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thanks optiskeptic...see you again bud
Gulf Arab States Should Scrap Dollar Currency Pegs, Faber Says
By Arif Sharif
March 16 (Bloomberg) -- Marc Faber, managing director of Marc Faber Ltd. and publisher of the Gloom, Boom & Doom report, said Persian Gulf economies should revalue their currencies after the dollar slumped to record lows.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and three other Gulf states should link their currencies ``to a basket, and not the weakest currency in the world,'' Faber told a Middle East investment conference in Abu Dhabi today. ``They should have de- pegged their currencies a long time ago,'' he said.
Faber, who advised investors to buy gold at the start of its six-year rally, this month said Federal Reserve moves to cut interest rates to avert a U.S. economic slowdown will ``destroy the U.S. dollar.''
The dollar sank below 99 yen, the weakest in 12 years, last week and slumped to a record low versus the euro after JPMorgan Chase & Co. and the Fed bailed out Bear Stearns Cos., as credit market losses widen.
The U.S. currency also plunged to less than one Swiss franc for the first time as traders speculated the Fed will slash interest rates as much as 1 percentage point on March 18 to avert a recession.
Gulf countries are under pressure to revalue their currencies, or drop their dollar pegs, after the U.S. currency fell 10 percent against the euro last year and the Fed started cutting rates. The weaker dollar has made imports from Europe more expensive, stoking record inflation across the region.
``I am a great believer in flexible exchange rates and a strong currency is a sign of a strong economy,'' said Faber, whose Hong Kong-based Marc Faber Ltd. manages $300 million.
The U.A.E. will keep the dirham pegged to the dollar until at least the end of this year, Central Bank Governor Sultan Bin Nasser al-Suwaidi said Jan. 3. There is ``no reason'' to revalue it, he said.
To contact the reporter on this story: Arif Sharif in Dubai at asharif2@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: March 16, 2008 13:21 EDT
Yeah, Chase starting to play with Dinar more than in past months now..not ripping you off on a sell either...
It's been so long now..hard to get excited you know? lol, I could use a reval today though.....
"Compatibility" is seeking to amend the constitution to define the powers of prime minister
قال عبد الكريم السامرائي القيادي في جبهة التوافق إن الجبهة ستسعى الى اجراء تعديل في الدستور العراقي، وتحديد الصلاحيات المفتوحة لرئيس الوزراء ومنح صلاحيات أكبر لمجلس الرئاسة العراقي. Abdel Karim al Accord Front leadership in the front to seek an amendment to the Iraqi constitution, and identify the powers open to the Prime Minister and granting greater powers of the Presidency of Iraq.
واكد السامرائي أن تعديل الدستور سيكون أول انجاز ينجزه البرلمان العراقي في الفصل التشريعي الجديد، وأكد أن العديد من الكتل البرلمانية تؤيد الجبهة في إجراء التعديل، لإعطاء صلاحيات أوسع لمجلس الرئاسة وتحديد بعض الصلاحيات المفتوحة لرئيس الوزراء في الدستور. The Samurai amendment to the Constitution that would accomplish the first delivery in the Iraqi Parliament Legislative new chapter, and stressed that many of parliamentary blocs in the front supports the amendment, to give wider powers of the Presidency and identify some of the powers open to the Prime Minister in the Constitution.
وأشار إلى أن إجراء التعديل، وتحديد صلاحيات رئيس الوزراء ليس موجها لشخص رئيس الوزراء نوري المالكي، بل هو تعديل للدستور الدائم للبلاد، ولصلاحيات أي رئيس وزراء سينتخب مستقبلاً. He pointed out that an amendment, and define the powers of the Prime Minister is not directed to a person Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, it is a permanent amendment to the Constitution of the country, and the powers of any prime minister will be elected in future.
Nasser Al-Sa'idi: oil and gas law needs to be another six months for endorsement
المواطن-خاص Citizen - particularly
اكد النائب عن الكتلة الصدرية ناصر الساعدي ان قانون النفط والغاز يحتاج في اقل تقدير الى 6 اشهر اضافية لمناقشته بشكل جاد، ومن ثم يصار الى التصديق عليه..حيث مازالت بعض بنود وفقرات هذا القانون تمنح الشركات الاجنبية حصة الاسد في الاستثمار والتنقيب عن النفط العراقي، واوضح في اتصال(هاتفي مع المواطن ان هذا الامر سيعطي هذه الشركات صفة (المستعمر) وهذا مما لا نرضاه. وفي السياق ذاته قال النائب عن الكتلة الصدرية فلاح حسن شنشل:"ان الكتلة الصدرية لاتعترض على قانون النفط والغاز باكمله وانما تعترض على بعض فقراته".واضاف امس :"ان قانون النفط والغاز يتضمن العديد من المخالفات الفنية والقانونية وان النقاش حول مضامينه في الفصل التشريعي المقبل سيكون حادا ". The deputy bloc chest Nasser idi Act oil and gas needs at least to 6 additional months to discuss it seriously, and then to be ratified .. where still some items and paragraphs of this law gives companies the lion's share of foreign investment in prospecting for Iraqi oil, He explained in a telephone (telephone conversation with the citizen, this recipe will give these companies (colonizer), it is this dimension. In the same context, said deputy bloc chest Falah Hassan Chanchal: "The bloc chest was not opposed to the law of oil and gas, but the entire object to some paragraphs" . added yesterday: "The oil and gas law contains many technical and legal irregularities and that the debate on its contents in the next legislative chapter will be sharp."
Steve: INTERESTING FROM ANTHR ROOM
May I suggest based upon the discussion on M2 it is my contention that a small revaluation may happen. If a small RV does occur, it only cements my decision to hold onto the notes I have and wait for the coming free float of the dinar.
I am suggesting a free float within certain boundaries. Those boundaries are defined by the amount of cash reserves inside Iraq and outside of the country. The next condition for a limited free float is the gold in reserve inside Iraq. We all agree the CBI must move away from the managed rate.
A limited free float based upon the boundaries above would solve the the potential problems concerning M2. I can see the CBI achieving the "real rate" of the dinar by a revaluation of a few pennies. Eventually, releasing their control over the exchange rate (after the speculators have been shaken out) to allow the currency to free float within the afore-mentioned limits.
Thanks,
Rob N.
High demand and low exchange rate of the dollar in the central bank auction
Baghdad - Iraq votes 17 / 03 / 2008 at 17:15:07
Increased demand for the dollar in the purchase of the Central Bank of Iraq auction for the sale and purchase of the dollar in the second meetings this week, on Monday, recording a total volume of demand was 131 million and 60 thousand dollars, compared to the 109 million requested and $ 890 thousand in the meeting Sunday.
The special bulletin ERA Central Bank of Iraq that "demand distributed at 12 million and 30 thousand dollars in cash, 119 million and 30 thousand dollars in the form of remittances outside the country fully covered bank exchange rate low after five meetings stability ability 1208 dinars compared to 1209 dinars Sunday, as did not make any of the 15 banks participating in the auction of any offers to sell the dollar to the Central Bank. "
He explained the Yasiri, one dealing with the auction, in an exclusive statement to the Independent News Agency (Voices of Iraq) that "the volume of demand today, a record number this year because of market activity on one hand and the fact that on Monday and Wednesday on the peak of each week, in addition to reducing the exchange rate ".
He pointed out that the rise in demand overall has been on remittances, which rose significantly impact of remittances provide futures and the exploitation of low exchange rate to pay the largest amount of remittances futures, with requests for cash to purchase their current level due to be affected significantly change the exchange rate. (???)
For his part, stressed economic expert Gomaa Ani to "reduce the exchange rate programmer and transparent policy and standards are not effective on the market will have a good effect in cases of habitual for the local market, taking into account the installation of holidays or in a state of stagnation." Ani added that transparency and a reduction in specific system makes it difficult for the success of any operation by speculators to manipulate exchange rates, which lead to trade shocks in the market, especially as the transparency proven in the past period when thwarted attempt active speculators to create a crisis in the market.
With expert said the economic and industrial Sadiq Abdul Razzaq that "the opportunity now opportunity for the government to implement economic policies and to benefit from the vital witnessed by the large domestic market activity at all economic actors."
He added that "the movement in the event of economic activity easier for legislators, planners and implementers find fertile ground for the implementation of economic plans and investment knives on the desired short-, medium - and so far at various levels of financial and developmental stagnation of the fact that the market is a factor impeding such directions, so this time is to promote timely BOOK Those policies are serving the government's plans to promote the private sector and the reputation of the Iraqi currency. "
He described Uday Shabib, owner of the Office of banking, dollar exchange rates in the local market Palmstkrh at 1221 dinars and for the third week of large transactions.
He said, "The purchase was at 1215 dinars to the dealings of small and large, while the selling price of the dollar dealings small ranges at two levels are 1225 and 1230 dinars, according to the Office of banking policy and the quantity sold, which reduced the sale price with the high volume amount."
http://translate.google.com/translat...language_tools
lmao...chasing them saying " REVAL YOU FU#&ERS " LMAO
GDP - CIA-The World Fact Book
https://www.cia.gov/library/publicat.../print/iz.html
Economy - overview: Iraq's economy is dominated by the oil sector, which has traditionally provided about 95% of foreign exchange earnings. Although looting, insurgent attacks, and sabotage have undermined economy rebuilding efforts, economic activity is beginning to pick up in areas recently secured by the US military surge. Oil exports are around levels seen before Operation Iraqi Freedom, and total government revenues have benefited from high oil prices. Despite political uncertainty, Iraq is making some progress in building the institutions needed to implement economic policy and has negotiated a debt reduction agreement with the Paris Club and a new Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF. The International Compact with Iraq was established in May 2007 to integrate Iraq into the regional and global economy, and the Iraqi government is seeking to pass laws to strengthen its economy. This legislation includes a hydrocarbon law to establish a modern legal framework to allow Iraq to develop its resources and a revenue sharing law to equitably divide oil revenues within the nation, although both are still bogged down in discussions. The Central Bank has been successful in controlling inflation through appreciation of the dinar against the US dollar. Reducing corruption and implementing structural reforms, such as bank restructuring and developing the private sector, will be key to Iraq's economic success.
