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Obama's biofuels announcement
Did anyone hear anything on this. I am aware that Obama spoke, but did not have a chance to really watch.
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones) -- An interagency biofuels group created by U.S. President Barack Obama is set Wednesday to outline a broad agenda for ensuring the U.S. increases the amount of biofuels used in cars, trucks, and airplanes. Obama will outline the strategy this afternoon.
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Also, CNBC had an interesting feature on Sugar (another Soft commodity -- that has been very much dormant until recently.
Sugar, Cattle, Pork, Lumber, Cotton, Electricity -- and a few others -- again very similar trading patterns since 2004.
WRT sugar -- I think Hawaii has barely a few plantations left -- and these guys in government wonder where all the jobs have gone. And then amplify that for each one of the above sectors (minus electricity).
In my view, this could explain the "unwind" in many of the hard commodities now and the significant rise in the softs. Funny that Gartman was not even mentioning lumber futures today.
Also, in my view ABWTQ needs to get lined up to be able to lock into FIXED PRICE FLOOR contracts for lumber -- shows future cash flow.
Say that Lumber rises to $300, then with a falling Canadian dollar (in a backwardated market) -- what will their net-backs be. Operating earnings go up.
But -- the cost of servicing the debt goes up too. So have Fairfax as the counter-party -- then, get court approval to enter into a financial derivative -- similar to the approvals received in the Calpine case, so as to protect the "translation on foreign exchange gain" that has already been made from the Cdn dollar moving up from 0.65 to 0.94 of the USD.
Debt Management is (I guess) the real issue here (imo).
Gartman and Lumber Futures
Gartman just said sell Euro, Canadian Dollar, Aussie Dollar and buy U.S. Dollar. Says Greece may recover, but not some other Euro countries.
We will see what that recommendation does to the perception of ABWTQ.
-------------
Lumber futures rose -- but still lots of gaps in an upward rising chart. Backwardation is coming into full force again.
It's good that "cash" has been stable or rising in some areas -- that means that futures can stay up there for a while longer. As well, the assets in NewFoundland become that much more valuable to ABWTQ in a Canada-U.S. Freer Trade War.
I do not know who is taking over for Danny (given his heart condition), but I think that $300 million is nothing now and should be settled ASAP (less w/h severance issue).
-----------
KANSAS CITY, Feb 03, 2010 (Dow Jones Commodities News via Comtex) -- Chicago Mercantile Exchange lumber futures traders Wednesday resumed their upward trek with nearby March moving up to match and close at the Dec. 1 contract high.
The March contract settled $8.00 per 1,000 board feet higher at $269.00, for a 3.07% gain. The May contract settled unchanged at $283.00. July was up $4.00, or 1.42%, at $286.00.
Floor traders and brokers linked the gains to a renewed interest in cash-market activity. Mills and wholesalers reported more demand than they saw Tuesday although less than they saw Monday.
Prices were higher, and buyers often found it difficult, if not impossible, to find what they needed.
One floor trader said it looked as though some of the buying in nearby futures contracts may have been from those who could not find what they wanted in the cash market. Speculative and commodity fund-style buying appeared to have less influence on the gains in lumber futures as it did Monday when prices went limit up.
No spread trading was reported in the pit. A spread trade is one in which two separate contracts are traded simultaneously with the price difference between them being the main trading point.
Help - can someone tell me how to send a private message
CNBC Video on Cap & Trade from last June 2009
The first minute of the Video that discusses the general theme is the most relavent part (Canaccord Capital presentation).
http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=1168066999&play=1
Cap & Trade and the ABWTQ Assets
I may have (or someone else may have) previously posted this link for Point Carbon. Attached is yet another blurb on Goldman's Big Stake in C&T -- No doubt, Wall Street wants the ABWTQ assets.
http://www.pointcarbon.com/research/
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I think that there is a huge stake in the ABWTQ Assets moving forward – and Wall Street wants them real bad. I think they have already spent Big Bucks on the next big “gamer” (C&T).
Gangster State: Goldman Sachs and Cap and Trade
June 30th, 2009 | by Jake the Champion of the Constitution | Comments
Last week the House voted 219-212 to pass HR 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, whose intent is to “create clean energy jobs, achieve energy independence, reduce global warming pollution and transition to a clean energy economy.”
