Register for free to join our community of investors and share your ideas. You will also get access to streaming quotes, interactive charts, trades, portfolio, live options flow and more tools.
Register for free to join our community of investors and share your ideas. You will also get access to streaming quotes, interactive charts, trades, portfolio, live options flow and more tools.
patchman,
I can't tell if this scrawled gibberish is the document that you are referring to, resulted in the document that you are referring to, or is in response to the document that you are referring to. It shows a date filed of 8/26, suggesting that it precedes the Moskowitz filing.
My guess is Door#2, but it's a mess.
http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/fcas/fcas_docs/2010AUG/3006010472010001SCIV.pdf
Plaintiff "Sponaetech".
EDIT: IN CASE THE LINK WON'T LOAD, GO VIA:
http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/SQLData.jsp?IndexNo=601047-2010
K,
Long time no see. Hope you are well.
My two ideas are almost 6 months old and they were awful (so far).
This came across the wire today and also promises to be awful, but interesting. From Crain's NY:
In the Markets
Say hello to the most overpriced stock ever
By
Aaron Elstein
on September 21, 2010 2:07 PM | Share | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)
The most overpriced stock ever just might belong to a tiny start-up company whose headquarters are listed at 100 Wall St.
The company, called Prime Sun Power Inc., says it's pursuing a business model producing solar-generated electrical power and other alternative renewable energies. Its stock fetches 70 cents a share on the OTC Bulletin Board, a quotation service for companies that don't qualify to list on an exchange.
Now, 70 cents may not sound like much, but it gives the company a market value of $28 million, which is absolutely sky-high considering the company has only $688 in assets. That's right, six hundred and eighty-eight dollars in assets, all in cash. In other words, the company's stock trades at 40,698 times its assets.
Even for the wild and wooly world of Bulletin Board stocks, this is pretty wacky stuff.
According to its most recent quarterly report, Prime Sun Power has some solar power projects underway in Europe, though nothing is close to being completed. No surprise, its big problem is its lack of resources.
The company says it needs to raise $2 million in additional funding in order to "conduct proposed operations" for the next year. It also says it would need another $19 million just to obtain the required licenses to begin construction on all of its contemplated projects. It would then need to arrange bridge loans to pay for the construction.
At least the company's costs are low. Its sole employee is its acting chief executive, a gentleman named Olivier de Vergnies, who, according to the company's annual report, is a former vice president at Dexia Private Bank in Switzerland, where he specialized in serving "Middle Eastern high net worth individuals." He's also former CEO of a New York-based company called 4C Controls, a penny stock that soared to $10 in 2008 before collapsing. He didn't return a call seeking comment.
Meanwhile, a California-based solar panel manufacturer called Sunpower Corp. has demanded that Prime Sun Power stop using the words "Sun Power" in its name and threatened legal action. Prime Sun Power says it has determined it will be "economically more rational" to change its name rather than engage in litigation and plans to adopt a new name by the end of the month.
It will certainly bear watching what name Prime Sun Power emerges with.
That's too bad. It is a quirky website, but I'm surprised that it was a total wipeout for you. As you probably noticed, toxic pretty much confirmed my findings so I'm reasonably satisfied that I didn't miss anything...including any reference to an attachment, which should have been published in the docket anyway.
I believe S&A simply screwed the old pooch.
You and toxic work for NASA or what?
I was perfectly happy with my numbers before I asked. Now, thanks to my own idle curiosity, I have a whole new reason to feel inadequate.
Terrific. I'm very happy for you.
:o)
http://www.scribd.com/doc/37813583/9-20-10-Dicon-Doc-162-Operating-Report-Aug-1-31
Some surprises.
More interesting is Docket#161, which is Whitakers response to the objections to his appointment. Unfortunately I haven't found it posted anywhere other than pacer, so no link.
Impressive.
Retirement does not offer (or require) such luxuries.
Thanks for the confirmation.
Did you try this?
http://www.speedtest.net/
If you have a minute, try it and then tell me what's going on in the 21st century that I'm missing out on.
Did Trustee Silverman use his hired accountant for help with this?
Again, from his Objections to the sale filing:
"However, the motion is silent on why the sale of assets valued on the July Balance Sheet in excess of $3,000,000.00, for a purchase price of $625,000.00, is warranted at this time."
Did he not notice that amongst those other $2,375,000 of assets was a building capitalized at $2,000,000+ and that the Liability section of that same Balance Sheet reflects a $2,600,000 Lease Liability for that building that is scheduled for assumption by the Proposed Purchaser?
And:
"However, the July Operating Report also shows that, during the period from June 29, to July 21, 2010, Dicon had net ordinary income of $682,280.25 and cash receipts in excess of disbursements of more than $34,000.00. Dicon’s business is not a moneylosing enterprise sapping the estate of large volumes of cash, nor are there wasting assets that must be preserved by an expedited sale."
I wonder how he will respond to the court when he is asked to explain how Dicon got $682K in income from $60K in sales. And whether that ratio can be expected to continue.
And I wonder if he will be able to address the likelihood that the $34K in positive cash flow, or any kind of positive cash flow, can be anticipated going forward if that $34K resulted from total receipts for the period of $110K in A/R collections in a period when retail sales were $60K. Will that continue as well?
Trustee Whitaker has a financial firm, too (OK, so it's literally Whitaker's financial firm). And I suspect that it will point out the pointlessness of the above to the court. Trustee Silverman's other Objections need to be better founded if he hopes to stall the sale.
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=54533639
If memory serves, tomorrow we get to find out if Whitaker keeps his job and on Thursday the sale gets kicked around.
Popcorn time.
The website is slow and clumsy to navigate.
That said, #133 just loaded in about 15 seconds for me with my cable modem and basic Imac machine. These things, like us, can have a bad day once in a while, but it sounds like much of the problem is with your snailatron 3000 or the nature of your service.....if it's dial-up you're one of a dying breed and my experience with dsl was poor. If you're curious about this you can go to the following and click Begin Test:
http://www.speedtest.net/
For frame of reference my Download speed was just 14.84Mb/s.
Back to #133:
It's just the petition from the long board on the consolidation. There are some shareholder comments, but trust me, no one that signed the long board petition used it to express a strong interest in making a bid for the consolidated S/D assets for a significant sum.....or any sum. So you might want to skip it and see if the individual letters load more quickly. Or you may want to abandon the project, which I would definitely understand but find a bit of a bummer....it would be nice if SOMEONE could confirm my findings. Frankly, if I were you and I thought the whole thing would take me more than the 20 minutes that you've already invested I'd probably throw in the towel.
Whatever you do, I appreciate the effort.
My fault.....sorry. Hope I didn't waste too much of your time. I went back and checked and the process I told you to use didn't scroll through ALL her documents. I can't think of a good excuse (See curly's quandary below).
Go to:
http://www.scribd.com/cbrenn2/documents
At the BOTTOM RIGHT of the page you'll see page numbers. Each page has a certain number of documents on it, some of which are the letters. If this doesn't work I'll give you my home address and you can come smack me around.
pj,
Thanks.
Christine Brenner, a very active shareholder, has been kind enough to post the letters and MANY other case documents on scribd (she also got unceremoniously dumped by the Long Board "owner", but that's another story).
It takes a little poking around, but you will find them all here (except for the #149 non-letter):
http://www.scribd.com/cbrenn2/documents
There are a couple arrows on the top left of the screen that will allow you to fast forward through the docket numbers quickly. I wish I had noticed them earlier.
ab,
Thanks. As usual, I can't add much to what oa posted.
I "suppose" that SPNG's trustee looked at the SPNG assets.....AR, INV, etc.?.....and concluded that they wouldn't amount to much if he could successfully turn them into cash. If he could get the court to consolidate the cases he could access Dicon's assets and sell them, as Whitaker is trying to do....thereby adding to the available cash. At this point, as noted, he is looking for ways to get himself paid....the so-called administrative costs of bankruptcy (trustees, accountants, lawyers) are prioritized as cash becomes available.
The Dicon creditors, at least those that filed the involuntary petition, primarily are concerned with the successful reorganization of the Dicon operation so that they can go back to doing business with a supplier/tenant, etc. that they had a profitable relationship with....their filing was more of a rescue attempt than an effort to get their debts paid. They would not be happy to see the sale of assets to the current Proposed Purchaser (Celia and co.) disrupted. As in the SPNG case, administrative costs are paid first.....if Whitaker is able to keep the cases separate and sell the assets for the agreed upon price, the unsecured creditors might see a couple bucks worth of leftovers....they are unfortunately no one's priority. If there are any unpaid salaries they would be paid ahead of them also.
All, as requested, suppositions on my part.
"That's an 84 page document I'd like to read."
VD,
Knock yourself out.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/37703313/9-18-10-Dicon-Doc-158-Notice-of-Filing-of-Supplement-to-Whitaker-Sale-Motion
Just to make sure this thing isn't broken (no posts all day), I'm gonna type something and see if anything happens.
Yesterday I posted the following passage from Silverman's Objections to the sale of Dicon's assets:
"43. During the past two months, the SpongeTech Trustee has been approached by numerous SpongeTech public shareholders who have expressed a strong interest in submitting a bid for the consolidated assets of Dicon/SpongeTech. See Separate letters from SpongeTech shareholders, filed with the Court as Docket Nos. 133-135, 139-141, 144-145 and 147-149. The shareholders have indicated to the SpongeTech Trustee a strong interest, subject to due diligence, to consider a significant purchase price for the consolidated assets of Dicon and SpongeTech."
We had a little chuckle about the due diligence thing.
Then I read it again. I'll summarize it...and I'd like to hear from anyone, absolutely anyone, that feels that this misrepresents what it says:
Silverman has received a bunch of letters, recorded in the case under certain specific docket numbers, from shareholders who have expressed a strong interest in submitting a bid at a significant price for the consolidated assets of Dicon and Spongetech.
It does say that, doesn't it?
