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Hi folks,
On the withdrawn patent, go to:
http://pair.uspto.gov/cgi-bin/final/home.pl
Then punch in the application serial no.: 09/796924
You will see that the patent was going to issue, but Rambus decided otherwise. The reason, which you can tell from reading the docket, is that they discovered some additional prior art, which they cited in the form of an IDS.
Now the art may or may not be fatal, but it is usually a better idea to have it considered so there is no question about the validity of the patent later.
Da Greek
I assume some foreign legal victory is necessary or else Rambus would not have bothered suing the Three Thieves overseas. Why incur legal fees for foreign litigation if a US legal decision would cover overseas markets?
Generally speaking your thinking is correct. With very few exceptions, a US patent does you no good vis-a-vis foreign activities. However, since the US is such a large market, and many downstream products end up here anyway (i.e., MOBOS with memory) most people have to settle with a domestic patent owner.
Da Greek
3Jack,
In the interest of fairness and public interest, here is the note I posted on MF (72498) dealing with the corresponding section from the CC filing against Rambus on the point of the burden of proof.
Snip here for MF posting:
--------------------------
Folks,
I've downloaded and ripped the text out of the CC post trial brief. From what I can tell, the Judge has still made no determination on the burden of proof applicable to the case. As I mentioned before, I don't consider this a good sign, as it gives him too much leeway now to give an adverse opinion that can't be addressed properly by Rambus, because they were not on notice of where the battleground really is.
I'm going to provide the snippets below from the CC brief on this topic. As you can see, they arguing for the POE standard again, to no suprise. In this particular brief, they have gone way beyond what they provided before in prior briefs, as they know this is a pivotal part of the argument. If you win on this point, the rest comes easy.
I have not had a chance to review their cases, or see what sense it makes, but I have to say it may be enough to have the ALJ feel that he has support for a ruling in that direction. Under a POE standard, he could easily find that even the adverse inferences (already in evidence) are sufficient to meet the level of proof.
Waiting for the Rambus rebuttal....
Da Greek
PS: you will note the CC "anticipates" my argument that I postulated some months back, and tries to address in section 2(c) - i.e., that regardless of what you call it, the remedy justifies the appropriate level of proof being higher - perhaps they ARE reading this board LOL
Snip here for page 23+ of CC brief:
---------------------------------------------------------
C. Burdens of Proof
This case is no different from any ordinary civil antitrust case brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Hence, Complaint Counsel's evidence, as is customary in Section 5 administrative actions, should be weighed by reference to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
There is no support, either in law or public policy, for applying a heightened, clear-and-convincingevidence standard. 12 See Trial Brief of Respondent Rambus Inc. at 27.
1. The Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard Governs This Case
As Rambus itself has acknowledged,12 the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard typically governs in FTC enforcement actions. See In the Matter of Adventist Health System/West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 297 (1994) (“Each element of the case must be established by a preponderance of the evidence”); In the Matter of Washington Crab Assn., 66 F.T.C. 45, 55 (1964) (violation of Sherman Act, Section 2, and thus F.T.C Act, “by a preponderance of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence”) (Initial Decision, aff'd by Commission); FTC v. Abbott Laboratories, 853 F. Supp. 526, 535 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the government must show “by a preponderance of the evidence that [defendant's] action was the result of collusion with its competitors”). See also Complaint Counsel's Pretrial Brief at 128-130.
In fact, the preponderance standard typically governs civil actions brought by the government, regardless of the agency involved, and as the Supreme Court has noted, “[e]xceptions to this standard are uncommon.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989). Moreover, the Supreme Court has pointed to civil antitrust suits as an example of a type of litigation in which “proof by a preponderance of the evidence suffices.” Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983). The two aspects of this case that Rambus in the past has suggested might warrant application of a heightened standard of proof – i.e., the fact that the case involves patents and allegations of deception – plainly do not justify a departure from the customary, preponderanceof- the-evidence standard of proof. Significantly, the Complaint, although it does allege deception, does not allege actionable fraud, nor must fraud be proven to establish antitrust liability in this case.13 Enforcement actions brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act often involve allegations of deception, sometimes even denominated as “fraud,” and yet in such cases courts nevertheless routinely apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See, e.g., FTC v. Renaissance Fine Arts, Ltd., 1994 WL 543048, *8 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (finding, by preponderance of evidence, that defendants had violated Section 5 through “a lucrative scheme to defraud”); In the Matter of Amrep Corp., 102 F.T.C 1362, *265 (1983) (applying preponderance standard to practices described by court as “land sale fraud”).
