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Robert you mention DeMarco everyone knows this is a crime. Even our friend Bradford knows it. These people are wicked.
Bradford Quote: "Fhfa and Treasury conspired to steal from shareholders and executed flawlessly and ed demarco survived his first court appearance with a mistrial despite lying on the stand." End of Quote
The strong hold of the wicked, the Treasury their heart is as fat as grease and are not satisfied unless mischief is done against the shareholders.
Again
Abuse and oppression of the vulnerable by the powerful Treasury is sadly prevalent against the Shareholders which is well documented throughout the years in this conservatorship.
It appears to be the underlying driver is the need to find some recognized level of power. These people in this powerful position are anxious about their power and the acquisition of power is a never-ending process and as for those who achieve any level of power quickly become accustomed to it. It becomes the status quo and the need for power can be fulfilled only by acquiring more. Obviously, it is not about the money the Treasury has the power to create as much money as desired.
For the abuser, the belief that they have an inherent right to power and the threat of the potential loss of their personal power fuels their hate towards the Shareholders. The abuser typically views themselves as on top and is constantly trying to secure their position. It is not enough to settle for a mere 79.9% of the Common Stock. This is why the abuser is controlling, easily angered, critical if questioned about their not so rightful ownership of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The conservatorship can be settled were each holder of equity in the companies come out to some degree satisfied. Neither the Junior Preferred or the Common Shareholders would be wiped out. The conservatorship has lasted 15 years and the common and JPS both have continued to trade. And the Treasury decides to take us out??
Of the $379 billion Treasury has received, it received approximately $324.2 billion since the Net Worth Sweep. This amount is roughly $150 billion larger than the maximum amount Treasury would have received under the original 10% senior preferred dividend (and even that number assumes the GSEs would not have been permitted to repay Treasury rather than paying the incredibly expensive 10% dividend ad infinitum). Under the original terms of the PSPA, if Treasury had wanted to take the maximum value it could from the GSEs, it could have received close to 80% of that $150 billion: but it would have had to pay some of that amount to the private preferred and common shareholders. Treasury was unwilling to do so; it wanted 100%, and it took 100%.
JUSTICE BREYER: Quote: “Thank you. I think in reading this you could, with trying to simplify as much as possible, do you -- the shareholders' claim as saying we bought into this corporation, it was supposed to be private as well as having a public side, and then the government nationalized it. That's what they did. If you look at their giving the net worth to Treasury, it's nationalizing the company. Now, whatever conservators do and receivers do, they don't nationalize companies. And when they nationalized this company, naturally they paid us nothing and our shares became worthless. And so what do you say?” End of Quote, page 12
Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-422_3e04.pdf
EternalPatience Quote: "You are giving way too much credit to a blog with 77 views..."
In other words, only 77 views of seeking garbage.
THE CONTRACT WITH THE SHAREHOLDERS
3. Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference
(a) Following termination of the Commitment (as defined in the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement referred
to in Section 8 below), and subject to any limitations which may be imposed by law and the provisions below, the
Company may pay down the Liquidation Preference of all outstanding shares of the Senior Preferred Stock pro rata,
at any time, in whole or in part, out of funds legally available therefor, with such payment first being used to reduce
any accrued and unpaid dividends previously added to the Liquidation Preference pursuant to Section 8 below and,
to the extent all such accrued and unpaid dividends have been paid, next being used to reduce any Periodic
Commitment Fees (as defined in the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement referred to in Section 8 below) previously
added to the Liquidation Preference pursuant to Section 8 below. Prior to termination of the Commitment, and
subject to any limitations which may be imposed by law and the provisions below, the Company may pay down the
Liquidation Preference of all outstanding shares of the Senior Preferred Stock pro rata, at any time, out of funds
legally available therefor, but only to the extent of (i) accrued and unpaid dividends previously added to the
Liquidation Preference pursuant to Section 8 below and not repaid by any prior pay down of Liquidation Preference
and (ii) Periodic Commitment Fees previously added to the Liquidation Preference pursuant to Section 8 below and
not repaid by any prior pay down of Liquidation Preference. Any pay down of Liquidation Preference permitted by
this Section 3 shall be paid by making a payment in cash to the holders of record of outstanding shares of the Senior
Preferred Stock as they appear in the books and records of the Company on such record date as shall be fixed in
advance by the Board of Directors, not to be earlier than 45 days nor later than 10 days preceding the date fixed for
the payment.
(b) In the event the Company shall pay down of the Liquidation Preference of the Senior Preferred Stock as
aforesaid, notice of such pay down shall be given by the Company by first class mail, postage prepaid, mailed
neither less than 10 nor more than 45 days preceding the date fixed for the payment, to each holder of record of the
shares of the Senior Preferred Stock, at such holder’s address as the same appears in the books and records of the
Company. Each such notice shall state the amount by which the Liquidation Preference of each share shall be
reduced and the pay down date.
(c) If after termination of the Commitment the Company pays down the Liquidation Preference of each
outstanding share of Senior Preferred Stock in full, such shares shall be deemed to have been redeemed as of the
date of such payment, and the dividend that would otherwise be payable for the Dividend Period ending on the pay
down date will be paid on such date. Following such deemed redemption, the shares of the Senior Preferred Stock
shall no longer be deemed to be outstanding, and all rights of the holders thereof as holders of the Senior Preferred
Stock shall cease, with respect to shares so redeemed, other than the right to receive the pay down amount (which
shall include the final dividend for such shares). Any shares of the Senior Preferred Stock which shall have been so
redeemed, after such redemption, shall no longer have the status of authorized, issued or outstanding shares.
4. Mandatory Pay Down of Liquidation Preference Upon Issuance of Capital Stock
(a) If the Company shall issue any shares of capital stock (including without limitation common stock or any
series of preferred stock) other than issuances of common stock with aggregate gross proceeds of up to $70 billion in
exchange for cash at any time while the Senior Preferred Stock is outstanding, then the Company shall, within 10
Business Days, use the proceeds of such issuance net of the direct costs relating to the issuance of such securities
(including, without limitation, legal, accounting and investment banking fees) to pay down the Liquidation
Preference of all outstanding shares of Senior Preferred Stock pro rata, out of funds legally available therefor, by
making a payment in cash to the holders of record of outstanding shares of the Senior Preferred Stock as they appear
in the books and records of the Company on such record date as shall be fixed in advance by the Board of Directors,
not to be earlier than 45 days nor later than 10 days preceding the date fixed for the payment, with such payment
first being used to reduce any accrued and unpaid dividends previously added to the Liquidation Preference pursuant
to Section 8 below and, to the extent all such accrued and unpaid dividends have been paid, next being used to
reduce any Periodic Commitment Fees (as defined in the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement referred to in Section
8 below) previously added to the Liquidation Preference pursuant to Section 8 below; provided that, prior to the
termination of the Commitment (as defined in the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement referred to in Section 8
below), the Liquidation Preference of each share of Senior Preferred Stock shall not be paid down below $1,000 per
share.