Well, somehow I found myself able to simultaneously read those letters and watch a thrice(?) retired old man with an M on his hat perform more like a bunny than a viking for the second week in a row. And guess what. NOT ONE of those letters from shareholders "expressed a strong interest in submitting a bid at a significant price for the consolidated assets of Dicon and Spongetech". Docket 149 isn't even a letter from a shareholder. In fact, it isn't a letter.
I can think of a half dozen people that could be expected to have this kind of "accident", none of whom has the word Trustee ahead of his name.
I hope that at least one person will take the time to read the letters and prove me wrong. I'd almost rather be proven wrong and have to apologize than think that the Trustee and his partner/attorney intentionally deceived the court on an issue that the court is sure to question. The import is that there are known bidders and the court will read those letters to see who they are. The urge to consolidate must be very strong....it seems to be affecting some people's judgment.
It's not that impressive a document...you would probably find yourself wondering what made you think that you would like to read it in the first place after you read it.
Where Silverman's Objections make for a reasonably dramatic presentation:
e.g. "Finally, because of the deep involvement of at least one of the Bidder’sprincipals, who is subject to a contractual non-compete agreement in favor of SpongeTech, in the management of Dicon, the licensing of critical technology and intellectual property and the
rapid demise of Dicon after its acquisition by SpongeTech, this proposed sale to an affiliate of
an insider should be deeply scrutinized and should not be approved, if at all, until after a substantially greater investigation than has been performed to date."
Whitaker's Supplement is a fairly straightforward, almost list-like document. It provides:
1. An Asset Purchase Agreement.
2. A proposed Sale Order for the judge to sign.
3. A pro forma release between Dicon, the Trustee and the Proposed Purchaser.
4. A pro forma release between Dicon, the Trustee and HH Brown.
5. 2 documents dealing with the the assumption, assignment and amendments to the existing lease agreement as they apply to Dicon, the Trustee, the Proposed Purchaser, the Development Authority and the Bank.
And that's pretty much it. It remains to be seen whether the Georgia Court considers his total package to be adequate to allow the sale to go forward. The releases address Silverman's concerns, but will certainly not satisfy them. Silverman wants the process held up until he can get a determination on the consolidation of the 2 cases. This process has the potential to be mindboggling....toss in the hearing on whether the Dicon Trustee is really the Dicon Trustee on Tuesday.
As to the issue of Silverman's compensation, it is capped in the bankruptcy law as a percentage of what the trustee is able to recover for the benefit of the debtors estate......and it ain't much. That's why you see both Whitaker and Silverman hiring their own firms as counsel....Whitaker I believe is a principal in the financial firm and I wouldn't be shocked to find out that there's a pre-existing relationship between Silverman and the numbers guys in NY. None of those guys fall under a calculated cap constraint, although their fees are subject to a reasonableness test by the court. In case it isn't obvious, I'm not a lawyer...this is strictly a belief based on my reading of what I believe is the governing law:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/11/usc_sec_11_00000326----000-.html
The way these "professionals" are putting in the hours they better find a way to unearth some buried treasure and I'm not sure that the Proposed Purchaser's $625K is gonna cover their nut no matter how it gets divvyed up.
ps. Pacer is worth the bucks when scion is out of town. $.08/page BUT if a document exceeds 30 pages they only charge you for 30.
So cynical.
I think the reference was to doo diligence. There was plenty of that.
BTW, The as-yet-to-be appointed Dicon Trustee's attorney just filed an 84 page Supplement to Sale Motion that responds to a number of the points made in the SPNG Trustee's Objections to the Sale.
As usual I am unable to link or otherwise reproduce it. The thing that makes me feel REALLY badly about my inability to do that is that there a couple of people on the SPNG LONG BOARD that seem to get it done with ease. I keep blaming it on my Apple stuff, but I think I'm just fooling myself.
I know, VD.
I just wish that it had been directed to the party that needs the education.
Sorry.....he's making me a little crabby.
As far as I can tell there has never been an operationally healthy company driven to bankruptcy due to a problem accessing capital as a result of a depressed share price that had naked short sales as its only problem.
(This is no more directed at you than your post was directed at me.)
;O) Good Luck.
There is no evidence of a naked short position in Spongetech.
"Let me address REFCO first"
first? It's the only thing addressed.
"your research is shallow"
It can't be THAT shallow.
It was adequate to confirm that this statement is false:
"Do a search on REFCO and you'll find why it went bankrupt....a huge NSS position was hidden!!!"
And there is absolutely no information, factual or even suggestive, in the 2 new links that you provided that your statement is true.
There is no naked short position in Spongetech.
And it is unlikely that, if there were a naked short position in Spongetech, that anyone capable of this bit of illogic would uncover it regardless of the hours they might spend on research:
"it really is irrelevant to me if you believe my statements or not as it has been a while since I did my research..."
I'm trying to find out the truth about Spongetech.....not assess your credibility. Any assistance that you can provide in that search would be most welcome.
You are preaching to the choir.
In the post that you replied to I said:
"The one thing that Spongetech and REFCO had in common, and it is the cause of their bankruptcy and all bankruptcies, was a lack of liquidity due to inadequate cash flows from their operations." ???
I understand the bankruptcy concept.
"Well..there is a huge overhang of 50 Billion shares"
Not only is there no proof of that, there's no evidence of it. No evidence that ANY shares exist other than the 3,000,000,000 shares issued by the company itself, which provided more than adequate downward pressure on the price, especially when coupled with the litany of real world problems that management itself created....failure to file, investigation, suspension, Wells, Complaint, arrests, voluntary bankruptcy (sorry, I know some people are sick of hearing about them but others apparently need to be reminded of the REAL issues).
"Do a search on REFCO and you'll find why it went bankrupt....a huge NSS position was hidden!!!"
I actually enjoy looking into these references that are provided as examples...I learn a lot of stuff from them.
REFCO's bankruptcy wasn't precipitated by a NSS position. There is no reference to the naked shorting of REFCO shares in any of the half dozen or so articles that I read about their bankruptcy. Here's the alert from Greenberg Traurig (heard of them?) reporting the REFCO bankruptcy filing:
http://www2.gtlaw.com/pub/Alerts/2005/1008.asp
Take special note that the word "short", naked or otherwise, does not appear in its 8-9 paragraphs.
The only issue related to short selling that I found attached to the name REFCO was done BY REFCO affiliates, not TO REFCO, and it turned up in an SEC complaint which notes "Refco is currently winding down its operations in
connection with Refco Inc.'s bankruptcy pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (In re: Refco Inc., Case No. 05-60006).
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19639.pdf
REFCO reportedly had $48Billion in assets when it filed Chapter 11......I believe it set aside $5Million (.01%) of that for the potential settlement of that complaint, which did not charge them with NAKED short selling.
The one thing that Spongetech and REFCO had in common, and it is the cause of their bankruptcy and all bankruptcies, was a lack of liquidity due to inadequate cash flows from their operations. Sorry...make that two things......they both LIED about those operations in such an exaggerated way that there was no likelihood that they would be provided the necessary outside capital to continue.
By the way, Trustee Silverman makes the following assertion in his Objections to the sale filing:
"43. During the past two months, the SpongeTech Trustee has been approached by numerous SpongeTech public shareholders who have expressed a strong interest in submitting a bid for the consolidated assets of Dicon/SpongeTech. See Separate letters from SpongeTech
shareholders, filed with the Court as Docket Nos. 133-135, 139-141, 144-145 and 147-149. The shareholders have indicated to the SpongeTech Trustee a strong interest, subject to due diligence, to consider a significant purchase price for the consolidated assets of Dicon and SpongeTech."
In the EXTREMELY UNLIKELY event that the cases and hence the assets of Dicon and Spongetech are combined and offered for sale, I'm itching to see how those "significant purchase price" bids stack up. However they do stack up, it's funny to think that the prospective bidders have an interest "subject to due diligence"...as if there hasn't been enough of THAT.
Perhaps you have another example. Just fill in the blank:
Do a search on ______ and you'll find why it went bankrupt....a huge NSS position was hidden!!!
Thanks, scion.
Just to make sure we're on the same track, though:
You're link is to Silverman's motion to consolidate the SPNG and Dicon's bankruptcy cases...docket#113 in the SPNG NY case.
My UNRECOGNIZABLE MESS is an awful reproduction of Silverman's objections to the sale of Dicon's assets...docket#156 in the Dicon GA case.
tds, re: "If all these alleged naked shares were never reported as having traded, how in the world do naked shorters drive down the price?"
A fine question. I don't have an answer. I suppose that those who engage in naked short selling could be comfortable enough in their ability to select companies that are likely to fail based on their own operational economics, combined with the exposure of those weaknesses based on the research of an aggressive media or their own research, so that the actual naked short sale statistics aren't required as a downward pressure.
But I really just wanted to make sure that you noticed that the poster himself indicates that he has "a clear idea" of the answer in the last line of his post, which he apparently chooses to keep a secret:
"As to how these phantom shares not recorded on the tape can exert downward pressure on a stock's price, I have a clear idea...but perhaps others more brilliant (like Patch ?) might want to chime in..."
Yes. Thank you.
Zecco has told you that your shares, held in Cede's name by DTC, will be sent to you in certificate form by Worldwide and someone will be charging you several hundred dollars for that service.
If I'm wrong about my understanding, please let me know.
"I suppose they relented or someone in the powers of all those i called just decided to issue me my shares."
Nifty....now back to my simple question.
Who said that they would issue you your certificate?
You do understand why I'm asking, right?
You aren't the only one who would like to have a certificate evidencing their share ownership. However, the DTC suspension of services precludes their members (brokers) from transferring shares. For Zecco or any other broker to provide you a certificate would represent such a transfer.
Only three things are possible:
1. My understanding of the DTC service suspension is wrong.
2. Some entity has actually committed to providing you with a certificate, leaving shareholders hope that they can get theirs, too....if you will just identify the entity.