Moreover, the fact that this case involves patent-related issues is not grounds for applying a heightened standard of proof. See, e.g., U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 388 (1948) (finding “the preponderance of evidence at the conclusion of the government's case indicated a violation of the Sherman Act” through the use of industry-wide patent license agreements); In the Matter of the Roberts Co., 56 F.T.C. 1569, *82 (1960) (finding proof of conspiracy through, inter alia, threatening patent infringement suits “sustained by reliable probative evidence.”). Indeed, as noted in the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (“IP Guidelines”), “[t]he Agencies apply the same general antitrust principles to conduct involving intellectual property that they apply to conduct involving any other form of tangible or intangible property.” 1995 WL 229332 (D.O.J.), 2.1.
2. This Is Not a Walker Process Case Meriting a Clear-and-Convincing Standard of Proof
There is one context in which courts have held that civil antitrust claims should be subjected to a heightened, clear-and-convincing standard of proof – namely, where the claimed misconduct involves alleged misconduct in procuring a patent from the PTO. See Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). Courts have required a heightened burden of proof in so-called “Walker Process” cases due to concerns linked to: (1) the fact that the alleged misconduct occurred in connection with procuring a patent from the PTO, and (2) the nature of the remedies sought. Id. at 180.
Of course, this is not a Walker Process case, nor can this case be likened to a Walker Process suit. The policy-related concerns that have caused courts to demand heightened levels of proof in the Walker Process context simply are inapposite here.
a. This Case Does Not Raise the Basic Policy Concerns
Implicated by Walker Process
The heightened burden of proof applied in Walker Process cases flows directly from concerns about the patent procurement process, which are not present here. As explained by Justice Harlan's concurrence in Walker Process:
[T]o hold, as we do not, that private antitrust suits might also reach monopolies practiced under patents that for one reason or another may turn out to be voidable under one or more of the numerous technicalities attending the issuance of a patent, might well chill the disclosure of inventions through the obtaining of a patent because of fear of the vexations or punitive consequences of treble-damage suits. 382 U.S. at 180 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
As further explained by the administrative law judge in the Commission's VISX case: “Practical policy considerations dictate that, given the complexity of the patent process, an applicant should not be exposed to treble damage liability for 'honest mistakes' or those mistakes described in the case law as 'technical fraud' which occur in the absence of a deliberate plan to deceive and mislead the PTO.” In the Matter of VISX, Inc., Dkt. No. 9286, 1999 WL 33577396 (F.T.C.) (emphasis added). See also Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chemical Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972) (“The road to the Patent Office is so tortuous and patent litigation is usually so complex, that 'knowing and willful fraud' as the term is used in Walker, can mean no less than clear, convincing proof of intentional fraud involving affirmative dishonesty . . . .”) (emphasis added).
The heightened burden in the specific context of patent procurement makes sense from a policy and efficiency perspective, not just because of the complex patent application process, but also because that process involves its own adjudicatory and review procedures. Establishing Walker Process claims in court after-the-fact necessarily requires second-guessing the outcome of the PTO's internal processes, which merits heightened scrutiny. The misconduct at issue here – Rambus's anticompetitive scheme to monopolize technology markets by subverting an open standards process – does not implicate the complex patent procurement process, nor does it require oversight of the PTO's fact-finding and adjudicatory procedures. Accordingly, the policy rationales for employing special scrutiny in the Walker Process cases have no relevance here.
b. The Remedy Sought Does Not Merit Applying the Clear-and-Convincing Evidence Standard
The second reason courts have imposed a heightened standard in Walker Process cases is because of concern about the harshness of the applicable remedies: treble damages and invalidation of a patent. The Complaint in this cases does not, and legally cannot, propose either of these remedies. Rather, the proposed remedy here is equivalent to the remedy obtained by proving equitable estoppel in an infringement action – non-enforcement of the patent against the entities affected by a patent holder's misconduct. The Federal Circuit has expressly held that preponderance of the evidence suffices to prove equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 776 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also In the Matter of Dell 28 Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 624-625 (1996) (“Moreover, the remedy in this case is consistent with those cases, decided under the concept of equitable estoppel, in which courts precluded patent-holders from enforcing patents when they failed properly to disclose the existence of those patents.”).
