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If someone is repeatedly posting fabrications and otherwise disrupting a board where people are trying to engage in serious discussion, that detracts from quality, IMO.
Fabrications? You can't be serious! Peruse the history of the IHub e.Digital thread. What percentage of the "positive" speculation proved to be "fabrication"? 97%? 98%?
I believe, and the facts support, that an overwhelming majority of "fabrication" is contributed by the pollyannish "believers".
I challenge you to indentify two (2) of my posts that are "fabrications" and refute the "fabrications" with credible and verifiable facts (excluding statements from the management or directors of the company as they are biased in their intent).
For every two (2) you identify and refute I will do the same for twenty (20) from the "believers".
..what reason would there be for management to do this ? Is it your thought.. that a strengthing asset for e.Digital was yanked....to keep the company at a level of poverty ? Giving it away for this reason ?
Perhaps greed?
If you were the director of a publicly held corporation and the corporation was the legal owner of a asset that was potentially extremely valuable ..
.. however that asset was an ownership interest in another company (stock), not a instrument that the corporation could leverage to provide a continuing stream of income.
Would you ..
1.) keep the "stock" in the corporation and thus held to the benefit of the shareholders of the corporation, 95% of which you don't know and care nothing about, or
2.) would you divine a method (ignorant to the possible
illegality of the method) to extract that "stock" from the corporation at fractions of its potential value and deposit it into private accounts owned to your benefit and/or the benefit of friends, family?
Okay, now add the fact that the corporation in which you are the director is in dire straights, trading at pennies per share, a negative shareholder equity (liabilities greater than assets) and, other than the "stock", has little in the way of assets. At this point largely "writen-off" by the remaining shareholders.
Okay, now add the fact that the corporation has been in business for nearly ten years, has tried and failed with a number of business models and absent of a current identity.
What would you do?
Keep the stock in the corporation and share its value with the shareholders of the corporation or move the stock out of the corporation and into private ownership where you and/or your friends and family will be the direct benefactors of its value?
You are wrong again.
I'm surprised you have invested in this company without engaging in even cursory due diligence.
Falk owns 1.15M
Putnam owns 1.125M
Diaz owns 360K
Collier owns 1K
Furman owns 0
Cocumelli owns 0
Ramsauer owns 0
Which represents 1.88% of the outstanding shares based on 140M shares outstanding.
Incorrect.
As of September 7, 2002 2.8% of the outstanding shares were owned by insiders.
The company has no individuals/entities (or a combination of) that hold greater than a 4.99999% interest in the corporation.
If there are individuals/entities that control 5% or greater of the outstanding shares, they are in violation of SEC reporting regulations.
Why you call me an idiot when the opposite is obviously the case is an issue that may be in your benefit to explore.
I think your understanding of the corporate structure is incomplete.
JABRA Corporation owned the asset (patent on EARPHONE technology).
e.Digital Corporation held an ownership in interest JABRA but exercised no control over JABRA Corporation.
JABRA's revenues increased 5700% from $700K in 1997 to $40 million in 2000 largely as a result of successfully exploiting the asset. JABRA was acquired in the early summer of 2000 by GN Netcom for $40 million and $35 million in additional earnout payments.
e.Digital's ownership in JABRA decreased 99.2% from their 12.1% stake in 1997 to their less than 0.1% stake by the completion of the acquisition of JABRA by GN Netcom.
Theoretically e.Digital Corporation would have been $4+ million richer if they kept their interest in JABRA Corporation, a direct benefit to the shareholders of the Corporation.
One can argue that over the course of 1997 through 2000, the directors of e.Digital did not recognize value in the company's ownership stake of JABRA and decided it was in the best interests of the Corporation to divest this investment.
That's okay! It is simply then a terrible decision by e.Digital management, failure to recognize value, a "bad trade" sort-of-speak. Though JABRA's revenues were taking off, e.Digital management found little value to the Corporation in maintaining their ownership interest. Stupid? Absolutely. Illegal? No.
However if e.Digital Corporation was selling its stake in JABRA to related parties, and because the ownership stake ultimately returned enormous value, the scenario potentially evolves from poor managerial decisions to possible fraud. This potentiality, when combined with the opaque accounting for the ongoing divestiture of JABRA is sufficient cause for concern.
My interest is not in keeping e.Digital Corporation in an "impoverished" state.
a.) e.Digital Corporation is for all intents and purposes and shell of a company, struggling to find an identity, carrying a negative net-worth.
b.) Shareholders of e.Digital Corporation can be described in a variety of ways from dreamers to rabid members of a cult to a disenfranchised investors who feel they've lost it all already and "can't afford to sell".
c.) e.Digital management, speficially those who have been associated with the company for five or more years, is where my concerns and suspicions rest.
If C is as sour as I believe "it" to be, there then is very little hope for A's success and therefore only a losing proposition for B.
Of course if B galvanized and campaigned for the removal of C then the probabilities of success for A increase, in my opinion, dramatically.
Metaphorically speaking- e.Digital has diagnosed with a terminal disease, and unless that disease is expunged from the body, you, the "family" of e.Digital, will only continue to grieve.
Actually our topic of conversation was one I intend to address in a letter to my clients. Our conversation provided a good launching point to begin to structure the words intended to describe the pictures.
But I do feel that these two segments were grossly influenced, like the individual, by the financial community or so called Wall Street experts. I say this because many of the pension funds are managed by company top level management with very little professional qualifications regarding investment strategies. I know this from personal friends who were in charge of various programs.
This is an interesting point as I was under the impression that most pension funds were outsourced to investment management companies. While top level executives select who manages what percentage of the monies, the portfolio managers of the investment companies select the actual investment vehicle.
With respect to your current project, see if their strategies don't to a large degree follow the general information released by the professionals, as opposed to them setting the tone.
The portfolio managers, along with their inhouse (or outsourced) research staff, of mutual funds and pension funds should be the professionals. These guys were not taking investment advice from Henry Blodgett, at least I hope not.
If the market has overvalued a stock, I would put the onus on the broker community, not the individual investor, who was told to continue buying even when the financial community was looking at PEs of 100-400 based on inflated future earnings. All of that was pure nonsense.
While the late nineties witnessed a large inflow of new capital into the financial markets, largely due in part to the advent and popularity of online brokers (lowering the transactional cost of investing in equities) and capital creation as a result of the longest peacetime economic expansion, the mutual fund industry is largely to blame for what we now define as the malinvestment of the equity market bubble.
The impact of capital flows from individual investors, influenced by the Wall Street analyst community, is miniscule in comparison to that of mutual funds and pension funds. We would like to believe these institutions invest with a higher level of sophistication than the individual investor but the inflation and subsequent deflation of the equity market bubble appears to have quashed that theory for the time being. During the latter part of the nineties these institutions, who historically invest on sound principles, began to base their philosophy on chasing performance rather than espousing a top-down or bottom-up analysis. The investment criteria evolved from investing in a company to investing in those companies that have appreciated the greatest over the calendar quarter. The actual fundamentals or future expectations began to mean very little.