I’ve only had time to browse the 1,092 page bill and sincerely believe it will not achieve a single one of its purposes.
The creation of clean energy jobs is very vague and the parts that are clear center not on industry but on educating people about global warming - this appears to signal the creation of a new class of bureaucrat-teachers, not industrial jobs.
Energy independence? Transition to a clean energy economy? Get real, there is nothing of substance in the document that details such a plan, and this is a pipe dream for government to create this. What will you ask? Only a free market, driven by the consumer and free from government interventions can do so, in my opinion.
“Reduce global warming pollution?” Somehow I missed the scientific debate where the global warmers square off against the global coolers and those who believe that ‘the weather just changes, weather you want it to or not’ as I suggested here “Anthropogenic Global Warming or an Ice Age, Which Is It? (PART 2/2)“. Is carbon dioxide really a pollutant? Don’t plants need it to live and don’t we all respire it? It would be a lot cheaper and a lot more useful than HR 2454!
My own private analysis of HR 2454 can be summarized up with:
• Inefficient energy sources will instead be propped up and buffered from free market competition by the government.
• The taxed companies will pass down the taxes to We the People, and energy costs will rise for us, the consumers.
• The State will subsidize and hence sponsor, mandated education that “global warming” is fact, stifling debate.
• Wall Street will have a great time doing all the carbon credits trading using derivatives with “underlying assets” that are literally in many cases, just hot air.
These were the Goldman Cap n Trade holding that were listed some time ago.
Itron ITRI
Telvent TLVT
Enernoc ENOC
US.Geothermal Inc. HTM
First Solar FSLR
Suntech STP
Unlisted companies are:
Horizon Wind Energy
Changing World Tech. (IPO held off)
BP Solar
Chicago Climate Enchange
Blue Source
Iogen
Bond
Sun Edison
Ice Energy
Nordex
Nordic Windpower
Perhaps if Cap n trade passes there will be a large number of IPO's coming, then Goldman backed CapNtrade ETF's will start.
Thanks - ergodoc (RE: ABWTQ and Tembec)
No wonder that M. Dumas from Tembec thinks the market is rigged.
And why Market Regulation of Canada either does not wnat to talk about it or says that the U.S. guys are running the show with their algorithim trading program.
Why -- because their program really does manipulate markets.
If as Goldman says, their trading program is based on mathematical formulas -- then we should be able to see relationships between trades and brokerages (shorts and longs -- differentials will be naked shorts -- some leg. naked shorts and some illegal).
Stockwatch only gives me data on the last ten trades (or so) for both ABWTQ and Tembec.
Look at Tembec first:
Wouldn't mind seeing a print out on TMB (daily trades for the whole day).
Note that TMB data also corresponds to TMBCF in the U.S.
What you are trying to tie into is the OTC trades (50,000 at 15:40:39 ($1.1159) and (50,000 at 14:53:25 ($1.1159). Vs. ABWTQ price of $0.115 and $0.12 price per share.
You may recall that I saw the 1.12 number being held by someone -- what a farce that they don't want to let TMB run at the moment -- why? why not? There was big volume coming in today as lumber futures closed higher on the day.
Then what you are trying to do is tie the 100,000 OTC trades under TMBCF into Goldman -- which you can tie 38,500 shares from the data (carryover of 11,500 into the 3rd. from the last block).
1st block I can't see both sides of the transaction. Don't have enough data to complete the analysis on TMB.
--------------------
Then move to ABWTQ data
You want to tie ABLE to the 100,000 OTB data somehow (if you can).
