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We are all guessing on the warrants and everything else. I am confident that the rule of law will be upheld.
i disagree...
I still think the warrants will get cancelled.
This guy has no valid legal background if he is trying to argue that the law shouldn't be followed. He needs to understand that folks like Theodore Olsen do understand the law. He picks the winning side and argues for them. He doesn't care if it is the liberal view or the conservative view. He only cares if it is the winning(legal) view. See Bush vs. Gore or DOMA that went to the Supreme Court. One is supposedly conservative and the other is supposedly liberal.
Also see Richard Epstein. These guys understand the constitution and law.
Nuff said.
Nice post Donotunderstand. You clearly understand.
Correct. I just posted the minimum amount. That is what it would be today.... Not a huge difference but is is a little different.
Correction.... A few months ago, I looked at it. If they resume dividends, it will be @ 7.75% on this cusip.(the minimum amount)
I agree, rosen. To expect to take the entire company for support(that was charged 10% interest with a 79.9% warrant) is laughable.
It would be like Warren Buffett saying that he deserves Goldman Sachs, GE and BAC for giving them support in '08. That without his support, they would have been bankrupt.
While it may be true, it cannot be done in hindsight. Also.... No shareholders would have taken the deal to be wiped for support for the business. They would have done like Lehman and said: "screw you, I would rather go bankrupt(as a shareholder) and take my chances of getting something then give you the company for zero compensation."(AKA nothing) That is why the lawsuits have merit. No shareholder is going to willingly give up ownership rights for zero dollars. For Geitner or anyone else to say that it is so, doesn't make it so.
For them to say that the board/DeMarco/whoever agreed to it for the bondholders is also laughable. Just wait until one of the staffers tells the gov't that they won't lie under oath. That always seems to put pressure on the situation.
There is no way they didn't talk about the DTA and loan loss reserves in August, 2012. Somebody is going to sing eventually.....
Are we giving up our shares "for the good of the country"? No Comrade!!! I am not.
Doc Emmett Brown is not getting into the delorean and taking us September 1, 2008. The deal was not for the whole company. Paulson publicly stated that shareholders were still "alive". It was on paper and publicly stated. They need to give just compensayion if they are taking the property. Otherwise, releasing them is the legal, moral and ethical thing to do.
Taoif looks interesting. Those are my kind of plays. While they can bleed, they have little to no risk of bankruptcy(due to zero debt, etc) and plenty of catalysts on the upside. I always like real estate and tons of patents over hope on oilfields. Given how many possibilities, it is worth a play. thanks for the post.
That is terrible. I am saying prayers for him and his loved ones. I hope his grandson can recover. Burns are always terrible.
This just got posted to the other board... I hadn't seen it for some reason so I figured you guys may not have either.
http://washingtonexaminer.com/ralph-nader-predicts-survival-of-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac/article/2547457?custom_click=rss
Also take note that the judge may either allow the discovery to be made public or may seal it depending on the situation. Only the discovery status updates(related to how discovery is going) is open to the public. It will be apparent that the gov't is stalling if they even attempt it. THEN things will get interesting and it will be covered negatively in the press how the gov't is stalling. It might end up like "W's" second term. At the end(from '06 on after Katrina in '05), he could do nothing right....
You can only participate by being there in person. There is no option for the public to "dial in" to the discovery status conference calls. Only attorneys for the parties and related parties can dial in.
Cool. Thanks for the message. Hopefully, I'll get to meet all of you guys in Vegas. Being in this for five years, it is a long time coming.
Are you the guy on the left or the right?(behind the lady in the yellow dress)
I wear a suit to work every day. They actually cost about as much as a pair of expensive blue jeans if you buy nice wool ones online and have them tailored at men's wearhouse for 30 bucks.
I'll probably get buried in a suit. The guys at work say that I either wear a suit or some really ratty clothes(sweat pants, workout shorts...)
I don't think they'll want to bury me in a T-shirt and shorts....