This methodology of chasing performance turned self-feeding and self-fullfiling and ultimately resolved in capital flowing into a narrow classification of equities, specifically large cap stocks and stocks in the technology sector. The most liquid stocks and the stocks within a industry and sector experiencing the greatest degree of growth.
One of my current projects is analyzing the capital flow of the mutual fund industry and its impact on the equity markets.
This is a graph of the ratio of capital inflows to outflows into equity mutual funds and the 12 month rate-of-change of the net assets of equity mutual funds.
As the navy blue line illustrates, though commencing from a lower base, in April of 1993 outflows began to increase at a greater rate than inflows. This applies a negative influence on the ratio. Ignoring the anolamaly in 1998 when LTCM failed, Russia defaulted and the economic storm clouds from the Asian contagion were approaching our economic shores; the ratio approaching one (outflows matching inflows) coincides with the end of the secular bull market.
Put simply, in April of 1993 and thereafter the rate of individuals pulling money out of stock mutual funds increased relative to individuals putting money in stock mutual funds.
This is a graph of the liquidity ratio of equity mutual funds (cash and equivelants expressed as a percentage of net assets), the monthly closing value of the S&P500 and the monthly closing value of the Volatility Index.
Most notable is as the pace of the decline in the liquidy ratio increases the S&P500 begins to appreciate at a greater rate and the Volatility Index reacts by maintaining a higher absolute level.
Please note that the liquidity ratio is largely dependent on the direction of interest rates. As rates decline the opportunity cost of investments in short term liquid investment increase.
So what fueled the bubble in equities?
1.) Commencing in 1993, outflows increasing at a higher rate than inflows threatened revenue growth to the mutual fund industry (the growth of their net assets, and thus fees, independent of market gyrations, begins to diminish).
2.) In response mutual funds began to allocate a greater percentage of their cash into the stock market.
3.) Boosting stock prices
4.) And helping to offset the negative influence of an increasing rate of outflows on their net assets (and associated fees as a percentage of assets).
This data also argues that we are no where near the necessary dynamics to spark a secular bull market. A environment for a secular bull market will exist when:
1.) mutual fund liquidity ratios move to a higher plateau
2.) mutual fund inflows increase at a greater rate than increases in outflows (or outflows decrease at a greater rate than decreases in inflows).
Number one is largely dependent on number two unless mutual funds increase their liquidity ratios by selling stocks, which will apply a negative influence on stock prices and stunt any potential bull market.
Number two is largely dependent on the interest rate environment, specifically a consistent trend of lower interest rates must continue (unfortunately though there is not much additional room to fall) and capital creation through economic expansion (increases in employment, income, savings etc) and thus a growing pool of capital looking for home of which a percentage will find its way into mutual funds.
If the market has overvalued a stock, I would put the onus on the broker community, not the individual investor, who was told to continue buying even when the financial community was looking at PEs of 100-400 based on inflated future earnings. All of that was pure nonsense.
While the late nineties witnessed a large inflow of new capital into the financial markets, largely due in part to the advent and popularity of online brokers (lowering the transactional cost of investing in equities) and capital creation as a result of the longest peacetime economic expansion, the mutual fund industry is largely to blame for what we now define as the malinvestment of the equity market bubble.
The impact of capital flows from individual investors, influenced by the Wall Street analyst community, is miniscule in comparison to that of mutual funds and pension funds. We would like to believe these institutions invest with a higher level of sophistication than the individual investor but the inflation and subsequent deflation of the equity market bubble appears to have quashed that theory for the time being. During the latter part of the nineties these institutions, who historically invest on sound principles, began to base their philosophy on chasing performance rather than espousing a top-down or bottom-up analysis. The investment criteria evolved from investing in a company to investing in those companies that have appreciated the greatest over the calendar quarter. The actual fundamentals or future expectations began to mean very little.
This methodology of chasing performance turned self-feeding and self-fullfiling and ultimately resolved in capital flowing into a narrow classification of equities, specifically large cap stocks and stocks in the technology sector. The most liquid stocks and the stocks within a industry and sector experiencing the greatest degree of growth.
One of my current projects is analyzing the capital flow of the mutual fund industry and its impact on the equity markets.
This is a graph of the ratio of capital inflows to outflows into equity mutual funds and the 12 month rate-of-change of the net assets of equity mutual funds.
As the navy blue line illustrates, though commencing from a lower base, in April of 1993 outflows began to increase at a greater rate than inflows. This applies a negative influence on the ratio. Ignoring the anolamaly in 1998 when LTCM failed, Russia defaulted and the economic storm clouds from the Asian contagion were approaching our economic shores; the ratio approaching one (outflows matching inflows) coincides with the end of the secular bull market.
This is a graph of the liquidity ratio of equity mutual funds (cash and equivelants expressed as a percentage of net assets), the monthly closing value of the S&P500 and the monthly closing value of the Volatility Index.
Most notable is as the pace of the decline in the liquidy ratio increases the S&P500 begins to appreciate at a greater rate and the Volatility Index reacts by maintaining a higher absolute level.
Please note that the liquidity ratio is largely dependent on the direction of interest rates. As rates decline the opportunity cost of investments in short term liquid investment increase.
So what fueled the bubble in equities?
As equity mutual fund outflows began to increase at a higher rate than inflows in 1993, threatening revenue growth to the mutual fund industry (the growth of their net assets, and thus fees, independent of market gyrations, begins to diminish), mutual funds begin to allocate a greater percentage of their cash into the stock market, boosting stock prices and which help to offsetting the negative influence of an increasing rate of outflows on their net assets (and associated fees as a percentage of assets).
This data also argues that we are no where near the necessary dynamics to spark a secular bull market. A environment for a secular bull market will exist when:
1.) mutual fund liquidity ratios move to a higher plateau
2.) mutual fund inflows increase at a greater rate than increases in outflows (or outflows decrease at a greater rate than decreases in inflows).
Number one is largely dependent on number two unless mutual funds increase their liquidity ratios by selling stocks, which will apply a negative influence on stock prices and stunt any potential bull market.
Number two is largely dependent on the interest rate environment, specifically a consistent trend of lower interest rates must continue (unfortunately though there is not much additional room to fall) and capital creation through economic expansion (increases in employment, income, savings etc).
richardosborne: You misunderstood my point. Society, the financial markets, et al. are to blame for rewarding information technology companies with valuations grossly exceeding the tangible value and realistic expectations of future earnings. If blame falls on the management of the two companies in question, it falls on their inability to recognize the irrationality of the market at that time. However they are human and, like the financial markets and society, subject to fads and fashions.
Generally speaking the executives of AOL and Time Warner, expect for Steven Case, have shared in the financial erosion with their stock holders.
You are entitled to your opinion however you are incorrect.
A lengthy litigation process taxing time and resources would be the prudent course of action should the basis of our concern possess legitimacy. We hope our concern is unfounded and this scenario can be avoided.
