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Yes ... I agree ... nice to see logic at work and facts that are not fabricated out of the ether ....
Don’t Kill Fannie Mae
By JOE NOCERA
Nice article .... found on the g-group ... thanks 20cent ....
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/opinion/nocera-dont-kill-fannie-mae.html?emc=edit_tnt_20130812&tntemail0=y&_r=0
"To quantify the impact, Zandi says that a 50-basis-point rise in g-fees on a standard, prime 30-year mortgage would boost the monthly payment by $75 for the average mortgage borrower. And even though mortgage rates have risen from 3.59% in early May to about 4.7% recently, affordability isn't thought to be a problem for most buyers until rates exceed 6% or housing prices zoom another 20% or so, observers say."
hmmm .... let's think about this ... I know I've heard this some where before .... Oh yea now I remember there was this guy who said .....
"The first sound they'll hear is their heads hitting the floor"
But ..... that shouldn't be a problem observers say .....
Fannie, Freddie: On Borrowed Time Page 2 and 3
While this scenario might sound plausible, it's improbable, say many Washington hands. For one thing, claims Jaret Seiberg of asset manager Guggenheim Partners, the reputation of Fannie and Freddie has become "too toxic" for them to continue to exist.
For another, Congress and Treasury are loath to share the billions of dollars that Fannie and Freddie now generate with private investors, particularly in the current environment of deficit reduction and budget stringency. The big checks the mortgage giants have recently cut allowed the donnybrook between the Republicans and Democrats over raising the debt ceiling to be put off by three months.
In other words, what happens in Washington stays in Washington. The GSEs' bailout is crucially different from that of insurer AIG, where the government made a profit ($23 billion on its net outlay of about $155 billion), and the old capital structure was preserved. As a result of the 2008 conservatorships, both Fannie and Freddie effectively became arms of the federal government, completely reliant on its guarantee of all the companies' obligations for their existence.
Otherwise, the two agencies would have died. Or, as Moody's Zandi notes, "Taxpayers took all the downside following the seizure of Fannie and Freddie, so one wonders why the common and junior-preferred shareholders should get any of the upside." As a result, it seems probable that both the common and junior preferred holders will ultimately be toast.
In part, Fannie and Freddie are now paying the price for their long and seamy history in Washington. No agencies of government operated in as meretricious fashion as Fannie and Freddie in the decade leading up to their demise. The companies lavished hundreds of millions of dollars in political donations and lobbying fees to literally all of K Street, and on high-paying executive appointments to leading Democratic and Republican operatives and former key congressional staffers.
Both companies got caught in the mid-2000s cooking their books in order to meet earnings targets that maximized executive bonuses. At the same time, they used their muscle in Congress to bully their regulators and keep their capital levels at risibly inadequate levels.
Their implied (now explicit) government backing of their debt allowed them to raise money at low, Treasury-like rates and then plunge those proceeds into higher-yielding risky instruments like, in the end, subprime and Alt-A securities for their investment portfolios. By the middle of the last decade, the value of these portfolios had soared to over $1.5 trillion. They were akin to internal hedge funds that supplied most of the agencies' profits and the earnings growth so important to shareholders and bonus-hungry GSE executives. And the game worked like a charm until housing prices began their relentless decline in 2006.
FANNIE AND FREDDIE'S renewed profitability is largely testimony to the tough love exerted by their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The agencies have been able to boost their g-fees to about 50 basis points from 20 basis points before the 2008 collapse. Credit standards on the mortgages in their $4.5 trillion guarantee portfolio have been raised. The typical mortgage guaranteed today has a conservative loan-to-value of 80%, a strong borrower credit score of 750, and a loan-to-income ratio of no more than 31%. Also, the two companies have been helped by a stronger home real-estate market that has both reduced loan delinquencies and defaults and boosted their recoveries on foreclosed properties.
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Despite the recent observations that Fannie and Freddie's combined dividends by late this year or early next will at least equal the $187 billion owed the government, it's not a foregone conclusion that the taxpayer will be fully repaid. Of the $187 billion total, some $80 billion represent markups by both Fannie and Freddie of an accounting item called deferred-tax assets.