GDP (purchasing power parity): $100 billion (2007 est.)
GDP (official exchange rate): $55.44 billion (2007 est.)
GDP - real growth rate: 5% (2007 est.)
GDP - per capita (PPP): $3,600 (2007 est.)
GDP - composition by sector: agriculture: 5%
industry: 68%
services: 27% (2006 est.)
Labor force: 7.4 million (2004 est.)
Labor force - by occupation: agriculture: NA%
industry: NA%
services: NA%
Unemployment rate: 18% to 30% (2006 est.)
Population below poverty line: NA%
Household income or consumption by percentage share: lowest 10%: NA%
highest 10%: NA%
Inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.7% (2007 est.)
Budget: revenues: $42.3 billion
expenditures: $48.4 billion (FY08 est.)
Agriculture - products: wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, dates, cotton; cattle, sheep, poultry
Industries: petroleum, chemicals, textiles, leather, construction materials, food processing, fertilizer, metal fabrication/processing
Industrial production growth rate: 4% (2007 est.)
Electricity - production: 33.53 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - production by source: fossil fuel: 98.4%
hydro: 1.6%
nuclear: 0%
other: 0% (2001)
Electricity - consumption: 35.84 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Electricity - exports: 0 kWh (2007)
Electricity - imports: 2.315 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Oil - production: 2.11 million bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - consumption: 295,000 bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - exports: 1.67 million bbl/day (2007 est.)
Oil - imports: NA
Oil - proved reserves: 115 billion bbl (1 January 2007 est.)
Natural gas - production: 3.5 billion cu m (2007 est.)
Natural gas - consumption: 980 million cu m
note: 1.48 billion cu m were flared (2005 est.)
Natural gas - exports: 0 cu m (2005 est.)
Natural gas - imports: 0 cu m (2005)
Natural gas - proved reserves: 3.17 trillion cu m (1 January 2007 est.)
Current account balance: $7.802 billion (2007 est.)
Exports: $34.04 billion f.o.b. (2007 est.)
Exports - commodities: crude oil 84%, crude materials excluding fuels 8%, food and live animals 5%
Exports - partners: US 46.7%, Italy 10.7%, Spain 6.2%, Canada 6.2% (2006)
Imports: $23.09 billion f.o.b. (2007 est.)
Imports - commodities: food, medicine, manufactures
Imports - partners: Syria 26.5%, Turkey 20.5%, US 11.8%, Jordan 7.2% (2006)
Economic aid - recipient: $21.65 billion $13.5 billion pledged in foreign aid for 2004-07 from outside of the US, over $33 billion pledged total (2005)
Reserves of foreign exchange and gold: $21.26 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Debt - external: $56.31 billion (31 December 2007 est.)
Market value of publicly traded shares: $NA
Currency (code): New Iraqi dinar (NID) as of 22 January 2004
Currency code: NID, IQD prior to 22 January 2004
Exchange rates: New Iraqi dinars per US dollar - 1,255 (2007), 1,466 (2006), 1,475 (2005), 1,890 (second half, 2003)
Fiscal year: calendar year
Everything fits so far..Cheney's there...who knows?
Seems like quicker movement to get things done at least
Gulf States close in on currency revaluation
International banks in Dubai have slashed interest rates on dirham deposits to around one per cent, a sure sign that revaluation is not far off and that the banks do not want to be left holding dirham deposits. Today, the delayed Saudirel Shura meeting of the king, finance minister and central bank governor is to discuss GCC-wide revaluation.
Middle East: Sunday, February 17 - 2008 at 10:16
The case for revaluation is getting stronger
Incumbent UAE Central Bank Governor Sultan bin Nasser Al Suwaidi could be replaced in a cabinet reshuffle on February 26; his present mandate expired on December 18.
This action would likely be a part of a wide ranging reform of UAE monetary policy. The GCC States, with the exception of Oman, committed themselves to a monetary union by 2010 at a meeting of heads of state last December.
Revaluation would be a logical step towards establishing a single GCC currency valued against a basket of global currencies and not just the US dollar, something like the successful Singapore dollar.
Controlling inflation
Meanwhile, a coordinated revaluation in advance of the single currency is also a logical move to head-off spiraling local inflation rates in the Gulf, and delivering a one-off relief to long suffering residents who are puzzled why the economic success of the region has resulted in this 'tax' on their salaries.
In order to make a real impact the Gulf States could choose a high, one-off revaluation of 10-15 per cent with the strong proviso that this was not going to be repeated before the 2010 common currency deadline.
From the perspective of the UAE there is a historical precedent to follow. Before independence in 1971 the dirham was a part of the sterling area, which then revalued and later moved to the fixed dollar peg.
Economists see the main benefit of an independent currency regime as being the ability to set interest rates in line with local economic conditions to avoid a boom-to-slump cycle. For the danger of having interest rates set by the US - whose economy is slumping and not booming - is very obvious.
Overheating
Overheating local economies with high inflation rates are unhealthy for long-term economic welfare, and action by the Gulf States will not be too late to make a difference.
The risk of not taking a decision is higher than taking the initiative and going for revaluation. US interest rates are set to go much lower this year and the situation can only deteriorate further.
Moreover, the recent rally in the US dollar due to the contraction of global liquidity amid the ongoing equity slump gives a golden opportunity to act on revaluation, without causing a negative impact on global dollar exchange rates.
Wise counsel and commonsense are likely to prevail in monetary policy, and the international banks in the UAE have sensed this and do not want to be left holding dirhams that might soon be converted into dollars at a new rate of exchange.
Cheney in Iraqi to meet with leaders By DEB RIECHMANN, Associated Press Writer
14 minutes ago
"It's good to be back in Iraq," Cheney said after an hour-long meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
BAGHDAD - Vice President Dick Cheney, marking five years since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, reaffirmed on Monday unwavering U.S. support for the Iraqis as they continue down what he called a "difficult but historic route to democracy."
Cheney, who was in Iraq 10 months ago, said the Iraqis have made legislative advances that would be vital to the country's future. He also said there was no question but there had been a dramatic improvement in security.
Al-Maliki, speaking through an interpreter, also cited security improvements and said he and the vice president had talked about negotiations underway to spell out the legal basis for the presence of U.S. troops on Iraqi territory and to establish the legal rights and obligations of the troops, the so-called "status of forces agreement."
Cheney landed at Baghdad International Airport, then flew by helicopter into the dusty, heavily secured Green Zone for talks with U.S. military and diplomatic officials and the Iraqi prime minister. It is Cheney's third vice presidential trip to Iraq where 160,000 American troops are deployed and the U.S. death toll is nearing 4,000.
Cheney's first meeting was a classified briefing with U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. military commander in Iraq who met him at the airport. Crocker and Petraeus are scheduled to travel to Washington next month to give a status report on the war.
For security reasons, Cheney officials divulged few details about the vice president's schedule and asked reporters not to report on his location until he had moved on to another. Cheney was expected to make stops throughout the country, speak to troops and spend time with other Iraqi leaders.
Cheney's motorcade zigzagged through Baghdad to meetings as helicopter gunships circled overhead. Explosions were heard in parts of the city, but none were near the vice president.
"There is still a lot of difficult work that must be done," Cheney said after sitting down with Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and one of the most powerful politicians in the country.
"But as we move forward, the Iraqi people should know that they will have the unwavering support of President Bush and the United States in consolidating their democracy," Cheney said.
Oman was scheduled to be the first stop on Cheney's 10-day trip to the Mideast, but on Sunday night, he left Air Force Two parked on a tarmac in England and boarded a C-17 for the final five and a half hours of the 13-hour flight to the Iraqi capital.
The future of Iraq will be discussed in his closed-door talks with leaders of Oman, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Palestinians and Turkey. Cheney's discussions at each stop also will touch on Iran's nuclear program and its desire for greater influence in the region, high oil prices and the pursuit of an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal that President Bush wants to see before he leaves office.
Cheney, who is traveling in Iraq with his wife, Lynne, and daughter, Liz Cheney, last visited the country in May 2007 before the president's buildup of more than 30,000 additional U.S. troops was in full gear. Bush dispatched the extra troops to reduce violence so Iraqi politicians could forge agreements that would bring minority Sunni Arabs into the government and weaken or end the insurgency.
Security has improved markedly since last summer when the last of the five Army brigades arrived in Iraq to complete the military buildup, but Iraqi politicians are still in gridlock.
Cheney advisers say the vice president will highlight the reduction in violence and praise the fragile Iraqi government for passing some legislation aimed at national unity. In short, Cheney will compare and contrast Iraq before and after the increase in troops. He'll tell Iraqi leaders that they are on the right track and have made strides, but that now is the time to do more.
The Iraqis do not yet have a law for sharing the nation's oil wealth among the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, a law that the Bush administration believes will trigger multinational energy companies to invest in exploration and production in Iraq.
Also unfinished is a plan for new provincial elections. Iraq's presidential council, which must give its nod to laws passed by the Iraqi parliament, rejected a plan for new elections last month, shipping it back to the legislature.
The rejection, a setback to the U.S. campaign for national reconciliation, came despite Cheney's last-minute phone call to the main holdout on the three-member panel: Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi, a Shiite. Cheney was expected to speak with Abdul-Mahdi and the other two members of the council, President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, and Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, while in Iraq.
