is...waitin for the government to get rite for the people
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Ya then theyll bash us for a .0000001 of a penny draw from treasury lol
Ty for looking into it Guido
Doesnt the final rule for the UMBS take effect today.
Treasury Consent for Enterprise Actions
Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must obtain Treasury approval for certain actions, the original agreements allowed exceptions. In 2012, an additional exception was added. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac no longer need Treasury consent for asset disposition as long as the fair market value of the asset is less than $250 million.
Anyone know what these cases in the 5th circuit are about
No. 18-20336 Sylvia Zepeda v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Appellant.
* No. 18-11211 Stephanie Warren, Appellant v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Etc.
HOWARD ON MORTGAGE FINANCE
The Beginning of the End
jtimothyhoward
3 hours ago
More than ten years after Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship, and more than two years after Treasury Secretary-designate Steven Mnuchin said to Bloomberg News, “It makes no sense that [the companies] are owned by the government and have been controlled by the government for as long as they have,” and that “we gotta get them out of government control….and we’ll get it done reasonably fast,” the White House made its first formal pronouncement on this issue in a March 27 memorandum on Federal Housing Finance Reform, saying “The housing finance system of the United States is in urgent need of reform,” and for that reason “the Secretary of Treasury is hereby directed to develop a plan for legislative and administrative reforms” of this system.
Participants in and followers of the secondary mortgage market reform dialogue rightly view the White House memorandum as a significant development, but beyond that there is little agreement as to what it means for how, when or even whether the longstanding battle over the fates of Fannie and Freddie might be resolved. Proper interpretation of the memo, I believe, requires an understanding of the context in which it was produced.
The debate over Fannie and Freddie’s role in U.S housing finance has been going on for decades. It has elements that are ideological, political and competitive. It has cut across administrations, and been driven more by institutions than individuals. Since the Reagan administration the most consistent institutional participant in what I call “the mortgage wars” has been Treasury, whose position for the last forty years has been that Fannie and Freddie’s federal charters give them too much market power and allow them to take too much risk, and that for those reasons their operations should at least be constrained and perhaps eliminated entirely. Supporters of the companies argue that the benefits of their charters flow primarily to low- and moderate-income homebuyers, that their interest rate and credit risks have been well controlled, and that the motive of many of their opponents is to shift market power and profits to primary market lenders at homebuyers’ expense.
The 2008 financial crisis presented Treasury with a unique opportunity to gain control of two companies it had historically opposed by effectively nationalizing them in the guise of a rescue, then using them to help stabilize the housing market after the private-label securities market imploded and banks had curtailed their lending because of the massive amounts of high-risk mortgages on their books. As I documented in my amicus curiae brief for the Jacobs-Hindes lawsuit in Delaware, Fannie and Freddie were taken over not because they were the weakest sources of mortgage financing going into the crisis but because they were the strongest. The conservatorships of Fannie and Freddie were pre-planned by Treasury for policy purposes, done without statutory authority and against the will of the companies’ managements, then handed to FHFA as a fait accompli to be carried out, which they were.
Treasury’s stated rationale for pushing Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship was that their regulatory capital was overstated because of favorable accounting treatments that made them look far stronger than they “truly” were. Consistent with this contention, FHFA as conservator and at the direction of Treasury booked a series of non-cash accounting expenses at both companies that totaled a mammoth $326 billion through the end of 2011. This wiped out their capital and forced them to draw $187 billion in non-repayable senior preferred stock from Treasury, on which they were required to pay an annual dividend of 10 percent after tax. But because the great majority of the accounting entries were based on extremely pessimistic estimates or only were timing differences, in 2012 they began to reverse, and in huge amounts. In just 18 months Fannie and Freddie recorded a combined $158 billion in book earnings, half again what they had earned over their entire existence. To prevent these earnings from becoming a torrent of returning capital—making it obvious that the companies’ failures had been engineered—in August of 2012 Treasury and FHFA amended the terms of their conservatorships to require all of their earnings to be paid to Treasury in perpetuity, in what was called the net worth sweep.