(b) If the Company shall not have sufficient assets legally available for the pay down of the Liquidation
Preference of the shares of Senior Preferred Stock required under Section 4(a) , the Company shall pay down the
Liquidation Preference per share to the extent permitted by law, and shall pay down any Liquidation Preference not
so paid down because of the unavailability of legally available assets or other prohibition as soon as practicable to
the extent it is thereafter able to make such pay down legally. The inability of the Company to make such payment
for any reason shall not relieve the Company from its obligation to effect any required pay down of the Liquidation
Preference when, as and if permitted by law.
(c) If after the termination of the Commitment the Company pays down the Liquidation Preference of each
outstanding share of Senior Preferred Stock in full, such shares shall be deemed to have been redeemed as of the
date of such payment, and the dividend that would otherwise be payable for the Dividend Period ending on the pay
down date will be paid on such date. Following such deemed redemption, the shares of the Senior Preferred Stock
shall no longer be deemed to be outstanding, and all rights of the holders thereof as holders of the Senior Preferred
Stock shall cease, with respect to shares so redeemed, other than the right to receive the pay down amount (which
shall include the final dividend for such redeemed shares). Any shares of the Senior Preferred Stock which shall
have been so redeemed, after such redemption, shall no longer have the status of authorized, issued or outstanding
shares.
https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Agree/FNM/SPSPA-amends/FNM-Fourth-Amended-Restated-Certificate-04-13-21.pdf
Bradford Quote: "Fhfa and Treasury conspired to steal from shareholders and executed flawlessly and ed demarco survived his first court appearance with a mistrial despite lying on the stand." End of Quote
If you know this use your platform to speak out against this Wickedness. Don't encourage the theft.
Key word 'CONTRACT' The shareholders are under a contract.
Again: Bradford, I am asking you to use your journalistic platform to advocate defending against the wicked. Be a lover of our constitution. Stop with encouraging the theft. You know it, I know it, and everyone else knows the Treasury is stealing from the shareholders, if the FHFA allows the SPS Conversion to common stock. And what makes anyone so sure the JPS can’t be wiped out.
AGAIN
The problem is not that the Treasury Swept the Net Worth of the companies. THE PROBLEM: The FHFA appointed CEOs failed by sending the NWS payments to the Treasury without the terms of the Pay Down of the Liquidation Preference applied.
Self-dealing FHFA appointed CEOs
WRITTEN AS CLEAR A DAY, Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference.
No one from the companies sent any letter to the Treasury stating the Liquidation Preference has been paid in full and the Senior Preferred Stock canceled. Instructions are written in the contract to do so. The FHFA appointed CEOs failed by sending the NWS payments to the Treasury without the Pay Down Option of the Liquidation Preference. The CEOs let the Treasury take it for free with no representation of the shareholders.
Self-dealing FHFA appointed CEOs
WRITTEN AS CLEAR A DAY, Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference.
Any loyal conservator of Fannie and Freddie would take advantage of the refinancing option to end the bailout arrangement, by paying off the senior preferred in full.
READ THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
According to the 'Contract' the companies did not need Treasury's permission to pay down the LP.
The money swept by the Treasury apply it to LP and the 10% over payment returned to the companies the LP would be paid in full and the SPS would be redeemed and the SAME DAY IN TIME the companies could turn to the Market with a secondary IPO replacing the commitment.
Link: https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Agree/FNM/SPSPA-amends/FNM-Fourth-Amended-Restated-Certificate-04-13-21.pdf
If what you are insinuating comes true, the FHFA with the Treasury are wicked to the core. Stealing from the shareholders and everyone who has studied the facts knows this to be true.
The SCOTUS said the NWS was Legal and sent it back to the lower court for calculated damages.
The problem is not that the Treasury Swept the Net Worth of the companies. THE PROBLEM: The FHFA appointed CEOs failed by sending the NWS payments to the Treasury without the terms of the Pay Down of the Liquidation Preference applied.
The companies are under a contract! Bryer understands it and said so.
JOoa0ky Quote: "Everyone keeps getting tripped up with the idea that IPO'ing shares are based on the current price... That's what Tim Howard seems to think as well..." End of Quote
No, you are the one getting tripped up. Apparently, you do not understand the meaning of
MARKET CAP:
The companies market capitalization would be about $220 billion.
To get to a Market Cap of $220 billion each company's common shares would have to trade at fair value on the open market. Mr. Howard calculated the companies are worth $220 billion.
Mr. Howard is saying if the Treasury would cancel the LP and deem the SPS paid in full then the Treasury could convert the warrants to common stock at 79.9% and sell their position in the open market.
This is what Mr. Howard said,
Quote: "At what I estimate as their sustainable rate of after-tax retained earnings—about $13 billion per year for Fannie and about $9 billion per year for Freddie" End of Quote
Quote: "As noted earlier, I estimate their combined sustainable earnings to be about $22 billion per year. At a multiple of 10 times earnings—less than half the price-earnings ratio of the S&P 500—their market capitalization would be about $220 billion. Through exercising the warrants, bringing Fannie and Freddie out of conservatorship with a capital standard that allows them to price their business on an economic basis, and then selling the shares from its warrant conversion, the Biden administration could capture a very large portion of that $220 billion potential value for itself for whatever purposes it wishes, including an affordable housing fund." End of Quote
https://howardonmortgagefinance.com/2023/01/04/a-political-problem/#comments
The focus point
Nationalized private companies.