Depth/Level II for Tembec Inc New (TMBCF)
$ 1.1159 0.0859 (+8.34%)
Volume: 100.0 k 3:40 PM EST Feb 2, 2010
Time & Sales
Price Size Exch Time
1.1159 50000 OTO 15:40:39
1.1159 50000 OTO 14:53:25
1.03 800 OTO 01/29
1.0518 900 OTO 01/28
1.0518 1000 OTO 01/28
1.0522 100 OTO 01/28
1.0706 1000 OTO 01/28
1.0539 300 OTO 01/28
1.1555 900 OTO 01/21
1.1635 11000 OTO 01/20
t 1.052 35322 OTO 01/14
t 1.032 35322 OTO 01/14
1.0405 100 OTO 01/14
1.0405 100 OTO 01/14
1.0405 100 OTO 01/14
1.0399 900 OTO 01/14
1.0399 300 OTO 01/14
1.0374 2200 OTO 01/14
t 1.03 47000 OTO 01/13
t 1.05 47000 OTO 01/13
t 1.03 7100 OTO 01/12
t 1.05 7100 OTO 01/12
1.05 600 OTO 01/12
1.05 4400 OTO 01/12
t 1.032 66800 OTO 01/11
t 1.052 66800 OTO 01/11
1.0485 10000 OTO 01/11
1.0485 10000 OTO 01/11
1.0274 400 OTO 01/11
t 1.05 15000 OTO 01/08
Symbol: GO
Symbol Lookup | Recent Quotes
TMBCF
Tembec Inc New X
Close
Detailed Quote for Tembec Inc New (TMBCF)
$ 1.1159 0.0859 (+8.34%)
Volume: 100.0 k 3:40 PM EST Feb 2, 2010
Today 5d 1m 3m 1y more
Last Price
1.1159
Change $
0.0859
Change %
8.34%
Tick
Open
1.1159
High
1.1159
Low
1.1159
Prev Close
1.03
Last Trade
3:40
Volume
100.0 k
52 Wk Hi
1.261
52 Wk Low
0.456
Shares
100,000,000
EPS (TTM)
N/A
PE Ratio
N/A
close Exchange Information
Listed On
Other-OTC (OTO)
Exchange
OTO
Data for TMB in Canada
Recent Trades - Last 10 of 34
Time ET Ex Price Change Volume Buyer Seller Markers
15:46:37 T 1.17 0.03 100 65 Goldman 1 Anonymous K
15:45:52 T 1.15 0.01 2,000 36 Latimer 65 Goldman K
15:45:52 T 1.15 0.01 8,000 7 TD Sec 65 Goldman K
15:40:13 T 1.17 0.03 700 36 Latimer 1 Anonymous K
15:39:46 T 1.17 0.03 3,300 36 Latimer 1 Anonymous K
15:39:24 T 1.17 0.03 3,500 36 Latimer 1 Anonymous K
15:39:24 T 1.17 0.03 20,900 33 Canaccord 1 Anonymous K
15:23:57 T 1.17 0.03 800 33 Canaccord 65 Goldman K
15:23:56 T 1.19 0.05 1,500 36 Latimer 9 BMO Nesbitt K
15:23:56 T 1.18 0.04 1,000 36 Latimer 19 Desjardins K
-------------------
Depth/Level II for Abitibibowater Inc (ABWTQ)
$ 0.12 -0.003 (-2.44%)
Volume: 463.8 k 3:56 PM EST Feb 2, 2010
Time & Sales
Price Size Exch Time
0.12 5000 OTO 15:56:55
0.12 25000 OTO 15:55:55
0.125 10000 OTO 15:52:42
0.125 35200 OTO 15:45:16
0.125 500 OTO 15:45:08
0.125 25000 OTO 15:44:59
0.124 2900 OTO 15:38:39
0.124 100 OTO 15:38:21
0.124 3000 OTO 15:37:46
0.124 200 OTO 15:37:23
0.124 9800 OTO 15:37:21
0.123 5000 OTO 15:36:22
0.123 5000 OTO 15:34:51
0.123 25000 OTO 15:34:33
0.123 25000 OTO 15:34:27
0.12 125 OTO 15:31:00
0.12 5000 OTO 15:30:11
0.12 5000 OTO 15:28:26
0.12 5000 OTO 15:25:04
0.12 3100 OTO 15:24:45
0.12 6900 OTO 15:24:42
0.12 15000 OTO 15:22:24
0.12 50000 OTO 15:22:15
0.115 25000 OTO 15:22:12
0.11 22000 OTO 14:46:36
0.11 5000 OTO 14:45:53
0.11 10000 OTO 14:45:18
0.11 2500 OTO 14:30:57
0.11 500 OTO 13:48:25
0.11 100 OTO 13:48:20
Ergodoc Data -- listed below -- This is what I could find at stockwatch.com
Trades
Exchange
Time Price Change Volume
Q 2010-02-02 15:56:55 0.12 -0.003 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:55:55 0.12 -0.003 25,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:52:42 0.125 0.002 10,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:45:16 0.125 0.002 35,200