3. I believe that to post the third possibility may be a violation of Ihub's Terms of Service, so I'll leave it unsaid.
It's important. Who said that they would issue you your certificate?
I'm glad I have your attention.
Please respond to my previous requests, repeated below. Others would like to know exactly to whom they should be making their requests for certificates and you made it clear that you can answer that question:
"I called the SEC, Zecco, DTC, Worldwide Stock Transfer.
And finally got them to agree to issue me my Certs."
Which of those 4 "thems" agreed to issue you your certificates?
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=54477368
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
And now:
"I hope they follow thru on it."
I'd really like to know who the "they" is.
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=54505905
OBJECTIONS OF KENNETH P. SILVERMAN TO THE DICON TRUSTEE’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE
TRUSTEE TO SELL SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF DICON’S OPERATING ASSETS
I STILL don't know how to link or post a copy of a pacer document to zoho, etc. and I don't know whether Ihub has constraints on the size of a post, but here are the OBJECTIONS...sorry if it doesn't copy and paste well esthetically:
EMF/610017.2/059228
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
In re: ) Chapter 11
)
DICON TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,1 ) Case No. 10-41275 LWD
)
Debtor. )
)
OBJECTIONS OF KENNETH P. SILVERMAN,
THE CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE OF SPONGETECH
DELIVERY SYSTEMS, INC.,2 TO THE DICON TRUSTEE’S MOTION,
PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 105(a), 363 AND 365 OF THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE AND RULES 2002, 6004, 6006, AND 9019 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE
TRUSTEE TO SELL SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF DICON’S OPERATING ASSETS
Kenneth P. Silverman, the chapter 11 Trustee (the “SpongeTech Trustee”) of
SpongeTech Delivery Systems, Inc. (“SpongeTech”),3 by his attorneys, SilvermanAcampora
LLP, respectfully submits these objections to the Amended Motion dated August 31, 2010 (the
“Motion”) of Lloyd T. Whitaker, the chapter 11 Trustee (the “Dicon Trustee”) of Dicon
Technologies, LLC (“Dicon”), and represents as follows:
1. Underlying the seemingly garden-variety Motion, which seeks authority to sell
substantially all of the assets used in Dicon’s business, is (i) a massive fraud perpetrated on
public holders of SpongeTech stock, (ii) the highly suspicious sale of Dicon’s membership
interests to SpongeTech by Wayne Celia (“Celia”), a principal of Diversified Technologies,
Inc. and JKA, Inc., the current, putative purchaser of Dicon’s assets (collectively, the
“Bidder”), (iii) the apparent breach by Celia of his prior employment contract with Dicon, and
1 Dicon’s principal business address is 100 Dicon Drive, Black Creek, Georgia 31308. The last four digits
of Dicon’s taxpayer number are 7889.
2 In re SpongeTech Delivery Systems, Inc. is a chapter 11 case pending in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York (the “SpongeTech Court”), case no. 10-13647.
3 As explained below, SpongeTech is the 100% owner of the equity interests in Dicon.
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:1 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
2
(iv) what appears to be the engineering by Celia of the rapid demise of Dicon for the sole
purpose of repurchasing the company’s assets at a fire sale.
2. Notwithstanding the extraordinary background to the Dicon and SpongeTech
cases and the offer to purchase from the Bidder, the Motion provides scant detail and absolutely
none of the essential information necessary for creditors, the SpongeTech Trustee,
shareholders4 of SpongeTech or the Court to assess whether the proposed sale represents the
highest available value for the assets being sold or is in the best interests of Dicon’s estate
and/or SpongeTech’s estate and their creditors and shareholders.
3. Moreover, because the Dicon Trustee has failed to file a fully executed Asset
Purchase Agreement, as was promised in the Motion, and because of onerous terms in the
(non-binding) Term Sheet attached to the Motion (the “Term Sheet”), the proposed sale
excludes meaningful competitive bidding and is a de facto lock-up transaction in favor of an
insider of Dicon.
4. Finally, because of the deep involvement of at least one of the Bidder’s
principals, who is subject to a contractual non-compete agreement in favor of SpongeTech, in
the management of Dicon, the licensing of critical technology and intellectual property and the
rapid demise of Dicon after its acquisition by SpongeTech, this proposed sale to an affiliate of
an insider should be deeply scrutinized and should not be approved, if at all, until after a
substantially greater investigation than has been performed to date.
5. Similarly, numerous unanswered questions should be addressed, in depth,
before the proposed sale is approved by the Court. Little over one year ago Celia and his
partners sold their membership interests in Dicon to SpongeTech for approximately $4.8 million
based on express representations and warranties made by Celia as to the business and sales
4 Allegedly, there are some 3 billion shares of SpongeTech stock issued and outstanding. The
SpongeTech Trustee has received numerous calls and written transmissions from scores of SpongeTech
shareholders expressing grave concern over the effect of the proposed sale on their efforts to continue
the SpongeTech consolidated businesses.
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:2 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
3
of Dicon, both historic and projected, and Celia’s express, contractual commitment to a noncompete
period. Until he was replaced by SpongeTech management, following the sale of
Dicon to SpongeTech, Celia managed the business of Dicon pursuant to a written contract
among Celia, SpongeTech and Dicon. As discussed below, Dicon was apparently used as an
instrumentality of fraud by SpongeTech principals during the period that Celia was running
Dicon, and thereafter. The extent to which Celia was aware of the fraud and the co-mingling of
assets between SpongeTech and Dicon is unknown. The extent to which Celia was responsible
for precipitous decline in Dicon’s business, included the purported termination of its exclusive
license rights, is unknown. What is known is that Celia and the Bidder are in willful breach of
Celia’s contractual obligation not to compete with SpongeTech by their submission of the offer
to purchase Dicon assets.
6. Because there is no indication that Dicon’s assets are wasting, and every
indication that the proposed sale does not maximize value for the Dicon or SpongeTech estates,
there should be no pressing urgency to avoid these important and critical issues prior to the sale
of these assets.
BACKGROUND
The SpongeTech Bankruptcy Filing
7. At all times relevant, SpongeTech was a publicly held Delaware corporation with
offices at 10 W. 33rd Street, New York, New York.
8. On July 9, 2010, SpongeTech filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition for relief in
accordance with chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
9. By Order of the Court dated July 19, 2010, and Notice of Appointment dated July
20, 2010, S. Gregory Hays (”Hays”) was appointed as the chapter 11 operating trustee of the
SpongeTech estate. On August 3, 2010, by Notice of Withdrawal, Hays resigned his position as
trustee in the SpongeTech case.
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:3 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
4
10. In accordance with an Order of the SpongeTech Court dated August 4, 2010,
Hays was discharged of his duties, and Kenneth P. Silverman, Esq., was appointed as the
Successor Operating Trustee.
SpongeTech’s Acquisition of Dicon
11. In or about July 2009, SpongeTech acquired all of the membership interests in
Dicon, and at all times relevant SpongeTech was and is the sole equity holder of Dicon. One of
the selling members of Dicon was Celia, who had acted as Dicon’s President prior to the sale.
The consideration paid by SpongeTech to Celia and his partners for their interests was $4.8
million.
12. The sale included a required employment agreement for Celia (and others) and,
up to approximately March 2010, Celia served as President of Dicon and effectively ran the
Dicon operations on a day-to-day basis. Thereafter, it appears that SpongeTech and Dicon
were managed and controlled completely by Chief Executive Officer and President Michael
Metter (“Metter”), Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer Steven Moskowitz
(“Moskowitz”), and Executive Vice President Barry Kolevzon (“Kolevzon”).
13. Prior to the July 9, 2010, SpongeTech and Dicon were purportedly engaged in
the manufacture and distribution of hydrophilic foam sponge products designed for, among
other things, cosmetics, the home, automobiles, watercraft, and pets.
14. As part of the manufacturing and distribution process, SpongeTech products
were manufactured in the Dicon plant in Black Creek, Georgia, and inventory was held on-site
and at the Oneida warehouse in Black Creek. It is this manufacturing facility that is the subject
of the Motion
The Criminal and Civil Actions by the United States
Against SpongeTech and Its Officers and Directors
15. In May 2010, the United States of America filed a criminal complaint in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York charging Moskowitz and Metter with
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:4 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
5
conspiracy to commit fraud and obstruction of justice. Moskowitz and Metter were arrested by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) for their alleged criminal activity, which raided
SpongeTech’s premises and removed most of SpongeTech’s invoices, books and records, bank
statements, and computers. Metter resigned from his position with SpongeTech on June 8,
2010.
16. At the same time, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a civil
complaint against Metter, Moskowitz and several others, alleging, inter alia, that they were
involved in a massive “pump and dump” scheme dating back to 2007, whereby, as part of their
scheme, they allegedly deceived the investors through false statements about non-existent
SpongeTech customers, fake sales orders, and phony revenue. According to the SEC
Complaint, the defendants then dumped the fraudulently inflated shares by illegally selling them
to the public through affiliated entities in unregistered transactions.
17. SpongeTech has not complied with any of its SEC filing requirements since at
least February 2009.
ARGUMENT
18. The SpongeTech Trustee objects to approval of the proposed sale of Dicon
assets because of, among other things, (i) the inadequate marketing efforts by the Dicon
Trustee, (ii) inadequacies and deficiencies in the Term Sheet and the bidding “process,” (iii) the
chilling effect that the lack of an effective auction process has had on competitive bidding, and
(iv) the numerous unanswered questions surrounding Celia’s involvement with Dicon and the
Bidder, and his obligations to the SpongeTech estate under the 2009 Agreement and the Celia
Employment Agreement. Finally, the proposed sale should not be approved until adjudication of
the issues raised by the SpongeTech Trustee’s substantive consolidation complaint.