The war is entering its sixth year. It was on March 17, 2003, that Bush gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to relinquish power. Three days later, U.S.-led forces began invading Iraq. The anniversary of the invasion is March 19 in the United States and March 20 in Iraq.
Bush and Cheney have just 10 months before they hand off the war to the next U.S. president.
Democratic rivals Sens. Hillary Rodham Clinton, D-N.Y., and Barack Obama, D-Ill., have said they would begin withdrawing forces quickly if elected. Expected GOP presidential nominee, Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who also is visiting Iraq, is more apt to continue Bush's strategy of bringing troops home only as conditions warrant.
It was unclear if Cheney and McCain would cross paths during their visits to Iraq.
White House Blames Bad Arabic Translation for Confusion Over Agreement with Iraq
Posted by Amanda Terkel, Think Progress at 2:12 PM on March 14, 2008.
The truth is that White House officials tried to undermine Congress on Iraq and were forced to muster a weak excuse when they were caught.
In November, President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki signed a non-binding “ Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship” that committed America to defending Iraq:
Supporting the Republic of Iraq in defending its democratic system against internal and external threats. […]
Providing security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.
At the time, the White House said that the unprecedented arrangement would not need “input” from Congress. After facing intense criticism from lawmakers, the White House backed off, recently stating that arrangement is “ not going to have a security guarantee.” Officials are now trying to come up with excuses to explain away their initial bumbling as well. Their latest? The long-term agreement was incorrectly translated from Arabic to English. Politico reports:
But the senior administration official, who briefed two Politico reporters on the condition that he not be identified by name, said that the “security assurances” phrase “was something we struggled with, it really was.” He said the original Arabic phrase was “translated in kind of an interesting way,” and that a better translation might have been, “We'll consult.”
This excuse seems unlikely. First, White House officials have never before mentioned it. Sen. Jim Webb (D-VA) said that the administration “ certainly did not speak to this unfortunate translation from Arabic” when it briefed senators on the planned agreement recently. Rep. Bill Delahunt (D-MA) also said that he hadn’t heard the argument.
Second, Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Bergner recently stated that Bush does have “constitutional authority” to “continue combat operations” in Iraq without Congress’s authorization. As evidence, he cited the 2002 authorization of force against Saddam Hussein and the resolution passed after 9/11. Clearly, Bergner never thought there was an Arabic mistranslation.
Both Webb and Delahunt also have their doubts about the administration’s newest excuse:
Delahunt said he suspected that the administration, having been “outed, if you will” by congressional oversight, has decided that it's the “safe course” to argue that the words aren’t what they appear to be. Webb’s spokeswoman, Jessica Smith, wondered why the White House didn’t “retranslate” the offending language before releasing the Declaration of Principles.
This distrust is understandable; in January, Bush attached a signing statement to a defense authorization bill saying that he would disregard a provision that “ bars funding for permanent bases in Iraq.”
The truth is that White House officials tried to undermine Congress on Iraq and were forced to muster a weak excuse when they were caught.
http://www.alternet.org/blogs/peek/79758/
Agreement with US includes three conditions
Baghdad, Mar. 15, P. 1
Political council of national security set three conditions to carry out talks with Washington to sign long term agreement between the two countries
as PM Noori Maliki sought to activate his government by proposing new candidates to fill vacuum ministries before ending this month. PM discussed with US President George Bush at Thuesday many issues through a call, spokesman of the Govt. Ali Dabbagh said.Bush praised Maliki's efforts and the Govt. at solve Iraq's problems and reconciliation, Dabbagh added.The political council set three conditions as principles of the bilateral agreement: no permanent US military bases in Iraq, Iraq wouldn’t provide any military facilities or immunity for tresspassers from these troops and this force has no right to arrest any Iraqi without advance permission or coordination with Iraqi authorities.
Drilling 40 oil wells in Dhi Qar
Nasiryah, Mar. 15, P. 1
Oil Ministry began its initisl works at a project to rehabilitate and develop "Rifa'ai oilfield" and drilling 40 new wells
Ahmed Sheikh Ali, deputy mayor, said at his meeting with officials from the ministry that developing the Gharaf and Nasiryag fields is first step and followed by develop the Rifa'ai field to feed major refinery that would built within Japanese loan and carried out by the Japanese company JAPEX.
Talabani calls for foreign investments
Published: March 14, 2008 at 9:00 PM
Print story Email to a friend Font size:ERBIL, Iraq, March 14 (UPI) -- Iraqi President Jalal Talabani addressed a delegation of Arab leaders on the final day of a summit in Erbil, calling for increased foreign investment.
Talabani addressed a delegation from the United Arab Emirates, saying the natural resources available in Iraq made the country ripe for large-scale investments, Emirates Business 24/7 reported Friday.
He noted the Iraqi government was developing an attractive investment environment in Iraq and pointed to the rise in per capita income and the improved living conditions in the country as a sign of an improving economic climate.
He also noted the recent moves to end state-owned monopolies in the industrial and manufacturing sectors created a more competitive economic environment in Iraq.
The delegate for the United Arab Emirates, Abdul Aziz Abullah al-Ghurair, said he would examine the business climate in Iraq and relay his findings to businessmen and investors.
Al-Ghurair said he hoped his visit would open avenues of cooperation across various economic sectors and asked Talabani to consider offering foreign investors preferential treatment and other incentives as a way to secure interest in Iraq.
Debating Devolution in Iraq
Reidar Visser
March 10, 2008
(Reidar Visser is a research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and editor of the Iraq website www.historiae.org.)
For additional background, see www.historiae.org and Reidar Visser, “Basra: Reluctant Seat of ‘Shiastan,’” in Middle East Report 242 (Spring 2007). Order the issue here.
In early August 2007, Jalal al-Din al-Saghir, a Shi‘i preacher affiliated with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, made headlines with striking comments to a reporter for the Christian Science Monitor. The cleric revealed in an interview with Sam Dagher that “a massive operation” was underway to secure the establishment of a Shi‘i super-province in Iraq, to be named the “South of Baghdad Region,” and projected to encompass all nine majority-Shi‘i governorates south of the Iraqi capital. Saghir claimed that his party had already drafted detailed plans for how such a super-province would be governed -- plans of such importance to Iraq and the region that there was “no room for misadventures.”[1] While Saghir did not mention a timeline for this remarkable undertaking, other Supreme Council supporters of the idea were less reticent: “The Shiite federal region will be announced in April 2008,” wrote one enthusiastic proponent.[2]
The date was not chosen at random. April 2008 is the month when the law for implementing federalism -- adopted by the Iraqi parliament in October 2006 -- comes into effect. For the first time in Iraqi history, areas of the country that desire a special federal status similar to that already enjoyed by Kurdistan may initiate a procedure for transforming themselves from ordinary governorates into “federal regions,” potentially acquiring such privileges as the right to establish local paramilitary forces and the right to negotiate local deals with foreign oil companies. In order to obtain the rank of federal region, a governorate must hold a referendum in which no less than 50 percent of the electorate votes and a simple majority votes yes. If multiple governorates wish to band together in one federal region, the proposition must pass such a referendum in each province tagged for inclusion. (Only the Baghdad province is prohibited from forming part of a greater federal region.) If one targeted governorate says no, the federal project founders.
PUTTING THE SUPER-PROVINCE ON ICE?
For a while, it seemed that Supreme Council leaders were on track to realize their grandiose federal ambitions south of Baghdad. The Supreme Council already held a very strong position inside the Iraqi government, thanks not least to its excellent relations with Washington and Tehran -- both of which capitals, somewhat incongruously, consider the Shi‘i Islamist party their number one partner in the Green Zone. The Supreme Council’s project also dovetailed nicely with the aspirations of the twin Iraqi Kurdish parties, which have long sought allies willing to engage in quid pro quo bargaining over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, which they aim to embrace inside expanded boundaries of the present Kurdistan Regional Government. (The Supreme Council could find Kurdish backing helpful for its similar designs upon areas of the Sunni Arab-dominated Anbar governorate.) And in September 2007 another potential ally entered the limelight: Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE) sponsored a Senate resolution recommending that Iraqi elites answer the question of federalism through a nationwide “conference settlement.” Such a “conference” would be alien to the provisions for gradual “bottom-up” federalism in the 2005 Iraqi constitution, but would be precisely the sort of setting where the polished Supreme Council leaders would have the upper hand and where the cumbersome, but more democratic constitutional modalities could be dispensed with altogether.[3] (In December, Biden’s non-binding “sense of Congress” resolution passed.)
On January 13, 2008, however, other Shi‘i actors, including loyalists of Muqtada al-Sadr, several branches of the Da‘wa party and many independents, joined Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, representatives of the Yazidi and Shabak minorities, and secularists of all communal backgrounds in signing a “Baghdad charter” that addressed the federalism question from a different perspective.[4] The document expressed deep concern about bids by regional entities to cut deals with foreign oil companies, adding that the status of Kirkuk (which the Kurds hope to absorb into their federal region through an early referendum) should be resolved only through negotiation and consensus, so that the city becomes a “model of national unity, coexistence and social integration of the people of a single united homeland.” The declaration also inveighed against the resort to ethno-sectarian principles in structuring Iraqi politics. Funds from the national budget, for example, should be distributed among provinces according to their relative demographic weight, not communal quotas.
Weeks later, this noteworthy cross-sectarian coalition asserted itself once more. On January 28, Baha’ al-Araji, a Sadrist, spoke before the Iraqi parliament on the issue of the draft law for the powers of governorates -- those that already exist, not the envisioned federal regions. He emphasized, firstly, that the powers the draft law gave to provincial assemblies should come into force only after new local elections had been held and, secondly, that it was necessary to insert a timetable for those provincial elections in the law. Al-Araji was supported in this stance by the Fadhila party (a spinoff from the main Sadrist bloc) and other Shi‘i Islamists, as well as Sunni Islamists, secularists and minority representatives.[5] The opponents of a timetable for elections were the Kurdish parties and the Supreme Council, which also voiced concern about the relatively large role given to the central government in supervising the existing governorates.
