U.S. Sidelines Exiles Who Were to Govern Iraq
Former Opposition Leaders Considered Unrepresentative and Too Disorganized
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, June 8, 2003; Page A01
BAGHDAD, June 7 -- Former Iraqi opposition leaders, many of whom were brought back from exile by the U.S. government with the expectation that they would run the country, have been largely sidelined by the U.S.-led occupation authority here, which views them as insufficiently representative and too disorganized to take charge.
In the six weeks after Baghdad fell to U.S. forces, leaders of seven political groups that had opposed former president Saddam Hussein acted with the swagger of a government in waiting. Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Pentagon-backed Iraqi National Congress, returned from London and ensconced himself with the help of his own militia in a private club in the capital's poshest neighborhood, where he received a procession of visitors who treated him with the deference due an incoming president. The chieftains of the two largest Kurdish parties traveled down to Baghdad from autonomous northern Iraq to hold court in large hotels surrounded by dozens of heavily armed guards. Other political leaders wooed people by touting their parties as key participants in a new government.
But as a scorching June heat envelops Baghdad, plans to cede power to the former opposition leaders have evaporated. Taking advantage of a recently passed U.N. Security Council resolution that gives the United States and Britain broad authority to run Iraq, the top U.S. civil administrator here, L. Paul Bremer III, said he intends to appoint Iraqis to a council that will advise him on policy decisions instead of endorsing the formation of a full interim government, which the former opposition leaders had hoped to lead. Bremer has promised that the council will include a spectrum of Iraqis and not be dominated by former exiles.
In a recent meeting with the seven leaders, Bremer told them they "don't represent the country," participants said. U.S. officials said he repeatedly asked the Iraqis to broaden their coalition to include women, Christians and tribal chiefs, but they failed to do so.
Rebuffed by Bremer, the former opposition leaders are quietly regrouping. One of the top two Kurdish leaders, Jalal Talabani, has left Baghdad. Chalabi's group moved out of the Mansour Hunting Club and into less prominent accommodations this week. His militia, the 700-member Free Iraq Forces, an American-trained contingent of paramilitary fighters, was disbanded last month on Bremer's order.
Representatives of the seven political organizations now devote much of their regular "leadership council" meetings to talking about how to regain political influence with the United States.
The decision not to hand over power to the former opposition leaders through a hastily formed transitional government, which U.S. officials here said was made by the White House, means the United States will occupy Iraq much longer than initially planned, acting as the ultimate authority for governing the country until a new constitution is authored, national elections held and a new government installed. One senior U.S. official here predicted that process could last two years or more.
"The idea that some in Washington had -- that we would come in here, set up the ministries, turn it all over to the seven and get out of Dodge in a few months -- was unrealistic," the official said.
"We gave them a chance," the official said. "We bankrolled some of them. But they just couldn't get their act together. It was amateur hour."
The initial backing of the exiles was a contentious issue within the Bush administration. Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress was championed by the Pentagon, which provided him with a liaison officer to the U.S. Central Command. Many in the State Department and the CIA, however, opposed support for Chalabi, arguing that he would not emerge as a national leader.
Some U.S. officials here said the decision to back away from the exiles was part of a broader restructuring of the U.S. postwar occupation strategy that included the deployment of more troops to stem looting and the replacement of the initial civil administrator, retired Lt. Gen. Jay M. Garner, with Bremer.
Some of the returning leaders were viewed with suspicion by Iraqis who never left the country. Signs denouncing Chalabi, a banker who had been living in London, appeared on walls almost as quickly as those posted by his supporters.
In addition, after living for years in the West, many found it difficult to adjust to the austere conditions in postwar Iraq. One top leader complained of getting diarrhea from drinking tap water. Others said they missed family they left behind in Britain and the United States.