Additionally, the Complaint does not seek treble damages, nor is such a remedy even permitted under the FTC Act. Thus, unlike in Walker Process, this case cannot possibly have any chilling effect of a treble damage remedy upon the disclosure of inventions through the patent process. See, e.g., 382 U.S. at 180 (Harlan, J., concurring) (expressing concern that private antitrust suits “might well chill the disclosure of inventions through the obtaining of a patent because of fear of the vexations or punitive consequences of treble-damage suits”).
c. FTC Walker Process Cases Do Not Support Application of a
Heightened Burden Here
Although there are two FTC cases involving Walker Process claims, VISX and American Cyanamid, neither supports the application of a heightened burden here. First and foremost, both cases, unlike this case, involved specific Walker Process claims, and thus are inapplicable here. Moreover, neither case reflects binding Commission precedent as to the applicability of a heightened standard of proof to demonstrate bad faith, even in a Walker Process context.The ALJ's decision in VISX, among other things, simply is not persuasive precedent for this matter for a number of reasons. First, as noted above, VISX involved clear Walker Process claims; the administrative law judge applied a clear-and-convincing standard to allegations of fraud and inequitable conduct in connection with procuring a patent from the PTO. In the Matter of VISX, Inc., Dkt. No. 9286, 1999 WL 33577396 (F.T.C.).
Second, the ALJ in VISX did not have to expressly rule on the whether standard in private Walker Process cases should apply to those before the Commission, as Complaint Counsel had conceded that a clear-and-convincing standard applied. See Complaint Counsel's Post-Hearing Brief, In the Matter of Summit Technology, Inc. and VISX, Inc., Dkt. 9286, at 9 n.26 (“Materiality, intent and 'but for' all must be proved by clear and convincing evidence”).
Third, the Commission never reviewed, let alone adopted the ALJ's decision in VISX or the standard of proof it applied, and has since dismissed the complaint. In American Cyanamid, the Commission never expressly required the application of the heightened burden to prove the Walker Process claim. It referred to the clear-and-convincing standard to describe how other courts deal with allegations of “fraud in the procurement of a patent.” In the Matter of American Cyanamid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747, 1963 FTC Lexis 77 at *224- 5. In this regard, the decision states:
In order for the government to prosecute successfully a suit for patent cancellation, common law fraud must be proven. . . . But we do not find such a holding necessary to our disposition of the case. Rather, we conclude that such conduct at the very least amount to 'unclean hands,' 'inequitableness' and 'bad faith.' Id. at 225 (emphasis in original).
Upon remand from the Sixth Circuit, the Commission again highlighted this distinction between fraud and bad faith. With no reference to a heightened burden of proof, the Commission first stated, “we conclude that Pfizer failed to abide by the standards of candor and good faith in procuring its patent, and that this conduct together with the
subsequent exploitation of the [relevant] patent constituted a violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.” In the Matter of American Cyanamid Co., 72 F.T.C. 623, 684-85 (1967), aff'd, Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968). The Commission went on to state, “We further find, as an alternative ground, that the evidence is clear and convincing that Pfizer committed fraud upon the Patent Office in procuring its patent.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Commission – without applying a heightened standard – found that Pfizer's bad-faith conduct violated the FTC Act.
Moreover, the only reference to “clear-and-convincing” is the Commission's acknowledgment that the record contained that quantum of evidence proving the existence of fraud. The case does not hold that the clear-and-convincing standard is the applicable standard in a Walker Process suit brought under Section 5, much less a Section 5 suit, like this one, in which no Walker Process claim is asserted.
NicdaGreek has commented on the brief at TMF, and perhaps he will post here as well.