Q 2010-02-02 15:45:08 0.125 0.002 500
Q 2010-02-02 15:44:59 0.125 0.002 25,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:38:39 0.124 0.001 2,900
Q 2010-02-02 15:38:21 0.124 0.001 100
Q 2010-02-02 15:37:46 0.124 0.001 3,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:37:23 0.124 0.001 200
Q 2010-02-02 15:37:21 0.124 0.001 9,800
Q 2010-02-02 15:36:22 0.123 0.00 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:34:51 0.123 0.00 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:34:33 0.123 0.00 25,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:34:27 0.123 0.00 25,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:31:00 0.12 -0.003 125
Q 2010-02-02 15:30:11 0.12 -0.003 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:28:26 0.12 -0.003 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:25:04 0.12 -0.003 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:24:45 0.12 -0.003 3,100
Q 2010-02-02 15:24:42 0.12 -0.003 6,900
Q 2010-02-02 15:22:24 0.12 -0.003 15,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:22:15 0.12 -0.003 50,000
Q 2010-02-02 15:22:12 0.115 -0.008 25,000
Q 2010-02-02 14:46:36 0.11 -0.013 22,000
Q 2010-02-02 14:45:53 0.11 -0.013 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 14:45:18 0.11 -0.013 10,000
Q 2010-02-02 14:30:58 0.11 -0.013 2,500
Q 2010-02-02 13:48:25 0.11 -0.013 500
Q 2010-02-02 13:48:21 0.11 -0.013 100
Q 2010-02-02 13:46:40 0.106 -0.017 240
Q 2010-02-02 13:40:39 0.11 -0.013 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 13:37:01 0.11 -0.013 33,900
Q 2010-02-02 13:35:54 0.11 -0.013 100
Q 2010-02-02 13:31:27 0.11 -0.013 24,500
Q 2010-02-02 13:31:19 0.11 -0.013 100
Q 2010-02-02 13:29:40 0.115 -0.008 2,500
Q 2010-02-02 13:11:56 0.115 -0.008 900
Q 2010-02-02 13:11:37 0.115 -0.008 100
Q 2010-02-02 12:55:54 0.115 -0.008 10,000
Q 2010-02-02 12:55:38 0.115 -0.008 2,000
Q 2010-02-02 11:59:22 0.115 -0.008 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 11:36:21 0.115 -0.008 10,000
Q 2010-02-02 10:59:00 0.12 -0.003 1,000
Q 2010-02-02 10:54:48 0.12 -0.003 1,000
Q 2010-02-02 10:48:22 0.115 -0.008 113
Q 2010-02-02 10:25:54 0.115 -0.008 422
Q 2010-02-02 09:54:14 0.123 0.00 9,402
Q 2010-02-02 09:54:14 0.123 0.00 10,598
Q 2010-02-02 09:53:17 0.12 -0.003 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 09:32:20 0.12 -0.003 5,000
Q 2010-02-02 09:30:08 0.118 -0.005 5,000
ergodoc - thanks - can you post house positions for this afternoon Abitibi trades
I've got a hunch.
That’s arbitrage
At exactly the same time that ABWTQ started moving up so did Tembec (maybe a co-incidence – but).
On Tembec, Canaccord doing a lot of buying today. And Anonymous doing everything it can to hold the bid at 1.12 (5,000 shares) at the end of the day by 1.17 – then Goldman paints the tape with the 100 shares.
Relationship between ABWTQ and Tembec appears to have been algorithm changed to 0.095 to 0.1 since we have been discussing everything.
Again, that’s arbitrage – why? Something is definitely going on with ABWTQ (close at 0.12 – just below the 0.123 – 50 day moving average). ABWTQ – finance guys not talking today. You ask them a question and they clam up (I dunno).