These are intangible assets that will only be turned into actual cash in years to come if the companies generate sufficient income to realize tax savings from their past losses. In the interim, the two GSEs will have to boost their net debt by using cash and borrowings to write the dividend checks to the government covering the DTA markups. In reality, the government is no better off financially: It also backstops the net debt of Fannie and Freddie.
Also, one can't be sure that Fannie and Freddie can keep their current yearly run rate of profits of a combined $20 billion to $25 billion that so many of the junior-preferred shareholders are counting on. Under FHFA direction, the GSEs are continuing to pare their internal investment portfolios by about 15% a year. Already, these high-earning portfolios have dropped to $1.1 trillion from $1.5 trillion at their peak.
Likewise, the GSEs' operations figure to be squeezed under the various reform plans, as the caps on the size of the mortgages they buy and then guarantee drop from the current level of $625,000 to $417,000 over five years. Then, too, though positive house-price cycles tend to have some longevity, one can't be sure what lies ahead for U.S. housing or the economy.
DESPITE THE ANTIPATHY of House Republicans like Texas' Hensarling toward any government role in the home-mortgage market, the final reform package will likely include a larger role for Washington than just supporting the FHA and other low-income mortgage programs. The Corker-Warner proposal, with its envisioned backing of 90% of the risk in qualifying MBS, will likely be part of a new hybrid system expected to evolve with private capital. This new system will rely in part on some of Wall Street's more sophisticated modern financing techniques: MBS deal structures with portions that push all the risk onto investors, risk-sharing via credit defaults, and capital cushions provided by issuers and insurers of government-backed MBS. Combined, these changes will provide a 10% first-loss level of protection to the government.
Why not just cut out the government? For one thing, private capital doesn't have the best record in home-mortgage finance. A recent Moody's report (see table below) notes that investors suffered a huge 20.3% loss on private-label mortgage securities totaling $449.4 billion on the $2.2 trillion in principal outstanding at year-end 2007, the veritable eve of destruction for U.S. housing. This was on the toxic paper unleashed by Wall Street backed by the subprime, Alt-A, option ARMs, and jumbo mortgages that proliferated in the years leading up to the crisis.
I think it is a three pager .... but never let it be known that mrfid gave up with out a fight ...
page 1
Even after their financial collapse and massive taxpayer-funded bailout, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are still the colossi of the U.S. home-mortgage market. They own or guarantee repayment on more than half of the system's $10 trillion in outstanding mortgage debt. More astonishing, these agencies are making money again -- lots of it -- under tightened government supervision and aided by strengthening home prices. Once their second-quarter numbers are released, they will show that the duo will have returned in dividends about $131 billion of the $187 billion that the government had to infuse into them following their September 2008 seizure.
The recent news from the two has been so encouraging that their delisted common shares are up about 500%; the price of their preferred stock has gained about 200%, as opportunistic hedge and mutual funds wager that the two will survive -- albeit heavily reorganized and privatized -- and eventually offer the kinds of big share payouts that investors reaped from American International Group (ticker: AIG), among other casualties of the financial crisis.
Don't bet on it. There is little appetite in Congress or elsewhere to permit the two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) ever again to exploit their federal charters, with the cheaper borrowing costs and implicit government backstop of their obligations, to enrich shareholders and leave the American taxpayers to pick up the pieces when the model blows up. Two legislative proposals have emerged in recent weeks, one in the House and one in the Senate, that call for the agencies' operations to be wound down, their charters revoked, and their remaining assets sold off in the ignominy of a receivership. In any event, it's highly unlikely that the common or preferred shares hold any lasting value.
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Michael Witte for Barron's
While the process will take some time, since no final legislation is likely to emerge until after the 2014 midterm elections, what is more probable than Fannie or Freddie's revival is the emergence of a hybrid American mortgage system in which the government has a lesser but continuing role as guarantor. The private sector will play a bigger part, but will also have to assume more risk. One result for prospective homeowners: The rate for a standard mortgage will be higher, possibly a half percentage point or more than under the current system.