At the time they agreed to the net worth sweep both Treasury and FHFA were committed to managing Fannie and Freddie in a way that accommodated and would encourage a wind-down of their operations and their ultimate replacement by Congress. A Draft Internal Memorandum to Secretary Geithner produced at Treasury in December 2011 contained “a plan with FHFA to transition the GSEs from their current business model of direct guarantor to a model more aligned with our longer-term vision of housing finance.” Components of this plan included guaranty fee increases that would continue “until pricing reaches levels that are consistent with those charged by private financial institutions with Basel III capital standards,” securitized sharing of credit risk, a single security for Fannie and Freddie and a “faster retained portfolio wind down”—all of which were put into effect. FHFA for its part published a strategic plan in February 2012 titled “The Next Chapter in a Story That Needs an Ending,” one of whose three principal goals was to “Gradually contract the Enterprises’ dominant presence in the marketplace while simplifying and shrinking their operations.”
What Treasury and FHFA wanted for Fannie and Freddie also was what the large banks wanted. To get it, they, their allies, affiliated trade groups and other supporters went to work drafting legislation aimed at replacing the companies with entities or mechanisms less threatening to banks’ underwriting and pricing flexibilities in the primary market. But in executing this task they fell victim to their own fictions. Their self-serving but false mantra of Fannie and Freddie as a “failed business model” ruled out the use of the main structures, elements or techniques the companies had used so successfully for decades. Instead, a series of proposals from Corker-Warner to Johnson-Crapo to the “Promising Road” to the Milken Institute’s “New Secondary Mortgage Market” all relied on new, mostly theoretical, generally incomplete and always unproven features that made them too risky for a $10 trillion market central to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy. None could gain broad support, and legislative reform stalled.
In the meantime, a second group was thinking about the futures of Fannie and Freddie. The net worth sweep had come as a shock to the companies’ investors, and several of the larger ones filed suit against Treasury and FHFA under various theories of the law. One set of suits claimed that because the sweep violated the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) that created FHFA and gave it its powers of conservatorship and receivership, the sweep should be reversed and the capital swept by Treasury returned to the companies. Plaintiffs in another set of suits claimed that the sweep was an illegal government taking; these plaintiffs were granted discovery in their cases, and documents produced in that discovery showed Treasury had devised the net worth sweep not for the reason it gave the public at the time—to prevent Fannie and Freddie from a “death spiral” of borrowing to meet their 10 percent annual dividend requirement—but instead to keep them from being able to retain the capital Treasury knew was about to come back to them from the reversal of the effects of the non-cash book entries made by FHFA.
Armed with the facts about the companies’ financial condition and prospects, and confident that the suits challenging the legality of the net worth sweep at some point would meet with success, a group of non-litigating shareholders hired an investment bank, Moelis & Company, to develop a plan to recapitalize Fannie and Freddie and return them to private ownership. Moelis published its “Blueprint for Restoring Safety and Soundness to the GSEs” in June 2017, and updated that plan in November 2018. The Moelis plan does not require legislation; it relies on existing FHFA and Treasury authorities to set new capital standards for Fannie and Freddie, strengthen their regulation, and allow them to exit conservatorship following a series of new equity issues. Moelis also contends that under its plan Treasury, as holder of warrants for 79.9 percent of the companies’ existing common stock, could earn $100 to $125 billion from sales of stock acquired upon exercise of those warrants.
The Moelis administrative reform path developed and supported by investors created a viable alternative to the legislative reform path advocated by banks, and it had one crucial advantage: it was based on fact and market reality and could be implemented immediately, whereas all previous bank-sponsored reform plans had been based on fiction and theory and had failed to gain traction. Secretary Mnuchin did not comment publicly on the Moelis plan, but continued to say he would prefer a legislative solution or an administrative plan with bipartisan Congressional support. After the November mid-terms, however, this posture became untenable. With the Democrats in control of the House of Representatives, even the staunchest bank supporters were not expecting reform legislation before 2020, and the two political parties are known to have different priorities for an administrative solution. As a consequence, Treasury now recognizes that to change the status quo for Fannie and Freddie it will have to take the lead, and make difficult choices.