We believe your qualification of our intentions is misguided. We wish no malice on the corporation or the shareholders of the corporation. However we are concerned that shareholders of record between the period 1997 and 2000 may have been treated in bad faith by those owing a fiduciary responsibility to the same.
Aol and Time Warner got together and now their losses are in the billions. Who are you blaming for that?
Their billion dollar losses are non-cash expenses resulting from amortization of goodwill and writing down assets. AOL generates free cash-flow. If there is blame to go around, it falls on investor's irrational exuberance for information-technology companies. If investors did not reward these companies with market values in the hundreds of billions, the goodwill as a result of mergers and acquisitions would not be in the billions.
Why don't you take your energies and apply them to the real dishonest people like the Enron management and so many other major corporations who cheated the investment community, an so many individuals, out of billions of dollars.
Why apply my energies to Enron when there are agencies, politicians, lawyers, and judges already focused on that debacle?
Unfortunately no one is scrutinizing companies like e.Digital.
We endeavor to build a case. Our goal is to build a case strong enough to warrant a subpoena of GN Netcom's records of the accounts and names that tendered JABRA shares for GN Netcom shares at the completion date of the acquisition. At that point our intention is to follow the money and transaction activity backward into time.
Our suspicion is that e.Digital Corporation was essentially looted by those owing a fiduciary responsibility to the corporation's shareholders. We fear that once those in a fiduciary position recognized a valuable asset (JABRA), they conspired to transfer that asset for a nominal price from the publicly held corporation to private ownership. We fear this process was undertaken without regard for the shareholder's best interests.
Should our fears be unfounded, which we hope is the case, we are rather confident that e.Digital's accounting for the divestiture of JABRA was haphazard at best and improper at worst.
1.) On January 15, 1993, the Company (“Company”, “EDIG”, “e.Digital”) sold 300,000 common shares of JABRA (“JABRA”) stock for $750,000, and JABRA sold 500,000 newly issued common shares with warrants for $1.25 million. The Company retained 2,300,000 common shares or 74.2% of JABRA stock and the Company agreed to surrender operating control of JABRA pursuant to the stock sale agreement
2.) On July 15, 1993, the Company sold an additional 500,000 common shares for $1.625 million and JABRA sold 1,000,000 newly issued common shares for $3.25 million. The Company’s 1,800,000 common shares represented 42.8% of the outstanding shares of JABRA and as a result of the lack of operating control; the Company ceased consolidating JABRA’s operations and recorded its investment on the cost basis because it no longer had significant influence over the operations of JABRA.
3.) At March 31, 1996 the Company’s ownership in JABRA, represented by 1,800,000 common shares, is 23.1% (or 20.1% on a fully diluted basis). During fiscal 1995 and 1996, JABRA reported to the Company the sale of 1,154,671 newly issued common shares for proceeds of $4.0 million. The Company has granted an option to purchase 300,000 of the JABRA common shares to CVD Financial Corporation (“CVD”).
4.) At March 31, 1996, the Company had a zero cost basis in its 1,800,000 JABRA common shares.
5.) On or about December 31, 1996 and January 2, 1997, the Company sold an additional 859,266 common shares of JABRA stock for $276,300.
6.) At March 31, 1997, represented by 940,734 common shares, was 12.1%. Accordingly, the Company exercises no control over the shares of JABRA.
7.) e.Digital Form S3 filed February 20, 1998: The Company also holds as an investment 62,000 common shares (less than
5%) of JABRA.
8.) e.Digital Form 10KSB filed June 26, 1998: The Company owns 58,600 common shares of JABRA or approximately 2.5% of JABRA's common shares with a carrying value of $Nil on the Company's consolidated balance sheets.
9.) May 21, 2002 GN Netcom signed an agreement to acquire JABRA for $40 million plus earn-out payments totaling a maximum of $35 million.
By: LawyerLong
09 Jan 2001, 10:23 AM EST Msg. 580277 of 967801
Please help with some EDIG Questions.
I am long on EDIG, holding several thousand shares for 18 months. I think this company has a chance to be big, and have considered taking (for me) a large stake. I have been talking with my broker about it and he says two things - I would love some honest feedback from some of you who know the company well.
1. He says there has been no true "design win" as of yet; that EDIG is doing some very interesting work to partner with known names, but no exclusive design wins that will lead to definable revenue. I am not sure what this means, but he is a very smart guy and we have made good money together. Is he right?
2. He says that, looking at the company's earnings report, they only have enough cash for 6 more months. Is this true? If not, why?
Don't give me a bunch of BS about bashing and being a short. I invested before knowing much, now am looking at putting some real money on the table. Thanks for your help.
LL
By: LawyerLong
11 Jan 2001, 10:47 AM EST Msg. 584359 of 967801
MIR - A question for you.
I'm sure this will draw a lot of derisive comments, but here goes anyway. I have always bought stock in companies that have proven themselves in the marketplace, not speculative ventures. With one exception, I should add, which is INOD (mentioned when I last posted) and this is, of course, the stock with which I have profited the most.
So I understand the risk/reward of investing - the more speculative the investment the greater the risk, the greater the reward. I am on the verge of selling some stocks that have, for the most part, realized their potential and putting the money in EDIG. If EDIG goes to 10 I make a lot of money, if it goes to 1.5, I lose what is, for me, a lot of money. Probably no different from many of you.
I have read messages, talked with Robert Putnam, etc. I would now like opinions on this question - what do you think is the worst case scenario for EDIG and its stock price over the next several years and how likely do you think this worst case scenario to be? As an investor I always ask myself and others this final question and it has served me well.
Thanks for your help.
LL
By: LawyerLong
12 Jan 2001, 01:41 PM EST Msg. 586410 of 967800
[EDIG PPS 01/12/01 $2.63]
OK - I'm in!
I just increased my holdings by tenfold. This was a big investment for me but after reading all the messages and links and after speaking with robert putnam I am very impressed with the game plan and the probable outcome of this plan. No one can predict the future, but it is hard to see how EDIG will not be successful at least to the extent of making 5x to 10x my original investment.
Like Mary in Red I am a buy and hold investor so I am giving this two years. Thanks to Tinroad, MIR, Dr.Hunt, GPDesign and others for their information. Thanks also to the bashers, whom I also read carefully. I was unable to find a single basher's message which contained real information that would lead me to doubt the motives, veracity, technical wherewithall and true potential of this company.
In March I will have more cash and will make another investment approximately half the size of today's.
LL
By: LawyerLong
08 Feb 2001, 09:17 AM EST Msg. 609015 of 967802
[EDIG PPS 02/08/01 $2.19]
Tin, re your post about bashers.
And to what end do they do this? To push the stock down? It's already as low as it will ever get? Someone pays them? What for?
This is the only thing about EDIG I can't get my arms around. What is the agenda of the bashers? Who profits from this course of action and how?
Oh yes, I am buying more today - my third position.