THE DISCUSSION DRAFT of the House bill, grandly called the Protecting American Taxpayers & Homeowners Act, or PATH, reflects the visceral disdain that Texas Republican Rep. Jeb Hensarling, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, has for any government role in housing finance other than a much slimmed down Federal Housing Administration extending loans to first-time mortgage borrowers and low- and moderate-income buyers. More than enough private capital exists in banks, insurance companies, and other financial entities to completely take over Fannie and Freddie functions, Hensarling feels. "Hardworking taxpayers must never again be asked to bail out banks and corrupt government enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," reads one of the talking points in the PATH release.
Far more measured is the bipartisan Senate bill, quarterbacked by Tennessee Republican Bob Corker and Virginia Democrat Mark Warner, even though it too snuffs out Fannie and Freddie after five years. It would create a new federal entity, the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corp., to insure 90% of any qualifying mortgage-backed security, with private-capital MBS issuers and insurers taking the first 10% of any portfolio losses. Under the current system, Fannie and Freddie insure 100% of qualifying securities.
The chances of any losses "attaching" to FMIC would be remote, with the 10% private-capital cushion and 20% minimum homeowner equity requirement under current tightened underwriting standards. Nonetheless, many observers think there must some federal backup to insure liquidity in the mortgage market. If we learned anything from the recent financial crisis, private capital took a powder when the going got rough, whether it was in the private-label MBS market or the availability of funding in the interbank markets.
Mortgage rates, however, will rise as a result of the demise of Fannie and Freddie, with their once implicit and now explicit backing of all their obligations, whether the agencies' debt outstanding or their primary business insuring the payment of interest and principal in all agency MBS. Mark Zandi, head of Moody's Analytics and an oft-mentioned candidate for federal housing czar as chief of FMIC, estimates that guarantee-fees (called "g-fees") in a hybrid system could jump anywhere from 20 basis points (a basis point is one-hundredth of a percent) to 60 basis points (0.6%) from the current agency level of about 50 basis points. In a totally privatized system, the market would probably dictate a nearly 90-basis point jump in mortgage rates.
To quantify the impact, Zandi says that a 50-basis-point rise in g-fees on a standard, prime 30-year mortgage would boost the monthly payment by $75 for the average mortgage borrower. And even though mortgage rates have risen from 3.59% in early May to about 4.7% recently, affordability isn't thought to be a problem for most buyers until rates exceed 6% or housing prices zoom another 20% or so, observers say.
"The g-fee increases likely under a hybrid reform system won't be nearly as meaningful a factor in boosting mortgage rates and potentially short-circuiting the housing market as the Federal Reserve's eventual wind-down of its $1.2 trillion in portfolio holdings of government-backed mortgage-backed security," claims Bose George, an analyst at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. Still, the two factors could mean a pretty substantial mortgage-rate rise ahead.
THE RECENT SURGE in Fannie and Freddie profitability has triggered a fight over the GSE carcasses to be. Several investors, such as hedge fund Perry Capital and Bruce Berkowitz's mutual fund Fairholme Fund (FAIRX), which bought the old preferred stock of Fannie and Freddie on the cheap, have filed lawsuits seeking to overturn an agreement that the government reached with the GSEs last August. The pact permitted Treasury to sweep away virtually all Fannie and Freddie profits (actually any increase in the two entities' net worth) as dividends on the taxpayers' $187 billion in capital infusions. That money constitutes the face amount of a special class of senior-preferred stock. The lawsuits contend that the agreement is an overreach by the government that siphons off potential returns to holders of the junior-preferred and even common stock holders -- Ralph Nader is a shareholder who has complained publicly of mistreatment -- of the pre-bailout Fannie and Freddie.
These securities were virtual roadkill after the government in 2008 put Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship and cut off all dividends to existing preferred shareholders. Since then, the stocks were delisted and sank to a low of about 20 cents a share, while the preferred sank to about $1.50 on their par value of about $25. But with the GSEs again making money, the main classes of preferred have jumped from under $2 a share to about $5, reaching a high of over $6.50 in May. (See chart below.) Meantime, day traders have played hacky sack with the common, pushing prices up recently to about $1.50 a share. Briefly in May, the capitalizations of the two companies on a fully diluted basis exceeded $40 billion, when a spasm of short covering drove the two stocks above $4 a share.