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:5 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
6
A. Any Sale at This Time Is Premature Until the
Numerous Questions Surrounding Celia, the Bidder and
H.H. Brown Shoe Technologies, Inc., Are Resolved;
The Bidder’s Principal, Celia, and H.H. Brown Are the Subjects of
Potential Claims by the SpongeTech Trustee
And, Therefore, the Bidder Is Hopelessly Conflicted
And Not an Arms’ Length Purchaser of Dicon’s Assets
19. One of the principals of the Bidder is Celia. Under the Term Sheet, and
presumably the unfiled Asset Purchase Agreement, one of the conditions to the Bidder’s
obligations to close is a general release from the Dicon Trustee in favor of the Bidder, Celia,
other principals of the Bidder and H.H. Brown Shoe Technologies, Inc (“H.H. Brown”), a former
owner of Dicon. It is easy to see why Celia and H.H. Brown are desperate to obtain such a
release.
20. H.H. Brown, the purported owner and licensor of technology and intellectual
property critical to the business of both Dicon and Spongetech (the “Sponge Technology”), was
the owner of Dicon prior to Celia’s ownership of Dicon. H.H. Brown spun Dicon off in a sale to
Celia and his partners, which included the exclusive right to use the Sponge Technology. For
some years, Celia and his partners apparently operated Dicon profitably. Celia had been an
employee and/or officer of H.H. Brown prior to the spin-off Dicon to Celia and his partners. In
2009, Dicon was once again sold in a transaction in which Celia was a critical and active
principal.
21. Celia was a principal seller of the membership interests in Dicon to SpongeTech
in July 2009. He is a party to the Membership Interest Purchase Agreement by and among
SpongeTech Delivery Systems, Inc., Dicon Technologies, LLC, Wayne M. Celia, Sam Ginsburg,
Clyde Williams, Roy Geronemus and John Schelb, dated as of July 9, 2009 (the “2009
Agreement”). Celia is also a party to an employment agreement by and among SpongeTech,
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:6 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
7
Dicon and Celia, dated July 7, 2009 (the “Celia Employment Agreement”).5 Copies of the 2009
Agreement and the Celia Employment Agreement are annexed hereto as Exhibit 1 and Exhibit
2, respectively.
22. Although Celia’s employment was terminated earlier this year by SpongeTech
management in accordance with the Celia Employment Agreement, certain provisions of the
agreement are still applicable. Specifically, pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Celia
Employment Agreement, Celia is prohibited from (a) interfering with the “relationship between
[Dicon], SpongeTech or its affiliates, divisions and related companies or any person or business
that was a customer, supplier, licensor, contractor or employee …,” (b) “solicit[ing] or attempt to
solicit any employee of the Company or SpongeTech to terminate his or her employment …” or
to assist another in employing such employees, and (c) “engage[ing] in, with or for any
enterprise, institution, …, business, or company, competitive with the “Business” of the
Company or SpongeTech ….”
23. The SpongeTech Trustee is informed that, following the acquisition of Dicon by
SpongeTech, and while Celia was still employed by SpongeTech, Dicon suffered a decline in
business and fell dramatically short of the financial projections made by Celia upon which
SpongeTech relied in purchasing Dicon.6
24. Following the termination of Celia’s employment by SpongeTech, H.H. Brown
purportedly terminated Dicon and SpongeTech’s exclusive right to use the Sponge Technology.
The SpongeTech Trustee, and apparently the Dicon Trustee as well (see the Motion, paragraph
19), believes that H.H. Brown’s termination of Dicon’s and SpongeTech’s right to use the
5 It is not known whether other principals of the Bidder may also be subject to non-compete covenants in
favor of the SpongeTech Trustee because there is no disclosure in the Motion concerning the principals
of the Bidder.
6 SpongeTech’s books and records are disorganized and completely unreliable. The SpongeTech
Trustee has attempted to obtain documents and information from the Dicon Trustee concerning Dicon
and SpongeTech and agreed to the terms of a proposed nondisclosure agreement with counsel for the
Dicon Trustee. However, the SpongeTech Trustee has not been given access to any of the information
or documents that he requested. Accordingly, the SpongeTech Trustee has been force to proceed so far
based on anecdotal information.
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:7 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
8
Sponge Technology may have been improper and wrongful. Moreover, upon information and
belief, Celia was instrumental in provoking H.H. Brown’s wrongful termination of Dicon’s and
SpongeTech’s right to the exclusive use of the Sponge Technology.
25. The SpongeTech Trustee intends to commence an adversary proceeding or
proceedings against Celia, H.H. Brown and the Bidder, and perhaps others, to enforce his rights
under the Celia Employment Agreement and to challenge the wrongful termination of the
exclusive right to use the Sponge Technology. The SpongeTech Trustee also intends to
investigate Celia’s role in the precipitous demise of the business of Dicon and whether his
wrongful conduct was related to his bid to re-purchase Dicon’s business at a substantial
discount to value.
26. At a minimum, the SpongeTech Trustee has property rights in the covenants
contained in both the 2009 Agreement and the Celia Employment Agreement that are
exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of the SpongeTech Court. See 28 U.S.C. 1334(e). To the
extent that the releases proposed to be given by the Dicon Trustee in favor of the Bidder, Celia,
H.H. Brown, or any other party, purport to affect any claims that the SpongeTech Trustee may
have against the Bidder, H.H. Brown and/or Celia, or any other person, this Court may not enter
an order affecting any right of SpongeTech arising from the 2009 Agreement, the Celia
Employment Agreement or the acts of any party affecting the rights of SpongeTech or the
SpongeTech Trustee.
27. As demonstrated above, Celia as been a seller of Dicon’s assets and is the buyer
favored by the Dicon Trustee. As further demonstrated above, despite the existence of noncompete
and non-solicitation provisions in favor of the SpongeTech estate in the Celia
Employment Agreement, the Dicon Trustee has agreed to grant full general releases to the
Bidder, Celia and all of the Bidder’s other principals—who may include other parties who are
bound by covenants in favor of the SpongeTech estate.
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:8 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
9
28. Given Celia’s history, the allegations made by SpongeTech shareholders that
Celia was dismissed for cause, see Objection filed by numerous SpongeTech shareholders,
Docket No. 145, and the patently inadequate consideration offered by the Bidder, the sale
should, at a minimum, be postponed until all questions are adequately answered.
29. Alternatively, the Bidder, who is not arms’-length, should be denied “good faith”
status and any release granted should expressly exclude any and all claims of the SpongeTech
Trustee and all other third parties against the Bidder, Celia or any other party.
B. The Bidder Is Not Entitled to Good Faith Status under Section 363(m)
30. Because of Celia’s breach of the Celia Employment Agreement, because of the
Celia’s involvement with the Bidder as a principal since his termination by SpongeTech, see
Motion, paragraph 7, and because of the potential claims against Celia and the Bidder, see
Motion, paragraph 19, by both the Dicon Trustee and the SpongeTech Trustee, the Bidder is
precluded from being designated a ‘good faith” purchaser under Section 363(m) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
C. There Are No Exigent Circumstances
That Justify an Expedited Sale of Assets
31. Rather than utilizing a customary two-step sale process, where bidding
procedures and standards for qualification of bidders are first approved by the Court on notice to
parties in interest, the Dicon Trustee has chosen to proceed via a single motion for approval of
the sale, without approval of bidding procedures, bid qualification standards, or the proposed
expense reimbursement cap. Moreover, the proposed sale of assets has been presented to the
Court a very short time after the commencement of the Dicon bankruptcy case. Simply stated,
no exigent circumstances exist that warrant this extraordinary and expedited process.
32. The assets proposed to be sold consist principally of accounts receivable, nonperishable
inventory, and fixed assets. See Dicon Trustee’s Operating Report for June 29,
2010 to July 31, 2010 (“July Operating Report”), and Balance Sheet as of July 31, 2010 (the
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:9 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
10
“July Balance Sheet”), collectively annexed hereto as Exhibit 3. There are no representations
made in the Motion that there are any perishable goods among Dicon’s assets. The sole
justification for the expedited process proposed by the Dicon Trustee is the prospect of further
losses to the estate. However, the July Operating Report also shows that, during the period
from June 29, to July 21, 2010, Dicon had net ordinary income of $682,280.25 and cash
receipts in excess of disbursements of more than $34,000.00. Dicon’s business is not a moneylosing
enterprise sapping the estate of large volumes of cash, nor are there wasting assets that
must be preserved by an expedited sale.
33. There are, however, very significant assets listed in the Dicon Trustee’s July
Operating Report, all of which appear to be among the assets being sold, that are not
mentioned, discussed or evaluated in the Motion. The Court, the creditors, the SpongeTech
Trustee and the shareholders deserve and require detailed information and disclosure
concerning all assets being sold before the Motion can be approved.
D. The Financial Affairs and Assets of SpongeTech and
Dicon Are So Intertwined as to Require Substantive
Consolidation and a Sale of the Consolidated Entities’ Assets
34. On September 15, 2010, the SpongeTech Trustee filed an adversary proceeding
in the SpongeTech Court seeking the substantive consolidation of the SpongeTech and Dicon
estates. A copy of the adversary complaint for substantive consolidation is annexed hereto as
Exhibit 4.
35. As detailed in the adversary complaint for substantive consolidation,
SpongeTech and Dicon shared corporate headquarters, shared management and shared
employees. SpongeTech and Dicon funds were comingled and used interchangeably, with the
result that intercompany claims between SpongeTech and Dicon are incapable of being
separated. It appears from the SpongeTech Trustee’s investigation that SpongeTech
accounted for and reported, for tax purposes and otherwise, the assets and finances of
SpongeTech and Dicon on a consolidated basis.
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:10 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
11
36. It further appears that SpongeTech carries an approximately $1.0 million
receivable due from Dicon that is, in reality, sales of SpongeTech products to vendors utilizing
Dicon’s vendor code. Upon information and belief, the proceeds of the sale of SpongeTech
products were retained and utilized by Dicon in the conduct of its business.
37. On the basis of the facts discovered to date, the SpongeTech Trustee is
confident that he will prevail in his adversary proceeding.
