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The GSE's were made to prevent another depression...which they effectively did...had we not have the GSE's back in 2007-2008 as the government line of defense...the scenario would have turned much uglier then what we witnessed...and now that they did their job, everyone including their grandparents want to blame someone for taking their homes...you can't send a soldier to go fight the war, then when the soldier comes home to blame him for the war...
There's nothing to reform...they were solvent...
You can't just play it...you have to give a lesson...lol
Well said...I applaud you...
The bottom is where you make it...
Because the GSE's are not government owned...they're shareholder owned is what is implied...
Equity raised with conversion? Maybe for the government not the GSE's...
Keep the wolves away!
Black crows are the opposite of white soldiers and the actual candles must be very similar sizes not one bigger than the other. What you're seeing are not 3 black crows...
It's holding at 3.01 Navy...maybe you should jump back in...
It was a collateral...you can't cash in on a collateral when the principal has been repaid...former treasury secretary has already told in front of congress on record that it was repaid...
Interesting...it almost sounds like they're planning on using the hurricanes to start buffering capital...
So what are you saying? 7 months later no real news...does that mean you believe the case will just go away so it will be an easy win for the defendants? Has it been that much of a nightmare? We're far from over...if that has been pretty bad then try the Chinese water torture method...maybe that will bring back some sanity...
It will be ridiculous to advertise to the world FnF will recap and release and then recap and release...sort of like giving everyone a chance to win the lotto...who does that? I'm sure it'll be done over a weekend before 2017 ends...maybe on a Sunday and say SU-PRISE!...
Obsession is not a long term strategy...however, lack of action by Congress is empowering Mel Watt to make a decision on GSE reform on building capital for the GSE's is looking quite attractive I must say...is it a strategy?...by all means, no...but it is making quite a stir to take action to end conservatorship and end NWS...once a payment is withheld, does that not end a contract that stipulates all profits must be swept to Treasury? It's a breach of contract at that point...sort of like ending the contract by default...unless Treasury would like to sue FHFA for it's action(s)...
Fannie & Freddie Both Changed The Way They Talk About Their Dividends, And It's Not By Accident
by Wayne Duggan
What a difference two little letters can make.
Shares of Federal National Mortgage Association (OTC: FNMA) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp (OTC: FMCC) are both up 4.8 percent this week after both government-sponsored enterprises included the word “if” in their quarterly financial statements when referencing their upcoming dividend payment to the Treasury.
“Fannie Mae will pay Treasury a dividend of $3.1 billion for the third quarter of 2017 by September 30, 2017 if FHFA declares a dividend in this amount before September 30, 2017,” Fannie Mae wrote in its second-quarter earnings report, following Freddie Mac’s lead.
According to Height Securities analyst Edwin Groshans, the carefully-placed “if” was no coincidence.
Groshans says the changes to the GSE’s dividend language highlight several key issues surrounding housing finance reform at the moment. While Federal Housing Finance Agency director Mel Watt hasn’t officially directed Fannie or Freddie to withhold dividend payments, it's well within his power to do so at any time. If Watt chooses to withhold some or all of the dividend payments, it could be a sign that the government has begun the long, arduous task of recapitalizing Fannie and Freddie.
???
Fannie & Freddie Both Changed The Way They Talk About Their Dividends, And It's Not By Accident
by Wayne Duggan15 hours ago
?
FMCC
FNMA
What a difference two little letters can make.
Shares of Federal National Mortgage Association (OTC: FNMA) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp (OTC: FMCC) are both up 4.8 percent this week after both government-sponsored enterprises included the word “if” in their quarterly financial statements when referencing their upcoming dividend paymentto the Treasury.
“Fannie Mae will pay Treasury a dividend of $3.1 billion for the third quarter of 2017 by September 30, 2017 if FHFA declares a dividend in this amount before September 30, 2017,” Fannie Mae wrote in its second-quarter earnings report, following Freddie Mac’s lead.
According to Height Securities analyst Edwin Groshans, the carefully-placed “if” was no coincidence.
Related Link: Despite Courtroom Losing Streak, Legal Action Still Best Route For Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Shareholders
Groshans says the changes to the GSE’s dividend language highlight several key issues surrounding housing finance reform at the moment. While Federal Housing Finance Agency director Mel Watt hasn’t officially directed Fannie or Freddie to withhold dividend payments, it's well within his power to do so at any time. If Watt chooses to withhold some or all of the dividend payments, it could be a sign that the government has begun the long, arduous task of recapitalizing Fannie and Freddie.