Also.... Is that T-Fud on the far left in the tan/light brown sweater? That is pretty much how I pictured him if it is.....
You don't need to agree. It's cool. I think 16 million dollars is a big trade (500 shares of FNMFO @ $33,000). You don't. You were trying to buy 50 FNMFO? wow. That's over 5 million in redemp value. I have a couple of shares of FNMFO....
You can buy mine for 105,000 if you want em!
The trades may be related to her order.... Keep in mind, not all discovery has to be made public. Most or all of it may, but if the judge orders it sealed, it will be. My guess is that she will allow almost(if not all) of it to be public. It is up to her discretion, though.
Her ruling was that all of the telephonic conference calls be open for any attorney related to the cases and an open courtroom to the public for the discovery status updates to the judge. That should put some pressure on the gov't to stop the stall tactics that they likely were going to attempt to employ.
Public scrutiny in the press can be terrible. The gov't does not want to look totalitarian in this case. Trying to override/overrule a judge in her courtroom will show very poorly on the attorneys and by extension, the gov't.
actually just over 50 million in redemption value traded today. 500 shares....
Discovery may not all be public.
The discovery conferences with the judge giving status updates will be public... It is still big because shenanigans will be in the public's view.
The gov't will probably try to keep as much of the discovery non-public as possible.
They will try to quash much of discovery calling "executive privilege.
I've been to Yellowstone. It's nice. I went for a day. My buddy was driving. Saw 'Ole Faithful. kinda cool.
Maybe if you go to the grand canyon, I could meet you for a drink there....
FNMFO traded 500 shares today. that is a big deal.
Someone big is selling and someone big is buying.
That is the equivalent of 2 million FNMAS all done in a couple of minutes.
http://ih.advfn.com/p.php?pid=squote&symbol=fnmfo
That's cool. At some point, I think we are doing it, though.... This is going to happen. I won't even care where we go. I honestly have no interest in Las Vegas. The Grand Canyon is more up my alley.
I have been in this since 2009.(the preferreds) It will be a long time coming.
I'd like to meet all of you guys. Hopefully, I will get the chance.
John Paulson. He is one of the biggest, baddest hedge fund guys.
I have seen you post for years on here and Yahoo with the same name. You can always hang with me. The preferred folks are planning to go to Vegas and have been for a long time. I don't even think I will like Vegas(more of a ski bum) but I want to meet a few of the guys including Beta Highlander. Heck, I'd like to meet Ebano. Although he knows nothing about capital structure and seemingly little about investing, he was correct that the commons had value.....
The volume was super heavy at the end. My guess is that there is court news/lawsuit news that is out but not fully disseminated.
Maybe Jimmy Buffet... A pirate looks at 40.
Margaritaville? It's 5 o'clock somewhere?(the live version)
I was just pointing out that he hasn't been in this for quite some time. Plenty of very smart hedge funds are. Good luck with your trades.
Not a buy or sell recco.
200 FNMFO traded today too. that is 20 million redemption value(approx since it is technically 105,000) for you home players(around 6.4 million in cash at today's price)
Buffett got out of FRE in 1999 or 2000. I doubt he spoke with Paulson back then(Paulson was probably at GS and not a friend of his). He is too involved with the gov't to buy these(many of his entities are insurance/re-insurance)
I don't think he'll ever buy these again....
Latest from Epstein:
Mr. Epstein latest legal briefs on FNF- interesting reading
The Past, Present and Future of Fannie and Freddie: Government Intransigence on the Current Lawsuits Could Make It Impossible to Reprivatize the Residential Mortgage Market
APRIL 9, 2014
By Richard A. Epstein
Today, the momentum is growing for fundamentally restructuring the national residential mortgage market in the wake of the earlier collapse of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, or "Fannie Mae") and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC, or "Freddie Mac). These two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)--so-called in recognition of their hybrid public/private nature--have long written large chunks of the residential home mortgage market, to the tune of trillions of dollars. The current legislative fixes now on the table include a bipartisan proposal from Tim Johnson and Mike Crapo, coupled with an earlier entry by Maxine Waters. The Johnson-Crapo proposal follows on earlier entries from Jeb Hensarling on the House side and Bob Corker on the Senate side. Each of these proposals seeks simultaneously to unwind the past and to redefine the future. To evaluate them requires understanding the historical linkage between past events and future prospects.