With the eventual passage on February 13 of the non-federated governorates act, Iraqi Shi‘a, and indeed Iraq as a whole, had moved very far from the imaginative federal plans described by Saghir to Dagher less than six months before. Through their actions in the legislature, substantial segments of the “Shi‘i” contingent had demonstrated commitment to another, less sectarian vision: consolidation of the existing system of government in Iraq south of Kurdistan, with a meaningful role for the central government, and with no administrative lines drawn to separate “Shi‘i” from “Sunni” areas. The Supreme Council, for its part, had apparently been outpaced by the comeback of this vision. In the January 2005 local elections, which some Shi‘i parties boycotted, the Supreme Council had managed to gain a foothold in several provinces south of Baghdad (though not in Basra and Maysan, sites of the main southern oilfields). Now, in an attempt to avoid the insertion of a date certain for provincial elections in the governorates law, the Supreme Council cited practical problems that would accompany early polls because many local offices of the Iraqi electoral commission remain inoperative. That argument, of course, would logically apply with equal force to any referenda upon new federal regions. Hence, if the Supreme Council is to remain consistent in its rhetoric, the southern super-province project must be put on ice until local elections offices are ready.
THE SUPREME COUNCIL’S BOMBSHELL
There could be other players in the federalism game come April 2008, however. On February 20, Wa’il ‘Abd al-Latif, a former judge and now member of Parliament for Basra, told the southern television channel al-Fayha that he was about to start efforts to create, “in accordance with the constitution,” a “region of Basra” limited to Iraq’s second city and environs, and thus separate from the rest of the Shi‘a of Iraq. In fact, this project dates back five years, and is the only federalist movement among the Shi‘a that cuts across party lines: It receives support from secular politicians (like ‘Abd al-Latif), from tribal leaders and from Islamist opponents of the Supreme Council, such as Fadhila.
Basra’s regionalism shows that Iraqi Shi‘a are not divided into two camps on the issue of federalism, but rather into three: centralists who want a strong Baghdad government, small-scale federalists and those advocating larger, ethno-sectarian regions. On many issues, however, the centralists and the small-scale federalists see eye to eye, as with regard to administration of the oil sector, where ‘Abd al-Latif, like many centralists, has spoken in favor of control by Baghdad. The main cleavage with respect to the question of devolution in Iraq is thus more accurately characterized as setting off the ethno-federalists (the Supreme Council and the Kurdish parties) from all the other groups. Indeed, the latter might well be thought of as “conservative moderates” or even “centrists” for proposing a decisive halt to the demolition of existing Iraqi structures of government that was initiated by US administrator L. Paul Bremer back in 2003. In the centrist view, it is time to start reconstruction in Iraq on the basis of existing infrastructure, instead of destroying even more of the current system, or generating further potential for civil conflict through divisive federal adventures and imagined sectarian “regions” of which no one had even heard prior to 2005.[6]
Notwithstanding the trend toward centrism in the Iraqi parliament, the ethno-federalists had one more card to play. At night on February 26, in the middle of a parliamentary recess and on the eve of the Arba‘in religious holiday, the Supreme Council’s ‘Adil ‘Abd al-Mahdi slipped a bombshell into a letter to his colleagues on the three-person Iraqi presidency council. By the terms of the 2005 constitution, this council is composed of a president (currently, Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) and two vice presidents, all three of whom have the prerogative to veto legislation passed by Parliament. In his February 26 missive ‘Abd al-Mahdi, one of the vice presidents and a Bush administration favorite, announced his veto of the recent law on the powers of the governorates.[7] In his view, many of the law’s provisions for a degree of central control over the governorates were “unconstitutional.” ‘Abd al-Mahdi clearly stretched the legal limits on his power to the maximum: According to the constitution, vetoes must be declared within ten days of receipt of laws at the presidency council, and the letter was sent 13 days after the disputed piece of legislation’s passage. Even in the middle of the holiday season, other Iraqi politicians reacted furiously, with ‘Abd al-Mahdi’s fellow Shi‘i Islamists in the Sadrist and Da‘wa movements prominent among the protesters.
What happens next with the law on the powers of governorates? The answer is not entirely clear. From the constitutional point of view, the process should be straightforward. Once Parliament reconvenes in mid-March, its members can debate the law and send it back to the presidency council, which will have to adopt it by consensus or reject it within ten days. It then goes back to Parliament, but this time the legislature has the power to ratify the law without presidential consensus. The caveat is that ratification must take place not by simple majority but by three-fifths super-majority (not two-thirds as claimed in some news stories). A complicating factor is that, through certain arguments in his letter, ‘Abd al-Mahdi enters the domain of constitutional review, which properly belongs to Iraq’s federal supreme court, instituted by the 2004 Transitional Administrative Law and still operative pending the establishment of a new court pursuant to the 2005 constitution. In fact, that court has already issued an opinion on the powers of the governorates, specifically limiting these to areas not among the “exclusive powers of the federal government” enumerated in the constitution.[8] But ‘Abd al-Mahdi refers to “legal experts” in his own office who will come up with suggestions for amendments. This practice of circumventing the emerging Iraqi judicial structure is quite typical of the ethno-federalist bloc. Lately, the Kurdish parties have been trumpeting a legal opinion that essentially argues that the Kurdistan Regional Government’s law on oil is more in tune with the Iraqi constitution than the draft law of the central government -- the problem being that the author, British lawyer James Crawford, is not a member of Iraq’s federal supreme court, whose very existence is ignored in his brief note.[9]
BUSH’S BIDEN POLICY
A great challenge to the diverse centrist coalition is the immense support given to its ethno-federalist opponents by players outside the 15 Iraqi governorates that are not part of a federal region. Firstly, there is the powerful backing of the Kurdish parties for the Supreme Council, which often seems aimed at depriving Baghdad of any real capacity for governance. The Kurdish parties are aligned with advocates of “soft partition” in the United States, like Sen. Biden, who tirelessly conjure images of an Iraq neatly split in three and who are programmatically opposed to any restoration of a powerful Baghdad in Iraq. Even in more modest statements, champions of “soft partition” insist on unconstitutional “conferences” that might well serve to perpetuate the hegemony of the ethno-federalists, who are proven masters of the art of backroom deals. The international media, for its part, simply refuses to recognize the existence of the second party in the ongoing two-way struggle. Instead the media read every single move on the Iraqi political scene as part of a “battle” between Iraq’s “main contending factions, the Shiites, the Sunnis and the Kurds” -- as seen, for example, in coverage of the law on the powers of governorates, largely presented to American readers as a “Shiite objective” in a grand compromise where the Kurds got “their” budget and the Sunni Arabs “their” amnesty law.[10] The deep intra-Shi‘i divisions on the governorates law and the Sadrist demands for a strong amnesty law were conveniently ignored; only the ethno-federalist players were even acknowledged.
Arguably, though, the greatest problem for the Iraqi centrists is what may be termed “Bush’s Biden policy.” While Washington speaks an admirable language of fidelity to strong central government, in practice it consistently extends material and moral support to the opposite camp, the ethno-federalists that share Biden’s vision for Iraq. In 2003, Bremer acceded to Kurdish demands to maintain peshmerga militias; in 2004, the US let the Kurdish parties introduce the fateful concept of “disputed areas” into the Transitional Administrative Law, whereby the old regime’s displacement of individual Iraqis can be redressed by collective demands on territory framed in an ethnic language. Since 2005, when it launched the divisive project of a single sectarian region south of Baghdad, the Supreme Council’s relationship with Washington has prospered. Whenever there is talk in Washington about an alternative to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the discussion tends to focus on the Supreme Council’s man (and the instigator of the presidential veto of the governorates law), ‘Adil ‘Abd al-Mahdi. ‘Abd al-Mahdi’s accession to power would probably mean the evaporation of the last remnants of centralist thinking in the Iraqi government, currently represented by Maliki personally, as well as figures like Oil Minister Husayn al-Shahristani. Conversely, Washington maintains little or no contact with representatives of the centrist trend whose vision for the future is far more compatible with the long-standing stated objective of US policy: a unified, multi-ethnic Iraq.
It is policy contradictions like these that facilitate the persistence of ethno-federalist dominance in Iraq, despite clear signs that this current is losing influence in the Iraqi parliament and among the Iraqi people south of Kurdistan. The ethno-federalists may not enjoy a parliamentary majority, but they have secured control of two of the three seats on the Iraqi presidency council. They cannot dictate the legislative agenda, but have managed to jostle their way to a blocking majority on the committee charged with revising the Iraqi constitution. Today, in a most ironic manner, Iraqi politics has come almost full circle in a gradual liberation from sectarianism: An institution originally designed in 2005 by the ethno-federalists to protect communal interests -- the presidency council -- is now being used by one of the vice presidents, ‘Abd al-Mahdi, to guard his ruling faction against democratic pressures framed in Iraqi nationalist terms, including from a majority within his “own” Shi‘i community. There are signs that at least some groups inside the government have had enough of the centrifugal forces associated with the ethno-federalists, with the Supreme Council’s complaints about the police in Nasiriyya and Basra suggesting that its supposed monopoly on the security forces south of Baghdad is much exaggerated. But until US policymakers realize the growing importance of the centrist trend in Iraq there can be no real alternative US policy: The major “alternatives” to Biden’s ideas on the Democratic side -- withdrawal or a focus on fighting al-Qaeda -- would only mean a freeze of current power structures and an irreversible head start for the axis of the Kurdish parties and the Supreme Council. These parties, notably, have benefited and continue to benefit from a disproportionate share of US spending on supposedly “national” institutions of government, including the arming and training of branches of the country’s security services. In the meantime, those Iraqis trying to push their country’s politics in a more sensible direction will continue to face a formidable opposition, made up of the combined forces of Republicans and Democrats in the United States, Iran and their ethno-federalist Iraqi partners.