Thanks.
LL
By: LawyerLong $$$$$
27 Feb 2001, 09:25 PM EST Msg. 625763 of 967803
[EDIG PPS 02/27/01 $1.78]
Took a fourth position in EDIG today.
I didn't think the stock would stay at this price until I was able to buy more. Glad it did, though sorry for those of you who have been holding for some time. If it is still under 2.50 in two weeks I will buy again. Things should be very interesting in the next 2 years.
LL
By: LawyerLong
07 Sep 2001, 07:17 PM EDT Msg. 772524 of 967803
Malt - I began buying
30 months ago and have purchased 5 positions in that time. I am of the same philosophy as you. time is on our side.
LL
By: LawyerLong
25 Sep 2001, 10:36 AM EDT Msg. 788988 of 967803
[EDIG PPS 09/25/01 $1.14]
Just added 5,000 shares. eom
[Down $4700]
By: LawyerLong
25 Sep 2001, 10:39 AM EDT Msg. 789000 of 967803
Yeah CRQ - I'M REALLY Desperate. I am so desperate
I have bought more and never sold for 3 years. THAT's desperation for sure.
LL
By: LawyerLong
14 May 2002, 09:59 AM EDT Msg. 975150 of 985489
Bought 30,000 shares at $.465 this AM. LL
[Down $8550]
By: LawyerLong
14 May 2002, 11:05 AM EDT Msg. 975181 of 985496
Bought 18,000 more at $.49.
[Down $5580]
By: LawyerLong
14 May 2002, 02:28 PM EDT Msg. 975388 of 985489
Added 40,000 more at .49 and .50.
[Down $12600]
By: LawyerLong
15 May 2002, 02:56 PM EDT Msg. 976115 of 985489
Added 10,000 shares at $.555.
[Down $3750]
Important DD on APS:
(Note: this is a bit long, but very worth it. It will surprise most of you).
On 10/23/02, e.Digital released the following PR about a partnership with "APS" to develop and market in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems:
http://www.edig.com/news/releases/pr102302.html
In the FAQ section of the EDIG website, management state (regarding this IFE relationship): "We view this as one of the major developments for e.Digital for this year and in years to come. Becoming part of the infrastructure that supports our IFE systems may generate multiple revenue streams for us." i.e., management is promoting this partnership as one if the major developments for the future.
However, when one reviews the PR, it is clear that it has very little information about APS and what is said is very ambiguous. No web site or contact information for APS was given.
As I previously pointed out, e.Digital erred in referring to Aircraft Protective Systems, Inc. (APS) as "APS, Inc." in its description of the company. However, in looking further into the situation, I believe that e.Digital has grossly exaggerated the potential revenue from this partnership and been very misleading in describing APS.
First of all what is APS and what does it do? The web site for APS is http://www.airprosys.com. The company has 3 products it seems to offer for sale (although no pricing or order information is given. These products are a (cargo) belt loader nose, a cargo door protector and a kevlar flight deck barrier. There is no mention about any IFE products or services.
APS is privately owned by William (Bill) Boyer, Jr. who also works for Alaska Air as a "Ramp Service Agent." The following is the Alaska Air job description:
Ramp Service Agent
-----------------------------------------
Ramp Service Agents at Alaska Airlines load and offload luggage and cargo. Duties also include working in the cargo area of the aircraft, transporting luggage and cargo to various airport locations, maintaining ramp and warehouse areas, and pushing-back and de-icing our aircraft.
The minimum requirements for the Ramp Service Agent position are as follows:
*Valid driver`s license and excellent driving record
*Ability to routinely lift 100 lbs
*Flexibility for shifts, including holidays and weekends
*Able to accept a starting wage of $9.10 per hour
*Must be a non user of nicotine products for the last six months
*High School diploma or equivalent
http://www.alaskasworld.com/Jobs/ASjobs/JobAlaskaDescr.asp?n_group=142&txtGroup=Airport+Jobs
Here is the article from the Alaska Air employee web site which describes how Boyer ended up marketing his design for a cargo door protector and making a prototype of the belt loader nose (designed by a VP at Alaska Air):
http://www.alaskasworld.com/news/2002/11/12_BeltBumper.asp
"The idea took wing when Bill Boyer, an enterprising ramp service agent based in Seattle, approached Prewitt, Alaska’s vice president of safety, about an aircraft door protector he developed and hoped to market. Prewitt then described his bumper idea. After putting their heads together to refine the idea, Boyer went back to his shop and created a prototype.
So, the President of APS, e.Digital's partner in this major development, is employed as a cargo loader for Alaska Air. Now for more...
The EDIG PR quoted Boyer as saying:
Bill Boyer, Jr., President of APS, said, "As a certified airline service and equipment provider, we have established key relationships with major airlines. In our business dealings with these airlines we recognized the substantial cost they would have to incur to upgrade their fleets with embedded IFE systems. Beginning with a major U.S. airline, APS and e.Digital are providing the first portable IFE solution to the airline industry at a significantly reduced cost."
It has already been established that APS and EDIG are NOT providing "the first portable IFE solution to the airline industry" as a company called InMotion had been renting DVD Players and DVD movies to airline passengers at NO charge to the airlines long before this PR was release, so that statment is false.
Also, what is meant by the term "certified airline service and equipment provider?" EDIG also described APS with this phrase in its description of APS in the PR:
About APS, Inc.
APS, Inc. is a privately owned, Tacoma, Washington-based company. A certified airline equipment and service provider, APS provides solutions, industrial design, and manufacturing services for companies who have specialized product needs.
Forget that the description given seems to be a gross exagerration of what APS does, what certification does APS have? The web site makes no mention whatsoever about any kind of certification. If it were ISO 9000 or AS 9100 Certified both the PR and the web site would be expected to state that. So what "certification" does APS have?
I think I found the answer. I found a company called Shaw Aero which appears to be the real manufacturer of the belt loader nose sold by APS (See the photos):
http://www.shawaero.com/documents/New%20Devel-Apr.pdf
Home page: http://www.shawaero.com/devicehomepage.htm
Shaw Aero has a "Certified" Supplier Program that APS may be part of (it appears it would be the "non-inventory" type):
http://www.shawaero.com/documents/71602%20Certified%20Supplier.pdf
Is this the "certification" being touted?
Now, as for "IFE" - how did Boyer get involved in that?
According to the following article on the Alaska Air employee website that describes how employees were making suggestions for IFE systems, including live TV. Alaska found that live TV was not suitable for them and that passengers won't switch airlines due to IFE options.
Instead of outfitting their flights with embedded IFE systems, Alaska Air signed an agreement with InMotion to offer IFE to Alaska Air passengers at a 25% discount without any financial risk to the airline. Furthermore, Alaska Air management was quoted as saying:
"We don’t want to get into the business of being our own supplier of equipment or videos for several reasons," Palmer says.