38. As alleged in the objections filed by Christine Brenner, Docket No. 144, there is
substantial reason to believe that much of the Dicon inventory may be property of the
SpongeTech estate. Indeed, because Dicon appears to have retained the sale proceeds of
SpongeTech products, it is impossible to distinguish between SpongeTech and Dicon inventory.
39. For all of the forgoing reasons, approval of the proposed sale of Dicon’s assets is
neither warranted by the “facts” set forth in the Motion nor timely given the substantial questions
about the adequacy of marketing efforts and the reasonableness of the Bidder’s offer.
40. The Court should also afford comity to the SpongeTech Court and defer from
approving the sale until the SpongeTech Trustee’s substantive consolidation adversary
proceeding has been adjudicated.
E. The Dicon Trustee Has Failed to
Adequately Market, Describe or Value Dicon’s Assets
41. A bankruptcy trustee selling a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code must strive to maximize the value of the assets being sold. See In re
Integrated Resources, Inc., 135 B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff’d 147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). Indeed, in affirming the bankruptcy court in Integrated Resources, the District Court
noted that “the management of a bankrupt company [in this case, the Dicon Trustee] must
‘further the diverse interests of the debtor, creditor and equity holders, alike.’” 147 B.R. at 658,
quoting In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). “It is a wellestablished
principle of bankruptcy law that the objective of bankruptcy sales and the trustee's
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:11 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
12
duty with respect to such sales is to obtain the highest price or greatest overall benefit possible
for the estate. In re Blue Coal Corporation, 59 B.R. 157, 162 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.1986). See also In
re Robison, 74 B.R. 646 (E.D.Mo.1987) (holding that in order to maximize the sale price of the
property of the bankruptcy estate, the trustee has the exclusive right, power and authority to sell
such property); Zaccaro v. Bowery Savings Bank (In re Jewel Terrace Corp.), 10 B.R. 1008
(E.D.N.Y.1981) (recognizing that the trustee has a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the
debtor's shareholders and creditors, so that the trustee properly sought approval of the more
advantageous contract for the sale of the debtor's assets).
42. The Dicon Trustee represents that he has undertaken a full marketing effort of
the Dicon assets. Significantly, the Motion concedes that Celia approached the Dicon Trustee
shortly after his appointment as the chapter 11 trustee. However, the motion is silent on why
the sale of assets valued on the July Balance Sheet in excess of $3,000,000.00, for a purchase
price of $625,000.00, is warranted at this time. The Motion is eerily silent as to exactly whom
the Dicon Trustee has marketed the assets, other than the Bidder, a deeply conflicted insider,
that is subject to breach of the Celia Employment Agreement’s non-compete covenant. Nor is
there any evidence that the Dicon Trustee utilized the services of a professional broker,
auctioneer or investment banker to market Dicon’s business and assets.
43. During the past two months, the SpongeTech Trustee has been approached by
numerous SpongeTech public shareholders who have expressed a strong interest in submitting
a bid for the consolidated assets of Dicon/SpongeTech. See Separate letters from SpongeTech
shareholders, filed with the Court as Docket Nos. 133-135, 139-141, 144-145 and 147-149. The
shareholders have indicated to the SpongeTech Trustee a strong interest, subject to due
diligence, to consider a significant purchase price for the consolidated assets of Dicon and
SpongeTech. The SpongeTech shareholders have expressed frustration to the SpongeTech
Trustee over not having received notice of the marketing efforts and over the disdain shown by
the Dicon Trustee to a substantive consolidation of the SpongeTech and Dicon estates. The
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:12 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
13
SpongeTech Trustee believes that, with an adjournment and the provision of information to a
wider group of potential purchasers, including SpongeTech shareholders, an offer substantially
in excess of that of the Bidder can be elicited.
44. There is no valuation provided for any of the assets being sold other than the
inventory. Indeed, there is a startling failure to describe in narrative format the assets being
offered for sale. Therefore, there is inadequate information provided by the Dicon Trustee for
any party to conclude that the estates are receiving any value for the valuable releases that the
Dicon Trustee proposes to give
45. In the motion, the Dicon Trustee represents that the Dicon business has
effectively ceased. Moreover, the purchase price of $625,000.00 offered by the Bidder is less
than the cost of Dicon’s inventory. It is clear that the Bidder’s offer allocates no value to the
releases received from the Dicon Trustee or the going concern business of Dicon. However, it
appears from (i) the Motion, (ii) the July Operating Report, and (iii) the Term Sheet with Respect
to Proposed Assumption and Assignment of Lease by and between the Development Authority
of Bryan County and Dicon Technologies, LLC dated August 1, 2008 (the “Lease Assignment
Term Sheet”), that Dicon’s fixed assets being leased from Bryan County may have very
substantial value that is not reflected at all in the Bidder’s offer.
46. For example, the July Operating Report values Dicon’s Building, Land and
Property, Plant and Equipment at $3,184,988.61, net of depreciation (the land is valued at
$207,550.00). The Lease Assignment Term Sheet provides that the Bidder pay a cure amount
of $100,000 to the Development Authority of Bryan County, plus the lease payments of $16,000
per month, and has the obligation to purchase the Dicon Black Creek facility for $10.00. Given
the value of Dicon’s Building, Plant and Equipment, as reported in the July Operating Report,
the proposed sale to the Bidder appears to be a patent give-away to the Bidder, with the Dicon
estate receiving nothing at all for Dicon’s apparently valuable facility.
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:13 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
14
47. Finally, the Bidder makes no commitment to hire employees. Accordingly, the
Bidder’s (non-binding) offer that is before the Court offers no value for any assets other than the
inventory of Dicon, including the fixed assets, good will and going concern value, if any, and
provides no assurances that any employees of Dicon will be retained by the Bidder.
48. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to proceed with the haste that is
proposed by the Dicon Trustee and every reason to adjourn the proposed sale while a search
for a higher and better offer is conducted and the issue of substantive consolidation is properly
determined by the SpongeTech Court.
F. The Motion Fails to Provide Any Basis to Conclude
That the Settlement of Claims of the Dicon Estate
Against Celia and H.H. Brown Is Fair and Reasonable
49. As detailed above and in Paragraph 19 of the Motion, the Dicon estate has
substantial claims against Celia, the Bidder, its principals and H.H. Brown. The proposed sale
implicitly settles all claims against these parties by granting them blanket general releases.
50. However, the Motion never allocates a portion of the proposed purchase price to
the settlement and makes no effort to show that the proposed settlement amount, whatever it
may be, is fair and reasonable as required by Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure.
G. The Term Sheet Is Grossly Inadequate, Non-Binding
And, Coupled with a Lack of Sound Bidding Process,
Is an Effective Lock-up that Chills Competitive Bidding
51. The Bidder’s “offer” is neither firm nor binding. See Term Sheet, attached to the
Motion. As of September 15, 2010, the day by which all competing bids must be filed, the
Court’s docket reflects that there is no signed (or even unsigned) Asset Purchase
Agreement (“APA”) between the Dicon Trustee and the Bidder to be considered by the
creditors and the Court, or for other bidders to mark up and execute. Because the unapproved
bidding procedures unilaterally established by the Dicon Trustee require any “qualified bidder” to
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:14 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
15
submit an executed mark-up of the APA, it is impossible for other bidders to qualify for the
“auction” being conducted by the Dicon Trustee.
52. Despite the fact that there are no wasting assets involved in the proposed sale,
the Dicon Trustee (i) did not seek approval of the bidding procedures, which, especially in light
of the Dicon Trustee’s failure to file the promised Asset Purchase Agreement, are nothing more
than a disguised lock-up in favor of the Bidder, and (ii) provided insufficient time for competing
bidders to enter the process.
53. Although to be “qualified,” bidders must certify that there has been no collusion,
the Bidder, who is both an insider of Dicon and who, together with its principals, are the subject
of very real claims of the SpongeTech Trustee, have apparently not been required to so
certify—presumably because, as the facts set forth herein show, the Bidder cannot.
54. The Motion and the Term Sheet attached to the Motion as Exhibit 1 also fail to
adequately describe:
a. The principals of the Bidder, and their relationships to
Dicon, SpongeTech and H.H. Brown Shoe Technologies,
Inc. (“H.H. Brown”), the licensor of technology critical to
Dicon’s business and also the subject of potential claims
by the SpongeTech Trustee;
b. The Bryan County Lease, which is critical to Dicon’s
business, the terms of the assumption of the lease and any
prospective cures;
c. Potential WARN Act liability that the Dicon estate may face
as a result of the proposed sale;
d. The liabilities that the Dicon estate will be left with after the
proposed sale closes;
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:15 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
16
e. The transfer taxes and amounts that each party will pay
upon the closing of the proposed sale;
f. The deposit, if any, tendered by the Bidder, the Dicon
Trustee’s investigation of, and the substance behind, the
financial wherewithal of the Bidder to close the proposed
sale and to provide adequate assurances of future
performance of any leases to be assumed;
g. Precisely which leases and executory contracts the Bidder
wishes to assume, potential costs to cure any assumed
contracts or leases and which party will be responsible for
cure amounts;
h. The nature and background of potential claims against
Celia and the Bidder, and the reasons for Celia’s
termination by Dicon in the first place; and
i. The grounds for H.H. Brown’s alleged termination of
Dicon’s license rights and why affirmation of the
termination is in the best interests of the Dicon estate.
55. The combination of inadequate disclosure, the pendency of a non-binding offer
and the failure to file any APA as the bidding deadline is at hand combine to create an uneven
playing field and a severe chill on competitive bidding that require a postponement of the sale
until the Dicon Trustee can satisfy minimal and fair disclosure, and provide a meaningful bidding
process that encourages—not discourages—competitive bidding.