Oil Minister opens second unit in the refinery, Najaf and confirms: ambition establishing new refineries in many provinces
المركز الاعلامي للبلاغ /النجف الاشرف – خضر الياس Media Centre of the communication / Najaf - Khader Elias
افتتح وزير النفط الدكتور حسين الشهرستاني اليوم الوحدة الثانية في مصفى النجف وسط احتفال حضره عدد كبير من المسؤولين في وزارة النفط ومحافظة النجف واكد الشهرستاني خلال مؤتمر صحفي عقد خلال الحفل :" تم اليوم في مدينة النجف الاشرف افتتاح المرحلة الثانية من تشغيل الوحدة الثانية في مصفى النجف الاشرف ، ونؤكد ان افتتاح هذه الوحدة له الاهمية الكبيرة لابناء المدينة وبقية مدن العراق الأخرى خاصة محافظات الفرا ت الاوسط ." Opened Oil Minister Dr. Hussein Shahrastani today, the second unit in refinery Najaf amid a ceremony attended by a large number of officials in the Ministry of Oil, Najaf governorate, Shahrastani said during a press conference held during the ceremony: "today in the city of Najaf opening of the second phase of the operation of the second unit in the refinery Najaf Ashraf, and stress that the opening of this unit is of great importance for the people of the city and the rest of Iraq's cities of other provinces especially Fra T. East. "
مضيفا ان ": العمل مستمرفي المصفى للمرحلة الثالثة ولابد ان نثمن جهود العاملين من ذوي الاختصاص العراقية والتي بذلوها في سبيل اكمال الوحدة الثانية في هذا المصفى وهذا انجاز كبير وهذه الوحدة طاقتها الانتاجية 10 الاف برميل يوميا ." He added that: "Labour Mstmervi liquidator for the third phase and should appreciate the efforts of workers with competence and Iraqi efforts to complete the second unit of the refinery is a major achievement and the unit production capacity of 10 thousand barrels per day."
مشيرا :"كلفنا الاخوة العاملين بمصفى النجف الاشرف بتأهيل وحدة جديدة ستنشأ في مصفى الديوانية وذلك من خلال تكليفهم بالاعمال الانشائية والقواعد الخاصة بالمصفى ومن المؤمل ان تصل مصافي الديوانية الى حالة الاكتفاء الذاتي بعد اكمال هذه الوحدة ." He: "Brothers mandated workers Bmsfi Najaf rehabilitate the new unit will be established in refinery Diwaniyah, through construction work assignments and rules of the Palmsfi It is hoped that up refineries Diwaniyah to the state of self-sufficiency after the completion of this unit."
مضيفا :" اننا نطمح الى انشاء مصافي جديدة لسد حاجة المصافي القديمة الموجودة في البصرة وبيجي والدورة ، والتي نقوم بتهيئتها حيث طموحنا الى اضافة وحدات جديدة الى مصافي الناصرية لتصل الى 300الف برميل يوميا وانشاء مصفى في كربلاء بطاقة انتاجية تصل الى 150 الف برميل يوميا وفي العمارة ايضا وفي كركوك ونحن ماضون بخططنا لبناء وتهيئة وتطوير تلك المصافي "، حيث ان الوحدة الجديدة من المؤمل ان تعمل بطاقة انتاجية تصل الى 10 الاف برميل يوميا لتزيد الطاقة الانتاجية الكلية للمصفى الى 20 الف برميل يوميا ومن المؤمل انشاء وحدة ثالثة من خلال التعاقد مع احد الشركات الامريكية النفطية . He added: "We aspire to establish new refineries need to bridge the old existing refineries in Basra and Baiji session, which we are creating with our ambition to add new units to refineries Nasiriyah to reach 300 thousand barrels per day refinery and the establishment in Karbala production capacity of up to 150 thousand barrels daily and Amarah Also in Kirkuk, we are continuing our plans for the building and the creation and development of those refineries ", as the new unit is hoped that the production capacity of up to 10 thousand barrels a day to increase the total production capacity of the liquidator to 20 thousand barrels per day and it is hoped the establishment of a third through a contract with one company U.S. oil.
مختتما حديثه الصحفي بقوله ان :" العراق يتقدم بخطى ثابتة من ناحية التصدير والانتاج النفطي حيث بلغ معدل الانتاج حوالي مليوني برميل يوميا ومع تزايد اسعارالنفط العالمية فان وزارة النفط توفرللخزانة المالية المركزية مايقارب ال5 مليارات دولار شهريا ."اما بالنسبة الى التقاريرالامريكية ضد بعض الوزارات العراقية فانها تدخل في باب الدعاية الانتخابية الامريكية بين الديمقراطيين والجمهوريين. Conclusion, the press saying that: "Iraq is like a steady pace in terms of export and production with average production of about two million barrels a day with the increasing global crippling the Oil Ministry Tovrellkhozanh Central Fiscal some 5 billion dollars per month." As for the Altaqariralammerique against some Iraqi ministries it interference in the American electoral propaganda section between Democrats and Republicans.
وفي تعليقه على سؤال حول التقاريرالامريكية الامريكية التي تقول ان ازمة الكهرباء في العراق سببها وزارة النفط رد الشهرستاني بقوله ان :" وزارة النفط لديها خزين هائل من مادة النفط الاسود والتي تعتبرمادة رئيسية في الانتاج الكهربائي ونحن نعتب على وزارة الكهرباء لعدم سعيها لتسلم الكميات المطلوبة للوحدات الكهربائية . Commenting on a question about Altaqariralammerique America, which says that the electricity crisis in Iraq caused by the Ministry of Oil Shahrastani responded by saying that: "The Ministry of Oil has a huge stock of TNT Black oil, which Tattabramada mainly in the production outages We Nattab the Ministry of Electricity for not seeking to collect the quantities required for electrical equipment .
ورافق وزير النفط الدكتور حسين الشهرستاني في افتتاح الوحدة الإنتاجية الجديدة رئيس واعضاء مجلس المحافظة ونائب محافظ النجف عبد الحسين عبطان ومدراء الدوائر الخدمية والعديد من مسؤولي المؤسسات الحكومية في النجف الاشرف ". He joined Oil Minister Dr. Hussein Shahrastani in the opening of the new unit productivity Chairman and members of the provincial council and the deputy governor of Najaf and Abdul Hussein Oil service managers circles, and many officials of government institutions in Najaf. "
من جانبه اكد نائب محافظ النجف عبد الحسين عبطان ان :" المدينة المقدسة مقبلة على مشاريع اعمارية واستراتيجية ضخمة واهمها اكمال مشروع مصفى النجف الاشرف لتصل طاقته الانتاجية الى 30 الف برميل يوميا ." For his part, the deputy governor of Najaf Aug. Abdul-Hussein: "The holy city is going to reconstruction projects, large and the most important strategy to complete the draft liquidator Najaf to reach production capacity to 30 thousand barrels per day."
فيما اكد المهندس دثار يحيي الخشاب مسؤول مصافي الوسط في حديثه حول المشاريع المستقبلية لمصفى النجف الاشرف :" لقد تم الاتفاق مع شركة سيسكو العالمية الامريكية لبناء وحدة اضافية في المصفى وايضا تحسين الانتاج الموجود في الوحدتين الحاليتين وخاصة وحدة البنزين وقد تم التعاقد مع الشركة الامريكية بمدة انجاز تتراوح مابين ال24 شهرا الى 30 شهرا وبكلفة 85مليون دولار." With Eng lot Yahya Khashab official refineries in the modern center on future projects for the liquidator Najaf: "We have been agreed with Cisco Global America to build additional units in the refinery and also improve production units located in the current and especially gasoline unit has been contracted with the American company limited to completion ranging from the 24 months to 30 months and cost 85 million dollars. "
BAGHDAD, IRAQ - MARCH 11: An Iraqi employee of Warka Bank for Investment and Finance shows how to use credit/debit cards machine on March 11, 2008 in Baghdad, Iraq. Warka Bank for Investment and Finance and other Iraqi banks have started issuing credit/debit cards in Baghdad, installing teller machines in selected places in the capital in a move to encourage Iraqis to accept the cards and surmount their repugnance to anything but cash.
Grabbing the Bull by the Horns: Oil Could Hit $130 by Year's End
Greenwire Friday, March 07, 2008
Crude oil may reach a record $130 a barrel this year because pension funds are investing more in commodities, according to one hedge fund executive.
The outlook for oil over the next five years is also "bullish" as producers find it hard to replenish reserves and demand outpaces supply, said Pierre Andurand, the chief investment officer of BlueGold Capital Management LLP.
Oil companies such as Exxon Mobil Corp., Royal Dutch-Shell and BP are finding it tougher to replace their
findings and are drilling for harder-to-reach deposits while energy demand and crude prices surge to records. With commodities prices surging to all-time highs, the California Public Employees' Retirement System, the largest U.S. pension fund, said it plans to boost investments.
Calpers, which has about $240 billion in assets, agreed at a Feb. 19 board meeting to hold between 0.5 percent and 3 percent of its assets in commodities, spokesman Clark McKinley said last week. The California-based fund last year put $450 million into commodities -- its first such investment.
"Next year, oil may rise even further to $150 a barrel," said Andurand, whose $300 million fund has so far invested 70 percent in energy and 30 percent in agriculture and metals since February.