The Shareholders have lost both companies to the Treasury. ALL THE CASH THAT CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF THE BUSINESS DURING ITS REMAINING LIFE.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Justice Breyer
UPMOST IMPORTANT: JUSTICE BREYER: Quote: “Thank you. I think in reading this you could, with trying to simplify as much as possible, do you -- the shareholders' claim as saying we bought into this corporation, it was supposed to be private as well as having a public side, and then the government nationalized it. That's what they did. If you look at their giving the net worth to Treasury, it's nationalizing the company. Now, whatever conservators do and receivers do, they don't nationalize companies. And when they nationalized this company, naturally they paid us nothing and our shares became worthless. And so what do you say?” End of Quote, page 12
Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-422_3e04.pdf
The conservatorship can be settled were each holder of equity in the companies come out to some degree satisfied. The Junior Preferred and the Common Shareholders do not have to be wiped out. Treasury has taken roughly $150 billion more than it could have received under the original 10% dividend. If the Treasury would deem the liquidation preference paid and the Senior Preferred Stock canceled the companies common stock and preferred stock both could be relisted on the NYSE and trade at fair value; the companies could turn to Wall Street with a Secondary IPO replacing the Treasury's backstop.
Bradford, I am asking you to use your journalistic platform to advocate defending against the wicked. Be a lover of our constitution. Stop with encouraging the theft. You know it, I know it, and everyone else knows the Treasury is stealing from the shareholders, if the FHFA allows the SPS Conversion to common stock. And what makes anyone so sure the JPS can’t be wiped out.
AGAIN
The problem is not that the Treasury Swept the Net Worth of the companies. THE PROBLEM: The FHFA appointed CEOs failed by sending the NWS payments to the Treasury without the terms of the Pay Down of the Liquidation Preference applied.
Self-dealing FHFA appointed CEOs
WRITTEN AS CLEAR A DAY, Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference.
No one from the companies sent any letter to the Treasury stating the Liquidation Preference has been paid in full and the Senior Preferred Stock canceled. Instructions are written in the contract to do so. The FHFA appointed CEOs failed by sending the NWS payments to the Treasury without the Pay Down Option of the Liquidation Preference. The CEOs let the Treasury take it for free with no representation of the shareholders.
Self-dealing FHFA appointed CEOs
WRITTEN AS CLEAR A DAY, Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference.
Any loyal conservator of Fannie and Freddie would take advantage of the refinancing option to end the bailout arrangement, by paying off the senior preferred in full.
READ THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
According to the 'Contract' the companies did not need Treasury's permission to pay down the LP.
The money swept by the Treasury apply it to LP and the 10% over payment returned to the companies the LP would be paid in full and the SPS would be redeemed and the SAME DAY IN TIME the companies could turn to the Market with a secondary IPO replacing the commitment.
Link: https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Agree/FNM/SPSPA-amends/FNM-Fourth-Amended-Restated-Certificate-04-13-21.pdf
The FHFA Director used the wording IPO...
No mention of a Secondary IPO or Re-IPO.
This is an indication either the existing shareholders will be wiped out in a receivership afterwards the Treasury sells the companies in the open market, OR the Treasury buys the existing shareholders out and sells the companies in the open market.
FHFA Director Sandra L. Thompson Quote: “If the enterprises ever get out of conservatorship everybody knows it's going to be the largest IPO ever. But there are questions investors will want to know”. End of Quote.
Thank you, Sir,...
The Contract reads as clear a day the Optional Paydown of the LP. And every time the Contract has been brought up certain ones always come back with an explain it away post.
The money swept by the Treasury if it had been applied to LP and the 10% over payment returned to the companies the LP would be paid in full and the SPS would be redeemed and at that point in time SAME DAY IN TIME the companies could turn to the Market with a secondary IPO replacing the commitment.
NO MONEY LEFT TO PAYDOWN THE LP AND REDEEM THE SPS WHEN THE TREASURY SWEEPS THE ENTIRE NET WORTH...
THE CONTRACT: https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Agree/FNM/SPSPA-amends/FNM-Fourth-Amended-Restated-Certificate-04-13-21.pdf
Every time for some unexplained reason the truth is disputed.
Again, Professor Richard Epstein explained the Optional Pay Down of the Liquidation Preference.
Link: Below
Quote: “ So why go through the charade of asking Fannie and Freddie raise additional capital to pay off the senior preferred in full when it has already been paid.
The mechanism is there as clear as day in the stock certificates and the repurchase option set out is fully consistent with the view that the government advances were, if possible, only a short-term backstop that Fannie and Freddie could refinance at any time with private capital.
Quote: “Section 3 then, set outs “Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference” that specifies that “[f]ollowing termination of the commitment” of the Treasury to make further advances of cash for new senior preferred shares, “the Company may pay down the Liquidation Preference of all outstanding shares of the senior preferred stock pro rata, at any time, in whole or in part, out of funds legally available therefore.” Since there are no unpaid cash dividends all, these payments immediately go to reduce the amount of the liquidation preference.
With or without the Third Amendment, the Treasury’s commitment to make further advances remains, even if no such advance has been made since the beginning of 2012. But that commitment is of little if any value now that further advances from Treasury are no longer needed. Most critically, Section 4 addresses “Mandatory Pay Down of Liquidation Preference Upon Issuance of Capital Stock.”
Its exact provisions need to be quoted to grasp the full legal position. This section comes into play “if the Company shall issue any shares of capital stock (including without limitation common stock or any series of preferred stock) in exchange for cash at any time while the Senior Preferred Stock is outstanding.” Note that this provision does not require the consent of that “the holders of record of the outstanding shares of the Senior Preferred Stock” (which need not be the US Treasury). These shareholders receive full protection because Fannie and Freddie are obligated to “use the proceeds of such issuance . . . to pay down the Liquidation Preference of all outstanding shares of Senior Preferred Stock pro rata, out of funds legally available therefor. . .”
In sum, Section 4, of the senior preferred stock certificate in essence allows the trustees of Fannie and Freddie to go to the market at any time to raise new capital, including new capital with lower dividend coupons, to buy back the Treasury’s senior preferred. Any loyal conservator of Fannie and Freddie would take advantage of this refinancing option to end the bailout arrangement, by paying off the senior preferred in full once Fannie and Freddie have sufficient capital to resume normal market operations. At this point, it is a fair inference that the Treasury commitment would end once that recapitalization is complete. In light of this arrangement, it seems incorrect to argue, as does Goodman, that “the GSEs were never provided with a mechanism to emerge from conservatorship because it was never expected they would do so.” The mechanism is there as clear as day in the stock certificates and the repurchase option set out is fully consistent with the view that the government advances were, if possible, only a short-term backstop that Fannie and Freddie could refinance at any time with private capital. Furthermore, FHFA would also refinance the expensive 10 percent preferred for cheaper preferred or common, once it became clear, as it is now, that these are healthy companies (in which case cheaper financing is available).