To begin, some background. In response to the brewing subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, Congress in late July of that year passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA). That legislation, inter alia, created a new Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which on September 7, 2008 placed into a conservatorship both GSEs. These conservatorships were intended to keep both entities alive in order to facilitate their return to the private market. They were not receiverships whose object is the orderly liquidation of the two businesses. The basic plan called for an infusion of up to $200 billion in fresh cash into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under a Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (SPSPA) that gave the government warrants, exercisable at a nominal price, to acquire a 79.9 percent ownership stake in each enterprise. In exchange for that advance the senior preferred stock carried a 10 percent annual dividend payment, which went up to 12 percent if the GSEs delayed their dividend payments on the senior preferred.
The terms of that deal were radically altered in August 2012, when the United States, acting through the Treasury Department, imposed, through the Third Amendment to the 2008 SPSPA, a "net worth sweep" that entitled the government to 100 percent dividends on future earnings. That one bold stroke effectively made it impossible for the GSEs to repay their loans and rebuild their capital stock. Both the junior preferred stockholders and the common shareholders could under this agreement never receive a dime from either GSE, even after the entities returned to profitability. Assessing this gambit requires understanding two things: first, the relationship between the Third Amendment and the original 2008 SPSPA; and second, the relationship between the Third Amendment and efforts to revitalize the housing market. Both relationships are widely misunderstood today.
Prior Writings In July, 2013, I attacked the Third Amendment for its refusal to allow for any pay down of the $188 billion in advances made under the 2008 SPSPA. The government did so on the dubious ground that it could repudiate its obligations in the name of "taxpayer protection." At that time, the Third Amendment meant that some $59 billion in designated dividends should have been recharacterized first as a payment of accrued interest, and afterwards as a return of capital, which necessarily would reduce the interest payments going forward, and speed the path toward reprivatizing Fannie and Freddie. As I wrote then, "even if the 2008 transaction stands, the 2012 transaction should be nullified, and the private and common shares restored."
Thereafter in November, 2013, I attacked the position that the government took in its litigation with Washington Federal, where it sought by a variety of procedural devices to prevent the case from being heard. There is no question that many legal and factual obstacles stand in the path of any suit under the 2008 SPSPA, especially in comparison with the Third Amendment. But it hardly follows that those plaintiffs do not deserve their day in court, as the government has claimed by insisting that they do not have standing to bring this lawsuit.
Finally, in March of this year, I attacked the government position in the strongest possible terms in light of the recent revelations by Gretchen Morgenson's New York Times article, "The Untouchable Profits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac." As Morgenson revealed, the Treasury and FHFA had decided as early as December 2010 to block Fannie and Freddie shareholders from sharing in the profits of the newly revived entities.
The current attacks on the Fannie and Freddie shareholders have not in my view come to grips with the key implications of the 2008 SPSPA and its August 2012 Third Amendment. Hence this further commentary on the topic.
The 2008 SPSPA In 2008, the government explicitly decided to keep both Fannie and Freddie alive in a conservatorship, which it was allowed to do under HERA. That decision may well have made sense for a whole variety of reasons. Forcing both companies into premature liquidation could have further roiled the financial markets. Even if it did not, there was an ongoing dispute--a dispute that remains, and on which I take no position--as to whether the stock of Fannie and Freddie was totally worthless or whether the liquid assets of both companies would have allowed them to ride out the storm without going bankrupt. Indeed, even in liquidation, shareholders have the right to claim their residual equity in their shares, thus opening the door to extensive evidence on valuation--evidence that could be highly sensitive to the time that is chosen for liquidation.