“Any adjustment to the dividend is unlikely to occur prior to Congress raising the debt ceiling and making progress on the FY2018 budget,” Groshans said.
Even if the government opts to begin recapitalizing the two GSEs, investors should keep their expectations in check. Earlier this year, Groshans estimates it would take roughly a decade for Fannie and Freddie to be adequately capitalized if they were allowed to retain 100 percent of their earnings.
The good news, however, is that Fannie Mae reported it expects to maintain its profitability in the foreseeable future.
http://m.benzinga.com/article/9881048
BankThink One part of GSE reform is already working
By
Mark Zandi
Published
August 04 2017, 10:18am EDT
Questions about what do with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and what our future housing finance system will look like have plagued policymakers since the two mortgage behemoths were put into conservatorship nearly nine years ago.
But in the background of this debate is an unheralded success story that goes a long way to settling it: credit risk transfers. Risk transfers are not only an effective method for mitigating the risk that Fannie and Freddie pose to taxpayers while in conservatorship, they should be a central part of any reformed housing finance system.
To understand credit risk transfers, consider that at their core Fannie and Freddie’s job is to separate the interest rate risk and credit risk inherent in the mortgage loans they purchase. The agencies sell the interest rate risk to investors in mortgage-backed securities, and before the financial crisis they held on to the credit risk. Of course, that’s what got them into trouble. As homeowners stopped making their loan payments, the credit losses overwhelmed what little capital the agencies had, and they failed.
This is where credit risk transfers come in. The transfers began more than four years ago at the behest of the agencies’ regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Instead of holding on to credit risk, Fannie and Freddie are now transferring much of it to private investors.
The bulk of these risk transfers are through capital market transactions with an array of investors, including asset managers, hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds that agree to buy securities backed by the agencies’ loans that are subject to write-downs if homebuyers default. The risk transfers have expanded more recently to include transactions with other financial institutions, including reinsurers, private mortgage insurers and mortgage lenders. Instead of credit risk remaining at the agencies, making them too big to fail, it is being dispersed broadly throughout the entire global financial system.
To date, Fannie and Freddie have transferred most of the credit risk on $1.6 trillion in mortgage loans — one-third of the loans they own — to private investors. On their more recent loans, the agencies have been transferring more than one-half of the risk, and the transfers are taking place mostly on loans that pose the biggest concern for taxpayers.
To put the progress into context, consider that private investors in the risk transfers are taking on what is approaching one-fifth of the credit risk in all single-family residential mortgage loans originated in recent years. This is more than private mortgage insurers, and on par with the risk being shouldered by commercial banks and other depository institutions, and the agencies themselves. Only the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration are taking on more risk.
The risk transfers aren’t without controversy. Some are concerned that they won’t protect the agencies and taxpayers when the economy stumbles badly. These are complicated transactions, and how well they transfer risk from the agencies to investors depends on many factors that are uncertain, including the timing of mortgage prepayments and defaults. So it is important to ask whether these transactions will work out as expected, with private investors shouldering a significant amount of any losses on the agencies’ loans when unemployment is high and rising and house prices are falling. From the evidence so far, the answer is yes.
To determine this, consider what would happen if the nation suffered another financial crisis and Great Recession like the one that put Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship. In that severe downturn, the agencies suffered large losses on their mortgage loans and securities, which completely overwhelmed the small amount of capital they held.
If a similarly severe downturn occurred today, the agencies would suffer smaller losses given that the mortgage loans and securities they own are of much higher quality. But more important, because of the capital market risk transfers now in place, approximately two-thirds of the losses would be borne by private investors, not Fannie and Freddie. And given how much capital the agencies would be holding if they were private institutions, they would avoid insolvency and another government takeover.
The risk transfers appear so successful in protecting Fannie and Freddie from losses in bad times, they would provide the agencies with a significant amount of capital if they were private institutions. How much? Based on very stressful scenarios, which include unfavorable assumptions regarding both the timing of prepayments, which are assumed to occur soon after the issuance of the risk transfer, and the timing of defaults, which are assumed to occur much later, the current risk transfers would cover a prodigious more than half the agencies’ capital needs.
Another potential issue with the risk transfers is that the agencies may be overpaying investors to take on credit risk — paying investors more than their own costs of shouldering the risk. If so, then the risk actually being transferred to private investors is less than meets the eye. To assess this, we calculated the interest cost to the agencies of paying investors in their transactions at issuance, and compared this to the agencies’ own cost of bearing the risk. It turns out they are roughly the same; there is thus no indication that Fannie and Freddie are overpaying to transfer risk.