At this point, the Third Amendment cannot be used to wipe out the 10 and 12 percent dividend rates in the initial stock certificates. Once the Third Amendment is declared illegal, as it should be, the extra payments to Treasury must be treated first as though they were a return of capital that calls for a dollar-for-dollar redemption of the senior preferred, thereby reducing the Treasury’s liquidation preference. Once all those shares are redeemed, the remainder of the money paid over to Treasury should be treated as excess payments that must be repaid in full to Fannie and Freddie with interest.
Nothing else makes sense. Suppose the government sought to just repay the extra money to Fannie and Freddie in order to reinstate the above-market 10 percent dividend. It still could not reasonably prevent Fannie and Freddie from exercising the mandatory repurchase under Section 4 So why go through the charade of asking Fannie and Freddie raise additional capital to pay off the senior preferred in full when it has already been paid. Read together, Sections 3 and 4 make it impossible for the government to keep the highly favorable 10 percent dividend in place when it is no longer warranted by market conditions.” End of Quote
https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2014/09/10/what-happens-if-the-government-loses-on-the-third-amendment-the-senior-preferred-stock-certificates-spell-nothing-but-trouble-for-the-government/?sh=50886006a393
From the yahoo
Quote: “ Mister
They turned it down because they are working for the crime syndicate and not for us. The crime syndicate appointed them, and they don't forget that. Who else could steal $100 billion and not even have it mentioned in the news let alone the courts?” End of Quote
The above SCOTUS in reference.
Highlighting a few sentences
PROBLEM: Self-dealing FHFA appointed CEOs
WRITTEN AS CLEAR A DAY, Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference.
Quote: “Company may pay down the Liquidation Preference of all outstanding shares of the Senior Preferred Stock pro rata, at any time, in whole or in part,” End of Quote
NOTE: WHOLE OR IN PART
Quote: “Prior to termination of the Commitment, and subject to any limitations which may be imposed by law and the provisions below, the Company may pay down the Liquidation Preference of all outstanding shares of the Senior Preferred Stock pro rata, at any time, out of funds legally available therefor,” End of Quote
NOTE: PRIOR TO TERMINATION.
PRIOR PRO RATA, AT ANY TIME!
COMPANY MAY PAY DOWN THE LIQUIDATATION PREFERENCE OF ALL SHARES OF SPS.
Quote: “In the event the Company shall pay down of the Liquidation Preference of the Senior Preferred Stock as aforesaid, notice of such pay down shall be given by the Company by first class mail, postage prepaid, mailed neither less than 10 nor more than 45 days preceding the date fixed for the payment, to each holder of record of the shares of the Senior Preferred Stock, at such holder’s address as the same appears in the books and records of the Company. Each such notice shall state the amount by which the Liquidation Preference of each share shall be reduced and the pay down date.” End of Quote
AS PLAIN A DAY!
The problem is not that the Treasury Swept the Net Worth of the companies. THE PROBLEM: The FHFA appointed CEOs failed by sending the NWS payments to the Treasury without the terms of the Pay Down of the Liquidation Preference applied.
According to the 'Contract' the companies did not need Treasury's permission to pay down the LP.
The money swept by the Treasury apply it to LP and the 10% over payment returned to the companies the LP would be paid in full and the SPS would be redeemed and the SAME DAY IN TIME the companies could turn to the Market with a secondary IPO replacing the commitment.
link: https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Agree/FNM/SPSPA-amends/FNM-Fourth-Amended-Restated-Certificate-04-13-21.pdf
AGAIN
The problem is not that the Treasury Swept the Net Worth of the companies. THE PROBLEM: The FHFA appointed CEOs failed by sending the NWS payments to the Treasury without the terms of the Pay Down of the Liquidation Preference applied.
Self-dealing FHFA appointed CEOs
WRITTEN AS CLEAR A DAY, Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference.
No one from the companies sent any letter to the Treasury stating the Liquidation Preference has been paid in full and the Senior Preferred Stock canceled. Instructions are written in the contract to do so. The FHFA appointed CEOs failed by sending the NWS payments to the Treasury without the Pay Down Option of the Liquidation Preference. The CEOs let the Treasury take it for free with no representation of the shareholders.
Self-dealing FHFA appointed CEOs
WRITTEN AS CLEAR A DAY, Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference.
Any loyal conservator of Fannie and Freddie would take advantage of the refinancing option to end the bailout arrangement, by paying off the senior preferred in full.
READ THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
According to the 'Contract' the companies did not need Treasury's permission to pay down the LP.
The money swept by the Treasury apply it to LP and the 10% over payment returned to the companies the LP would be paid in full and the SPS would be redeemed and the SAME DAY IN TIME the companies could turn to the Market with a secondary IPO replacing the commitment.
Link: https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Agree/FNM/SPSPA-amends/FNM-Fourth-Amended-Restated-Certificate-04-13-21.pdf
Abuse and oppression of the vulnerable by the powerful Treasury is sadly prevalent against the Shareholders which is well documented throughout the years in this conservatorship.
It appears to be the underlying driver is the need to find some recognized level of power. These people in this powerful position are anxious about their power and the acquisition of power is a never-ending process and as for those who achieve any level of power quickly become accustomed to it. It becomes the status quo and the need for power can be fulfilled only by acquiring more. Obviously, it is not about the money the Treasury has the power to create as much money as desired.
For the abuser, the belief that they have an inherent right to power and the threat of the potential loss of their personal power fuels their hate towards the Shareholders. The abuser typically views themselves as on top and is constantly trying to secure their position. It is not enough to settle for a mere 79.9% of the Common Stock. This is why the abuser is controlling, easily angered, critical if questioned about their not so rightful ownership of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The conservatorship can be settled were each holder of equity in the companies come out to some degree satisfied. Neither the Junior Preferred or the Common Shareholders would be wiped out. The conservatorship has lasted 15 years and the common and JPS both have continued to trade. And the Treasury decides to take us out??
Of the $379 billion Treasury has received, it received approximately $324.2 billion since the Net Worth Sweep. This amount is roughly $150 billion larger than the maximum amount Treasury would have received under the original 10% senior preferred dividend (and even that number assumes the GSEs would not have been permitted to repay Treasury rather than paying the incredibly expensive 10% dividend ad infinitum). Under the original terms of the PSPA, if Treasury had wanted to take the maximum value it could from the GSEs, it could have received close to 80% of that $150 billion: but it would have had to pay some of that amount to the private preferred and common shareholders. Treasury was unwilling to do so; it wanted 100%, and it took 100%.