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Hedge-fund managers, including billionaire John Paulson of Paulson & Co., have been lobbying Congress hard not to overlook the interests of the junior-preferred holders, of which he is one. They argue that profits generated by the GSEs should instead be used to recapitalize Fannie and Freddie. Then all the preferred shares could be converted into common stock with the senior and junior shares receiving allotments commensurate with their size in the capital structure. That would allow taxpayers to be more than completely compensated through public offerings for their $187 billion bailout with plenty of money likely left over for the $33 billion in junior preferreds to be made whole.
Is this the one Joe ....
Barron's Cover | SATURDAY, JULY 27, 2013
Fannie, Freddie: On Borrowed Time
By JONATHAN R. LAING
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748704755304578621870811760716.html?mod=TWM_pastedition_1#articleTabs_article%3D1
if the link is broken just google "Fannie, Freddie: On Borrowed Time" .... I was able to read it that way
this looks like the one you are referencing .... not really and article though ....
http://www.streetinsider.com/Rumors/Fannie+Mae+(FNMA),+Freddie+Mac+(FMCC)+Stock+to+Be+Worthless+-+Barrons/8539262.html
Lew says stubborn Congress risks repeating U.S. fiscal .... wounds
http://news.yahoo.com/lew-says-stubborn-congress-risks-repeating-u-fiscal-131024700.html
Would be fun to know the cost to taxpayers every time clowngress decides they wann'a puff up and take a moral stance against all this run away spending and such ....
oh I'm sorry it's clearly the GSE's fault ... all that money the GSE's paid this summer in divi's surely have caused a rip in the space time continuum .... lucky for us taxpayers we have these guy's in our corner drag'n their feets and look'n out for the little guy .... can't git me enough of that good ol Daddy Fix .... add water ... makes it's own sauce!!! ....
Right on Beta ... I see yer grrrr and raise it by two "Dang nabit #^!@'s !!!"
in the end nothing but spin from most of these articles
it does get old ....
Why are you guy's so harsh on brother Wheel ...
I'm sure tis nuthing but a case of "Inquiring Minds wan'a know"
:)
"She declined to say what law she was referring to, or otherwise elaborate on her statement. So it isn't clear what she was talking about."
could it be the ... don't show yer cards til the bet'n is done ..... law
Naw ...make a lot of noise and let em know were coming .....
If this is the best they've got .... let them come ....
and remember no one fires until we see the whites of their eyes ...
Hey!! what about mrfidlsticks ...I'm just sit'n here watch'n the the world go round ..... I tried to get all up in the fray with my Fuk-cow-ee post but ... nobody said nutt'n so I done pulled the plug ... and I got's the laugh track up on craigs list .... Hey I could'a been the King of Flint .... don't ya Know .... don't need Tex'as fer shore .... but hep me to sum of the chick'n pick'n if ya don't mind .....
lego you are so right ....
"Notice in the bought Media THERE HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY NO DISCUSSION of even the existence of Capuano's Bill. And practically all media articles repeat the Big Lie that Fannie and Freddie are broke, caused the Housing Crisis blah etc. "
The lawsuits provide so much more info then the Media seems willing to to share with it's readership .... we now seem to have shifted slightly away from they (the GSE's ) caused a massive crack in the earth's crust .... to they (the GSE's ) are a massive lotto play ... with possible tie's to the native peoples known far and wide as the Fuk-cow-ees ... one prominent member of clowngress was quick to acknowledg his membership to the tribe ... where upon arriving at the capitol in DC he was observed proudly anouncing ....
Where the Fuk-cow-ee ....
What they want us to believe ... (cue America The Beautiful .... )
“It is important to remember that U.S. taxpayers provided over $187 billion in exceptional support to these two entities to maintain their solvency, protect the broader economy and support continued access to mortgage credit for millions of American families,” Treasury said in an e-mailed statement. “We fully believe our actions have been lawful and appropriate.”