Among them are:
It’s complicated. Transporting equipment, determining how many players are needed and what movies are offered can quickly become a logistical nightmare. Plus, equipment would need to be cleaned, recharged and possibly repaired after each flight. This would require additional staffing.
It’s expensive. Players would first have to be purchased and contracts would need to be reached with various content providers—with slim hope of recovering direct costs.
http://www.alaskasworld.com/news/2002/09/30_entertainmentoptions.asp
Therefore, it does NOT appear that Alaska Air intends to buy any personal video devices directly from APS. In fact, an RB alias that popped up on the day of the PR who seemed to know a lot about Boyer and APS (was it Boyer himself?), seemed to indicate that the plan was for APS to offer the kind of service that InMotion does, talking the financial risk. See:
http://ragingbull.lycos.com/mboard/memalias.cgi?member=goldwingin
In summary, I believe that the APS partnership and e.Digital's potential revenue from the partnership has been grossly exaggerated by management.
Man learns from history, not to repeat...
Revolving Business Plans
1. We will license our proprietary technology!
2. OK, well that didn’t work… we will make and sell consumer electronics!!
3. OK, well that didn’t work… we will license our old proprietary technology!!!
4. OK, well that didn’t work… we will we will make and sell consumer electronics!!!!
5. OK, well that didn’t work… we will license our old proprietary technology!!!!!
Seems like an endless cycle of repetition.
And sometimes, as time passes; history is kinder to him.
Time provided e.Digital personnel with the greatest concentrated period of information technology-based investment and spending in history.
e.Digital delivered $82K in revenues and lost a million dollars.
Further..
JABRA had total revenues of $600,000 in 97, getting almost $300K was a steal AT THAT TIME.
Then the same can be said about EDIG AT THIS TIME, right?
If you own 10% of e.Digital, or any percent for that matter, selling that 10% for $2.5 million would be a "steal" in light of the company's trailing twelve month revenue of $2 million and net loss applicable to share holders of $4.5 million.
Certianly then e.Digital investors should capture this "steal" immediately. Correct? So you are advising shareholders to sell?
Signing as the Chief Financial Officer in the 10K filed in 1996 is KATHLEEN E. TERRY.
ELWOOD G. NORRIS: Chairman of the Board
ROBERT PUTNAM: Director and Secretary
R. GORDON ROOT: President and CEO
10K filed in 1997:
ELWOOD G. NORRIS: Chairman of the Board, Executive Officer and Director, (principal executive officer)
ROBERT PUTNAM: Director and Secretary
ALFRED H. FALK: President and Director
RENEE WARDEN: Controller (principal financial officer)
S3 filed in 1998:
ELWOOD G. NORRIS: Chairman of the Board, President, Cheif Executive Officer and Director
ROBERT PUTNAM: Vice President and Director
ALFRED H. FALK: President and Director
RENEE WARDEN: Controller (principal financial and accounting officer)
10K filed in 1998:
ELWOOD G. NORRIS: Chairman of the Board, Cheif Executive Officer and Director
ALFRED H. FALK: President and Director
RENEE WARDEN: Controller (principal financial officer)
ROBERT PUTNAM: Vice President, Secretary and Director
In 1998 we also get Warden's bio:
RENEE WARDEN - Ms. Warden was appointed Controller of the Company in
June 1997. From November 1991 to June 1997 she was Accounting Manager for the
Company. Since 1993 she has attended Palomar College and most recently the
accounting program at the University of Phoenix, San Diego.
Warden was "accounting manager" from 1991 through 1997 although since 1993 she "attended" Palomar College (Junior College) and "most recently" (1998?) attened the "accounting program" at the University of Phoenix (online)?
The accounting and financial officer of the company at the time of the filing had not graduated from a JC and was attending an "accounting program" at what is now widely recognized as an "online" method for college credit! Surprised?
*******A KATHLEEN E. TERRY is currently listed as CFO and VP of a Carlsbad, CA Semiconductor company. 2001 annual revenues: $200K.
http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:u6tnuvDCyjcC:www.hoovers.com/co/aag/4/0,2658,16144,00.html+%22K...
Signing as the Chief Financial Officer in the 10K filed in 1996 is KATHLEEN E. TERRY.
A KATHLEEN E. TERRY is listed as CFO and VP of a Carlsbad located Semiconductor company. 2001 annual revenues: $200K.
http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:u6tnuvDCyjcC:www.hoovers.com/co/aag/4/0,2658,16144,00.html+%22K...
ELWOOD G. NORRIS: Chairman of the Board
ROBERT PUTNAM: Director and Secretary
R. GORDON ROOT: President and CEO
10K filed in 1997:
ELWOOD G. NORRIS: Chairman of the Board, Executive Officer and Director, (principal executive officer)
ROBERT PUTNAM: Director and Secretary
ALFRED H. FALK: President and Director
RENEE WARDEN: Controller (principal financial officer)
S3 filed in 1998:
ELWOOD G. NORRIS: Chairman of the Board, President, Cheif Executive Officer and Director
ROBERT PUTNAM: Vice President and Director
ALFRED H. FALK: President and Director
RENEE WARDEN: Controller (principal financial and accounting officer)
10K filed in 1998:
ELWOOD G. NORRIS: Chairman of the Board, Cheif Executive Officer and Director
ALFRED H. FALK: President and Director
RENEE WARDEN: Controller (principal financial officer)
ROBERT PUTNAM: Vice President, Secretary and Director
In 1998 we also get Warden's bio:
RENEE WARDEN - Ms. Warden was appointed Controller of the Company in
June 1997. From November 1991 to June 1997 she was Accounting Manager for the
Company. Since 1993 she has attended Palomar College and most recently the
accounting program at the University of Phoenix, San Diego.
Warden was "accounting manager" from 1991 through 1997 although since 1993 she "attended" Palomar College (Junior College) and "most recently" (1998?) attened the "accounting program" at the University of Phoenix (online)?
The accounting and financial officer of the company at the time of the filing had not graduated from a JC and was attending an "accounting program" at what is now widely recognized as an "online" method for college credit! Surprised?
Right, $600K in 97, $4M in 98, $40M in 00. Over the same period of time e.Digital's interest in Jabra dropped from 12% in 97 to one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) by the closing of the (net aggregate potential) $75M acquisition.
12% to 0.1% for about $315K ($276K + $40K in share buyout from GN Netcom) in net-proceeds, over the course of three years, from the sale of their interest while the company's revenues increased 65,000% over the same period of time. From a potential of $4.8M plus additional payouts to a net-realized gain of $315K over the course of three years. Whomever was lucky enough to purchase that remaining 11.9% from e.Digital for $315K made a killing! And that is the pertinent question, who bought the ownership? Affiliated individuals? e.Digital insiders? Polis? Davric? Norris? Putnam? Falk? Joe Sixpack? Frank?
What is most unsettling is the accounting for the Jabra investment on the balance sheets. Shares start disappearing and e.Digital's theoretical carrying value (they carried it at no cost) dropped 90% over the course of one year. Extremely sloppy accounting.