To be sure, if the credit risk transfer process is to provide a stable source of capital through the entire economic cycle, it will need to evolve and expand. Financial markets are volatile and there will be times when capital market investors are unwilling to provide capital, at least not at an exorbitant price. Reinsurers, private mortgage insurers and REITs have a bigger role to play, as they have access to plenty of capital and are willing to take credit risk in less favorable market conditions. They just need to be as financially strong as the agencies and have the same obligations to serve the mortgage market.
While Fannie and Freddie’s credit risk transfers are still in their infancy, they are already succeeding in pushing off considerable amounts of credit risk to private investors, reducing the threat the agencies pose to taxpayers in the current housing finance system, and offering a solid foundation on which to build a new one.
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/one-part-of-gse-reform-is-already-working?feed=00000158-080c-dbde-abfc-3e7d1bf30000
08/04/2017 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 08/04/2017 14:16
FHFA Says No Change In GSE Credit Scoring Models Until 2019
In a speech August , 2017 at the National Association of Real Estate Brokers' 70th annual convention, Federal Housing Finance Agency Director Mel Watt explained there will be no change in the credit scoring system before mid-2019.
Watt explained the FHFA continues to research options for an alternative credit scoring model, however several new factors came up about competition in the credit score market.
Watt said more work also needs to be done on the operational impacts of the industry, and stressed that this task has been one of the most difficult evaluations undertaken during his tenure as director of the FHFA.
He said the FHFA will issue a request for industry input this Fall in order to get more information about the impact of alternative credit scoring models.
So far this year, Watt explained Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have put forth several changes which help ease access to credit such as the changes to student loan debt in April. The GSEs will continue to bring forth further change throughout this year to continue easing access to credit.
Currently, the Senate is considering a bill that would direct the FHFA to create a process that would allow alternative credit scoring models to be validated and approved by the GSEs when they purchase mortgage.
http://www.publicnow.com/view/D9D79120F86687ECFD4800FD90FF16EF8D90B165?2017-08-04-22:00:08+01:00-xxx114
How can GSEs succeed in helping underserved markets?
by Francis Monfort | Aug 04, 2017
With the forthcoming implementation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s “Duty to Serve Underserved Markets Plans,” a panel of housing finance leaders shared their views on how the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) can achieve their missions.
The plans are part of a Federal Housing Finance Agency rule that addresses mortgage access issues among low- and moderate-income families in the underserved manufactured-housing, affordable-housing-preservation, and rural-housing markets.
To maximize the impacts of their plans, housing-finance leaders said during a July 19 panel discussion at the Urban Institute that Fannie and Freddie should:
expand involvement in manufactured housing
incorporate federal programs to support rural housing
invest in community development financial institutions (CDFIs)
provide accessible reporting
collect and disseminate data
include other underserved markets
Ann Kossachev, regulatory affairs counsel for the National Association of Federally-Insured Credit Unions, said GSEs should become more involved in manufactured housing, including chattel lending, to support standardization to this market. Lending for manufactured homes, which comprise 9% of new single-family starts, faces financial, legal, and regulatory issues. Specifically, chattel lending in this market has greater risk because of weaker consumer protections and the lack of reliable data on which loan pricing is based. She said standardization brought about by GSE involvement will lower costs and lead to better borrower protections.
Although the GSEs’ plans already highlight federal programs like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit and existing loans programs of the Department of Agriculture, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may see benefits from incorporating these into their plans, said Corianne Scally, senior research associate with the Metropolitan Housing and Communities Policy Center of the Urban Institute. Scally said rural areas usually find it hard to compete for funding against urban areas and these federal programs provide them a source of affordable housing. In addition, GSEs should also tap small lenders and maximize their deep market knowledge.
Doug Ryan, director of affordable homeownership at Prosperity Now, said Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should help CDFIs have better access to capital to support the preservation of existing affordable housing. CDFIs and other nonprofits already serve the markets targeted by the GSE plans and have specialized local market knowledge.
The GSEs should be transparent in terms of program implementation, monitoring, and evaluation as they implement finals plans. According to Ethan Handelman, vice president for policy and advocacy with the National Housing Conference, potential program partners may be barred from involvement as the plans only represent objectives for one year of the plan’s three-year coverage.
The panel also suggested that the GSEs should help researchers and policymakers analyze the programs by publishing implementation data and in effect help make the programs scalable and sustainable. The experts also said that the GSEs can improve their plans by sufficiently addressing the underserved markets of single-family rentals, small-dollar loans, and farm worker assistance.