JUSTICE BREYER: Quote: “Thank you. I think in reading this you could, with trying to simplify as much as possible, do you -- the shareholders' claim as saying we bought into this corporation, it was supposed to be private as well as having a public side, and then the government nationalized it. That's what they did. If you look at their giving the net worth to Treasury, it's nationalizing the company. Now, whatever conservators do and receivers do, they don't nationalize companies. And when they nationalized this company, naturally they paid us nothing and our shares became worthless. And so what do you say?” End of Quote, page 12
Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-422_3e04.pdf
Lies do not become true no matter how many times they are repeated. The same for opinions. No matter how many times the theft is attempted explained away it is still theft.
Quote: “In closing, there is a simple test by which to measure the probity of the combined actions of FHFA and Treasury. If FHFA were replaced by a private trustee, and Treasury were replaced by a private supplier of fresh debt or equity capital, both parties would end up in jail if they concocted a scheme that resembled the NWS. Everyone would cut through the various smokescreens to see that the excess dividends were a naked raid on the interests of the other shareholders as happened here. The great tragedy of the majority opinion is it follows the all-too-common practice of giving the government a free pass when its own motives are as corrupt, or more so, than comparable private parties in similar roles and with similar legal duties. From the time that I started to work on this issue, I always said that litigating against the government is like playing craps with loaded dice.” End of Quote
Richard A. Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch professor of Law at NYU, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School.
Link: https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2017/03/03/d-c-circuit-refuses-to-see-limits-to-government-power-and-inexcusably-upholds-the-net-worth-sweep/?utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=partner&utm_campaign=yahootix&partner=yahootix&yptr=yahoo&sh=1c4704c74167
According to Professor Richard Epstein
The Senior Preferred Stock would have been redeemed.
Quote “The conflict of interest took a more ominous turn with the adoption of the Third Amendment between FHFA and Treasury nearly four years later. At that time, the market had quieted down, and the GSEs were making timely dividend payments on Treasury’s preferred stock. Nonetheless, FHFA and Treasury ripped up the old agreement, and substituted in its place a new deal that created a “net worth sweep” whereby all of the funds received by the GSEs were paid over to Treasury as a dividend, even in amounts far in excess of the original 10 percent dividend. The consequences have been huge. Without the Third Amendment, virtually all the senior-preferred stock would have been redeemed. With the Third Amendment, about $128 billion that could have been used to redeem the preferred shares has been reclassified as a dividend payment, rather than a return of capital.” End of Quote
Please Note: “Without the Third Amendment, virtually all the senior-preferred stock would have been redeemed.”
Link: https://ricochet.com/326448/fannie-freddie-fiasco/
Professor Richard Epstein explained the Optional Pay Down of the Liquidation Preference.
Link: Below
So why go through the charade of asking Fannie and Freddie raise additional capital to pay off the senior preferred in full when it has already been paid.
The mechanism is there as clear as day in the stock certificates and the repurchase option set out is fully consistent with the view that the government advances were, if possible, only a short-term backstop that Fannie and Freddie could refinance at any time with private capital.
Quote: “Section 3 then, set outs “Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference” that specifies that “[f]ollowing termination of the commitment” of the Treasury to make further advances of cash for new senior preferred shares, “the Company may pay down the Liquidation Preference of all outstanding shares of the senior preferred stock pro rata, at any time, in whole or in part, out of funds legally available therefore.” Since there are no unpaid cash dividends all, these payments immediately go to reduce the amount of the liquidation preference.
With or without the Third Amendment, the Treasury’s commitment to make further advances remains, even if no such advance has been made since the beginning of 2012. But that commitment is of little if any value now that further advances from Treasury are no longer needed. Most critically, Section 4 addresses “Mandatory Pay Down of Liquidation Preference Upon Issuance of Capital Stock.”
Its exact provisions need to be quoted to grasp the full legal position. This section comes into play “if the Company shall issue any shares of capital stock (including without limitation common stock or any series of preferred stock) in exchange for cash at any time while the Senior Preferred Stock is outstanding.” Note that this provision does not require the consent of that “the holders of record of the outstanding shares of the Senior Preferred Stock” (which need not be the US Treasury). These shareholders receive full protection because Fannie and Freddie are obligated to “use the proceeds of such issuance . . . to pay down the Liquidation Preference of all outstanding shares of Senior Preferred Stock pro rata, out of funds legally available therefor. . .”
In sum, Section 4, of the senior preferred stock certificate in essence allows the trustees of Fannie and Freddie to go to the market at any time to raise new capital, including new capital with lower dividend coupons, to buy back the Treasury’s senior preferred. Any loyal conservator of Fannie and Freddie would take advantage of this refinancing option to end the bailout arrangement, by paying off the senior preferred in full once Fannie and Freddie have sufficient capital to resume normal market operations. At this point, it is a fair inference that the Treasury commitment would end once that recapitalization is complete. In light of this arrangement, it seems incorrect to argue, as does Goodman, that “the GSEs were never provided with a mechanism to emerge from conservatorship because it was never expected they would do so.” The mechanism is there as clear as day in the stock certificates and the repurchase option set out is fully consistent with the view that the government advances were, if possible, only a short-term backstop that Fannie and Freddie could refinance at any time with private capital. Furthermore, FHFA would also refinance the expensive 10 percent preferred for cheaper preferred or common, once it became clear, as it is now, that these are healthy companies (in which case cheaper financing is available).
At this point, the Third Amendment cannot be used to wipe out the 10 and 12 percent dividend rates in the initial stock certificates. Once the Third Amendment is declared illegal, as it should be, the extra payments to Treasury must be treated first as though they were a return of capital that calls for a dollar-for-dollar redemption of the senior preferred, thereby reducing the Treasury’s liquidation preference. Once all those shares are redeemed, the remainder of the money paid over to Treasury should be treated as excess payments that must be repaid in full to Fannie and Freddie with interest.