Avoiding these issues made perfectly good sense, but the conservatorship itself presented a new round of issues on just how to value the contribution to equity made under the SPSPA. On this point, Senator Bob Corker thinks that Fannie and Freddie and their shareholders have no beef at all stating, "While I'm always glad when taxpayers see a return on investment, we can't forget that Fannie and Freddie wouldn't be earning one penny today without the government guaranteeing their transactions."
To this argument there are two replies. The first is that Fannie and Freddie may never had gotten into the mess if the United States had not insisted that it make high-risk loans to low- and moderate-income housing, first under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (HCDA), as amended in 2007. In 1992, 30 percent of GSE loans were devoted to these programs. By 2007, that target had been raised to 55 percent. The conditions attached to the 1992 Act could be satisfied only in some financial Nirvana, for the legislation announced that Freddie and Freddie "have an affirmative obligation to facilitate the financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families in a manner consistent with their overall public purposes, while maintaining a strong financial condition and a reasonable economic return . . . ." No one can do both simultaneously. It is a financial impossibility to increase the number of high-risk loans, without courting disaster in the event of a market downturn. Yet nothing in the Corker calculations takes this heavy obligation into account. Instead, he focuses exclusively on the government's implicit guarantee of Fannie and Freddie, later made explicit, which kept them afloat.
The deep danger in his approach is that it makes it impossible to determine the relationship between the heavy costs under the HCDA against the implicit government guarantee. But it is assuredly a wrong answer to count the implicit guarantee while ignoring the correlative duties that Congress imposed. In my view, a first-best world removes both of these requirements so that market-based housing becomes the norm. It might be said in response that without government intervention, the number of Americans that will own their own homes will decline. But that proposition is not the same as saying that the number of Americans with a roof over their head will decline. Instead it will lead to an increase in rental housing, which reduces radically the risk of major financial dislocations. Landlords run businesses and in general will not engage in the kind of borrowing and leasing that are likely to cause a financial disaster.
The second response in this instance is that the 2008 agreement is water over the dam. Before that agreement was entered into, the government had the option under HERA for the FHFA to close down Fannie and Freddie. But legal consequences follow once it takes the decision to go the other route. It is critical to remember that the shares of both companies traded in the market after the 2008 date marking the onset of the conservatorship, and the share prices in those transactions rested on the assumption that the Fannie and Freddie could not be stripped of future profits by government fiat. One cannot defend the Third Amendment in 2012 by announcing after the fact--and following and in the midst of active trading--that the 2008 SPSPA was, well, a mistake. That brazen approach gives the government two bites at the apple, and a free option to switch from one system to another with the benefit of hindsight after events have played themselves out. One might as well let gamblers place their bets in a horse race after the race has been run, and not before.
The Third Amendment The previous discussion sets up the analysis of the Third Amendment. In dealing with this issue, the government in its briefing in a shareholder lawsuit challenging the government's move took the strong position that the value of the government commitment in 2008 was "incalculably large," so that Fannie and Freddie shareholders had no expectation of being repaid. In and of itself, that statement is odd because in a financial situation it should always be possible to calculate the size of a bet, whether it be large or small.
In response, I wrote, "the level of the Treasury commitment was not 'incalculably large': it was $188 billion, all of which will shortly be repaid." A detailed criticism of this statement was prepared by Larry Wall, of the Center for Financial Innovation and Stability of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. He graciously amended his account in response to some comments that I sent to him, so I shall examine the criticisms of my position only in his revised version.
Wall's first argument is that the $188 billion was not the only financial commitment; there was also the interest. I agree of course with that point, and thought that it was too obvious to say in that context. As should be evident from the discussion above, the government is entitled to recover that interest in full. The government surely took a larger risk at the earlier date. But by the time of the Third Amendment, which was the focus of my writing, the principal was on the road to being repaid, and all interest obligations were current.