H. The Expense Reimbursement Cap Is Grossly Excessive
56. The Term Sheet requires an expense reimbursement payment to the Bidder if it
is not the winning bidder in an amount up to $75,000 (the “Break-up Fee”), or more than 13% of
the proposed purchase price. When compared to break-up fees approved by bankruptcy
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:16 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
17
courts, a 13% fee is grossly excessive. The court is “charged with the duty of reviewing the
agreement to determine that it is reasonable in relation to the bidder’s efforts and the magnitude
and significance of the transaction, and will enhance rather than detract from the bidding
process.” In re Integrated Resources, 135 B.R. at 753 (citations omitted).
57. In In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 B.R. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), the Court posed
the Integrated standard for evaluating break-up fees as a 3 part test: 1) is the relationship of the
parties who negotiated the break-up fee tainted by self-dealing or manipulation; 2) does the fee
hamper rather than encourage, bidding; and 3) is the amount of the fee unreasonable as related
to the proposed purchase price? The Metaldyne Court held that the less than 3% break-up fee
and expense reimbursement amount was not unreasonable as it fell within the range of what
courts in this jurisdiction have found to be acceptable. Here, the proposed Break-up Fee chills,
rather than encourages, bidding and, at 13% of the proposed purchase price, is grossly
excessive.
58. In In re America West Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908 (Bankr.D. Arizona 1994), the
Court rejected the notion that the business judgment rule is the appropriate standard by which
to determine whether a break-up fee should be upheld. Rather, the Court emphasized the
distinction between the non-bankruptcy context (wherein the business judgment rule controls)
and bankruptcy context wherein “the standard is not whether the break-up fee is in the best
interests of the debtor, but whether the transaction will further the diverse interests of the debtor,
creditors and equity holders alike.” 166 B.R. at 912 (internal quotations omitted). In addition, the
Court stated that the “proposed break-up fee must be carefully scrutinized to insure that the
Debtor’s estate is not unduly burdened and that the relative rights of the parties in interest are
protected.” Id citing In re Hupp Industries, Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 196 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1992).
59. Expense reimbursement provisions in bankruptcy sales are claims for
administrative expenses that are subject to approval under section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code. In In re Obrien Environmental Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527, 535 (3d Cir. 1999)), the Third
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:17 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
18
Circuit employed the following standard: “whether break-up fees or expenses are allowable
under §503(b) must be made in reference to general administrative expenses jurisprudence.” At
535. The O’Brien Court stated that the “allowability of break-up fees,… depends upon the
requesting party’s ability to show that the fees were actually necessary to preserve the value of
the estate.” The Third Circuit denied the request for break-up fees as the requesting party was
not able to show that its due diligence data had helped establish information on which other
bidders could rely, thus their research efforts were not necessary to preserve the value of the
Debtor’s assets. Here, the Bidder has made no effort to present justification for the proposed
Break-up Fee and as the Term Sheet makes clear, the Motion is seeking approval of the Breakup
Fee with further application to this Court to review the necessity and reasonableness on any
claim for expenses. See In re Dorado Marine, Inc., 332 B.R. 637 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 2005).
60. Moreover, in stark departure from the customary practice of obtaining court
approval of break-up fees before a sale or auction, the Dicon Trustee did not seek approval of
this Court. Instead, the Dicon Trustee and the Bidder made the Break-up an effective part of
the overbid procedure by requiring other bidders to bid $625,000, plus $10,000, plus $75,000.
Thus, any initial overbid must be at least $710,000, or approximately 13% higher than the
Bidder’s non-binding offer. The so-called “expense reimbursement cap” is, in reality an
exorbitant over-bid designed to chill the bidding in favor of the Bidder. Furthermore, because
there is no evidence of the Bidder’s expenses, there is no way for the Court, the creditors or the
SpongeTech Trustee to assess the relationship between the Break-up fee and the actual costs
and expenses of the Bidder.
61. Because the Dicon Trustee has not, as of the day that competing bids are due,
produced a binding APA signed by the Bidder, any claim that the Break-up Fee is warranted
because the Bidder has “committed” to a purchase that might induce others to bid, rings
decidedly hollow.
I. The Sale Should be Postponed Until Determination
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:18 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
19
Of the Substantive Consolidation Adversary Proceeding
62. It may well be that the best interests of the creditors of both Dicon and
SpongeTech, and the defrauded public shareholders of SpongeTech, will best be served by a
sale of the consolidated assets of SpongeTech and Dicon. That determination, however, is
premature and must await the determination of the SpongeTech Trustee’s substantive
consolidation adversary proceeding.
63. The July Operating Report establishes that there is a business to operate and
that the dire consequences that Dicon Trustee fears are not likely to come to fruition. The facts
shown herein further demonstrate that prudence, restraint, and further inquiry is warranted,
including inquiry into the extent of the comingling of the assets, finances and business of Dicon
and SpongeTech. Such an inquiry can only be accomplished in the context of the adversary
complaint filed by the SpongeTech Trustee.
64. As a matter of comity, the Court should adjourn the sale hearing until the
substantive consolidation proceeding is decided by the SpongeTech Court.
CONCLUSION
65. For all the forgoing reasons, approval of the sale to the Bidder is not appropriate
or warranted at this time. The Court should enter an Order denying the Motion, without
prejudice to renewal when the SpongeTech Trustee’s substantive consolidation proceeding has
been fully adjudicated, when the issues clouding the status of and claims against the Bidder and
Celia have been resolved and when the Dicon Trustee has disclosed all relevant information
about the assets being sold, their nature, their value and the bona fides of the proposed
purchaser.
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:19 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
20
WHEREFORE, the SpongeTech Trustee respectfully requests entry of an Order denying
the Motion, without prejudice.
Dated: Jericho, New York SILVERMANAcampora LLP
September 16, 2010 Counsel for Kenneth P. Silverman, as
Chapter 11 Trustee for SpongeTech
Delivery Systems, Inc.
By: s/Edward M. Flint
Edward M. Flint, Esq. (Admission Pro Hac
Vice Pending)
100 Jericho Quadrangle, Suite 300
Jericho, New York 11753
(516) 479-6300
McCALLAR LAW FIRM
/s/ Tiffany E. Caron
C. James McCallar, Jr.
State Bar No. 481400
Tiffany E. Caron
State Bar No. 745089
Attorney for Kenneth P. Silverman,
As Chapter 11 Trustee for
SpongeTech Delivery Systems, Inc.
McCallar Law Firm
115 West Oglethorpe Avenue
P. O. Box 9026
Savannah, GA 31412
(912) 234-1215
mccallar@mccallarlawfirm.com
The signatures represented by /s/ on this document conform to original signatures on the paper version of
this document maintained by the filing user.
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:20 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
21
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
In re: )
) Chapter 11
DICON TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, )
) Case No. 10-41275-LWD
)
Debtor. )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I have this day served a copy of the foregoing Objection to Sale
upon the parties listed below via E-mail through the Court’s ECF System or by regular U.S.
Mail:
Debtor
Dicon Technologies, LLC
Attn: Rosalind Nathaniel, Registered Ag
100 Dicon Drive
Black Creek, GA 31308
Chapter 11 Trustee
Lloyd T. Whitaker
Newleaf Corporation
2810 Spring Road - Suite 106
Atlanta, GA 30339
Attorneys for the Trustee
Katie Z. Merrell
William S. Sugden
Alston & Bird LLP
1201 West Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30309
L. Stephen O'Hearn
Mark Bulovic
Bulovic Law Firm, LLC
1020 Bryan Woods Loop, Suite 5
Savannah, GA 31410
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:21 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
22
Office of the United States Trustee
U. S. Trustee
Office of the U. S. Trustee
Attn: Joel Paschke
222 West Oglethorpe Ave., Ste. 302
Savannah, GA 31401
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
Frank J Perch, Ill
Hunter Maclean Exley & Dunn PC
200 East Saint Julian Street
P 0 Box 9848
Savannah, GA 31412
Global Alliance Logistics(NYC), Inc.
133-33 Brookville Blvd., Ste. 228
Rosedale, NY 11422
Holland, Henry & Bromley LLP
Attn: Jack Richard Henry, Jr.
P 0 Box 8878
Savannah, GA 31412
Product Development & Packaging, Inc.
11 Prospect Street
Morristown, NJ 07960
Entities Having Filed Notices of Appearance
Darryl S. Laddin
Michael F. Holbein
Amall Golden Gregory LLP
171 17th Street NW, Suite 2100
Atlanta, Georgia 30363-1031
Anthony Acampora
Kenneth P. Silverman
SilvermanAcampora LLP
100 Jericho Quadrangle, Suite 300
Jericho, NY 11753
Michael Holbein
Arnall Golden Gregory LLP
171 17th St, NW, Ste 2100
Atlanta, GA 30363-1031
Diversified, Cooley LLP
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:22 of 23
EMF/610017.2/059228
23
Attn: Brent Weisenberg
114 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
This 16th day of September, 2010.
McCALLAR LAW FIRM
/s/ Tiffany E. Caron
C. James McCallar, Jr.
State Bar No. 481400
Tiffany E. Caron
State Bar No. 745089
Attorney for Kenneth P. Silverman,
As Chapter 11 Trustee for
SpongeTech Delivery Systems, Inc.
McCallar Law Firm
115 West Oglethorpe Avenue
P. O. Box 9026
Savannah, GA 31412
(912) 234-1215
mccallar@mccallarlawfirm.com
Case: 10-41275-LWD Doc#:156 Filed:09/16/10 Page:23 of 23
dr,
In case you missed it:
"I called the SEC, Zecco, DTC, Worldwide Stock Transfer.
And finally got them to agree to issue me my Certs."
Which of those 4 "thems" agreed to issue you your certificates?
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=54477368
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
And now:
"I hope they follow thru on it."
I'd really like to know who the "they" is.
"I called the SEC, Zecco, DTC, Worldwide Stock Transfer.
And finally got them to agree to issue me my Certs."
Which of those 4 "thems" agreed to issue you your certificates?
