled in different courts by different typed judges. He simply asserted it without demonstration. Judicial discretion and judicial independence were not central issues that were argued and demonstrated in any of the courts. Thus, the courts and the oppositional party had little to say about it. It was an unsupported assertion presented with little persuasive merit.

Too bad no judges would give an opinion.

There was no substantial issue of that kind on which to present an opinion.

I wonder what the rationale was for Congress changing the Court.

That information is readily available. For example, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: a Practitioner's Perspective - https://bit.ly/2uRRbkM

My gut tells me that an Article 1 judge is less dependent and likely to side with the government due to the lack of tenure. Just the nature of being human.In my non lawyer view it has the appearance of a conflict of interest to have a term limited judge under the executive branch hear and render opinions on fifth amendment takings claims against actions from the executive branch.

How does being less dependent (is it meant here more dependent?) and having a lack of tenure lead to siding with the government?

Article I judges have 1) 15 years terms, 2) removal only for incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, engaging in the practice of law, or physical or mental disability, 3) reappointment opportunities, 4) lucrative retirement options and 5) senior judge statuses that would seem to give a great deal of independence from President and legislative influence as long as Article I judges behave themselves in office.

Article III judges appear to have greater insulation from the executive and legislative branches influence since they can only be removed through impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction in the Senate. Article III judges also serve until they die, retire, or are convicted by the Senate.

However, siding with the government may be more due to personal ideological preference, predilection, prejudice and bias that operates in decisions made regardless of Article I or Article III status. Consider the recorded judicial activism of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, the lone support of the 5th Circuit en banc against 4617(f) and the seeming support of government arguments made over plaintiffs in most GSE cases.

See:
Bias and Judging
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/msen/files/bias-judging-arps.pdf