Related stories:
Fannie, Freddie release three-year plan on serving underserved markets
GSE reform must include affordable housing – civil rights groups
http://m.mpamag.com/news/how-can-gses-succeed-in-helping-underserved-markets-75087.aspx
BankThink A cautionary note for those intent on gutting GSEs
By
Thomas P. Vartanian
Published
July 31 2017, 12:04pm EDT
There is a body of opinion in Washington that the best way to move on from the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is to develop legislation to create a new housing finance system that retains a government backstop.
However, there can realistically be only muted hope that today’s Congress, nine years after the conservatorships started, will agree on a feasible strategy to unwind Fannie and Freddie and replace them with a viable alternative. Washington is too divided; the chances of a bipartisan bill are still in question.
Of course, Congress doesn’t need to act to end the conservatorships. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 in fact empowered and delegated the Federal Housing Finance Agency with the legal authority and responsibility to bring Fannie and Freddie out of conservatorship — assuming they can be sufficiently capitalized — and reform their regulation. The law could not be any clearer about the FHFA’s authority to set the housing finance system on a proper footing without direction from Capitol Hill.
Regardless of whether Congress could act, some supporters of proposals to recast or eliminate the two government-sponsored enterprises — and yet retain government support for mortgage assets — don’t seem to fully consider the complexities of transitioning to a future without Fannie and Freddie. Whenever elaborate financial policy reforms are implemented, a variety of economic, political, market and regulatory forces all necessarily intertwine over time to determine whether a policy will be successful, or an unintentional failure. Unfortunately, policymakers have all too often failed to rely on a clear, fact-based analysis of the risks and bad incentives they may be cultivating over the longer term. History tells us that it often takes decades before the impact of such a financial stew ferments into intended or unintended consequences.
The savings and loan crisis of the late eighties and early nineties is a perfect example of how good intentions can produce dire unintended financial consequences many years later. Its seeds were sown in the 1960s, when consumer deposit interest rate caps for S&Ls were capped at 5.5% to favor the S&Ls over banks and therefore help spur mortgage lending. But the market did not cooperate — interest rates in the country generally increased to unprecedented levels, hitting double digits by the early 1980s.
Depositors naturally abandoned banks and thrifts in favor of money funds which were paying about 10%. In response to this massive disintermediation, the government eliminated Regulation Q’s interest rate caps in 1982. But S&Ls then had to pay double-digit interest rates to remain liquid, while their assets consisted of 30-year fixed-rate mortgages yielding about 7%. This created negative spreads that burned through their capital. The die was cast at that point through the implementation of half-baked public policies.
So what is an example in some of the current GSE proposals of ideas that may have unintended consequences? Well, the capital base underlying a reformed housing finance system, for one. Large amounts of capital will undoubtedly be needed in a non-conservatorship future. This is particularly true since 100% of the profits that Fannie and Freddie have been earning over the last few years have been “swept” into the U.S. Treasury, and government policy has set Fannie and Freddie on a flight path to reach zero capital by Jan. 1, 2018.
In a recent speech, Federal Reserve Board Gov. Jerome Powell discussed GSE reform and sounded supportive of suggestions that Congress overhaul the system, although he did not endorse any one of the many GSE plans being floated. Powell mentioned the importance of capital, but he did not discuss the complex factors that will impact attracting that capital. Remember, Fannie and Freddie were never placed in receivership; they still have equity and debt holders whose ownership and contractual rights continue to be economically and legally extant. Any solution therefore requires that they be at the negotiation table.
Put another way, if their rights are eviscerated by whatever solution is forged, it will not only produce a volcano of litigation (which has already begun) similar to the “goodwill” cases brought by purchasers of failed S&Ls, it will impact negatively on the market’s willingness to provide the future capital that Fannie and Freddie (or their descendants) will need, as well as the cost of that capital.
Powell, some lawmakers and other commenters have also called for any future government guarantee to be explicit and transparent — rather than Fannie and Freddie’s implicit guarantee — and apply only to the mortgage securities issued under a new system.
But one byproduct of such an explicit government guarantee of GSE-backed MBS (that is presumably not extended to private-label MBS), which is hardly mentioned, is the likely reduction of risk-weighting of those securities for bank capital purposes — perhaps to zero. This would make them among the most attractive of investments. But like the incentives that were built into the Volcker Rule favoring government securities, such guarantees could have market- and liquidity-related effects that were never analyzed or intended.