As it does, Treasury will be working with a new director at FHFA—Mark Calabria, who was nominated to his position last December and confirmed by the Senate on April 4. Calabria appeals to both investors and banks, but for different reasons. Investors like the fact that he is an outspoken critic of the net worth sweep, contending, as one of the principal authors of HERA when he was a staffer for the Senate Banking Committee in 2008, that it violates the plain text of the law as well as established practices of conservatorship and receivership on which the law is based. Banks like the fact that Calabria is a long-time critic of Fannie and Freddie and the roles they play in our financial system. In a paper done for the Urban Institute in 2016, Calabria referred to mortgage securitization as “a false god that failed us,” and argued for mortgage lending to return to the “originate and hold model” of depository institutions, going so far as to recommend that Fannie and Freddie be given bank charters and converted to bank holding companies. And as recently as last week Calabria said he thought part of his job was to “urge Congress to act” to change the companies’ charters, because “I think we should go to a different model.”
It is against this complex backdrop that the Federal Housing Finance Reform memorandum from the White House can best be assessed. We know it was authored by Larry Kudlow, the Director of the National Economic Council and Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, because it stipulates that “The Treasury Housing Reform Plan shall be submitted to the President for approval, through the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.” Kudlow is not a neutral participant. He has been unfriendly to Fannie and Freddie since at least the mid-1980s, when he was assistant to David Stockman at the Office of Management and Budget and Stockman’s point person for trying to get Congress to impose what were called “user fees” on the companies’ debt, to raise their cost of borrowing.
I interpret both the timing and the substance of the White House memo as an attempt by Kudlow to insert himself into the mortgage reform process to the benefit of the banks, who now are seeking to achieve through administrative reform what they previously had been seeking through legislation. Numerous elements of the memo reveal a pro-bank bias. Its very first paragraph states that Fannie and Freddie “suffered significant losses due to their structural flaws and lack of sufficient regulatory oversight.” That’s the (provably false) bank argument. The memo then sets as the second goal of mortgage reform, after ending the conservatorships, “Facilitating competition in the housing finance market,” and lists as a sub-objective “authorizing the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to approve guarantors of conventional loans in the secondary market.” The multi-guarantor model is what the banks support, and is the opposite of the utility model favored by investors, affordable housing groups and community banks. Making “facilitating competition” a core objective of the reform process rather than an option to be assessed on its merits puts a heavy pro-bank thumb on Treasury’s scale.
Treasury’s institutional history of opposition to Fannie and Freddie, the involvement of Kudlow and Calabria, and the White House directive to Mnuchin to produce the Treasury Housing Reform Plan “as soon as practicable” all strongly suggest that the banks stand an excellent chance of getting what they want from this process. Yet they face a formidable obstacle that I doubt even Treasury fully understands, and I suspect Kudlow and Calabria do not at all: in an administrative reform process the investment community has effective veto power over any significant proposed changes to Fannie and Freddie, because the companies cannot be recapitalized without the new equity these investors must provide. Precisely for this reason, the weak and ineffective versions of Fannie and Freddie that the banks have put forth for so long in legislation simply are not options in an administrative process. For investors to put new capital into Fannie and Freddie, the companies must be set up to succeed, not struggle.