SILVERMANACAMPORA LLP
Counsel to Kenneth P. Silverman, Esq. the Chapter 11 Operating Trustee 100 Jericho Quadrangle, Suite 300 Jericho, New York 11753
(516) 479-6300 Anthony C. Acampora Edward M. Flint Jay S. Hellman
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK AT BOWLING GREEN -------------------------------------------------------------x In re:
SPONGETECH DELIVERY SYSTEMS, INC.,
Debtor. -------------------------------------------------------------x
KENNETH P. SILVERMAN, CHAPTER 11 OPERATING TRUSTEE OF SPONGETECH DELIVERY SYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
-against-
DICON TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, and LLOYD T. WHITAKER, solely in his capacity as Trustee of DICON TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Defendants. --------------------------------------------------------------x
Chapter 11 Case No.: 10-13647 (SMB)
CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE’S COMPLAINT FOR SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
Plaintiff, Kenneth P. Silverman, Esq. (the “Trustee”), the operating chapter 11 trustee of SpongeTech Delivery Systems, Inc., the above-captioned debtor (“SpongeTech” or the "Debtor"), by his attorneys, SilvermanAcampora LLP, for his complaint against Dicon Technologies, LLC (“Dicon”) and Lloyd T. Whitaker, as Trustee of Dicon Technologies, Inc. (the “Dicon Trustee”) alleges as follows:
Adv Pro. No.
(SMB)
JSH/589811.1/059228
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. In this adversary proceeding, the Trustee seeks a judgment substantively consolidating one of the Debtor’s wholly-owned subsidiaries, Dicon, including its respective assets and liabilities, with the Debtor’s chapter 11 estate.1
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2. This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the order of reference of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
3. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1408 and 1409. This is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§157(b)(2)(A) and (O).
THE PARTIES
4. At all times relevant, the Debtor was a publicly held Delaware corporation with offices at 10 W. 33rd Street, New York, New York.
5. On July 9, 2010, the Debtor filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition for relief in accordance with chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Court").
6. By Order of the Court dated July 19, 2010, and Notice of Appointment dated July 20, 2010, S. Gregory Hays (“Hays”) was appointed as the chapter 11 operating trustee of this estate. On August 3, 2010, by Notice of Withdrawal, Hays resigned his position as trustee in this case.
1 The Trustee intends to file voluntary petitions for relief and seek the substantive consolidation of the remaining seven (7) subsidiaries: SpongeTech® Europe, SpongeTech® Health & Beauty, Inc., SpongeTech® Kitchen & Bath, Inc., SpongeTech® Auto, Inc., SpongeTech® Medical, Inc., SpongeTech® Pet, Inc., and The Smarter Sponge CompanyTM.
2
JSH/589811.1/059228
7. In accordance with an Order of this Court dated August 4, 2010, Hays was discharged of his duties, and Kenneth P. Silverman, Esq., was appointed as the Successor Operating Trustee in this case.
8. In or about July 2009, SpongeTech acquired One Hundred Percent (100%) of the membership interests in Dicon, and at all times relevant SpongeTech was and is the sole equity holder of Dicon.
9. The acquisition of Dicon was reflected in SpongeTech’s general ledger as an intercompany transfer, with the purchase price as being “due from” Dicon.
10. Upon information and belief, immediately upon the acquisition of Dicon, the Debtor began to exert full operational and financial control.
11. Upon information and belief, after the acquisition Dicon management was replaced and, thereafter and at all times relevant, the Debtor and Dicon were managed and controlled by Chief Executive Officer and President Michael Metter (“Metter”), Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer Steven Moskowitz (“Moskowitz”), and Executive Vice President Barry Kolevzon (“Kolevzon”).
12. Prior to the Petition Date, SpongeTech and Dicon were purportedly engaged in the manufacture and distribution of hydrophilic foam sponge products designed for, among other things, cosmetics, the home, automobiles, watercraft, and pets.
13. Upon information and belief, as part of the manufacturing and distribution process, SpongeTech products were manufactured in the Dicon plant in Black Creek, Georgia, and on-site inventory was held at the Oneida warehouse in Black Creek.
14. Inventory reports from available books and records reflect that inventory of the Debtor and Dicon were and continue to be commingled.
15. Upon information and belief, and also as part of the manufacturing and distribution process, Dicon personnel were located in the SpongeTech offices in New York and were paid through SpongeTech.
3
JSH/589811.1/059228
16. Concomitantly, upon information and belief, other Dicon personnel were located in the SpongeTech offices in New York and were paid through Dicon.
17. In addition, sales personnel sold both SpongeTech and Dicon products.
18. SpongeTech sales to certain vendors were sold through Dicon and appear as though those sales were made by Dicon and, as a result, at least $1.2 million was collected and retained by Dicon.
19. Moreover, the company financials and federal tax returns for SpongeTech and Dicon were reported on a consolidated basis.
20. On June 18, 2010 an involuntary petition was filed against Dicon.
21. On June 24, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division, (Davis, J.) entered an order directing the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee for Dicon and, on July 9, 2010, Lloyd T. Whitaker was appointed the chapter 11 trustee for Dicon.
The Criminal And Civil Actions By The United States Against The Debtor And Its Officers And Directors
22. In May 2010, the United States of America filed a criminal complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York charging Moskowitz and Metter with conspiracy to commit fraud and obstruction of justice.
23. Moskowitz and Metter were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) for their alleged criminal activity, which raided the Debtor’s premises and removed most of the Debtor’s invoices, books and records, bank statements, and computers.
24. Metter resigned from his position with the Debtor on June 8, 2010.
25. At the same time, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a civil complaint against Metter, Moskowitz and several others, alleging, inter alia, that they were involved in a massive “pump and dump” scheme dating back to 2007, whereby, as part of their
4
JSH/589811.1/059228
scheme, they allegedly deceived the investors through false statements about non-existent SpongeTech customers, fake sales orders, and phony revenue.
26. According to the SEC Complaint, the defendants then dumped the fraudulently inflated shares by illegally selling them to the public through affiliated entities in unregistered transactions.
27. The Debtor has not complied with any of its SEC filing requirements since at least February 2009.
THE TRUSTEE’S INVESTIGATION
28. Upon his appointment as the operating chapter 11 trustee of the Debtor’s estate, the Trustee secured and inspected the Debtor’s premises and those documents within the premises that were not seized by the FBI.
29. Additionally, the Trustee has commenced and continues to conduct his own investigation including numerous interviews of employees and others.
30. The Trustee and his professionals have also diligently worked to determine the nature, extent and value of the Debtor’s inventory, the actual value of accounts receivables and royalty payments, the authenticity and ownership of patents, trademarks, trade secrets and licenses, and the nature and extent of the Debtor’s liabilities.
31. Based upon the Trustee’s inspection of the premises, independent investigation and review of various documents recovered from the premises and the interviews conducted by the Trustee and his counsel, it has been revealed that Dicon was commonly managed and controlled by Metter, Moskowitz and Kolevzon.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (incorporating all previous allegations)
32. The Debtor used Dicon as its instrumentality by commingling funds with Dicon and ignoring the separate corporate existence of Dicon.
33. Dicon shared headquarters with the Debtor in New York City.
5
JSH/589811.1/059228
assets.
34. Dicon was inadequately capitalized or capitalized with the Debtor’s
35. Dicon and the Debtor shared common ownership and management.
36. Upon information and belief, some or all of Dicon’s work was performed by the Debtor’s employees and all compensation for that work was paid by the Debtor.
37. Upon information and belief, all assets in the name of Dicon were obtained through use of the Debtor’s funds.
38. Dicon and the Debtor did not deal with each other at arm’s length.
39. The financial affairs of Dicon and the Debtor are irreconcilably entangled and the assets and liabilities of Dicon and the Debtor cannot be separated without the expenditure of significant accounting and legal costs.
40. Dicon and the Debtor are alter egos of each other.
41. For example, upon information and belief, SpongeTech products were sold to Walmart utilizing Dicon’s Walmart vendor code. At all times Walmart believed it was dealing with Dicon, but, in reality was purchasing Dicon and SpongeTech products as if from a single source.
42. Creditors of Dicon and the Debtor did not deal with Dicon and the Debtor as separate economic units.
43. Corporate formalities were not observed by and among Dicon and the
Debtor.
44. Creditors of Dicon and the Debtor will benefit from the substantive consolidation of the entities.
45. Substantive consolidation of Dicon and the Debtor is necessary to avoid in inequitable diminution of the Debtor’s estate and to protect the Debtor’s creditors.
6
JSH/589811.1/059228
46. Based on the foregoing, the Trustee is entitled to an order substantively consolidating Dicon, including its respective assets and liabilities, with the Debtor’s chapter 11 estate.
WHEREFORE, the Trustee respectfully demands: a) judgment substantively consolidating Dicon, including its assets and liabilities,
with the Debtor’s chapter 11 estate; and b) such additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Dated: Jericho, New York September 14, 2010
SILVERMANACAMPORA LLP
Attorneys for Kenneth P. Silverman, Esq., Chapter 11 Operating Trustee
s/Edward M. Flint
Edward M. Flint, Esq. A Member of the Firm 100 Jericho Quadrangle - Suite 300 Jericho, New York 11753 (516) 479-6300
By:
7
JSH/589811.1/059228
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
All I can add at this point is that I suspect a great many of the "upon information and belief" items are compliments of SM and could not be otherwise documented. I suspect that his unwillingness to provide testimony, not to mention his imminent "vacation" may present a problem to the court in its pursuit of a resolution to the complaint.
(edited for appearance..appears as docket 113 in the SPNG BK case)
Spongetech Trustee Silverman and attorney Acampora have filed a motion in Georgia seeking the right to appear as representatives of a party in interest in the Dicon case. It is not clear to me whether it is their hope to attend the hearing on Whitaker's appointment (tomorrow), the sale of Dicon's assets or both.
"People who believe "naked short selling" hurts companies deserve to be mocked."
I must admit that that would then include yours truly. Because I believe that it could.