Wall's second and more serious point relates to the obligations, if any, to absorb further losses in the portfolio, which could be a large sum, albeit one that was limited by the ability of the government not to make further advances if it chose not to. But however these residual risks of 2008 are calculated, they are not beyond calculation. Indeed, the applicable limits on how much the Federal Reserve had to commit to this venture were twice raised. By the time the Third Amendment came about, no additional commitments would be needed, so that these contingent liabilities were not a serious factor in figuring out whether the Third Amendment was fair to the shareholders--which given its wholly one-sided nature it was not.
Wall's third point relates to the decision of the Treasury to take for nominal consideration an option to purchase 79.9 percent of the common stock. That option today would be worth billions of dollars if the Third Amendment had not been adopted. At this point two questions arise. The first is how we value that particular option as of 2008. Wall assigns to it a modest value, which is again disputable. To be sure, the odds that it would come into the money may have been low, but if the housing market did recover, as it did, chances are that it would be worth a substantial sum. The high rate of return is thus in tension with the low probability of its occurrence. Working out these numbers does not lead to the conclusion that the warrants should have been ignored in calculating the value of the government's stake.
More critically, once it is settled that the action is over the Third Amendment, all of Wall's calculations, as noted, are irrelevant. The proper time to evaluate the fairness of the Third Amendment is when it is made, not sooner. Indeed, ironically, the Third Amendment, if allowed to stand, wipes out the value of the government option to buy 79.9 of the common because Fannie and Freddie shareholders will never receive any payments either by way of dividend or liquidation ever. No analysis of the 2008 deal gives any insight into the Third Amendment.
Going Forward My last point is brief, but critical. There are all sorts of ways in which to reform the housing market, in order to avoid the mistakes of earlier periods. To do that, any workable reform, critically, would involve removing the deadly combination of an implicit government guarantee coupled with a mandate to make high-risk loans with small down-payments to low- and middle-income individuals who lack sufficient capacity to repay.
Unfortunately, the major reform proposals advanced to date, including most recently the Johnson-Crapo proposal, essentially double down on the old, failed model. The Johnson-Crapo bill is, I think, highly flawed. Its dangerous willingness to have the federal government guarantee about $5.2 trillion of mortgage debt is well-exposed in a recent Cato Institute Working Paper by Ike Brannon. Its dangerous similarity to recent health care reform is the centerpiece of James Glassman's pieces in the Weekly Standard, which characterizes the bill as the Obamacare of real estate. Here is not the place to go examine the Johnson-Crapo bill's complex structure and perverse incentives. Quite simply, the new bill repeats most of the old mistakes with Fannie and Freddie in the form of a new Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation that has the same cross-subsidy to high-risk borrowers, now called "equitable access." Because the political pressures to service low- and middle-income groups will be as great now as they have ever been, it is an open question, at best, whether the new reforms will be able to prevent a slow decline in underwriting standards under the proposed new regime.
Complicating the uncertain prospects for Crapo-Johnson, and all future proposals, is the aftermath of the government's extraordinary actions under the Third Amendment. There is a tight connection between the past obligations to Fannie and Freddie and the creation of any new facility in which private parties are asked to risk capital, given the very real risk that private capital will stay away from facilities that are empowered to make foolish loans under federal oversight that will, almost inevitably, cave with time. The short answer is that if the Third Amendment holds up in court, private parties will in fact stay away in the future. There are just too many possibilities to wipe out private investment if the government has the power that it claims here and everywhere else. (If the executive branch can rewrite the ObamaCare legislation repeatedly, it can rewrite any legislation including regulation for the residential mortgage market.) Indeed, the situation is worse: even if the shareholder suits against the various government agencies prevail, private investors would rightly perceive an ongoing risk that they could be tied up for years in litigation brought to enforce their contractual rights. That grim prospect will certainly deter private participation in any new mortgage-loan facilities being contemplated.