3Jack,
For the benefit of those who don't subscribe to MF, and don't want to waste time wading through the Yahoo crap, here is the Rambus filing dealing with the particular issue of the burden of proof ONLY. I consider this the most important aspect of the case.
Snip here for MF post:72498
---------------
Folks,
I've ripped and posted the pertinent corresponding section on the burden of proof from the Rambus filing. I've tried to preserve the formatting by manually fixing the margins. For those of you who have seen the full document, you will appreciate that this argument is front and center, at the beginning of the brief, because everything else has to be judged in light of the standard set here.
My 15 minute “take” on this is as follows: (1) Rambus' argument looks a lot like what they submitted back in April; (2) they did not significantly bolster their initial submission. Please note that I consider this a result of the fact that their original work was pretty good, so there was not much room for incremental improvement.
On the other hand the CC's original filing was pretty crappy, but now has been improved considerably in my eyes anyway. Again, because they had so far to go, any improvement looks impressive.
My gut feeling is that CC SHOULD lose, but they probably won't. I see the ALJ as having ample fodder now for sticking with a POE approach. Accordingly, with all things being equal, I consider this an unfavorable position.
The major battleground on this point (Burden of Proof) is this:
(1) Does the ALJ agree that this is a Walker Process type case? In my opinion, he does not have to find so, so the CC is likely to prevail.
(2) Does the ALJ walk away from the prior ALJ's ruling in VISX as regards the burden of proof? IMO, he should not, but he is not bound by it, because I don't believe this part of the ruling was ratified by the full Commission
(3) Does the ALJ consider that given the remedy requested, the POE standard is inappropriate? Again, I think this clearly favors Rambus, but I can see him falling back on the CC precedent to find otherwise. Whether the Commission and Courts accept it will be a fight for another day.
Da Greek
PS:I strongly believe that this flaw in the ALJ's procedure (i.e, not telling the parties the burden of proof) was known and understood by persons close to the matter in early August. There is a large news-free divergence in the stock price relative to its peers (or at least the Nasdaq) since that time. So I think this turn of events has been factored in as a 20% haircut; this correlates to my counter-prediction that a favorable ruling would have resulted in a 20% boost.
Snip here for Rambus brief:
-------------------------------
B. Complaint Counsel's Burden Of Proof
The courts have long recognized an inherent tension between the patent and antitrust laws. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Constitution, a patent confers a legal monopoly for a limited period of time. In return for a patent, the patentee must fully disclose the patented invention or process, and after the expiration of the statutory period, the patentee loses all exclusive rights to the invention. See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974). As the Federal Circuit has explained, this system “serves a very positive function in our system of competition, i.e., 'the encouragement of investment based risk,'” which in turn “'encourages innovation and its fruits: new jobs and new industries, new consumer goods and trade benefits.'” Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
Precisely because a patent constitutes a monopoly (albeit a lawful one), a patentee who attempts to enforce a patent is often faced with threats of antitrust liability. Most commonly, the defendant accuses the patentee of obtaining market power improperly by withholding material information from the patent office in the course of obtaining the patent. Such claims are called “Walker Process” claims, after the Supreme Court's decision in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), which allowed the fraudulent procurement of a patent to form the basis for an antitrust claim under certain circumstances.
The courts have consistently required parties asserting Walker Process claims to prove the elements of fraud with “clear and convincing” evidence. See, e.g., Loctite Corp., 781 F.2d at 876-7. They have done so not simply because many, if not most, states require clear and convincing evidence of common law fraud. See generally 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (Chadbourn rev. 1981), 2498 at p. 424. The courts have required the heightened burden of proof for substantial public policy reasons, in recognition of the statutory basis of a patent's monopoly status and to “prevent frustration of patent law by the long reach of antitrust law.” Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing Walker Process and holding that the “clear and convincing” standard that had been applied in such cases would also apply to antitrust claims based upon the bad faith enforcement of a patent); see also Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing that a “suitable accommodation” between the patent and antitrust laws “has been achieved by erecting certain barriers to antitrust suits against a patentee attempting to enforce its patent”).