From the PERRY CAPITAL Lawsuit comes another view .....(cue Nazareth .... Now Yer Mess'n with a son'of a'bitch .... )
41. Once in conservatorship, the Companies incurred substantial impairments to their balance sheets. The Companies, under the direction of the FHFA, expected to incur substantial loan losses in the coming years and did not expect to be profitable. Thus, the Companies booked substantial reserves—recorded loan losses before actually incurring them—and under applicable accounting standards, eliminated the value of non-cash deferred tax assets from their balance sheets.
42. These impairments set off a harmful feedback loop that required the Companies to draw increasing amounts against Treasury’s funding commitment. Because of the accounting
adjustments, the Companies had less capital and therefore needed capital from Treasury to operate. And because of their depleted operating capital, the Companies also sometimes lacked the funds necessary to pay Treasury the quarterly dividends due under the PSPAs. This required the Companies to draw additional funds from Treasury’s funding commitment in order to pay the ividends. All of these draws increased the amount of Treasury’s aggregate liquidation preference, and thus the amount of dividends payable to Treasury. Under the PSPAs, as amended, Treasury infused approximately $187 billion into the Companies and received
approximately $55 billion in return in the form of dividends and other fees between 2008 and 2012.
Here ya ar ....
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2435
sum mo if ya want ....
About half way down .... "Last week I introduced H.R. 2435: “Let the GSEs Pay Us Back” "
http://www.house.gov/capuano/e-updates/eu2013-06-24.shtml
ok ... fair enough ... if they come look'n fer ya ... I'll tell em ya went..
that a way ....
Mine has been billed as the perfect country and western song ...
Your's .... well any more like that and you might might be look'n at hard time in sing sing ...
I agree on the mod's .... this is viewed by most as a starting point it seems to me many are in agreement that it will take time to hammer out anything with a real chance to gain any traction ...
and time is on our side ... now we use that time to ... sit back relax have a coke .... grab yer git'ar and play a tune ....
Well I was drunk the day my mom got out of prison
And I went to pick her up in the rain
But before I could get to the station in the pick-up truck
She got runned over by a damned old train
Here is yer link ld ...
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?play=1&video=3000178350
OK thanks Cotton ... I just sent mine ....
I'm a long time reader / ct owner .... not to much of a poster ...
anyway thanks everyone for all the info this is a great group ... very lucky to have found the board .... I'll post any reply's I might receive
Coming from the CBO and the with the reference to Freddie I say nice find and thanks for the link!
David ..here is a link to a spreadsheet with the info ....
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AoGfU7_pX6tndFg1MjdxMER4T0hHVW1FLUgxVGxZNkE#gid=0
OT Hi camaro ...I am also very excited and feel this is a life changing event .... but I can't help but ask one question of you .... do you see a new Camaro in you future mabe a 69 Z or an SS ... mine will be a 70 Boss 302 .... I've got the car bought in my 20's never had the money to do the restore but looks like that might change .... (fingers crossed) .... thanks camaro and everyone long term on the board ... see ya at the party you'll know me when the Boss backs in next to the Camaro ..... Rock On!!
rant away .. it's all good here ...
I'm with you ... how much are we over reserved and how much of the debt we owe is directly tied to the "over reserves" and then how often and how much of new draws were tied to being forced to the over reserves .... I've heard of compound interest ... were these draws on "over reserves" compound debt .... it stinks ....
ok .... my rant over also ... mabey a case of the compound rant
Yes Excellent and then some ... every time we see a story like this based on logic and truth .... I see the reform guy's standing on an ever thining ledge .... alone ... naked .... and cold ....
it's been a long ride but maybe it's been worth it ....
taint posted this link on g-groups .... very cool nice positive spin .... if this is a sign of the future ... then maybe sunny days ahead ....