As Treasury and FHFA engage in serious dialogues with plaintiffs in the lawsuits about settlement and institutional investors about recapitalization, I believe they will realize that they and the investment community have very different views about Fannie and Freddie’s business operations, what has been done to them in the past, and what must be done to revive them as private companies in the future. Treasury and FHFA will find that investors do not share the view that Fannie and Freddie need to be drastically overhauled because they are a “failed business model” and caused the financial crisis (they know neither of these claims are true), nor do they share the goal of reducing the companies’ market power for the benefit of primary market lenders. And investors are acutely aware that since 2012 Treasury has been taking (they would say illegally) all of Fannie and Freddie’s profits to keep them in conservatorship while it decides what to do with them, and they will need to be convinced that nothing similar will occur in the future.
I can’t predict what particular set of proposals for Fannie and Freddie’s capital standards and regulatory postures will be deemed acceptable by investors, and thus permit the companies’ reform and recapitalization to go forward. But I do believe that FHFA’s most recent version of its risk-based capital standard and Mark Calabria’s advocacy of having Congress eliminate the companies’ charters each will need to change. As I noted in my public comment, FHFA’s June 2018 risk-based capital proposal has too many elements of conservatism designed to back into a “bank-like” average capital ratio that is incompatible with the risks of the credit guaranty business to which Fannie and Fannie are restricted, and which if not removed will limit the scope of the companies’ business, distort their risk profiles, and make them less profitable for no good reason. FHFA also must eliminate the standard’s extreme procyclicality, caused by linking the companies’ required capital to the market value of their loans (which no other financial regulator does). And, of course, Fannie and Freddie’s regulator cannot be asking investors to put capital into them at the same time as it advocates repealing the charters that give them their market value.
It won’t be an easy process—and it may take the prodding of a reversal by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals en banc of the net worth sweep to get there—but I believe Treasury and FHFA ultimately will have no alternative but to shape, and to pledge to regulate, the Fannie and Freddie of the future in a way that gives investors confidence that the companies will be successful, in spite of what the banks want. If I’m right and this occurs, then the White House memo of March 27 will prove to have been the beginning of the end of Fannie and Freddie’s more than decade-long conservatorships.
Lookin for green all week with maybe a small red scare before earnings. Doubt a release but earnings do matter. We need over 1.5. A surprise would be really nice only reinforcing a plan is in place and already working on the trial as it comes to an end. Enbanc ruling....all I gotta say is this could be a WOW week. Cross whateva you got. By the way all freddie if I sound bias lol
First time in I cant remember since they both reprted the same day. I smell boom smoke.
I think 1.98 is quite possible but I sure hope not!
The whole stock market is a gamble man. Geeze get some nuts and stand up for whats rite. This is a literal war for our democracy dont you see it. The constitution isbeing completwly threatened everywhere. Which side are you on!
I dunno if im reading that rite but with all the math that equation only adds 172 million shares to the new ipo. That would put us at net .05pps! WHAT ARE YOU SAYIN SPOCK!
Whatinsisweinfor
Hope so. Ive had no luck and im really beginning to wonder wtf rite now. stress level is a movin up again on this crappola
Anyone know what the freddie refi loan purchase was in feb? 11.3 bill for march. I believe delinquincys fell 2 basis pts also. I dont thi k its as bad as its made out to look. These loans are all in the prime for rate and refis is all Im questioning
29th monday. really seems ultra quiet on that. I cant even find any links to it to listen
most likely in steps and not all at once. Recap now would be nice way to start off the earnings calls!
I agree. June or maybe a lil sooner. we'll see.
As for teaching her to drive stick, been workin on that forever. Last Thursday was 23 years, but she still prefers her paddles
Newspapers report the same thing over and over about reform. Yet nobody reports the fact that we are at the brink of disaster in the housing market.
Markets are at all time highs and pushing for growth but the money just isnt in the hands of the people to do so. 400k homes are barely in reach for the average joe. Let alone a 700k. Down payments are unattainable especially when as a renter your paying 40+ % of your income. Saving even 20k for a down takes the average joe over 20 years at 400 bucks a month.