As Complaint Counsel will be quick to point out, this is not a private antitrust suit brought in federal court, and the Administrative Procedure Act has been held to require that an administrative agency need satisfy only a preponderance of the evidence burden in most agency proceedings. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981). The Federal Trade Commission, however, has acknowledged the tension between the interests served by the patent and antitrust laws and has expressly adopted the “clear and convincing” standard of proof in Section 5 cases based on the allegedly fraudulent procurement of a patent.
As early as the 1960's, in the American Cyanamid cases, the Commission observed that “[w]here fraud in the procurement of a patent has been alleged in infringement suits and cancellation proceedings, the courts have stated that it must be established by clear and convincing evidence that the false or misleading statement was made (or information was withheld) deliberately and with intent to deceive. Also, of course, the information that is misrepresented or withheld must be material.” In the Matter of American Cyanamid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747, 1963 FTC Lexis 77 at *224-5. Upon remand from the Sixth Circuit, the Commission again employed the “clear and convincing” standard in finding that American Cyanamid and Pfizer had committed fraud upon the patent office. See In the Matter of American Cyanamid Co., 72 F.T.C. 623, 1967 FTC Lexis 43 at *138-*145.
More recently, in In the Matter of VISX, Inc., Docket No. 9286, the Commission alleged that VISX, Inc. had fraudulently procured a patent covering certain surgical procedures. The Commission alleged, as an alternative, that VISX had engaged in “inequitable conduct” before the Patent Office that justified an order barring further enforcement of the patent. In a lengthy Initial Decision, Judge Levin held that:
(1) an antitrust claim based upon the allegedly fraudulent procurement of a patent requires, in part, that the Commission present “[c]lear and convincing evidence of an intent to deceive the examiner and reliance must be adduced”; and
(2) to establish inequitable conduct, “clear and convincing evidence must demonstrate both the materiality of the reference . . . and a deceptive intent in withholding the reference. . . .”
Initial Decision, In the Matter of VISX, Inc., Dkt. No. 9286 (filed May 27, 1999) (available at www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9286/index.htm) (“VISX Initial Decision”), pp. 111, 139.
Complaint Counsel conceded the correctness of this approach, noting in their Post-Hearing Brief that to find either fraud or inequitable conduct, “[m]ateriality, intent and 'but for' all must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, evidence 'which proves in the mind of the trier of fact an abiding conviction that the truth of [the] factual contentions [is] highly probable.'” Complaint Counsel's Post-Hearing Brief, In the Matter of VISX, Inc., Dkt.. No. 9286 (filed April 7, 1999), p. 9 n.26 (citations omitted) (available in Commission file).
After reviewing the evidence, Judge Levin dismissed the fraud and inequitable conduct claims. As he explained:
The patent grant allows the patentee to exclude competition in the use of the patented invention, and the absence of clear and convincing evidence of concealment or omission of the prior art with intent to deceive necessarily strips complaint charges of monopolization, attempted monopolization, and unfair competition of all foundation and support. Absent fraud or inequitable conduct, the other elements of the violations alleged in the complaint are not material under Rule 3.51(c)(1). Since Complaint Counsel have failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that prior art was either withheld or omitted with intent to deceive the PTO, a Section 5 violation cannot, as a matter of law, be sustained against VISX on Walker Process or American Cyanamid grounds. Accordingly, Count 3 of the complaint must be dismissed. VISX Initial Decision, p. 145.2
Complaint Counsel will argue that they have not asserted a Walker Process claim, and that American Cyanamid and VISX are not applicable here. There are, however, substantial similarities between the claims asserted in American Cyanamid and VISX and the claims asserted in the Complaint, and all of the policy considerations that led the Commission and Judge Levin to require “clear and convincing” evidence in those cases apply with equal force here. For example, the alleged wrongdoing in each case was the failure on the part of the patentee to make certain disclosures in the face of a purported duty to disclose. In each case, the Commission alleged that, as a result of its non-disclosure, the patentee had unfairly acquired market power that it would not have otherwise held. And in each case, the remedy sought was (and is here) an order barring the respondent from exercising its right of free access to the courts to enforce its patents.
Since the right to petition the courts is not just based in the patent laws but also springs from the Constitution, it may not lightly be taken away by a court or agency. See generally CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 849 (1st Cir. 1985) (“courts have protected the federal interests in patent law enforcement and the free access to the courts by requiring, in addition to the other necessary elements of an antitrust claim, 'clear and convincing evidence' of fraud in asserting or pursuing patent infringement claims.”)