Nothing else makes sense. Suppose the government sought to just repay the extra money to Fannie and Freddie in order to reinstate the above-market 10 percent dividend. It still could not reasonably prevent Fannie and Freddie from exercising the mandatory repurchase under Section 4 So why go through the charade of asking Fannie and Freddie raise additional capital to pay off the senior preferred in full when it has already been paid. Read together, Sections 3 and 4 make it impossible for the government to keep the highly favorable 10 percent dividend in place when it is no longer warranted by market conditions.” End of Quote
https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2014/09/10/what-happens-if-the-government-loses-on-the-third-amendment-the-senior-preferred-stock-certificates-spell-nothing-but-trouble-for-the-government/?sh=50886006a393
Smokescreen Quote: " following termination of the commitment." End of Quote
The money swept by the Treasury if it had been applied to LP and the 10% over payment returned to the companies the LP would be paid in full and the SPS would be redeemed and at that point in time SAME DAY IN TIME the companies could turn to the Market with a secondary IPO replacing the commitment.
NO MONEY LEFT TO PAYDOWN THE LP AND REDEEM THE SPS WHEN THE TREASURY SWEEPS THE ENTIRE NET WORTH...
The problem is not that the Treasury Swept the Net Worth of the companies. THE PROBLEM: The FHFA appointed CEOs failed by sending the NWS payments to the Treasury without the terms of the Pay Down of the Liquidation Preference applied.
Self-dealing FHFA appointed CEOs
WRITTEN AS CLEAR A DAY, Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference.
No one from the companies sent any letter to the Treasury stating the Liquidation Preference has been paid in full and the Senior Preferred Stock canceled. Instructions are written in the contract to do so. The FHFA appointed CEOs failed by sending the NWS payments to the Treasury without the Pay Down Option of the Liquidation Preference. The CEOs let the Treasury take it for free with no representation of the shareholders.
Self-dealing FHFA appointed CEO’s
WRITTEN AS CLEAR A DAY, Optional Pay Down of Liquidation Preference.
Any loyal conservator of Fannie and Freddie would take advantage of the refinancing option to end the bailout arrangement, by paying off the senior preferred in full.
READ THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
According to the 'Contract' the companies did not need Treasury's permission to pay down the LP.
The money swept by the Treasury apply it to LP and the 10% over payment returned to the companies the LP would be paid in full and the SPS would be redeemed and the SAME DAY IN TIME the companies could turn to the Market with a secondary IPO replacing the commitment.
Link: https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Agree/FNM/SPSPA-amends/FNM-Fourth-Amended-Restated-Certificate-04-13-21.pdf
If the FHFA allows the Treasury to convert the SPS into common stock it will be theft from the shareholders, legalized stealing.
Senior Preferred Stock cannot be converted to Common Stock or any class of Stock
UNDER THE TERMS of THE AGREEMENT.
FOURTH AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF DESIGNATION OF TERMS OF VARIABLE LIQUIDATION PREFERENCE SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK, SERIES 2008-2
FACT: The Senior Preferred Stock cannot be converted to common stock.
No 6 and No 7
Quote “No Conversion or Exchange Rights
The holders of shares of the Senior Preferred Stock shall not have any right to convert such shares into or exchange such shares for any other class or series of stock or obligations of the Company.
No Preemptive Rights
No holder of the Senior Preferred Stock shall as such holder have any preemptive right to purchase or subscribe for any other shares, rights, options or other securities of any class of the Company which at any time may be sold or offered for sale by the Company.” End of Quote
Link: https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-Stock-Agree/FNM/SPSPA-amends/FNM-Fourth-Amended-Restated-Certificate-04-13-21.pdf
Who reads seeking alpha anyway? No one in their right mind reads seeking alpha. It’s laughable that seeking alpha wants a person to pay to read the garbage. Beware??? Oh my goodness
Thank God for Mr. Tim Howard.
https://howardonmortgagefinance.com/
From the yahoo
Quote: “ Mister
Buying a $60 stock for 38 cents. Not too often you can do that. Because the share price is artificially and maliciously suppressed, and is not base on fundamentals, I'll just keep picking up shares here and there with mad money. The crime syndicate stole 80% of the companies but left us 20%. Unless they plan on stealing the other 20% we will eventually get some return on our investment here. “ End of Quote
If the FHFA allows the Treasury to convert the SPS into common stock it will be theft from the shareholders, legalized stealing approval of the unjust judges. AND EVERYONE WHO HAS STUDIED THE FACTS KNOWS THIS TO BE THE TRUTH.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
This cannot be squared with the Takings Clause. This Court must therefore grant certiorari to ensure that the Takings Clause still exists for shareholders in regulated financial institutions.
Of the $379 billion Treasury has received, it received approximately $324.2 billion since the Net Worth Sweep. This amount is roughly $150 billion larger than the maximum amount Treasury would have received under the original 10% senior preferred dividend (and even that number assumes the GSEs would not have been permitted to repay Treasury rather than paying the incredibly expensive 10% dividend ad infinitum). Under the original terms of the PSPA, if Treasury had wanted to take the maximum value it could from the GSEs, it could have received close to 80% of that $150 billion: but it would have had to pay some of that amount to the private preferred and common shareholders. Treasury was unwilling to do so; it wanted 100%, and it took 100%.
Taking property on such a scale should not be permitted without review by this Court. Moreover, as discussed in Section II, below, the drastic nature of the Federal Circuit’s decision is compounded by its holding that the derivative Takings claim also had to be dismissed. According to the Federal Circuit, once the Government has regulatory authority to put an enterprise into conservatorship, it has the power to take 100% of its net worth for the financial benefit of the Government without triggering the Takings Clause. App.52a–53a. No prior case supports that holding, and this Court should not allow it to stand.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-98/230704/20220722162334690_Petition%20for%20Writ%20Of%20Certiorari.pdf
If the FHFA and Treasury are determined to keep the companies in perpetual conservatorship pay the Shareholders fair market value compensation.
The conservatorship can be settled were each holder of equity in the companies come out to some degree satisfied. Neither the Junior Preferred or the Common Shareholders would be wiped out.
It is not about money the Treasury owns the printing press and creating trillions is the norm. Why are these people continuing to hold us in prison?
Makes a person wonder if the real reason the companies continue to this day in conservatorship, possibly, a large naked short position outstanding left over from the 2008 Market Makers’ Failure To Deliver.’ No way to hide the counterfeit shares if and when the companies are released.