Recent Trades - Last 10 of 34
Time ET Ex Price Change Volume Buyer Seller Markers
15:46:37 T 1.17 0.03 100 65 Goldman 1 Anonymous K
15:45:52 T 1.15 0.01 2,000 36 Latimer 65 Goldman K
15:45:52 T 1.15 0.01 8,000 7 TD Sec 65 Goldman K
15:40:13 T 1.17 0.03 700 36 Latimer 1 Anonymous K
15:39:46 T 1.17 0.03 3,300 36 Latimer 1 Anonymous K
15:39:24 T 1.17 0.03 3,500 36 Latimer 1 Anonymous K
15:39:24 T 1.17 0.03 20,900 33 Canaccord 1 Anonymous K
15:23:57 T 1.17 0.03 800 33 Canaccord 65 Goldman K
15:23:56 T 1.19 0.05 1,500 36 Latimer 9 BMO Nesbitt K
15:23:56 T 1.18 0.04 1,000 36 Latimer 19 Desjardins K
Another Take on the ABWTQ Administration Filing
For now, continue to assume that there is a deal with Tembec – Tembec said last week that they are close to selling their Europe facilities. ABWTQ tried to sell theirs, but couldn’t – so they file Administration – stranded asset)
And, in the interim, ABWTQ does not want to compete with either their own or Tembec’s plants (worldwide).
Other comments Tembec Annual Meeting that may assist in ABWTQ asset evaluation
Saw mills running at 42% capacity-looking at a further 2-3 years for USA housing recovery Using $206 per for RL lumber – for cash flow est. -- Upside here according to Management very lean inventory in both lumber and log inventory in all of North America.
Lumber price increases could be surprising. China becoming a significant purchaser of West coast lumber. I believe he said 100% year over year.
Newsprint -- exiting Manitoba one way or another. But as the Canadian dollar falls, export markets will come back.
Pulp was brightest point , China back in buying in a big way Febuary price increase likely to stick ,the world credit problems helped stymie new mill construction out for a couple of years and or maybe indefinatley.
Black liquor credits expired December. Specialty Pulp very tight bullish demand.
In relation to Tembec’s stock trading price over the past several years, including a discussion of the company’s naked shorts and its own reorganization plan, M. Dumas commented that it’s got to be rigged.
In conversation with Market Regulation Services in Canada – they do not want to talk about Abitibi. They say that they cannot comment on any pending investigations into Stock Trading.
But the fact that I got the run-around tells me that something could be going on behind the scenes. I think Big Brother is watching this one extremely closely – because it is so political, because of the pension issue.
Note below comments from another trading board on the relationship between the U.S. and the Canadian Dollar from November 21, 2009. The 2nd comment in particular caught my eye.
CD$
gk - Friday at 12:16 PM
Completing a very large triangle that started in July, 2009. Wave e being completed now. Triangle size projects a 20 to 25 cent rally which would put the $US at 1.20 to 1.25 for one $CD. We will easily exceed the the previous high of $1.10 US to $1.00 CD made a year or so ago.
gk
* Re: CD$
jake - Friday at 12:21 PM
totally agree gary...theres a number of technical and fundamental issues lining up. this will wreak havoc on the phony ontario/quebec manufacturing industry.
Something is definitely not right. Below is a list of the insiders on ABWTQ – FYI
MAJOR DIRECT HOLDERS (FORMS 3 & 4)
Holder Shares Reported
STEELHEAD PARTNERS LLC
N/A 23-Apr-09
STEELHEAD NAVIGATOR MASTER, L.P.
5,194,652 5-Dec-08
PATERSON DAVID J
228,710 30-Jan-09
EVANS RICHARD B
101,040 21-Nov-08
HARVEY WILLIAM G
78,105 30-Jan-09
-------------
As an aside, but very much related to the naked shorting on ABY, BOW and ABWTQ is
JLL Partners and Patheon – Advised by Goldman Sachs same as ABWTQ.
Did JLL naked short their own stock to acquire more shares in the company and force a showdown.
Data will paste into Excel.