What is clear is that the "protection of taxpayers" motif is bipartisan. Both parties see every reason to ignore contractual and constitutional obligations to Fannie and Freddie shareholders. What reason is there in this political climate to think that the Congressional leopard will lose its spots anytime soon? On all these issues, any defense of the Third Amendment, such as that offered by Larry Wall, only makes matters going forward worse.??Richard A. Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and a Visiting Scholar with the Manhattan Institute's Center for Legal Policy. Professor Epstein works as an advisor to several hedge funds that have financial interests in the issues covered in this essay.
Yes. I would like to bet $100,000 on Orb to win the 2013 Kentucky Derby. I would also like to bet a $200 superfecta. 16-4-3-5 Let me know if this is possible, Larry....
The superfecta for my 200 bucks would return 2.85 million dollars. Again, let me know.
The 139th Kentucky Derby Payout Schedule[2]
Program
Number Horse Name
Win
Place
Show
16 Orb US$12.80 $7.40 $5.40
4 Golden Soul – $38.60 $19.60
3 Revolutionary – – $5.40
$2 Exacta: (16–4) $981.60[2]
$1 Trifecta: (16–4–3) $3,462.80[2]
$1 Superfecta: (16–4–3–5) $28,542.00[2]
It is so cool that Harry Reid gets it. You can reform without dismantle...
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-08/housing-bill-threatened-by-rift-on-help-for-disadvantaged.html?cmpid=yhoo
I am shocked that UCONN beat Kentucky. Awesome game between two great teams.
I won't be shocked when Ackman gets FNF released from C-ship.
GO FNF. We have Ted Olsen AKA Napier!!! He hits the clutch 3 pointers every time!!
No problem. With all the acronyms and industry jargon, it can get complicated and confusing for all of us.
So many nuances to all this stuff with hedge funds, private equity, Mortgage backed securities, Collateralized Debt obligation, Crdit default swaps, structured products, Ackman's common stock swap agreement and many more crazy jargon things....
Sure. There is no proof that the US Treasury has offered FNF warrants to any institution to date. I won't say it hasn't happened.
While I don't think it has(offered warrants), the deal between the treasury and FHFA on 8-17-12 is plenty to prove self dealing....
These don't appear to be Fannie and Freddie warrants as you can see in my reply to obit. I read prospectuses all the time:
The only link to Waterstone is they own 4.79 shares of COB....
I also think a bunch of hound dogs are barking up the wrong tree, here. I hope I am proven wrong but I doubt it.
There is plenty of self dealing here, already. We don't need anymore to win the case.
JMO. again. not a recco.
This prospectus relates to the offer and sale of up to 10,462,631 shares of our common stock, no par value per share, by certain selling shareholders identified herein, collectively referred to as the Selling Shareholders, which includes 22,072 shares of common stock issuable upon exercise of a warrant to purchase common stock issued to the United States Department of the Treasury, or the Treasury, on October 21, 2011. We refer to such warrant as the Amended TARP Warrant. We issued the common stock and the Amended TARP Warrant as part of our Recapitalization (as described below). We are registering the resale of the common stock as required by the exchange agreement we entered into with the Treasury and the subscription agreements we entered into with the other Selling Shareholders.
The Selling Shareholders may sell all or a portion of the common stock from time to time, in amounts, at prices and on terms determined at the time of the offering. The common stock may be sold by any means described in the section of this prospectus entitled “Plan of Distribution” beginning on page 15.
We will not receive any proceeds from the sale of the common stock by the Selling Shareholders.
On October 31, 2011, we effected a one-for-one hundred reverse stock split of our common stock.[color=red][/color] All share numbers and per share prices in this prospectus reflect the one-for-one hundred reverse stock split, unless otherwise indicated
The symbol is now COB. The only link to COB by Waterstone appears to be that they own 4.79% of COB's shares:
From Yahoo Finance....