More Facts from Tim Howard,
Quote: “HERA also contained a clause not present in any other regulatory statute: “The members of the board of directors of a regulated entity shall not be liable to the shareholders or creditors of the regulated entity for acquiescing in or consenting in good faith to the appointment of the agency [FHFA] as conservator or receiver for that regulated entity.” The rationale for this clause became evident within a matter of weeks. When Paulson met with the directors of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to inform them of his intent to take over their companies, neither entity met any of the twelve conditions for conservatorship spelled out in the newly passed HERA legislation. Paulson since has admitted that he took the companies over by threat. Absent the unique provision in HERA exempting Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s directors from shareholder lawsuits for acquiescing in conservatorship, they may well have balked at Treasury’s demand that they allow the companies whose shareholders they represented to be taken over by the government without statutory cause.” End of Quote
Link: https://howardonmortgagefinance.com/2015/01/
The unjust judges who are wise in their own eyes and prudent in their own sight! Which justify the wicked for reward. We know this to be theft the crime of stealing. The oppression of the shareholders, the perverting of judgment and justice is wrong.
kthomp Quote: "Let's say you are right and Paulson really did threaten the boards and they caved and consented to conservatorship. So what? Is that a reason to celebrate while the commons trade at 36 cents and the juniors at single digit percentages of par? Would it un-dismiss Washington Federal?" End of Quote
So what?? It's theft, the action of the crime of stealing. AND it will be brought before 'The Judge.'
"Litigating against the government is like playing craps with loaded dice.”
Professor Richard Epstein
Paulson was unaware that the FHFA had sent both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac letters saying the companies were safe and sound and exceeded their regulatory capital requirements. Paulson told Lockhart that he had to change his agency’s posture on the two companies, and FHFA did exactly that. FHFA sent each company an extremely harsh mid-year review letter, and two days later, Paulson, Lockhart and Fed chairman Bernanke met with the companies’ CEOs and directors to tell them they had no choice but to agree to conservatorship.
When Paulson met with the directors of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to inform them of his intent to take over their companies, neither entity met any of the twelve conditions for conservatorship spelled out in the newly passed HERA legislation. Paulson since has admitted he took the companies over by threat.
ADMITTED HE TOOK THE COMPANIES OVER BY THREAT
Threat defined: a statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action on someone in retribution for something done or not done.
Okay, Let's stick to the facts.
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE TUESDAY, JULY 15, 2008
STATEMENT OF HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Quote: “Fannie and Freddie play a central role in our housing finance system and must continue to do so in their current form as shareholder-owned companies.” End of Quote Page 6
Quote: “Our proposal was not prompted by any sudden deterioration in conditions at Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. OFHEO has reaffirmed that both GSEs remain adequately capitalized.” End of Quote Page 6
Quote: “Let me stress that there are no immediate plans to access either the proposed liquidity or the proposed capital backstop. If either of these authorities is used, it would be done so only at Treasury's discretion, under terms and conditions that protect the U.S. taxpayer and are agreed to by both Treasury and the GSE.” End of Quote Page 6
Quote: “As I have said, we support the current shareholder-owned structure of these enterprises. Our plan addresses current market challenges by ensuring, on a temporary basis, access to both liquidity and capital, while also ensuring that the GSEs can fulfill their mission--a mission that remains critical to homeowners and homebuyers across the country, especially during this housing correction.” End of Quote Page 7
Link: https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Senate-110-1008_2008.pdf
The above to THE UNITED STATES SENATE
” Yet he had a very different private message for Wall Street insiders."
EVIDENCE
Convincing evidence exists that the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were planned well in advance, and that they were intended to remove the companies permanently from private ownership.
Quote, “On July 11, the New York Times published a front-page article saying, “Senior Bush administration officials are considering a plan to have the government take over one or both of [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] and place them in a conservatorship if their problems worsen.”Shares of the companies plunged, and in response Paulson publicly pledged support for them on July 13, saying, “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play a central role in our housing finance system and must continue to do so in their current form as shareholder-owned companies.”Yet he had a very different private message for Wall Street insiders. As reported by Bloomberg in November of 2011, Paulson met with a select group of hedge fund managers at Eaton Park Capital Management on July 21, where he told them that Treasury was considering a plan to put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, which would effectively wipe out common and preferred shareholders.This, of course, is precisely what happened six weeks later. End of Quote, From “Treasury, the Conservatorships, and Mortgage Reform” January 11, 2015
Treasury, however, lacked authority to put the two companies into conservatorship; only the new regulator, FHFA, could do that. And Treasury had kept neither the old OFHEO nor the new FHFA apprised of its nationalization intentions. Paulson was unaware that the FHFA had sent both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac letters saying the companies were safe and sound and exceeded their regulatory capital requirements. Paulson told Lockhart that he had to change his agency’s posture on the two companies, and FHFA did exactly that. FHFA sent each company an extremely harsh mid-year review letter, and two days later, Paulson, Lockhart and Fed chairman Bernanke met with the companies’ CEOs and directors to tell them they had no choice but to agree to conservatorship.
When Paulson met with the directors of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to inform them of his intent to take over their companies, neither entity met any of the twelve conditions for conservatorship spelled out in the newly passed HERA legislation. Paulson since has admitted he took the companies over by threat. This fact has been stated in the Washington Federal Lawsuit filed against the government.
Page 30-31 Twelve Conditions
Link: https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxUYhg0cYUOTbkZYVVJkaGtoS1E/edit?resourcekey=0-gU6I5hW3ndG5E3uY2VEyGA
posted this a few days ago...
The Attorneys gave us the numbers, in chart format too. Link below
NOTE: rather than paying the incredibly expensive 10% dividend any good conservator would have turned to the market and refinanced the SPS removing the Treasury from ownership. AND YES THE COMPANIES HAS THIS RIGHT WRITTEN IN THE CONTRACT. Professor Epstein pointed it out in his writing.
Quote
“In the Supreme Court of the United States On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
This cannot be squared with the Takings Clause. This Court must therefore grant certiorari to ensure that the Takings Clause still exists for shareholders in regulated financial institutions.
Of the $379 billion Treasury has received, it received approximately $324.2 billion since the Net Worth Sweep. This amount is roughly $150 billion larger than the maximum amount Treasury would have received under the original 10% senior preferred dividend (and even that number assumes the GSEs would not have been permitted to repay Treasury rather than paying the incredibly expensive 10% dividend ad infinitum). Under the original terms of the PSPA, if Treasury had wanted to take the maximum value it could from the GSEs, it could have received close to 80% of that $150 billion: but it would have had to pay some of that amount to the private preferred and common shareholders. Treasury was unwilling to do so; it wanted 100%, and it took 100%.