Iraq War Could Help GOP Win in NovemberFri Mar 14, 3:00 AM ET
A funny thing happened on the way to the election: Many Americans had a change of heart about the war in Iraq. No, I'm not talking about the large numbers of Americans who now think that the United States should never have gone to war in the first place, or those who want the troops brought home immediately. To the contrary, two recent Pew Research Center polls show that Americans are more upbeat in their assessment of the Iraq War than at any time in the last couple of years and less focused on American casualties there. Responses to a number of the surveys' questions suggest problems ahead for the Democrats, no matter which candidate the party nominates.
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The findings from the nonpartisan Pew Research Center come from two separate surveys, one on the presidential election and another on the public awareness of various public policy and political issues. In the first survey of 1,508 Americans taken over four days in late February, Pew asked respondents a variety of questions about their attitudes toward the presidential candidates and various issues in the campaign, including several questions on Iraq, Afghanistan and the war on terror. The second survey on awareness of issues included 1,003 adults and was taken Feb. 28-March 2.
What emerged was a complicated picture of American attitudes, but one that should give some solace to Republican candidate Sen. John McCain.
While about equal numbers of Americans believe U.S. troops should remain in Iraq (47 percent) as want troops withdrawn (49 percent), the shift in public opinion over the last year has been toward keeping troops there — up 5 percent since February 2007 and 8 points since September 2007. And barely 14 percent favor Democratic candidate Sen. Barack Obama's position, removing all troops immediately.
More importantly, a rapidly growing number of Americans believe the military effort in Iraq is going well — 48 percent compared with only 30 percent a year ago. And a majority now believes that the U.S. will succeed in Iraq, 53 percent compared with 42 percent last September.
Barely more than a quarter of respondents could correctly identify the number of Americans killed in Iraq — almost 4,000 combat fatalities since the war's inception — the lowest percentage that could do so since Pew began asking this question in April 2004. Although the reasons for this decline in awareness might be debatable, at least part of the reason is that fewer Americans have been killed in recent months (about the same number as in 2004), which has taken the war's toll off the front pages of most newspapers.
The Democrats' strategy to take back the White House has been focused largely on the war in Iraq. Both Obama and his rival, Sen. Hillary Clinton, have been vying with each other for months over who could claim to be the most anti-war candidate (though the prize clearly belongs to Obama). But the American public may not be ready to cut and run so quickly. And dissatisfaction with Iraq is not turning into the key to winning the election in November that Democrats thought it would be.
A lot could happen between now and Election Day; but as the situation currently stands, it does not appear that Democrats have the edge on Iraq. McCain, whose support for the war has never wavered, has always maintained he'd rather lose the election than betray his principles on this issue. Now, it seems, he may not have to worry that his positions will cost him the election.
The bigger worry for McCain — indeed all Republicans — is a souring economy. Although presidents have little control over the economy — which at about $14 trillion is too large for any one person or institution to exert much influence — voters often blame the party in power for whatever goes wrong. Come November, voters will be less interested in figuring out which candidate will bring the troops home than in picking the candidate who can jumpstart the economy.
Linda Chavez is the author of "An Unlikely Conservative: The Transformation of an Ex-Liberal." To find out more about Linda Chavez, visit the Creators Syndicate web page at www.creators.com.
GCC ‘studying’ dollar pegs amid uncertainty
Published: Thursday, 13 March, 2008, 01:59 AM Doha Time
DUBAI: The United Arab Emirates is studying whether to maintain its current exchange rate policy of pegging the dirham to the US dollar, the country’s finance minister said.
“We’re under study with the Gulf and we’ll see what’s the solution,” Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid al-Makhtoum, said on the sidelines of a business event in Dubai. “It is difficult to know where you are going to move.”
The emirates has set up a task force to assess options on whether to revalue, or depeg the dirham from the plummeting US dollar, Zawya Dow Jones reported on Monday, citing people familiar with the matter at the country’s central bank.
“There is the dollar, the euro and the yen. These are the only three currencies you can rely on. You can’t go straight to the euro because it’s too high and the yen is going up and down very quickly.
“And it’s true the rate of the dollar is losing. It is true we are exporting more than we’re importing but we’re just exporting the crude oil,” said Sheikh Hamdan, who is the elder brother of Dubai’s ruler Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid al-Makhtoum.
Inflation in the emirates is surging as the country struggles to match US Federal Reserve interest rate cuts at a time when a booming economy and rising consumption in the UAE calls for tighter fiscal policies.
Pegged at a rate of 3.6725 dirhams against the greenback, some economists estimate its resulting imported inflation contributes 40% of total inflation. The National Bank of Abu Dhabi estimates UAE inflation at 10.9% in 2007.
The government yesterday introduced price caps on 16 basic food commodities including sugar, cooking oil and eggs in an effort to halt spiraling inflation.
Meanwhile, the Mideast chief executive of Deutsche Bank (DB) said yesterday that
the UAE was unlikely to depeg its currency from the US dollar.
“It is not going to happen,” Henry Azzam said. “The decision is both economic and political. The depeg has to be done region-wide starting from Saudi Arabia and I don’t see it happening.”
Traders are raising bets that the UAE and Qatar will take the lead among Gulf states and sever their links with the dollar or revalue their currencies as they struggle to keep pace with US Federal reserve interest rate cuts.
“The UAE has billions of dollar-based assets. If they depeg, they will have to convert assets overnight, losing millions and millions of dollars,” Deutsche’s Azzam said.
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, or ADIA, is estimated to hold two-thirds of its $900bn worth of assets in US dollar denominated investments and securities.
“They’re already losing now with the weakening of the dollar. On the contrary, we see that they’re still accumulating dollar assets,” Azzam said.
The governor of the central Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Hamad (Sama) al-Sayari meanwhile said yesterday that the US dollar is a “good buy” at this stage.
He was speaking on the fringes of a joint conference of the European Central Bank and the GCC in Mainz, Germany.
“I don’t like volatility in the markets,” he said, adding that the dollar was currently “undervalued.”
Asked about plans for a possible monetary union of the GCC nations, al-Sayari said officials had engaged in a fruitful discourse with euro area officials.
He said “in many respects” the eurosystem is a role model for the GCC nations, suggesting that some of its features could be applied, should a monetary union be formed.
Asked about his expectations for inflation in Saudi Arabia, Al-Sayari repeated that Sama expects inflationary pressures to recede in the second half of 2008.
He said these expectations were based on the view that recently implemented government measures would ease pressure from bottlenecks in some markets or stabilise prices. – Zawya Dow Jones
http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topic...8&parent_id=28
Banks say falling dollar could bring G7 intervention
Bloomberg
Published: March 15, 2008, 00:10
London: The dollar's record-breaking slide may trigger the first coordinated effort to shore up the currency in 13 years, according to strategists at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
The currency yesterday fell below $1.56 a euro and slumped to the lowest level in 12 years versus the yen. That has prompted complaints from European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet and Japanese Finance Minister Fukushiro Nukaga. US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said Thursday he backs a "strong dollar" and refused to elaborate when questioned at a press conference in Washington.
The challenge for officials is fighting the $3.2 trillion-a-day currency market while the Federal Reserve reduces interest rates and the US economy falters. With traders increasing bets on a weaker dollar, the Group of Seven nations may be compelled to act, some strategists said.
"We're on an intervention watch," Stephen Jen, Morgan Stanley's London-based head of foreign-exchange research, said. "While I don't think we have reached the threshold yet, the argument in favour of it is gradually becoming compelling."
The dollar on Thursday dipped below 100 yen for the first time since 1995, when the G7 last stepped in to prop up the currency. It has lost 15 per cent against the euro since September as the Fed's rate reductions dull the currency's allure. The slide has accelerated in the past two weeks.
Watanabe anxiety
The US currency traded at $1.5633 per euro as of 2.17pm in Tokyo, after touching $1.5645 Thursday, the weakest since the euro's debut in 1999. The dollar fell to 100.16 yen after sliding to 99.77 yen yesterday, the lowest since October 1995.
Executives and politicians across the world say they are becoming increasingly worried about the dollar's decline.
Toyota Motor president Katsuaki Watanabe said on March 7 the stronger yen is making conditions "tough" for the carmaker. Germany's MTU Aero Engines Holding AG, the largest independent provider of jet-engine maintenance, said yesterday that the dollar's drop may "cancel out" the company's growth in euro terms this year.
The US currency's drop may also infect other markets by further weakening confidence in US assets, said Jim O'Neill, chief economist at Goldman Sachs. Morgan Stanley's Jen said the weaker dollar is already spurring higher commodity prices.
"The dollar's fall will worry other markets, which are so fragile right now," O'Neill said. "Intervention will definitely be on the minds of policy makers."
Any action by the G7 would be the first since its governments united in September 2000 to boost a falling euro. The dollar sank as low as 79.75 yen in 1995 to prompt a rescue then.
http://www.gulfnews.com/business/Economy/10197487.html
recap...old stuff
Yeah,,,scraping info from everywhere
Dinar speculation in Saudi market
Increased Iraqi dinar exchange rate to the Saudi riyal in the market by 11% yesterday, Wednesday, 2-2-2005 reflection of the improvement in the rate of the Iraqi currency to the American dollar after the Iraqi elections held last Sunday.
http://64.233.179.104/translate_c?hl...26sid %3D3120
On his part, economic analyst Dr. Yasin Al-Jafari that the Iraqi government would not be able to dissociate itself from the new Iraqi dinar in any event, and the expectation of further climb in the coming period, stressing that the current period is not appropriate for the sale of the dinar, but the entry to purchase special All the indicators currently available, promising a better future for the currency.
Political first: the American Embassy stresses: No secret items in the long-term Convention between Baghdad and Washington
She was awaiting notification from the Iraqi government on tripartite talks
Baghdad morning
The spokesman of the American Embassy in Baghdad Mirembe Nantungu the embassy awaiting notification from the Iraqi government on a date for the tripartite talks in the Iraqi affair with the Iranian side,
Registration shown significant progress in the performance of the Iraqi government over the past year had highlighted the results achieved on the security front and national reconciliation.