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/gse-critics-ignore-loan-performance-1059187-1.html?pg=1
GSE Critics Ignore Loan Performance
David Fiderer
MAY 17, 2013 9:00am ET
Money talks. It says the only way to measure the quality of mortgage underwriting is to track loan performance — delinquency and default rates, loss severity — in comparison with the rest of the mortgage market. Otherwise, any analysis of the government-sponsored enterprises' role in housing finance is meaningless.
And yet, critics demanding GSE reform ignore the topic altogether. Search through any book or article promoting the thesis that the GSEs helped cause the mortgage crisis for a passage comparing GSE loan performance with the rest of the market. Almost certainly, you will come up empty-handed.
There is no data anywhere to cast doubt on the vastly superior loan performance of the GSEs. Year after year, decade after decade, before, during and after the housing crash, GSE loan performance has consistently been two-to-six times better than that of any other segment of the market. The numbers are irrefutable, and they show that the entire case against GSE underwriting standards, and their role in the financial crisis, is based on social stereotyping, smoke and mirrors, and little else.
Consider Fannie Mae's historical loan performance, reported each year by the Federal Housing Finance Agency in its Annual Report to Congress. Over a span of 37 years, from 1971 through 2007, Fannie's average annual loss rate on its mortgage book was about four basis points. Losses were disproportionately worse during the crisis years, 2008 through 2011, when Fannie's average annual loss rate was 52 basis points. Freddie Mac's results are comparable.
By way of contrast, during the 1991–2007 period, commercial banks' average annual loss rate on single family mortgages was about 15 basis points. During the 2008-2011 period, annual losses were 184 basis points.
Or check out the FHFA study that compares, on an apples-to-apples basis, GSEs loan originations with those for private label securitizations. The study segments loans four ways, by ARMs-versus-fixed-rate, as well as by vintage, by FICO score and by loan-to-value ratio. In almost every one of 1800 different comparisons covering years 2001 through 2008, GSE loan performance was exponentially better. On average, GSE fixed-rate loans performed four times better, and GSE ARMs performed five times better.
Mortgage analyst Laurie Goodman estimated that private label securitizations issued during 2005-2007 incurred a loss rate of 24%, whereas the GSE loss rate for 2005-2007 vintage loans was closer to 4%.
And yet, large numbers of people remain convinced that Fannie and Freddie's underwriting standards caused the mortgage crisis. Why is that? The only plausible answer is that people are besotted by social stereotypes. Words like "government" and "affordable housing goals" make them jump to the unsupported conclusion that underwriting standards were compromised.
GSE critics seem disconnected from the world of business, which draws keen distinctions among words, actions and final results. In the real world, Edward Pinto's expansive definitions of "subprime" and "Alt-A," used by the American Enterprise Institute and others, have no impact on loan performance data. Neither does the allegedly overbearing personality of former Fannie CEO Jim Johnson. Nor do any selected quotations of Barney Frank.
GSE critics also claim that Fannie and Freddie led the rest of the market in a race to the bottom. This fanciful theory is based on a series of false equivalencies, wherein low-income borrowers are considered no different from subprime borrowers, and no different from those who took out two-year teaser rates or liar loans.
This race-to-the-bottom narrative implies that GSE securitizations are the same as private label securitizations, as if concepts like, "nonrecourse," or "originate to distribute," versus "buy and hold," are not meaningful.
Since every GSE mortgage securitization benefits from a corporate guarantee, GSEs' retention of credit risk is diversified among huge portfolios of low risk loans booked before, during and after the bubble. By way of contrast, a private label securitization is a single static portfolio in liquidation. So it made no sense for private label deals to mimic GSE credit standards.
And yet, Sen. Johnny Isakson, R-Ga., addressing an audience of industry professionals last month at the Zillow Forum on the Future of Housing, persisted in repeating the myth that Fannie and Freddie's underwriting standards caused the crisis.
Soon thereafter Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., greeted the nomination of Rep. Mel Watt, D-NC, to head up the FHFA by declaring, "The debate around his nomination will illuminate for all Americans why Fannie and Freddie failed so miserably."
Let's finally have an honest debate about the GSEs. Because the only way to illuminate what happened is to examine loan performance data.