Former opposition leaders argue that U.S. officials underestimated the difficulty in building support and party infrastructure in a country where, for 35 years, no political organization except for Hussein's Baath Party was allowed. "We all have extensive contacts, but there is a lot we are doing from scratch," said Entifadh Qanbar, a top official with the Iraqi National Congress.
Even so, party leaders contend that they have made significant inroads, signing up thousands of new members and opening scores of new offices. They also point to Chalabi's extensive discussions with tribal leaders and Muslim clerics, and to Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani's meeting on Thursday with Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, one of the most senior Shiite Muslim clerics in Iraq.
"We share Mr. Bremer's belief in a broad, representative government," said Hoshyar Zebari, a top aide to Barzani.
Bremer's decision to rely on a council of 25 to 30 members instead of devolving power to a transitional government has riled many of the former opposition leaders, who say that the Bush administration has reneged on commitments to let them be in charge.
"This is a regression of what the U.S. had promised us," Qanbar said.
"We should not be sidelined," he said. "We should not be looked at as unrepresentative. In any democracy, there is no government that represents everybody."
In a last-ditch effort to influence the interim administration, the former opposition leaders have insisted that the participants be selected through a national assembly they would organize. Such a forum could give them a chance to ensure that the council was stacked with their members and allies.
Bremer, however, has rejected that request, insisting that it would take too long to convene an assembly and that it could be prone to manipulation by former Baathists and radical Islamic clerics. He said he will handpick the council, although he has promised to engage in broad consultations with Iraqis.
In response, one of two Shiite parties among the seven, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, threatened today to boycott the advisory council if members are selected by Bremer.
"If he's going to appoint an administration, we can't be part of that," said Hamid Bayati, a top Supreme Council official. "We will only be part of an administration selected by the Iraqi people. There are certain lines which we cannot cross."
Bayati expressed dismay that Bremer would try to marginalize parties that have pledged to cooperate with the United States and that serve as a link to important segments of Iraqi society. The Supreme Council, which had been based in Iran, is one of the largest parties representing Iraq's politically influential Shiite majority.
"If they sideline the former opposition groups, who are they going to consult with?" he said. "If he doesn't take the view of the seven groups, what other Iraqi groups can replace them?"
U.S. officials in the occupation authority say there are other Iraqis -- who opposed Hussein but did not go into exile -- who could serve as advisers to the United States and as possible future political leaders. As a first step in that direction, Bremer invited 10 more Iraqis to join a meeting on Friday evening with representatives of the seven former exile groups. The additional participants, most of whom stayed in the country during Hussein's rule, included three women, two tribal chiefs, a newly elected local mayor and a Muslim religious scholar.
"Before we got here, we had to depend on the exiles," one U.S. official said. "That's no longer the case."
In an attempt to address some of the participants' concerns about the council's role, the official said Bremer pledged to let the members provide advice on policy decisions and select interim leaders of some ministries. But representatives from three of the seven parties said today that those concessions would not assuage them.
The frustration of former exiles extends beyond those seeking a role in politics. Some Iraqis who have recently returned under Pentagon sponsorship to serve as technical advisers to government ministries complained that promises of significant responsibility have not been kept.
"Our role is very limited," said Isam Khafaji, a professor who had been living in the Netherlands and was sent to Iraq last month as part of the Defense Department's Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council. "We're not allowed to make any decisions."
The 150-member group had been billed by the Pentagon as a way to bring exiles with specific technical experience back to the country to help resuscitate ministries. The participants were expected to stay for about 90 days and serve as advisers to ministerial employees and U.S. officials.
Khafaji, who left Iraq in 1978, said he and several others were told they would have a chance to play a key role in reshaping the ministries. Instead, he said, he and other council members have been relegated to such dull tasks as translating for Americans and screening ministry employees for senior Baath Party members.
Some members said they were thinking of quitting if they were not given more authority and responsibility.
"We've been marginalized and humiliated," one returning exile said. "We came here to help, to make a difference. Now it looks like nobody wants us."
© 2003 The Washington Post Company
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