Visionaries indeed! They envisioned a way to extract a extremely valuable asset from the balance sheets of a publicly held company (owned for the benefit of shareholders) and into the possession of unknown individuals and/or entities for pennies of it value just a few years thereafter.
Oh, but that's the past and has little to do with today or the future; except three of the four individuals in key management positions then are still at e.Digital now.
Name,
The rules are simple;
No inane prattle: No one line comments like "Name- LOL! Post of the day"
No personal attacks: self-explanatory.
All speculation and opinions should be documented with facts or an exhaustive illustration to support the idea: No comments like "DigitalWay is OEM our product" unless supported with concrete and credible sources.
Get the idea?
My conditions of posting (COP) was an agreement the Ihub Admin Matt and I entered into when I was "permanently" TOSD. If I linked the COP at the end of my posts for one month, I would be permitted to keep posting.
Cheers.
As JABRA's sales were growing and the implied value of the company increasing (of course the growing success of the company was unknown at the time to outside persons but I have verified the company's historical sales and profit totals with the acquiring company GN Netcom), e.Digital was actively divesting their remaining interest of the company to unnamed parties, and not accounting for the transactions, for pennies of it's future acquisition price.
For example, throughout the calendar year 1997 e.Digital sold 859,299 shares of Jabra for $276,300 (to whom? it is not disclosed!), or $0.32 per share. Three short years later those shares would have been worth over FOUR MILLION DOLLARS plus additional earnout payments totalling up to another four million. Based on Jabra's historical financials, it was around 1997 when the company turned the corner.
http://www.communitech.com/Manufacturer%20News/gn_netcom/GN_Netcom_may_22.htm
Is this what visionaries are made of Frank? e.Digital's management DUMPED, for pennies on the future dollar value, the ONE TECHNOLOGY that proved successful (and remains successful today- one of GN Netcoms best performing divisions).
Part of their divestiture was to finance the ill-conceived ASMD contract-manufacturer and FLASHBACK endeavor. Visionary!
Randy Granovetter left NCII to work at Jabra and Vicki Marion was the CEO of the company.
The accounting for the Jabra ownership and divestment is extremely messy and incomplete.
Frank, did you get a piece of the Jabra action from e.Digital? Did Norris slip a few thousand shares out of the corporation for a couple hundred bucks? It was quite a lucrative investment considering what the company was willing to part with it for and what it was eventually worth a year or two later.
I will happily forward you the document my accountant authored and which we forwarded to the SEC and FASB for review.
I am sorry but I cannot understand people like you. What is your purpose in doing things like this? Don't you have the least little bit of a conscience...If you don't like the company and wish to complain that's one thing, but to make up facts with the sole purpose of sowing seeds of doubt and dissention among those who are invested in EDig is not something my parents brought me up to feel was how to live my life...
What about people like you? People you pontificate from a position of authority when their knowledge of the facts are nonexistent? People who sow the seeds of certainty and optimism when the situtation is as dire as it can be? Frank, how many people have espoused your pollyannish perspective and watched their invested capital erode to virtually nothing?
Frank, I suggest you review e.Digital's financial statements.
As JABRA's sales were growing and the implied value of the company increasing (of course the growing success of the company was unknown at the time to outside persons but I have verified the company's historical sales and profit totals with the acquiring company GN Netcom), e.Digital was actively divesting their remaining interest of the company to unnamed parties, and not accounting for the transactions, for pennies of it's future acquisition price.
For example, throughout the calendar year 1997 e.Digital sold 859,299 shares of Jabra for $276,300 (to whom? it is not disclosed!), or $0.32 per share. Three short years later those shares would have been worth over FOUR MILLION DOLLARS plus additional earnout payments totalling up to another four million. Based on Jabra's historical financials, it was around 1997 when the company turned the corner.
http://www.communitech.com/Manufacturer%20News/gn_netcom/GN_Netcom_may_22.htm
Is this what visionaries are made of Frank? e.Digital's management DUMPED, for pennies on the future dollar value, the ONE TECHNOLOGY that proved successful (and remains successful today- one of GN Netcoms best performing divisions).
Part of their divestiture was to finance the ill-conceived ASMD contract-manufacturer and FLASHBACK endeavor. Visionary!
Randy Granovetter left NCII to work at Jabra and Vicki Marion was the CEO of the company.
The accounting for the Jabra ownership and divestment is extremely messy and incomplete.
Frank, did you get a piece of the Jabra action from e.Digital? Did Norris slip a few thousand shares out of the corporation for a couple hundred bucks? It was quite a lucrative investment considering what the company was willing to part with it for and what it was eventually worth a year or two later.
I will happily forward you the document my accountant authored and which we forwarded to the SEC and FASB for review.
I am sorry but I cannot understand people like you. What is your purpose in doing things like this? Don't you have the least little bit of a conscience...If you don't like the company and wish to complain that's one thing, but to make up facts with the sole purpose of sowing seeds of doubt and dissention among those who are invested in EDig is not something my parents brought me up to feel was how to live my life...
What about people like you? People you pontificate from a position of authority when their knowledge of the facts are nonexistent? People who sow the seeds of certainty and optimism when the situtation is as dire as it can be? Frank, how many people have espoused your pollyannish perspective and watched their invested capital erode to virtually nothing?
Oh, okay. As I said, congratulations are in order. 600% is certainly a spectacular return on investment in any economic climate.
Unrealized losses reduce aggregate net-worth. I consider negative influences to net-worth as losses, especially so when speaking of paper assets and more so when speaking of paper assets representing a company with negative shareholder equity. However, this intrepretaion is mine and generally shared amongst those whom I commiserate.
The accuracy of my chart predictions have been uncanny. As I said previously, check the records; the evidence is represented in the database of my messages. It's obvious you can't deal with the fact that I have accurately predicted the swings in the price of this equity. Having said all that, time variables are important in judging an investment. e.Digital's stock price is generally unchanged since I shared my recent projection but the value of capital tied into the stock is worth less today than one month ago. In that respect, my recent prediction is still accurate; although the price has yet to resolve to my target, you've lost money based on the carrying-cost alone.
My qualifications? I've have been employed in the financial industry, in a number of different facets, for many years. Today, I am self-employed, focused on running a medium-sized business and managing my accumulated assets.
I post because I have followed this company since early 1999. I intend to continue to follow the company until a conclusion is reached, if it hasn't been reached already. I'm not here to sugar coat, I'm here to share my opinion. Unfortunately there are few too little positive aspects to color my opinion differently. I admire their ingenuity, I find their managerial ability and their treatment of shareholders shameful. Unfortunately for shareholders of the company, ingenuity only goes so far when the managers charged with leveraging the inventiveness into value are incapable, inept and focused on their own selfish-interests only.
Good Day
Why so salty Richard? Your need to patronize speaks for itself.
A loss is a loss, whether realized or unrealized. Unless you can use your paper-loss as collateral (you can't), that money is effectively gone.