Nantungu said in an interview with the "morning" yesterday: that there is a misunderstanding on the media not to attend the embassy delegation for talks with the Iranian side, pointing out that the embassy were not aware when the talks originally and it was awaiting notification from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to conduct a new round with the Iranian side, the administration Iraqi.
The spokesman indicated that the Embassy of the United States I have made progress in the performance of the Iraqi government over the last year, including successive successes at the level of stability of the security situation, national reconciliation and progress in the economic and financial side.
And the Convention on the long-term between Iraq and the United States indicated that the delegation of the United Nations of the United States of America on the presence of multinational forces will end with the end of this year and that the Iraqi government requested from Washington last August desire to conclude a convention of the long-term security cooperation, political, cultural and economic.
They pointed out that the Convention would be transparent and not by any confidential items as it will be presented to the American Congress and will be presented to the Iraqi parliament for ratification.
She Nantungu: that a large number of Iraqi cities and governorates become safe areas after the areas are dangerous and hot addition to the success of the Iraqi parliament to approve a number of laws such as the Law of retirement and the law of accountability, justice and the law of provincial councils raises to the efforts of the Iraqi government to close points between all parties involved, both in the political process or outside, in the economic area, the IMF said that Iraq would witness a growth rate of 7% during the current year and that it has a strong and stable currency with a significant decrease levels of inflation compared to previous years.
And the challenges faced by the Iraqi government said: that national reconciliation and narrow the gap in viewpoints between the leaders of the political blocs most important challenges facing the Government during the current year, and the government should seek to remove the crisis of confidence between the political blocs and to initiate a dialogue among themselves be transparent interest of the Iraqi people are in the end Ultimately that is what Iraq needs an Iraqi solutions to the problems.
The Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has signed with President Bush last November on a declaration of principles which include outlines of the long-standing convention between the two countries to ensure that the Convention of full sovereignty to Iraq in this direction are intensive dialogues between the two sides to examine the contents of the Convention to configure before signature .
It showed that the Convention as a general framework to ensure political support, security, cultural and economic development by the United States to Iraq after the American delegation.
As for the release of Iraqi prisoners in the jails of multinational Nantungu said: that the forces intent of the release of Iraqi prisoners in accordance with the legal framework and it has almost 20 thousand detainees being studied their files and release covered monthly.
http://www.google.com/translate?u=ht...&hl=en&ie=UTF8
here comes the reval baby
On his part, economic analyst Dr. Yasin Al-Jafari that the Iraqi government would not be able to dissociate itself from the new Iraqi dinar in any event, and the expectation of further climb in the coming period, stressing that the current period is not appropriate for the sale of the dinar, but the entry to purchase special All the indicators currently available, promising a better future for the currency
Dinar speculation in Saudi market
Increased Iraqi dinar exchange rate to the Saudi riyal in the market by 11% yesterday, Wednesday, 2-2-2005 reflection of the improvement in the rate of the Iraqi currency to the American dollar after the Iraqi elections held last Sunday.
http://64.233.179.104/translate_c?hl...26sid %3D3120
On his part, economic analyst Dr. Yasin Al-Jafari that the Iraqi government would not be able to dissociate itself from the new Iraqi dinar in any event, and the expectation of further climb in the coming period, stressing that the current period is not appropriate for the sale of the dinar, but the entry to purchase special All the indicators currently available, promising a better future for the currency.
ok, shot 88...had 2 8's to start so not so bad...driver didn't happen till bout 5th....
gotta go...12:41 tee time..weeeeee
I know, I know, it's old but although there are huge differences between the two countries but there are som similarities as you can see...interesting read
Soldiers Battle With Economies
Although some of the emergencies of civilian life were overcome, the Italian economy was a serious problem throughout the occupation. In the first of the two stages which marked Allied efforts to cope with what can only be called the near breakdown of the Italian economy, civil affairs authority faced, in addition to the problems inherent in the initial war devastation, the difficulties arising from the limitations of early military policy. The U.S. Army had accepted these limitations-and persuaded the British to accept them also-in the planning period when, expecting to turn over civil affairs relatively soon to civilian agencies, they had felt justified in confining themselves to relief and very simple rehabilitation. Accordingly the Army restricted its supply program to food, medical and sanitary items, and other classes of supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest from interfering with military operations. Seriously needed supplies in other categories, it was presumed, would be obtained by civilian agencies, though as matters developed, it was difficult or impossible for such agencies to secure from supply and shipping authorities allocations over and above those certified as militarily necessary. Thus, illogical as it may seem, it was easier for AFHQ to get thousands of tons of wheat than for it to obtain agricultural or industrial machinery occupying less cargo space and designed to reduce the need for imports by increasing local production.
Rehabilitation in the sense of reconstruction was to be reserved for civilian agencies; certainly, however, the military authorities were expected to rehabilitate the economy of the occupied country to the extent necessary to prevent civilian upheaval from interfering with military operations. What was not foreseen was the degree to which, in Italy, war damage alone would bring the Italian economy to the brink of disaster. Even a minimum rehabilitation program presented a problem of staggering proportions. Allied bombings and the far more destructive German demolitions had reduced the Italian economy to a shambles. Industrial plants had been destroyed or damaged; transport and communications systems had been disrupted; agricultural machinery and farm animals had largely been seized by the retreating armies. Moreover, in their efforts to make the country as useless as possible as a base of operations the Germans had laid their knives at the jugular vein of the Italian economy: the hydroelectric system on which, since Italy is lacking in coal, 90 percent of the industrial system depended. Earlier efforts at recovery had to be made amidst active military operations, which compelled the Allied forces to hang on to such supplies, transportation, and machinery as were available, as well as the relatively few large industrial buildings that remained intact. The physical devastation, bad as it was, was not as bad as the evils that came in its
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wake. Invasion, only the last in a train of misfortunes, led to a general shortage of basic commodities, serious inflation, and a shakiness in the financial position both of private banking and of the government.
The situation in Italy was far worse than the drafters of military government economic doctrine could have foreseen when they enjoined GAO's "to revive economic life" and so "to develop the area as a source of supply for future operations." The question was not whether Italy could aid the Allies in the future but whether, within the limits of the supply program, the Allies could aid Italy sufficiently to make it usable for present military operations. In theory a re-examination of the entire concept of military necessity could have been demanded at this point to determine whether this concept could not validly be broadened instead of being defined in terms of fixed supply categories. But initially the Army was still trustful that the civilian agencies could, as planned, soon take over and meanwhile step into any serious breach. In the earlier stage, and until experience showed that this inveterate assumption was not valid, military authorities concentrated upon economic rehabilitation within the limits of existent policy, while at the same time attempting to provide such rehabilitation materials as were needed by the few plants capable of producing for the war effort.
Economic and financial experts in uniform were on hand who, while convinced at the outset that the measures available were chiefly palliatives, still hoped that palliatives might be sufficient for the time being. In some spheres, especially those where the expedient of Allied military lire could be employed, initial Allied measures did some temporary good. As a first step the banks were reopened a few weeks after the invasion of the mainland and unlimited withdrawals were permitted. Within a short time deposits were exceeding withdrawals and a complete financial breakdown was prevented. However, it was necessary at first for the Allied authorities to give aid to the government, not only in printing military lire but in lending them as well. The general policy was that the currency needs of the government should be met through the banks. In November 1943, however, an emergency arose whereby the Italian government had to pay off a maturing issue of government bonds. It was essential that this obligation be met if the credit of the government was to be maintained. With permission from CCAC, funds up to 300,000,000 lire were made available to the Treasury and the Bank of Italy. Thereafter, emergency arrangements were made for the Bank of Italy to assume responsibility for financing governmental needs, and direct advances by the Allied Military Financial Agency (AMFA) to provincial and local agencies were no longer needed. But distrust in the currency could not be suppressed and to the Allied Commission (AC), at least, there seemed justification in the government's plea that it needed financial assistance to offset the huge national deficit created by Allied expenditures in military lire for which Italy would have to pay the piper in the end. Later, in 1944 and again in 1947, the government was granted dollar equivalents for Allied lire expenditures in Italy. The extension of substantially less aid earlier in the occupation would have been more useful. But Allied public opinion was then indicated by the financial officer who wryly commented that Italians demanding financial help should be advised of the taxes in England.
The basic economic problem was control of inflation. The roots of the evil went back to the Fascist regime, which had spent lavishly to finance Mussolini's military exploits. The already weakened system of price and rationing controls collapsed with the invasion and, though the Allies con-
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tinued all of them, the system could never be rebuilt. Nor did the reduction of controls to a few basic foods work much better. The inflationary spiral continued, wage increases were allowed and then disallowed, and farmers preferred to hoard wheat rather than sell at official prices. As the problem mounted, the FEA toward the end of 1943 dispatched a special mission headed by Adlai Stevenson to investigate. This group laid the principal blame on the expenditure of A.M. lire by Allied troops and also criticized by implication the rate of exchange of 100 lire to the dollar on the ground that it undervalued the lira. The FEA experts were skeptical of current theater hopes of successfully applying selective price controls and subsidies. Soon ACC itself became skeptical-just when the CCS, concerned over the mounting theater calls for wheat imports despite shipping stringencies, cabled AFHQ suggesting an attempt to defeat the black market by still more drastic measures. The Supply Subcommittee of the CCS added a second group of visiting experts to the theater at the same time that ACC was just setting up still a third group-an Anti Inflation Committee consisting of representatives of the U.S. and U.K. Treasuries as well as of some financial specialists already in the theater.