Lems would rather buy a ferrari thats wrecked to show how cool they is first and waste 6 years on that payment before buying a roof. Give us back our Fannies and I will buy another home then a buy a ferrai that needs a new clutch
Just my opinion. If congress does nothing now it will be the same in 6 months. If the WH does nothing they plain ole wont be focussed on this in 6 months. Treasury will have waited to long if they sell in 6 months. The houseing market will be at peak in 6months, most likely already starting a decline and signs of recession. Not that the entities wont still be worth alot but all the air in the ballon will be gone. I for one am gonna be done with this in the next couple months. Ive had it. Rode some other stocks on the way up but this has literally been the bigest turd ever other than playing with the volatility
According to a freddie mac report. Miami is the highest rent burdened city in the country with renters paying over 41% of their income toward rent. That is 2100 dollars a month!
We have matching ferraris but diff color lol
Is Carson even anybody anymore. His indian and ankle tat girl are members of FhFA now
Excercise 150 billion in warrants between the two entities? Where the hell does that leave us. Theyve already taken over 200billion as it is.
Fannie and Freddie's Uncertain Future, ExplainedBY CHRISTINA REXRODE AND HEATHER SEIDEL | DOW JONES & COMPANY, INC. - 11:17 AM ET
Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Freddie Mac (FMCC) are the heart of the U.S. housing system.
They're also a topic of intense debate.
The Trump administration recently asked for plans to overhaul Fannie and Freddie. It also installed a new official to oversee the two companies, and he says he wants to put them on the road toward returning to private hands. Yet lawmakers have spent the last decade arguing about how big they should be and how much the government should be involved in their operations. Some have said they shouldn't exist at all.
So what's the hangup?
Fannie and Freddie make mortgages more readily available and more affordable. The 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage essentially owes its existence to them. But some argue that the private market could fill this role more efficiently. Right now, there isn't much agreement on either side of the aisle on how to change the government's involvement in mortgages or what the market would look like without the two companies.
The government created Fannie in response to the Great Depression to encourage banks to make more home loans. Fannie and Freddie buy mortgages from banks, alleviating some of the risk that lenders have to take on.
Almost half of mortgages made today are backed by Fannie and Freddie.
Critics of this system say the private sector, not the government, should be filling this role, and the White House has said it wants more competition. Private firms make up just a tiny portion of this market now.
Those who support the current setup point out that private firms tend to exit whenever a market starts to turn sour. That means credit can dry up at a time when the economy is already struggling, making a downturn worse.
Supporters also say the government has a responsibility to keep housing affordable. For many Americans, owning a home has been the most important way to build wealth.
This is how the two companies work:
Why is this process so important?
Banks are wary of making mortgages they have to keep on their books. For one reason, they're then on the hook if a borrower stops paying.
Banks are also worried about interest rates rising and falling. Say a lender gives you a mortgage with a 4% fixed interest rate, and then rates rise. The bank can't then increase the rate on your mortgage. That's good for you but bad for the bank, which is now holding a mortgage that is less valuable.
But lenders aren't so concerned about these risks if they sell the mortgages.
If lenders couldn't sell their mortgages, they would probably make fewer of them, charge higher interest rates and require bigger down payments.
That means that without Fannie and Freddie, few lenders likely would offer the 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage.
This product is practically considered an American birthright. But in other countries, where mortgage systems are funded differently, the 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage isn't widely available.
Mortgages in the U.S. were also much different before Fannie was created. Back then, mortgage loans often had floating rates and typically lasted for just five or 10 years, with a big balloon payment that came due at the end.
Some economists argue that allowing mortgage rates to fluctuate with the broader market would help borrowers. Rates tend to fall in a recession, which would give home buyers a discount on their monthly payment when they most need it.
But Americans tend to like the certainty of fixed rates. Even a 1-point change in your mortgage's interest rate can add -- or subtract -- hundreds of dollars from your monthly payment.
U.S. borrowers flocked to adjustable-rate mortgages in the run-up to the financial crisis, but they returned to the 30-year, fixed-rate loan after the housing bubble burst in 2008. Today, more than 90% of U.S. home buyers choose this product.