But I don't believe that it could result in the bankruptcy of a healthy company. No amount of naked short selling could do that and I challenge anyone to provide an example that proves differently. Nor could it impact a company's revenues or, in fact, do any more damage than the issuance of unregistered shares by the company itself. And it couldn't be be more harmful than a company misrepresenting its financial condition and operational results in its communications to the public and its shareholders, either.
But I think it could hurt a company, if it could be proven to exist. And if it existed here, it certainly hurt this company less than the factors above.
"My point is that taking all the quotes regarding naked shorts from Silverman/Acompora leaves me to believe they have not spent much if any time on this particular issue."
I agree that it doesn't SOUND that way.
On the other hand, it could just be another one of the abundant reasons (bad books, missing accountants, fifth amendment claims, etc.) available to them to toss up to the judge if and when they propose that a re-organization plan is practically and economically impossible, making his acceptance of that motion a slam dunk. And they may be just warming him up to the idea.
As the judge pointed out, the lack of obvious sources of recovery could result in any expensive efforts toward that end on their part jeopardizing their ability to recover their own costs. He seems to think that it might be unwise to drag the process out any longer than necessary.
There's really no good reason that I can think of for the subject to come up in the first place.
"Everyone seems to overlook Silverman's language that starts the paragraph in question.
Quote:The numbers that have been thrown aroundat us..."
tds,
In the interest of keeping things straight, here is the full preceding statement, which was made by Silverman's attorney Acampora and not Silverman himself.
"The numbers that have been thrown around at us in conjunction with listening to the debtor, the Securities Exchange Commission, my conversations with the FBI and the U.S Attorney is that there's somewhere in the neighborhood of three billion shares actually issued. That does not take into account all of the naked short sales, which could amount to 50 billion shares."
I saw no other reference to "50 billion shares" in the transcript. But obviously once was once too many.
The statements made by Silverman himself imply that he believes that there were naked short sales, but he doesn't specifically quantify them:
"You have three billion of alleged issued shares, you have billions of naked short sales for which there were never any shares. Those individuals are looking for their certificates. They probably will never get them."
"As to the individuals out in the market, I'm not sure that the SEC can tell me how when and where they would get certificate or quantify the certificate based on all of the naked short sellings."
The other reference to the identification of shareholders issue is made by Gasparini, attorney for the US Trustee, in reference to the difficulty in establishing a Shareholders committee due to the inability to confirm that people putting themselves forth as shareholders, having every right to believe that they are shareholders, are really shareholders:
"There was also statement regarding an equity committee The United States Trustee has not received formal letter asking for the formation of such committee. It's ultimately in her discretion. Your Honor. Having said that you know at this point from what we've heard the estate the debtor is
insolvent. So it would be an unusual case in which an equity committee is appointed in an insolvent case. Also there is a question of who actually the shareholders are so we know that some investors have come forward have filed things with the Court on the docket. Its just a question of whether or not they're actually holding shares in the company."
Please excuse any typos and layout problems in the above…for some reason the original document does not copy and paste perfectly.
At the end of the petition, after the "signature" line, there is an option similar to the following:
Display options:
X Show my name in the online signature list.
I think it is safe to assume that the Anonymous signers are those that chose to uncheck that display option. It is further probably safe to assume that the document finally forwarded to the intended recipient by the petition sponsor would show the "real" signers name.
Otherwise you would be correct and it would be dopey.
Rumor has it indeed.
Added 7 words.
They made a lot of sense, but didn't make it into the final product. I suspect the reason/explanation is that they weren't received until after the critical "right after Sunday brunch" deadline.
The latest from Petitions "R" Us:
http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/nss/
Nope....I couldn't be that lucky twice.
I was just a little surprised to see that he stayed on the horse into 2010. The fact that you were mistaken and he hadn't "resigned months ago" as of 1/2/2010 makes me feel like I won the pot without even having to feed the kitty.
Added a little icing to this very large cake, from 5/2/2010....not quite 3 full days before the arrests:
themanfromboston:
"so, even after the SEC has formally claimed that SPNG financials filed with the SEC and included in PR's are false, you still state that you believe that those very figures issued by Moskowitz and SPNG that the SEC says are false - are now true?"
Christy from Google:
"In this matter - Mosky has told the truth"
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=49680565
"I'm willing to bet Franky resigned months ago." (CfG....1/2/2010)
Not a gambling man, but that's a wager I should've taken.
From FL's motion to dismiss in the class action case:
"Prior to resigning from the board in 2010, Mr. Lazauskas served as a non-employee director and was described in SpongeTech's SEC filings as a member of its audit committee."
http://www.scribd.com/doc/37202626/9-8-10-Class-Action-Doc-68-Memorandum-of-Law-to-Dismiss-Lazauskas
Also, it's interesting that he seems to be considering his position as a member (the only member), not to mention chairman of the audit committee as some kind of unproven accusation versus a fact. For those that are interested, the way the issue of one's responsibilities as an audit committee member are basically dismissed in terms of liability in the case are noted in the linked document. Citations are made to the effect that an audit committee member can't be assumed to know that fraudulent statements are made in the financial filings without specific proof that he/she is otherwise aware that they are fraudulent. Leaving one to wonder, if that 's true, who needs an audit committee anyway.
I forgot to note.....the topic of the post is:
"Please check over the new petition to Judge Bernstein for errors. I will post it for signing Sunday morning. Thank you."
The new proposed petition.
Some lessons for the judge and a simple request.
To the Honorable Chief Judge Stuart Bernstein.
RE: 10-13647-smb SpongeTech Delivery Systems Inc.
Your Honor, First I would like to thank you very much for the time you
have taken to include the shareholders point of view regarding this
case. You are helping us make a difference. We greatly appreciate
that.
We the undersigned shareholders of SpongeTech Delivery Systems
respectfully request that you look into the matter of the "ILLEGAL"
naked short selling (NSS) of SpongeTech Delivery Systems stock.
Your Honor, when I was in your court for the hearing regarding the
replacing of Mr. Hay's as a trustee, you asked a shareholder what NSS
is. He did not give a very good explanation. I would like to give you
a better one. First you must understand short selling (which is legal)
In short selling a stock you are basically betting the price per share
(PPS) will go down. You must find someone who owns shares and borrow a
certain amount of shares from that shareholder. Once the shares are
"loaned" to you, they are immediately sold by you. You must buy these
shares back within a predetermined time. Usually 3 days. When you buy
the shares back you return them to the person who allowed you to
borrow them.
If for example I borrowed 10 shares of XYZ company stock valued at $10
per share. $100 total value. Then sold them immediately into the
market for $100. I would have to buy them back at whatever they were
selling for at the time. If as expected the PPS goes down to say $7
per share. I buy the shares back for $70 return them to the person I
borrowed them from and keep the $30 difference. If the PPS goes up. I
must still purchase the shares and return them at a loss to myself.
With NSS which is illegal. The stock is never borrowed to begin with
but still sold into the market. This cannot be done by the average
retail investor. It can only be done by large financial institutions.
Hedge funds and the like. They can do this because it is taken for
granted that they have indeed already borrowed the shares needed. In
effect they are selling "Non Existent" shares and keeping the proceeds
as profit. To put it bluntly they are selling counterfeit shares. The
addition of these "counterfeit" shares into the market causes a
cascading effect driving down PPS.
Now here is the interesting part. Once NSS has been started, the
company that was sold short must be driven out of business. You see,
once the business has gone under there is no way for anyone to find
out what really happened. The books are closed and the criminal
perpetrators of the NSS never have to cover their cost of the
counterfeited shares. This task is accomplished by the hedge funds or
other financial institutions. They hire people to post messages on
internet sites such as Yahoo and Google and many more to bash the
targeted company with exaggerated claims of wrong doing or other
improprieties by a company or its executives. (Companies like this are
prime targets for these criminals) Combine this with the power to have
the press write negative story after negative story and you have what
is called the "short and distort"
Most of the time a company gets attacked by a short and distorts
shareholders get scared and sell their stock to avoid more losses.
This usually causes a faster demise of the company. This time however
the criminals who pulled the short and distort on SPNG did not count
on the SPNG Long Board with over 700 shareholder members banding
together to stay informed on what was really happening. They also did
not count on the Honorable Chief Judge Stuart Bernstein to listen to
our pleas for help.
Your Honor. What we wish is for the court to order a complete and
total FORENSIC share count. Including but not limited to an
"independent third-party reconciliation of the
stock transfer register (STR)" maintained by the company. The
company’s STR reflects the legally outstanding shares as of some
date. It needs to be reconciled with the DTCC OBO (Objecting
Beneficial Owners)/NOBO (Non Objecting Beneficial Owners) lists,
including reports of positions held in Euroclear/Clearstream. There
is still no way to get the “Ex-Clearing” numbers, so they have to be
left out. If the SEC were willing or forced to do it, they would
compare the daily trading volume from the Blue Sheets and CNS reports
against the STR. But the SEC has consistently avoided doing this
citing privacy matters, etc.
Your Honor you heard Mr. Silverman estimate that there are as much as
50 Billion NSS of SPNG stock. More conservative estimates place them
at 10 Billion shares. Even with the 3 Billion shares allegedly
illegally dumped into the market by SPNG management there are over 3
to 7 times that amount of shares that have actually been sold into the
market. This is why when several shareholders requested their stock
certificates be sent to them by their brokers they were told “We
cannot send you your certificates because we cannot verify their
authenticity" or "If we send you your certifications we will not take
them back because we cannot verify their authenticity." Your Honor, We
hope you find those statements as disturbing as we do. If Your Honor
can order and receive the forensic share count and devise a mechanism
to force the criminal NSS perpetrators to buy back all the counterfeit
shares SPNG could easily pay their way out of bankruptcy. Thereby
satisfying ALL the creditors and shareholders’ needs. We know this is
a daunting task Your Honor but we are glad to see it in your capable
hands. Thank you for hearing us once again.
Sincerely,
James Sasser on behalf of the undersigned shareholders and The SPNG
Long Board.