Guaranteeing mortgage security instruments could also change the risk profile for taxpayers. As the last crisis proved, relying on deposit insurance in a widespread financial crisis to resolve failing banks can be more costly than guaranteeing the banks (as carried out by the Troubled Asset Relief Program.)
While returning Fannie and Freddie to the ranks of the private sector does require rigorous analysis, it is an admission of defeat to keep them in conservatorship. The FHFA has the full authority to end the conservatorships, and implement positive and attainable reforms. The only missing ingredient now is the will of the government.
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BankThink A cautionary note for those intent on gutting GSEs
By
Thomas P. Vartanian
Published
July 31 2017, 12:04pm EDT
More in
Housing finance reform
GSEs
Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac
FHFA
There is a body of opinion in Washington that the best way to move on from the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is to develop legislation to create a new housing finance system that retains a government backstop.
However, there can realistically be only muted hope that today’s Congress, nine years after the conservatorships started, will agree on a feasible strategy to unwind Fannie and Freddie and replace them with a viable alternative. Washington is too divided; the chances of a bipartisan bill are still in question.
Of course, Congress doesn’t need to act to end the conservatorships. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 in fact empowered and delegated the Federal Housing Finance Agency with the legal authority and responsibility to bring Fannie and Freddie out of conservatorship — assuming they can be sufficiently capitalized — and reform their regulation. The law could not be any clearer about the FHFA’s authority to set the housing finance system on a proper footing without direction from Capitol Hill.
?
In a recent speech, Federal Reserve Board Gov. Jerome Powell mentioned the importance of capital in the GSE debate, but he did not discuss the complex factors that will impact attracting that capital.Bloomberg News
Regardless of whether Congress could act, some supporters of proposals to recast or eliminate the two government-sponsored enterprises — and yet retain government support for mortgage assets — don’t seem to fully consider the complexities of transitioning to a future without Fannie and Freddie. Whenever elaborate financial policy reforms are implemented, a variety of economic, political, market and regulatory forces all necessarily intertwine over time to determine whether a policy will be successful, or an unintentional failure. Unfortunately, policymakers have all too often failed to rely on a clear, fact-based analysis of the risks and bad incentives they may be cultivating over the longer term. History tells us that it often takes decades before the impact of such a financial stew ferments into intended or unintended consequences.
The savings and loan crisis of the late eighties and early nineties is a perfect example of how good intentions can produce dire unintended financial consequences many years later. Its seeds were sown in the 1960s, when consumer deposit interest rate caps for S&Ls were capped at 5.5% to favor the S&Ls over banks and therefore help spur mortgage lending. But the market did not cooperate — interest rates in the country generally increased to unprecedented levels, hitting double digits by the early 1980s.
Depositors naturally abandoned banks and thrifts in favor of money funds which were paying about 10%. In response to this massive disintermediation, the government eliminated Regulation Q’s interest rate caps in 1982. But S&Ls then had to pay double-digit interest rates to remain liquid, while their assets consisted of 30-year fixed-rate mortgages yielding about 7%. This created negative spreads that burned through their capital. The die was cast at that point through the implementation of half-baked public policies.
So what is an example in some of the current GSE proposals of ideas that may have unintended consequences? Well, the capital base underlying a reformed housing finance system, for one. Large amounts of capital will undoubtedly be needed in a non-conservatorship future. This is particularly true since 100% of the profits that Fannie and Freddie have been earning over the last few years have been “swept” into the U.S. Treasury, and government policy has set Fannie and Freddie on a flight path to reach zero capital by Jan. 1, 2018.
In a recent speech, Federal Reserve Board Gov. Jerome Powell discussed GSE reform and sounded supportive of suggestions that Congress overhaul the system, although he did not endorse any one of the many GSE plans being floated. Powell mentioned the importance of capital, but he did not discuss the complex factors that will impact attracting that capital. Remember, Fannie and Freddie were never placed in receivership; they still have equity and debt holders whose ownership and contractual rights continue to be economically and legally extant. Any solution therefore requires that they be at the negotiation table.
Put another way, if their rights are eviscerated by whatever solution is forged, it will not only produce a volcano of litigation (which has already begun) similar to the “goodwill” cases brought by purchasers of failed S&Ls, it will impact negatively on the market’s willingness to provide the future capital that Fannie and Freddie (or their descendants) will need, as well as the cost of that capital.
Powell, some lawmakers and other commenters have also called for any future government guarantee to be explicit and transparent — rather than Fannie and Freddie’s implicit guarantee — and apply only to the mortgage securities issued under a new system.