David Fiderer has previously worked in energy banking for more than 20 years. He is currently working on a book about the rating agencies.
I agree this guy won't say sh*t even if he has a mouth full..
But how bout this exchange ...
WSJ: Should Fannie and Freddie be wound down?
Mr. Watt: There is general—almost unanimous—consensus that we should move as much of this back into the private sector as quickly as can be done. There’s virtual unanimity.
What part of the private sector are we talking .... how bout the part that currently is invested in GSE stock I wonder if current shareholders are private enough ....
Yes up less than 1% in terms of RV ...
But my get in was slightly under 5% of RV ....
I first bought common in early 09 and have followed the board from way back then ... so after all crap this lottery ticket has taken me thru the 1% today makes me very happy .... and thanx to all for the many great posts along the way !!
I have learned alot and will have no regrets no matter how the finish
There's got to be some kind of way out of here
Said the Joker to the Thief
Too much confusion
I can't get no relief
Business men they drink my wine
Plow men dig my earth
None of them along the line
Know what any of it's worth
No reason to get excited
The Thief, he kindly spoke
There are many here among us
Who think that life is but a joke
But you and I we've been through all that
And this is not our fate
So let us not talk falsely, now
The hour is getting late
Burma Shave ......
Very Cool ..... touché camaro
We shall serv no wine before it's time ...... the fix is in
John Paulson ... Paulson & Co. Inc. (“Paulson”) is an investment management firm ...
From Wikipedia "In December 2009, the New York Times reported that Paulson had profited during the financial crisis of 2007 by betting against synthetic collateralized debt obligations"
Now it looks like he betting the other way .... but hey if he wants to drag those blood sucking ZOMBIE GSE's out to the light of day ..... well I guess that's ok ...as long as he knows if those things soil the carpet he's gonna clean it up ....
Paulson Leads Hedge-Fund Lobby Push to Privatize Fannie
Some News .....
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-30/paulson-leads-hedge-fund-lobby-push-to-privatize-fannie.html?cmpid=yhoo
Yes .... thanx I'm good at reading .. not so much with the posting ..
seems to me you are right on ... it is hard for me to understand exactly what these two did to deserve the full support and attention our fine government has showered upon them ....
now that word shower kind'a congers up images of ol Jerry Sandusky
I can hear em now .... Fannie .... Freddie ... get in hear Ol Uncle Gov needs to wash that back side ...
This according to Wikipedia .....
Over 98% of Fannie's loans were paying timely during 2008.[49] Both Fannie and Freddie had positive net worth as of the date of the takeover, meaning the value of their assets exceeded their liabilities.
If this was at the front side of conservartorship ...
And from the FHFA Fact sheet QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON CONSERVATORSHIP ....
"The FHFA, as Conservator, may take all actions necessary and appropriate to (1) put the
Company in a sound and solvent condition and (2) carry on the Company’s business and
preserve and conserve the assets and property of the Company."
It seems to me it's the goverment that's got sum splain'ing to do .... but what do I know Im just a troll sitt'n on my Ivory ....
Very Cool .....
Make mine a Mustang ... I bought my 70 Boss 302 in the 80's ...
I still have it .... if my preferreds ever catch legs I might be able to afford some proper ethyl too .... :)
Heal Fast .. Take Care .... and have a great Holiday!
Freddie Mac battles FHFA, banks over foreclosure plan, WSJ reports ....
Whats up ... is this another case of the man keeping me down ....
link http://finance.yahoo.com/news/freddie-mac-battles-fhfa-banks-100616736.html
Freddie Mac (FMCC) is battling its regulator and Wall Street over a plan to provide loans to investors that are buying homes in foreclosure to rent them out, reports the Wall Street Journal. Freddie wants to finance these investors to help jump-start a housing recovery. But the Federal Housing Finance Agency put that on hold, concerned it would make it difficult for banks to compete for the growing number of buyers of foreclosed homes, sources say, as well as increase the government's role. Banks told the FHFA that they can provide plenty of loans to investors.
Any old growth rosewood laying around here ....