"You don't lose until you sell" is an old broker tactic employed to calm livid clients.
My charts have been consistently accurate, check the records. Admittedly the duration of the current consolidation has taken longer than I initially expect however I stand by my projection that the lows will be breached. If the January high is breached first, I will have no problem admitting my current analysis has been proven inaccurate.
You realized a 600% gain? Congratulations. Then again a 600% gain is meaningless unless the aggregate return is discounted for inflation and the compounded, risk-free rate of return over the life of the investment (ie carrying cost). For all I know the annualized rate of return may be 5% per year after adjusting for inflation which is certainly nothing to crow about when contrasted against the risk-free rate of return.
have I realized large gains recently? Nope. 65% of my liquid investments are allocated in fixed income securites (Agency & Investment grade corporate bonds), 15% in hedge funds mandated to short-selling equities and speculative grade corporate bonds, 5% in real estate investment trusts and 5% in high yielding blue chip companies. I employ 10% of my liquid investment capital for the purpose of timing the market, a hobby of mine, using vehicles such as options, futures and options on futures. Lately most of my activity has been in the commodity markets.
In the event you were not aware, commodities are in the midst of one of their strongest bull markets since the seventies.
So you only lend credence to those who are compensated to opine on a product or service? Unpaid opinions, no matter what the experience of the individual providing the analysis, should be disregarded or considered tainted or suspicious?
Next time my friend, the film aficionado, recommends a movie, I should be suspicious of her opinion since she is not paid to review films? I should defer my decision until Roger Ebert reviews the film?
RichardOsborne, you have spent an inordinate amount of time sharing projected sales volumes and margins of e.Digital products. What exactly are your qualifications to posit this analysis?
Are you a Wall Street financial analyst?
Are you paid to provide financial and product-cycle analysis on e.Digital?
If the answer is no, are you then suspicious of your own "tainted", amateur reviews?
Face the facts Richard, the review is not palatable because you don't want to accept the conclusion. If austonia championed the Odyssey1000 compared to the competition, I suspect the "amateur" analysis wouldn't be an issue with you.
I imagine you are sitting on a tremendous unrealized loss on this investment, it's the only possible explanation for your constant denial of reality.
The subject individual has done a far more exhaustive review than I have seen from any shareholders.
What is a "professional reviewer"? Do you mean a journalist who covers the Consumer Electronic landscape? Have you ever recommeded a movie to someone? A specific wine?
But isn't it tainted with an inordinate amount of time putting together an elaborate table, taking dozens of pictures, talking about millimeter differences in weight and dimensions. In addition making the case a big deal when it has nothing to do with the performance of the player.
So an exhaustive analysis which includes a matrix comparing every nuance of the competing products, a variety of photos, etc. is "tainted" and "suspicious"? Would it have been less tainted and suspicious if the subject individual did not compile the elaborate table, not taken dozens of pictures and not discussed a differences in weight and dimensions?
The fact is this individual has done an exhaustive review of three competing products and has determined Odyssey1000 inferior. You find it suspicious and tainted only because you don't like the final analysis. In my opinion, this makes your criticism of the reviewer SUSPICIOUS and TAINTED.
BTW, do you own a Odyssey1000 and competing players? Have you ordered a Odyssey1000 or competing players? Have you operated a Odyssey1000 or competing players? No? Then WHO are you to determine the legitimacy?
Why would a OEM pick up a competitively inferior product? Answer: they won't. Why would a OEM pick up a product six months from being reaching legacy-status? Answer: they won't. Why would DigitalWay OEM the product to sell in Asia and Europe when e.Digital is on the line to them for 5 million in purchase orders? Answer: they won't.
What then is the purpose of the Odyssey1000 you ask?
To extract another $350 from shareholders.
If they can't get you people to buy the stock, they surely can get you to buy their (inferior) products.
After discounting for the cost of goods sold, every sale is $100 in cash to be allocated to salaries.
Considering e.Digital has not marketed the unit to the general public, what percentage of aggregate sales is accountable to shareholders, or friends and family of shareholders? 70%? 80%? 90%?
This company has historically exploited their shareholders to finance the engineering and design hobby of Norris, his children and friends. In the one instance where the company possessed intellectual property that would be in high demand by the public (Jabra Earphone Technology), it mysteriously and clandestinely disappeared from the company's balance sheet. That's right, they quietly divested their, at one time, 100% ownership in Jabra to the point where the corporation received $40,000 on a $40 million dollar purchase price. From 100% to one-tenth of one percent of what became a $40+ million dollar company. Visionaries? Hardly. Thieves? Pending SEC review.
Selling product to shareholders is yet another avenue employed to exploit shareholders. In every instance e.Digital/Norris Communications has attempted to sell product to the general public, the company has hemorrhaged cash.
Why would a OEM pick up a competitively inferior product? Answer: they won't. Why would a OEM pick up a product six months from being reaching legacy-status? Answer: they won't. Why would DigitalWay OEM the product to sell in Asia and Europe when e.Digital is on the line to them for 5 million in purchase orders? Answer: they won't.
What then is the purpose of the Odyssey1000 you ask?
To extract another $350 from shareholders.
If they can't get you people to buy the stock, they surely can get you to buy their (inferior) products.
After discounting for the cost of goods sold, every sale is $100 in cash to be allocated to salaries.
Considering e.Digital has not marketed the unit to the general public, what percentage of aggregate sales is accountable to shareholders, or friends and family of shareholders? 70%? 80%? 90%?
This company has historically exploited their shareholders to finance the engineering and design hobby of Norris, his children and friends. In the one instance where the company possessed intellectual property that would be in high demand by the public (Jabra Earphone Technology), it mysteriously and clandestinely disappeared from the company's balance sheet. That's right, they quietly divested their, at one time, 100% ownership in Jabra to the point where the corporation received $40,000 on a $40 million dollar purchase price. From 100% to one-tenth of one percent of what became a $40+ million dollar company. Visionaries? Hardly. Thieves? Pending SEC review.
Selling product to shareholders is yet another avenue employed to exploit shareholders. In every instance e.Digital/Norris Communications has attempted to sell product to the general public, the company has hemorrhaged cash.
Dollar volume capitulating.
Can price be far behind?
Since what can be construed as "positive" fundamental developments no longer move the share price, the probability is high that future share price levels will be dictated by "negative" news. With liquidity all but completely exhausted, marginal increases in selling interest should precipitate extreme increases in implied volatility.
e.Digital Dollar Volume Cratering..
From the most recent FAQs:
Q: Please discuss your development plans as they relate to wireless technology.
A: We have developed a platform incorporating a popular wireless protocol; we are currently designing it into a product for a major OEM customer. We expect to be able to release details about this product this quarter.
----------------------------------------------
Wordsmithing is a tactic heavily employed by e.Digital Corporation.
One rightly wonders why the company cannot disclose the "popular wireless protocol". Is it bluetooth? 802.11b?