All three committees made useful suggestions although perhaps their chief usefulness lay in convincing higher authorities (in Washington and London) that not too much more could be done than was already being done. Some authorities in the theater, such as, for example, the vice-president of an ACC Section who believed that the worst ills could be overcome if the government were required to pay larger sums to Italians on relief, also seemed in need of an education in economics. But by and large, theater officials, professional soldiers as well as former civilians, were learning something of economics through hard experience. They were not surprised, therefore, when the Allied Anti-Inflation Committee reported that just as inflation had no single cause so there was no simple remedy. Both this committee and the Combined Supply Group, however, emphasized the need for a limited program of imports, not only to relieve severe shortages but also to help restore production, especially agricultural, and to counter inflationary tendencies. The difficulty with this suggestion lay not only in the continuing shipping shortage but even more since the type of imports recommended would not take too much cargo space-in the severe limitations on the Army supply program in respect to rehabilitation supplies. The latter difficulty would be overcome if, now that the 6-month period of military responsibility for civilian supply had ended, responsibility could be taken over as planned by civilian agencies which would have greater latitude in importing rehabilitation supplies. In February and March the Assistant Secretary of War negotiated on this question with both FEA and the State Department, and though these negotiations failed, the Secretary of War returned to the issue again in June in a letter addressed to the Secretary of State. The civilian agencies wished the War Department to continue its supply responsibility because they were now hopeful that before too long UNRRA could assume the burden-a hope the materialization of which was delayed again and again due to unforeseen difficulties.
Under the circumstances AFHQ and ACC could only continue to put their chief efforts into measures other than basic rehabilitation. As the visiting experts had advised, but as the theater would probably have done of its own accord, ACC intensified its attempts to increase Italian production. The measures included preparations for an all-out amassment program for the new crops, and the aid of the
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Italian Prime Minister and even of the Vatican itself was enlisted for the attendant propaganda effort. In addition, as the Combined Supply Group had advised, ACC waged a campaign to reduce the number of ration cards by ferreting out the large number of illegal cardholders. Still further, it tried to get a greater proportion of local resources for civilian needs by reducing unnecessary military pre-emption. It did so chiefly by bringing the issue to the attention of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (SACMED) and gaining his support in a reorganization of the military Local Resources Board designed to give ACC greater representation. SACMED also gave signal aid by announcing, avowedly to reduce inflation and effect dehoarding of grain, an increase of the bread ration in Southern Italy to 300 grams. Finally, now being supported in this move by the visiting economists and supply experts, ACC requisitioned agricultural rehabilitation supplies, such as fertilizers, and at the same time requisitioned clothing and raw materials to stimulate local production.
Most of the supply requests had to be rejected by Washington because of shipping and supply stringency. Despite advice from the CCS that he would have to meet the increase in the bread ration entirely from local production, SACMED let the increase go into effect as the psychological effect of its announcement had already proved beneficial. The requisition for wearing apparel elicited in July an inquiry as to the basis on which it was justified; AFHQ tried to make out the best possible case on the ground of minimum civilian needs; the CCAC then asked directly whether. the requisition could be justified by military necessity; and AFHQ in its reply of 13 September, felt that it could not in good conscience answer in the affirmative. This, as AFHQ probably fore saw and as it was advised on 27 October, doomed the requisition within the framework of the military supply program.
On 15 September, two days after being asked whether civilian clothing was a military necessity, General Wilson addressed to the CCS a rather extraordinary communication, which is reproduced at the end of this chapter and which brings the first phase of rehabilitation efforts to its climax if not its conclusion. His motives may have included irritation over the wearing-apparel correspondence, a sense of injustice at Washington's criticism of the theater's efforts, a belief that reasoning could still produce some immediate good, and a judgment that even if it did not, the present unsatisfactory situation should be set forth in the record. Whatever the underlying motives which prompted it, the letter is marked by a tone which at least shows the exasperation of the sender. This did not preclude humor, as General Wilson referred to the case in which a requisition of paper for keeping Italy's tax records had evoked the inquiry as to whether it could be justified by military necessity. Instead of attacking the narrow interpretation of military necessity (which the British had never liked from the beginning) General Wilson took the still more radical course of suggesting that a broader criterion than military necessity now seemed to be called for if the Allies, in concentrating upon the current military aims, were not to be defeated in their ultimate objective of a reasonably prosperous and contented postwar Italy. He asked whether the directives on civilian supply and economic assistance could not be reconsidered, and he requested that, if it was now Allied policy to assist Italy beyond the point required by military necessity, he be informed of the extent and type of industrial rehabilitation desired, the extent to which, if at all, he might take
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inflation into account, and the degree to which he could take measures for encouraging exports.
As he must have known even before the CCS so informed him, General Wilson had raised a question calling for political decision. Already the President and the Prime Minister had been driven by various forces and considerations to ponder this question, and in less than two weeks after SACMED's letter they announced jointly a new policy toward Italy. Its economic and supply implications conformed to SACMED's suggestions, and the subsequent history of Allied assistance to Italy revolves about the efforts to implement the new dispensation. (See Chapter XVII.)
TWO GOALS-REVIVAL AND USE OF LOCAL ECONOMY
[U.S. Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, Dec 43]
k. Economics. The basic economic policy of United States military government is two fold: first, to revive economic life and stimulate production in order to reduce to a minimum the needs of the area for United States and allied assistance and to develop the area as a source of supply for further operations, and second, to use available goods and services as efficiently as possible for the satisfaction of military and civilian needs. ♦ ♦ ♦
AMGOT MAY SUCCEED WHERE MUSSOLINI FAILED
[Finance Div, AMGOT Hq, Rpt, May 43-Nov 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. Y-11, p. 63]
1.... Ever since 1930 Italian budgets had consistently shown heavy deficits, . resulting from Italy's self-sufficiency campaign, the Abyssinian and Spanish adventures, and the administrative burden of the corporative state. Italy's additional war expenditures were 6o billion lire in 1940-41, and 80 inflationary borrowing methods. Thus the inadequate taxation program of the Italian government, declining revenues from existing taxes, the greatly increased currency circulation, the shortage of consumer goods and the surplus purchasing power consequent upon these factors, produced a heavy upward pressure upon prices which the government made numerous unsuccessful attempts to relieve. The deterioration of the wartime financial situation was obvious to the Italian people and the inflationary trend was thereby aggravated.
2. With this background in mind, the Finance Division of AMGOT Headquarters in Palermo created, as soon as the required personnel was available, the Finance Intelligence Office for the purpose of collating information on the inflationary picture and suggesting measures for dealing with it. ♦ ♦ ♦
A PROGRAM Is DRAWN UP FOR CONTROL OF INFLATION
[Finance Div, AMGOT Hq, Rpt, May-Nov 43]
7. Upon instructions from the Economic and Financial Council on 13 September, the Intelligence Officer of the Financial Division prepared a comprehensive plan for inflation control.... The chief recommendations in this report were:
(a) Tax revenue should be increased and the existing system reviewed.
(b) Savings channels should be restored.
(c) Pressure for wage increases should be resisted.
(d) Appeals continued to troops to use discretion in local spending.
(e) Energetic enforcement of all price and rationing orders.
(f) Systematic supervision of distribution channels, notably wheat and olive oil.
(g) Importation of certain basic commodities.
(h) Construction of a price index to measure cost of living. ♦ ♦ ♦
THE GOVERNMENT WANTS A BETTER EXCHANGE RATE BUT FINANCE SUBCOMMISSION DISAGREES -- Italy's problems post war---
[Memo, Finance Subcom, ACC, 29 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/429, app. to Rpt, Allied Anti-Inflation Comm. (Italy), PP. 51-52]
1. The Italian Government's argument as presented in Marshal Badoglio's letter and as presented orally by the Minister of Finance to representatives of the Finance Subcommission from time to time is briefly as follows: 10
(a) The present rate of exchange increases substantially incomes of soldiers spent in Italy and constitutes, therefore, the major inflationary factor.
(b) People in Italy are "exchange rate conscious." The sharp downward revision in the exchange value of lire has caused psychological reactions which have aggravated the inflation problem in liberated Italy.
2. The extent to which soldier expenditures constitute an inflationary factor in liberated Italy is exaggerated in the Italian Government's argument. A reduction of these expenditures will not change the course of inflation in Italy, although it may slow down the inflationary process. ♦ ♦ ♦
3. . . . Distrust of the currency is undoubtedly present in Italy; and it may have some effect in stimulating inflationary price movements. But will one exchange rate rather than another change distrust into confidence? Changes in the exchange rate, whatever the character of the change, are an extremely important factor in creating distrust. To change the exchange rate now would increase the distrust of the people in the currency, particularly since the currency would be fixed at a value which is obviously too high to be maintained over a long-run period. 11
Changes in the Iraqi constitution between reality and ambition
تقيم رابطة الشباب المسلم ندوة بعنوان "التعديلات في الدستور العراقي بين الواقع والطموح" لتسليط الأضواء على آخر ما انتهت إليه مسألة التعديلات في الدستور العراقي، وعلى تأثيراتها المرتقبة على العملية السياسية الجارية في العراق، وآفاق الحل ومعوقاته. Assess the Muslim Youth Association seminar entitled "Amendments in the Iraqi constitution between reality and ambition" to highlight the latest findings issue of adjustments in the Iraqi Constitution, and the anticipated effects of the ongoing political process in Iraq, prospects for a solution and constraints. تستضيف فيها النائب في البرلمان العراقي عن كتلة الإئتلاف العراقي الموحد الاستاذ عباس البياتي وبإدارة الاستاذ صلاح التكمجي. Hosts a deputy Iraqi bloc United Iraqi Alliance Professor Abbas Al-Bayati and management professor Salah Altk..
المكان : مؤسسة دار الإسلام Place: House Foundation Islam
الزمان: يوم الجمعة 14-03-2008 في الساعة: 8:00 مساءً. Date: Friday, 14-03-2008 at: 8:00 p.m..