Perhaps its time for an MMEX retrospective, before trading in a new week opens tomorrow morning.
Since the March 7, 2017 announcement of MMEX’s “refinery” project, over that 496-day time span, MMEX has accomplished nothing of value.
Fundamentally, the only accomplishment that would have any value is securing the necessary project financing, which would have been the very first step, before forming a shell corporation, or any other action that MMEX took.
There is only one realistic approach to entry into the refining sector - development of a full-scale, complex refinery, capable of producing marketable, transportation-grade fuels, feedstocks, and high-value refined products. There is no possibility that a phased approach, as proposed by MMEX can possibly succeed. I’ve taken time, and care since the October 2017 time-frame to point out why this is the case, along with references, both technical, and market-based, as well as existence proof (Dakota Prairie, Blue Dolphin).
Given that the only success case would be a full-scale, complex refinery, there is an associated price tag, and time-table - for a 100K bpd unit, about $850-million - more realistically, $1-billion, once blending capability, or the alternative, RIN credits, etc. are added to the package.
So stripping away all of MMEX’s B.S., failed-out-the-gate maneuvering, that leaves one real question. To finance a $1-billion infrastructure project, there are two alternatives - self-financing (something like what ExxonMobil, or a legitimate company might do), either on the books, or off-book, or the only other alternative - formation of a joint venture.
MMEX has no money, no operations, no nothing - so the self-financed route is out of the question, and was never on the table for debate.
MMEX offers nothing as a joint venture syndicate partner. A JV partner meets certain characteristics:
- it has access to significant capital (MMEX has none)
- it holds key intellectual property rights, or controls proprietary technology (MMEX has neither)
- it has significant supplier, and/or customer relationships (MMEX has none)
- it has a luminary management and/or technical team (MMEX has none)
In fact, MMEX falls so short in all four characteristics as to be diametrically opposite what’s necessary in a syndicate partner:
- MMEX is insolvent, carrying nearly $40-million in cumulative loss, liability, and current debt - its only access to “capital” is via floor-less convertible debt
- MMEX has no IP, or proprietary tech, and no team to even develop or maintain any
- MMEX can’t even form a valid, legal, enforceable supply, or delivery contract
- MMEX’s “team” is a host of grifters, con-men, failures, and nobodies, some with track records that include criminal fraud, and 30-plus years of shady business ventures and failures
So, with no possibility of self-financing, and no possibility of forming a legitimate JV, MMEX can’t obtain the necessary project financing for anything, the imaginary “Phase I(a)” “Crude RDS” is still a $10-million (or more) project, even to execute poorly. The “Phase I(b)” rudimentary topping unit, imaginary all along, would fail - there is no possibility for it to succeed economically, and it would never generate positive cash-flow.
The “Phase II” “complete refinery,” whatever that means in the imagination of Mad J., and MMEX is so far beyond the realm of reality that it is laughable to discuss it - where is an insolvent, super-dilutive shell company, with no assets, no nothing, going to come up with $1-billion…?
Then, there is the timeline, and expense for the NSR, environmental permitting required for a complex refinery. This process costs millions to prepare the review, conduct the engineering, fund the application, and competent companies require 18 to 24 months to complete it. MMEX has no chance, and would be unable to even get this process off the ground.
The whole of MMEX is nothing more than a hoax - a ruse, a charade designed to support a run-of-the-mill share-selling scheme on the OTC. The company’s SEC filings document all this - one need only read them, and evaluate them against the overall market, and the sector.
The MMEX rotting carrot on a stick was bad originally - now it is made worse by the rancid bacon wrapper of the “Crude RDS” and “Solar Power” projects. Anyone that falls for the standard OTC/Pink-sheet scam of the “bigger better deal” is getting exactly what they deserve.
After three failed, utterly blown claims of closing project financing, B.S. shareholder letters, an impaired toxic lending market, and closing below a penny for 145-consecutive trading days, there is no chance MMEX will do anything other than perhaps take on more toxic debt.