Top Institutional Holders
Holder Shares % Out Value* Reported
Waterstone Capital Management, L.P. 1,051,764 4.79 13,409,991 Dec 31, 2013
Oak Hill Capital Management, LLC 4,930,314 22.44 62,861,503 Dec 31, 2013
Carlyle Group L.P. 4,930,313 22.44 62,861,490 Dec 31, 2013
Credit Suisse/ 625,000 2.84 7,968,750 Dec 31, 2013
Vanguard Group, Inc. (The) 472,608 2.15 6,025,752 Dec 31, 2013
BlackRock Fund Advisors 287,583 1.31 3,666,683 Dec 31, 2013
State Street Corporation 165,348 0.75 2,108,187 Dec 31, 2013
BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A. 143,448 0.65 1,828,962 Dec 31, 2013
Northern Trust Corporation 130,350 0.59 1,661,962 Dec 31, 2013
Palisades Hudson Asset Management, L.P. 93,750 0.43 1,195,312 Dec 31, 2013
Again. I hope that this is an example of more self dealing but there is no evidence I have seen so far. That prospectus is the bank selling it's own shares in an offering.
There is plenty of self dealing between FHFA and Treasury. The evidence is self evident.
I agree obit. This appears to be the bank selling it's own shares derived from warrants received from the U.S. gov't.
They received TARP funds and gave the gov't warrants. Which poses the question:
Will the gov't ultimately surrender the FNF warrants????
I still think so. Not a recco.
I also think a bunch of hound dogs are barking up the wrong tree, here. I hope I am proven wrong but I doubt it.
There is plenty of self dealing here, already. We don't need anymore to win the case.
JMO. again. not a recco.
This prospectus relates to the offer and sale of up to 10,462,631 shares of our common stock, no par value per share, by certain selling shareholders identified herein, collectively referred to as the Selling Shareholders, which includes 22,072 shares of common stock issuable upon exercise of a warrant to purchase common stock issued to the United States Department of the Treasury, or the Treasury, on October 21, 2011. We refer to such warrant as the Amended TARP Warrant. We issued the common stock and the Amended TARP Warrant as part of our Recapitalization (as described below). We are registering the resale of the common stock as required by the exchange agreement we entered into with the Treasury and the subscription agreements we entered into with the other Selling Shareholders.
The Selling Shareholders may sell all or a portion of the common stock from time to time, in amounts, at prices and on terms determined at the time of the offering. The common stock may be sold by any means described in the section of this prospectus entitled “Plan of Distribution” beginning on page 15.
We will not receive any proceeds from the sale of the common stock by the Selling Shareholders.
On October 31, 2011, we effected a one-for-one hundred reverse stock split of our common stock.[color=red][/color] All share numbers and per share prices in this prospectus reflect the one-for-one hundred reverse stock split, unless otherwise indicated
The symbol is now COB. The only link to COB by Waterstone appears to be that they own 4.79% of COB's shares:
From Yahoo Finance....
Top Institutional Holders
Holder Shares % Out Value* Reported
Waterstone Capital Management, L.P. 1,051,764 4.79 13,409,991 Dec 31, 2013
Oak Hill Capital Management, LLC 4,930,314 22.44 62,861,503 Dec 31, 2013
Carlyle Group L.P. 4,930,313 22.44 62,861,490 Dec 31, 2013
Credit Suisse/ 625,000 2.84 7,968,750 Dec 31, 2013
Vanguard Group, Inc. (The) 472,608 2.15 6,025,752 Dec 31, 2013
BlackRock Fund Advisors 287,583 1.31 3,666,683 Dec 31, 2013
State Street Corporation 165,348 0.75 2,108,187 Dec 31, 2013
BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A. 143,448 0.65 1,828,962 Dec 31, 2013
Northern Trust Corporation 130,350 0.59 1,661,962 Dec 31, 2013
Palisades Hudson Asset Management, L.P. 93,750 0.43 1,195,312 Dec 31, 2013
Funny. I thought of that today when running an errand. Kinda like the dow 10,000 hats. The guys at work kept bring them out for 10+ years every once in a while!!
Perry Capital bought in 2010
I think...
Gator Capital was in in 2009
Kyle Bass 2009
They were all in until before or right after the 2012 amendment