And this is our backing. Quite a list:
NQ OwnersAmg Funds Iv Cash Account Trust Aim Counselor Series Trust (invesco Counselor Series Trust) Hartford Hls Series Fund Ii Inc Jnl Series TrustRivernorth/doubleline Strategic Opportunity Fund, Inc. Master Large Cap Series Llc Janus Detroit Street Trust Deutsche Money Market TrustBlackrock Balanced Capital Fund, Inc.State Farm Associates Funds TrustsPimco Income Opportunity FundCapital World Bond Fund Advisorone Funds Pioneer Money Market TrustThompson Im Funds Inc City National Rochdale Funds Morgan Stanley Mortgage Securities Trust Ab Global Bond Fund, Inc. FS Global Credit Opportunities Fund Natixis Funds Trust I Legg Mason Partners Money Market Trust Legg Mason Partners Variable Income Trust Cavanal Hill Funds Deutsche Global/international Fund, Inc. Fs Global Credit Opportunities Fund-d Praxis Mutual Funds Blackrock Muniholdings Quality Fund Ii, Inc. Fs Global Credit Opportunities Fund-a John Hancock Hedged Equity & Income Fund Aim Treasurers Series Trust (invesco Treasurer's Series Trust) Mfs Municipal Income Trust Vanguard Money Market Reserves State Street Navigator Securities Lending TrustShort-term Bond Fund Of AmericaJohn Hancock Funds Iii Mfs Series Trust Iv American Century Strategic Asset Allocations Inc Amg Funds IiiJohn Hancock Funds Ii Timothy PlanPutnam Premier Income Trust Pimco Strategic Income Fund, Inc Fs Global Credit Opportunities Fund - AdvNeuberger Berman Income FundsNatixis Etf Trust Putnam U S Government Income Trust Wesmark Funds Wilshire Mutual Funds IncFidelity Salem Street Trust Investment Co Of America Allianz Funds Multi-strategy Trust Federated Adjustable Rate Securities Fund Mfs Series Trust V Global Macro Absolute Return Advantage Portfolio Federated U S Government Securities Fund 1-3 YearsCalamos Investment Trust/il First Investors Income Funds Thrivent Core Funds Jpmorgan Institutional TrustPace Select Advisors Trust Deutsche Municipal Trust Pimco Income Strategy Fund Ii Bond Fund Of AmericaVanguard Cmt Funds Mutual Of America Institutional Funds Inc Virtus Equity Trust Gps Funds I Transamerica Series Trust Blackrock Funds IiGlenmede Fund Inc Sit U S Government Securities Fund IncBrinker Capital Destinations TrustWestern Asset Variable Rate Strategic Fund Inc. Managed Account Series IiMfs Series Trust Ix American Beacon Funds Wells Fargo Master TrustWestern Asset Municipal High Income Fund Inc. Ishares Trust Blackstone Alternative Investment Funds Money Market Portfolios John Hancock Variable Insurance Trust Eaton Vance Municipals Trust Ii Pimco Income Strategy Fund Vanguard Valley Forge Funds Blackrock Long-term Municipal Advantage Trust Manager Directed Portfolios Fs Global Credit Opportunities Fund - T Forethought Variable Insurance Trust Sit Mutual Funds Ii Inc Deutsche Market TrustMaster Bond Llc Pimco Global Stocksplus & Income Fund Putnam Asset Allocation Funds Putnam Master Intermediate Income TrustPrudential Investment Portfolios, Inc. 14 Mutual Of America Investment CorpBrandes Investment Trust First Investors Life Series Funds Global Opportunities Portfolio Harbor FundsVoya Funds Trust Etfis Series Trust IAmerican Century Government Income Trust Bny Mellon Funds Trust Trust For Advised Portfolios American Century Target Maturities Trust College Retirement Equities Fund Credit Suisse Trust State Street Variable Insurance Series Funds Inc Pimco Flexible Credit Income Fund Prudential Investment Portfolios 9 First Investors Equity Funds Mainstay Funds Pimco High Income Fund
There is plentiful news out there. So much that its getting hard to know which to believe. Everytime we see a sign and get hopes up only to be dashed by "oh in about 6 months" or here comes another court ruling failing our cause. Lets not forget about all the gasbags and Lems. Theyre really F ed but lets give em some props of hope so theyll keep giving us their money to support our bs system of politics.
