This company is sad. The financials and disclosures are riddled with outdated information but of greater interest why does it take a year for them to convert receivables to cash? They have revenues from a year ago that have not yet converted to cash - $240K receivables up from $180K last quarter from the $60K in quarterly consulting revenues (assuming these are still for the digital consulting in Columbia and Peru - the filing no longer has transparency into the revenue source but it is the same quarterly amount so probably) while cash was stagnant at $40K with no financing cash flows in the cash flow statement despite third party loans dropping slightly with the issuance of more than 56.9MM shares at an average of just above $.004 with the conversion of a death-spiral (negative premium) convertible helping to create a 73% increase in float without any additional cash (no - they didn't dilute to put a deposit on a factory or any of the other theories that have been used in ALYI's defense) - they did reduce some of that debt but the cost of capital of using a death spiral convertible is insane and any company with ANY real value would finance much more cheaply with venture capital or strategic partner funding - let's see what the potential funding for the ANTICIPATED revenues and factory looks like (i.e., hopefully no negative premium death spiral convertibles).
We do know who HAS benefited from using ALYI to wash the purchase of useless patents
NOTE 5 - RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
As of March 31, 2019, a total of $1,831,707 was payable to former directors and former officers of the Company, which
was non-interest bearing and had no specific terms of repayment.
It will be fascinating to see what their planned management and restructuring brief this week and then "final plan" next week hold.