Taking property on such a scale should not be permitted without review by this Court. Moreover, as discussed in Section II, below, the drastic nature of the Federal Circuit’s decision is compounded by its holding that the derivative Takings claim also had to be dismissed. According to the Federal Circuit, once the Government has regulatory authority to put an enterprise into conservatorship, it has the power to take 100% of its net worth for the financial benefit of the Government without triggering the Takings Clause. App.52a–53a. No prior case supports that holding, and this Court should not allow it to stand.”
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-98/230704/20220722162334690_Petition%20for%20Writ%20Of%20Certiorari.pdf
bobstruths, the charts you are referring to, I wrote about in an earlier post pointing out the fact recorded in the FOOT NOTE on the charts.
Regards,
Quote: "Deferred Tax Assets fabricated losses, the FHFA admits this fact in a foot note on their own website. Well over $300 billion in non-cash accounting expenses were recorded on their income statements. These non-cash expenses, most of which were discretionary, eliminated all of the Companies’ capital and forced them, together, to take $187 billion from Treasury. Fabricated losses to make the companies appear bankrupted.
FROM NUMBER 1 FOOT NOTE FHFA WEBSITE: link below
Quote: “Both GAAP stockholders’ equity and GAAP net worth are measures of the difference between an Enterprise’s assets and liabilities. Both measures include realized and unrealized losses as of the reporting date. Losses ultimately realized in the future may differ from unrealized losses as of the reporting date.” End of Quote... NOTE: “UNREALIZED LOSSES”
Mr. Howard Quote: “Because accelerated or exaggerated expenses cause losses that are only temporary, Fannie’s and Freddie’s non-cash losses began to reverse themselves in 2012. Coupled with profits resulting from a rebounding housing market, the reversal of these losses enabled both Companies to report in August 2012 sufficient second quarter income to not only pay their dividends to Treasury but also retain a total of $3.9 billion in capital. As soon as it became apparent that a large percentage of the non-cash accounting losses booked during the previous four years was about to come back into income, Treasury and FHFA entered into the Third Amendment to the PSPA.” End of Quote
Link: https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Documents/HPI/Market-Data/Table_1.pdf
Link: https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=169706756
The unjust judge.
WE KNOW THE TRUTH!
Paulson was unaware that the FHFA had sent both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac letters saying the companies were safe and sound and exceeded their regulatory capital requirements. Paulson told Lockhart that he had to change his agency’s posture on the two companies, and FHFA did exactly that. FHFA sent each company an extremely harsh mid-year review letter, and two days later, Paulson, Lockhart and Fed chairman Bernanke met with the companies’ CEOs and directors to tell them they had no choice but to agree to conservatorship.
When Paulson met with the directors of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to inform them of his intent to take over their companies, neither entity met any of the twelve conditions for conservatorship spelled out in the newly passed HERA legislation. Paulson since has admitted he took the companies over by threat.
ADMITTED HE TOOK THE COMPANIES OVER BY THREAT
Threat defined: a statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action on someone in retribution for something done or not done.
None of this matters because the unjust judge said so.
An unjust judge ruled against the plaintiffs and that somehow makes the facts of the theft go away??
Tell us which one of the twelve conditions for conservatorship spelled out in the HERA legislation, which one put the companies by definition into conservatorship?
12 conditions
When Paulson met with the directors of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to inform them of his intent to take over their companies, neither entity met any of the twelve conditions for conservatorship spelled out in the newly passed HERA legislation. Paulson since has admitted he took the companies over by threat. This fact has been stated in the Washington Federal Lawsuit filed against the government.
Page 30-31 Twelve Conditions
Link: https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxUYhg0cYUOTbkZYVVJkaGtoS1E/edit?resourcekey=0-gU6I5hW3ndG5E3uY2VEyGA
FFFacts Quote “ the price of the stock at the time of the takings is what will matter” End of Quote
This statement reminds me of the Lawyers asking for 1.8 billion in lost dividends.
Quoted share price and value or two very different calculations.
The share price as of today's trading has absolutely nothing to do with the VALUE of Fannie and Freddie. The share price the day before or the day after the taking has absolutely nothing to do with the VALUE of the companies.
Value is a calculation of Property, Plant and Equipment and most important EARNINGS POWER OF THE BUSINESS.
VALUE
Quote: “Intrinsic value is an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life.” – Warren Buffett" End of Quote
The Shareholders have lost both companies to the Treasury. ALL THE CASH THAT CAN BE TAKEN OUT OF THE BUSINESS DURING ITS REMAINING LIFE.
The Attorneys gave us the numbers, in chart format too. Link below
NOTE: rather than paying the incredibly expensive 10% dividend any good conservator would have turned to the market and refinanced the SPS removing the Treasury from ownership. AND YES THE COMPANIES HAS THIS RIGHT WRITTEN IN THE CONTRACT. Professor Epstein pointed it out in his writing.
Quote
“In the Supreme Court of the United States On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
This cannot be squared with the Takings Clause. This Court must therefore grant certiorari to ensure that the Takings Clause still exists for shareholders in regulated financial institutions.
Of the $379 billion Treasury has received, it received approximately $324.2 billion since the Net Worth Sweep. This amount is roughly $150 billion larger than the maximum amount Treasury would have received under the original 10% senior preferred dividend (and even that number assumes the GSEs would not have been permitted to repay Treasury rather than paying the incredibly expensive 10% dividend ad infinitum). Under the original terms of the PSPA, if Treasury had wanted to take the maximum value it could from the GSEs, it could have received close to 80% of that $150 billion: but it would have had to pay some of that amount to the private preferred and common shareholders. Treasury was unwilling to do so; it wanted 100%, and it took 100%.
Taking property on such a scale should not be permitted without review by this Court. Moreover, as discussed in Section II, below, the drastic nature of the Federal Circuit’s decision is compounded by its holding that the derivative Takings claim also had to be dismissed. According to the Federal Circuit, once the Government has regulatory authority to put an enterprise into conservatorship, it has the power to take 100% of its net worth for the financial benefit of the Government without triggering the Takings Clause. App.52a–53a. No prior case supports that holding, and this Court should not allow it to stand.”
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-98/230704/20220722162334690_Petition%20for%20Writ%20Of%20Certiorari.pdf
kthomp, I do understand exactly what you are saying. I get it.
The Treasury / FHFA can play on words, phrases, etc... Everyone knows this is stealing!
Legally Stealing.
As you said, you laugh when someone mentions Moral Ethics. I understand.
Best Regards