"Major OEM" can literally mean anything. It can mean a company that holds a dominant market share in an industry (Nokia in cell phones would be a example). It just as likely can mean the OEM is "major" to e.Digital, for example one OEM that represents the majority of EDIG's revenue for the services category.
Does anyone have any experience or knowledge on disclosure requirements? In other words, what if any information outside of the contractual boundaries of a nondisclosure agreement is e.Digital required to disclose to shareholders and the market considering the company is publicly traded?
Quite a convincing argument.
"The economy will improve sooner than later."
"The stock market will pick up"
At the expense of sounding flippant, your words echo those of the sell-side analysts that have been championing a economic and market "second half recovery" since early 2001.
While I can neither deduce whether you are intentionally curt or simply ignorant, I can point you in the direction of a one Mr. Paul Kasriel, Director of Economic Research at Nothern Trust Corporation.
http://www.northerntrust.com/library/econ_research/weekly/us/021220.html
Hope, believe and have faith to your heart's content my irrationally optimistic one; by all means increase your risk profile, buy more and more "promising", "concept" companies. I'll continue to buy yield while methodically reducing my duration exposure.
Indeed, and what a disasterous miss that ultimately proved to be. ;o)
Pertinent "Buffettisms" worth noting:
Is management candid with the shareholders? No.
Is management rational? No.
"Turn-arounds" seldom turn. Uh oh!
Look for companies with high profit margins. Ooops!
It is more important to say "no" to an opportunity, than to say "yes". Too little, too late!
Does the business have a consistent operating history? No.
The critical investment factor is determining the intrinsic value of a business and paying a fair or bargain price. $0.00 per share.
Warren Buffett Quotes
Quotes from the Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway
You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd disagrees with you. You are right because your data and reasoning are right.
We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own assets.
When [Berkshire] buys common stock... we approach the transaction as if we were buying into a private business.
Wide diversification is only required when investors do not understand what they are doing.
Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable.
Never invest in a business you cannot understand.
Unless you can watch your stock holding decline by 50% without becoming panic-stricken, you should not be in the stock market.
Why not invest your assets in the companies you really like? As Mae West said, "Too much of a good thing can be wonderful".
[When speaking of managers and executive compensation]... The .350 hitter expects, and also deserves, a big payoff for his performance - even if he plays for a cellar-dwelling team. And a .150 hitter should get no reward - even if he plays for a pennant winner.
The critical investment factor is determining the intrinsic value of a business and paying a fair or bargain price.
Risk can be greatly reduced by concentrating on only a few holdings.
Stop trying to predict the direction of the stock market, the economy, interest rates, or elections.
Many stock options in the corporate world have worked in exactly that fashion: they have gained in value simply because management retained earnings, not because it did well with the capital in its hands.
Buy companies with strong histories of profitability and with a dominant business franchise.
Be fearful when others are greedy and greedy only when others are fearful.
It is optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.
As far as you are concerned, the stock market does not exist. Ignore it.
The ability to say "no" is a tremendous advantage for an investor.
Much success can be attributed to inactivity. Most investors cannot resist the temptation to constantly buy and sell.
Lethargy, bordering on sloth should remain the cornerstone of an investment style.
An investor should act as though he had a lifetime decision card with just twenty punches on it.
Wild swings in share prices have more to do with the "lemming- like" behaviour of institutional investors than with the aggregate returns of the company they own.
As a group, lemmings have a rotten image, but no individual lemming has ever received bad press.
An investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes.
"Turn-arounds" seldom turn.
Is management rational?
Is management candid with the shareholders?
Does management resist the institutional imperative?
Do not take yearly results too seriously. Instead, focus on four or five-year averages.
Focus on return on equity, not earnings per share.
Calculate "owner earnings" to get a true reflection of value.
Look for companies with high profit margins.
Growth and value investing are joined at the hip.
The advice "you never go broke taking a profit" is foolish.
It is more important to say "no" to an opportunity, than to say "yes".
Always invest for the long term.
Does the business have favourable long term prospects?
It is not necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary results.
Remember that the stock market is manic-depressive.
Buy a business, don't rent stocks.
Does the business have a consistent operating history?
An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business.
The concept of valuing investments on a specious future is largely what precipitated the bubble in common stocks, especially relevant to the technology sector. If history is a guide, we are approximately eighty years from yet another period of irrational exuberance. I hope you have time on your hand as until then the market, save for the periodic, temporary divergence here and there, will largely value equity investment by more traditional means of analysis. More specifically, qualitative and quantitative measures based on tangible, measurable variables. The effectiveness and impact of hyperbole and illusory promise has largely, and thankfully, been muted.
You have a product? Who cares! I want to see management's plan to leverage the product in an effort to return value to shareholders (profits) and I want to deliberate until I see management successfully implement the plan.
The decades henceforth will largely be a period where measures of management's effectiveness (return on equity, return on assets) are the dominant focus. In other words, the period of public demand for participation in venture markets is dead. Once bitten, twice shy.
If we can glean one lesson from the recently departed stock market bubble (though some argue, and often rightfully so, that the market, based on current valuations, remains mired in a bubble, though to a lesser extent) it is good ideas and good products do not sell themselves, and in the rare events they do there is no guarantee that those charged with managing the sales will extract value (profits).
But Anyway
Alexa.com stats for edigital-store.com.
http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details?q=&p=Det_W_g_40_M1&url=edigital-store.com
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I stand corrected, your understanding is correct.
Having said that, I wonder if APS paid them in cash or in the form of a letter of credit?
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Who to believe? Good question.
I'll defer to the Form 10Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 14th, 2002 which states:
"In October 2002, we announced a partnership with Aircraft Protective Systems, Inc. (“APS”) to develop and market a portable, hard disk drive-based In-Flight Entertainment, or IFE, system under contract for a leading U.S. airline. The agreement specifies that we will manufacture and sell the customizable digital video player through APS. The agreement includes provisions for non-recurring engineering (“NRE”) fees to be paid by APS to us for design services plus licensing fees and royalties. To date, we have received $50,000 in payments under this agreement with respect to NRE fees only, of which $50,000 has been deferred at September 30, 2002."
For the uninitiated, the term "deferred" means e.Digital has not collected any payments from APS.
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"when was the DVD concept first introduced: IMHO it has really been only in about the last year or so that DVD has started[!] to make a dent %wise in the marketplace; i suspect however that overal the DVD platform compared to VCR is still in the minority worldwide"
Per Blockbuster most recent Form 10Q, DVD rental revenues were $469.7 million, up 118.9% from the comparable quarter last year. VHS rental revenues were $538.3 million, down 29.4% from the comparable quarter last year.
DVD rental revenue represents 46.5% of Blockbusters aggregate rental revenues (excluding video games).
DVD holds the distinction of being the most rapidly accepted consumer electronic format of all time.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1085734/000093066102004007/d10q.htm
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An important technical day, which may explain the increase in volume.
Price is breaking out downward.
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