Its not like we havnt felt like this before. Its becoming a way of living. I agree F this. FFFFF
2 more K deals posted today that will settle just in time for earnings.
June change.Trunk obviously didnt read this PC initiatives will be
Freddie Mac: Investor Reporting Change Initiative Revisions Will Start in May>FMCCDOW JONES & COMPANY, INC. - 5 MINUTES AGO
change effective/complete June 6th
Freddie Mac Announces Updates to PCs for Investor Reporting Change InitiativeGLOBENEWSWIRE - 13 MINUTES AGO
MCLEAN, Va., April 23, 2019 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Freddie Mac (FMCC) announced today that, beginning in May 2019, its Investor Reporting Change Initiative (IRCI) will revise Single-Family investor reporting requirements. This includes moving the investor reporting cycle from mid-month to end-of-month and updating remittance cycles.
The company is making the changes to promote alignment and industry standards for the Uniform Mortgage Backed Security (UMBS).
IRCI updates will be effective beginning with the June 6, 2019 monthly factor/disclosure for all currently issued PCs. This initiative will also apply to the new Freddie Mac UMBS and MBS, which Freddie Mac (FMCC) expects it will begin issuing on June 3, 2019.
For more information regarding the IRCI changes for PCs, please refer to http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/docs/f354news.pdf ;
or, for details on the IRCI effort, please visit http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/service/investor_reporting_changes.html.
Freddie Mac (FMCC) makes home possible for millions of families and individuals by providing mortgage capital to lenders. Since our creation by Congress in 1970, we’ve made housing more accessible and affordable for homebuyers and renters in communities nationwide. We are building a better housing finance system for homebuyers, renters, lenders and taxpayers. Learn more at FreddieMac.com, Twitter @FreddieMac and Freddie Mac’s blog FreddieMac.com/blog.
Is it just me or does Shazar just exemplify the monotony of these types of articles. Its all babble anymore.
Thank you kthomp. I find it interesting that 7 day is the amount of working days from the earnings release. Also we are all standing around with one foot on the wall for any sign of an enbanc ruling. We are in for the ride of our lives.
Can anyone post some concrete evidence as to where the Sweeney case is. The last I recall she told them to come back last December or November,somewhere around there with a viable resolution whatever happened to that resolution. Then all of the sudden the en banc is all everyone can talk about and here we are 90 days and no peep of a resolution there
Can anyone post some concrete evidence as to where the Sweeney case is. The last I recall she told them to come back last December or November,somewhere around there with a viable resolution whatever happened to that resolution. Then all of the sudden the en banc is all everyone can talk about and here we are 90 days and no peep of a resolution there
Buys in the 10s of thousands. If you sell now your falling into the trap. Big dogs ar now kickin the ball back n forth. Dont be the guy caught in the middle chasing the keep away
Absolutely believably unbelievable jaw droppin scared pressure manipulating attack on all the unsure yellow bellied liver eating lems selling. SUCKERS!
Has anyone else noticed the vagueness of any plan being completed much less implemented. IMO whenever this actually happens its gonna blindside everyone. Just dont see anything leaking as to a direction, it just cant be like that or someone on the other side would call it insider trading.
Lets see. Pay the bills or add more before friday????
Messing with this stock has got to be my biggest life mistake. Sitting here waiting for a measly 10 bucks a share for 10 years. WTF WAS I THINKING!
Its always at its darkest before the light. We shall see very very soon!
I agree