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But one byproduct of such an explicit government guarantee of GSE-backed MBS (that is presumably not extended to private-label MBS), which is hardly mentioned, is the likely reduction of risk-weighting of those securities for bank capital purposes — perhaps to zero. This would make them among the most attractive of investments. But like the incentives that were built into the Volcker Rule favoring government securities, such guarantees could have market- and liquidity-related effects that were never analyzed or intended.
Guaranteeing mortgage security instruments could also change the risk profile for taxpayers. As the last crisis proved, relying on deposit insurance in a widespread financial crisis to resolve failing banks can be more costly than guaranteeing the banks (as carried out by the Troubled Asset Relief Program.)
While returning Fannie and Freddie to the ranks of the private sector does require rigorous analysis, it is an admission of defeat to keep them in conservatorship. The FHFA has the full authority to end the conservatorships, and implement positive and attainable reforms. The only missing ingredient now is the will of the government.
?
Thomas P. Vartanian
Thomas P. Vartanian is a partner in the law firm of Dechert LLP. He is a former general counsel of the agency that regulated S&Ls and oversaw the operation of Freddie Mac. He has represented GSEs, their executives, banks, trade associations and other investors in matters related to GSEs.
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/a-cautionary-note-for-those-intent-on-gutting-gses
They're also starting to do farmland...
Housing reform not GSE reform...
He sounds confused crossing back and forth...Housing Finance Reform is Congress' duty...not GSE Reform...GSE Reform has already taken place and is in its final stages of completion...once It's complete, its lights are ready to be switched on hence Mel Watt already giving Congress a heads up...ready or not the lights will switch on and the dancing will begin...
What the heck? Mel is about to get his groove on?! Lol
Too big to fail would be too much bigger too fail?
No he didn't...the vote was at 01:46PM...Why are you trying to make excuses for Corker?...just admit...he got mad at Mel and walked out...it is WATT it is...
Vote Summary
Question: On the Nomination (Confirmation Robert Lighthizer, of Florida, to be United States Trade Representative )
Vote Number: 127
Vote Date: May 11, 2017, 01:46 PM
Required For Majority: 1/2
Vote Result: Nomination Confirmed
Nomination Number: PN42
eeerrr....matey...'tis the map burrrriiiiedd in Davey Jones Locker...
Duty to Serve
You think they're smarter than a fifth grader to do that?...it only makes COMMON sense...
No thank you...fear of my calculator running low on battery and shutting off while spelling it incorrectly like some people that I post with here...
Then talk to me when the GSE'S are placed into receivership because we're not even close yet...
Eh...like you said...it was killed off very quickly...why worry about it now...it's going the other direction politically...
You've peaked my interest...now I'm analyzing your thought process...
Previously you've responded to my post as:
capitalismforever Member Level Saturday, 04/29/17 07:58:47 PM
Re: Captain Jack Sparrow post# 406776
Post #
406777
of 406817 Go
It's a rarity that I miss much when it comes to business analysis, but it's not impossible.
https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=130931687
However, for a business analyst to not know info on Morgan Stanley Treasurer Celeste Mellet Brown especially when we have google these days...to be honest I'm quite surprised...again no offense...
Also, on another note since you keep wanting to discuss receivership even though it's irrelevant right now...I've seen you've mentioned this over and over...the other...entity that you refer so much about...how much do you know about this possible entity during receivership? What I've read is that this entity is not one for replacement of the GSE's but rather to continue the process to wind up the affairs of the GSE's in the instance the GSE's are poised for receivership? Fear mongering should not be done during seeking the truth and explaining facts that you so dearly abide by...but yet...I see more so of the mongering than manifesting...why discuss anything about receivership now since we're so far fetched from even having to contemplate on the discussion? The food has not even begun to cook in the kitchen to be able to smell it at the dining table...how can you possibly smell it???
Just wanted to make sure you didn't miss at the bottom of my posting since the jpg blew up...because I only saw a partial quote of my post...and I didn't hear a response...
What I think will happen is irrelevant...it's what has been said and done is what my judgement is based on. Currently receivership is only a possibility whether or not it will be exercised?...take the current facts and the political direction and you can paint a picture on your white wall...hopefully it's not yet muddied...
Then I must say that you've been missing some recent facts...no offense...
People take actions, actions make changes to the outcome...a new staff has been made in charge, statements have been made that are much different than the past adminstration's "turning the page theory", a new cycle has begun...the wind is now blowing on the backs of the shareholders...but everyone is entitled to their own opinion...