A heightened burden of proof is appropriate here not just because of the nature of the remedy sought. In addition, there are strong public policy considerations arising from what Complaint Counsel concede is the social importance of standard-setting organizations in today's high-tech economy. The risks associated with participation in standards-setting must not be so great that innovators are deterred from participating by fear that a mistake in judgment, or an “after-the-fact morphing of a vague, loosely defined policy,” could lead to forfeiture of valuable intellectual property. Infineon, 318 F.3d at 1102 n.10.
The clear and convincing burden of proof is also appropriate here because of the nature of the claims asserted and the evidence offered to support those claims. As a three-judge panel in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission proceeding explained in 1992, an agency finding of dishonesty or fraud can result in “severe reputational injury,” which supports the utilization of a higher standard of proof. See Inquiry Into Three Mile Island Unit 2 Leak Rate Data Falsification, 19XX WL 910, *14 (N.R.C. 1992).
In addition, where an agency's examination of events comes well after the events transpired, and the resolution of important issues “depends on strained and faded memories, it would be unfair to find a person guilty of dishonest or fraudulent conduct on a mere preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
In sum, given the conflicting statutory interests involved, given the nature of the claims alleged and the evidence offered to support and rebut them, and given the fundamental nature of the rights that would be lost were the remedy sought ever implemented, it is not just appropriate, but necessary, that Complaint Counsel bear the burden of proving the essential elements of their claims, ncluding “materiality, intent and 'but for,'” by clear and convincing evidence.
I knew something had to explain the price erosion. I can only hope that the ALJ made an honest, non political decision to fault Rambus attorneys for failing to present this during he trial.
I think you are spot on; its a noticeable 'hit' but not life threatening.
If it had been an unfavorable decision on the burden of proof the damage would be far more significant, as this would affect the entire case (not just one defense).
Da Greek
What you posted in the above referenced post IS WRONG...No matter how many links, charts, photos, roadmaps, other posters opinions, or anything else you post to cover up what you said in the above post, you are WRONG according to BRIAN SMITH <bsmith@rambus.com> Business Development Manager at RAMBUS Coporation.
Mutha,
Not to point out the bleeding obvious, but isn't it the job function of every business "development" manager to persuade the public that his/her product does everything for everyone?
So give me a break; presenting propaganda from the company as truth is extremely dangerous. I would hope after years of listening to incorrect legal predictions in Italy, Germany, US - not to mention proclamations that they would take over the PC market - that you would have a more skeptical mind.
My reading of what Cor is saying is basically that while "theoretically" what you say is possible, the market reality is such that it will never be competitive. So as I read his post, the thing will be stillborn at some point, even if you deliver it. If you have some logic, technical analysis, etc., to refute Cor's analysis, by all means provide it - I'll read it; but spare me the constant "Rambus said so and thus it must be true" marketing blather.
Da Greek
Zeev would say the news will leak and show in the chart before the announcement, so we'll see.
Maybe it already did a few days ago, as I saw a "blip" over the course of the day which seemed inconsistent with the overall market movement and lack of news. But if anyone has real info, they should let us know.
Is SARS under control yet, or did you wear a mask over there?
There seems to be little of the panic and chaos of a few months ago. One of the really neat features is that they automatically "scan" your body temperature as you walk by their camera/sensors, so they can screen right away for problematic incoming/outgoing passengers. All you see is this green blur moving on the screen, and an indication of your temperature.
Da Greek
I think Nic is taking a breather...
Only a breather from posting, not from working unfortunately.
Just returned from an Asian business trip, and I am completely buried with new work.
Not much interesting going on in the legal front; if something special happens I will post it first on TMF to get my BIG RED STAR, and then here. Seems like a nice place here with a mixture of participants, and so far, free of the "F** you" ... "No F*** you"
Da Greek
PS: rather annoyed that the Judge did not say anything yet about the damn burden of proof in the case; how are they going to write a brief??? At least they are due before my September options expire, so I will know one way or the other what is going on - except, of course, I won't see them on the FTC site until days later....