SETTLEMENT DATE CUSIP SYMBOL QUANTITY (FAILS) DESCRIPTION PRICE
20061013 70319W108 PNHNF 30400 PATHEON INC (F) 1
20061222 70319W108 PNHNF 19500 PATHEON INC (F) 1
20070430 70319W108 PNHNF 13900 PATHEON INC (F) 4.26
20070607 70319W108 PNHNF 37983 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.9
20070612 70319W108 PNHNF 15500 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.97
20070613 70319W108 PNHNF 15500 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.68
20070614 70319W108 PNHNF 15500 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.75
20070615 70319W108 PNHNF 20000 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.9
20070718 70319W108 PNHNF 118644 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.98
20070719 70319W108 PNHNF 25002 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.97
20070808 70319W108 PNHNF 48000 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.63
20071126 70319W108 PNHNF 30740 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.12
20071127 70319W108 PNHNF 23000 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.04
20071228 70319W108 PNHNF 11100 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.13
20080109 70319W108 PNHNF 15150 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.11
20080123 70319W108 PNHNF 10000 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.12
20080124 70319W108 PNHNF 15500 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.10
20080225 70319W108 PNHNF 39000 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.21
20080331 70319W108 PNHNF 36400 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.03
20080404 70319W108 PNHNF 10000 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.13
20080508 70319W108 PNHNF 10976 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.85
20080626 70319W108 PNHNF 30000 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 4.11
20080731 70319W108 PNHNF 10870 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.94
20080903 70319W108 PNHNF 36470 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 3.29
20081030 70319W108 PNHNF 12100 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 1.68
20081118 70319W108 PNHNF 34887 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 0.91
20081201 70319W108 PNHNF 43654 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 1.03
20081202 70319W108 PNHNF 29271 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 0.93
20081211 70319W108 PNHNF 38545 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 1.69
20081223 70319W108 PNHNF 10000 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 1.70
20090323 70319W108 PNHNF 30500 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 1.98
20090422 70319W108 PNHNF 10000 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 1.99
20090423 70319W108 PNHNF 19200 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 1.95
20090424 70319W108 PNHNF 19200 PATHEON INC RESTRICTED VOTING 1.99
Pick your lumber futures month
Basically all the same from a "technical" trading standpoint".
I expect huge swings and volatility, until the pattern is cast. (ie. may go down for two days, then up huge).
http://futures.tradingcharts.com/chart/LU/70
http://futures.tradingcharts.com/chart/LU/90
Cash Collateral Information on CDS – may assist
Guest Post: Sham Transactions That Led To AIG's Downfall: The Ugly Truth Was Hiding In Plain Sight
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 01/29/2010 16:58 -0500
Submitted by David Fiderer, posted originally at Huffington Post
Sham Transactions That Led To AIG's Downfall: The Ugly Truth Was Hiding In Plain Sight
If you want to understand the deals that wiped out AIG, the best place to start is the website of the New York Fed. In the financial statement of Maiden Lane III, published last April, we see the gory details of the three largest CDO investments - Max 2008-1, Max 2007-1, and TRIAXX 2006-2A - acquired from AIG's banks at par. Those deals, which totaled $10.7 billion, offer a template for evaluating the other sham transactions in the portfolio.
Initially, the business deal between AIG and the banks was that AIG sold credit default swap protection. Banks buy credit default swaps for two reasons: They want to slice and their dice credit risk, and/or they want to hide something. Here's a simple, fairly innocuous, illustration: Suppose you're a banker who tells his client, Procter & Gamble, "We want to expand the relationship and do more business with you." P&G then says, "Fine, lend us $100 million." Back at the office, your senior credit management says, "The maximum risk exposure we approve for P&G is $80 million." How do you keep in P&G's good graces? You lend the company $100 million, and simultaneously offload $20 million in risk exposure by purchasing a credit default swap from another bank. P&G's understanding is that you've lent them $100 million.
When Deutsche Bank bought a credit default swap from AIG in 2008, its primary motivation was not to slice up the credit risk, but to hide virtually all of it.
Max 2008-1, a CDO that Deutsche arranged and closed on June 25, 2008, was huge. The total debt issue was $5.8 billion, of which 94%, or the entire $5.4 billion Class A-1 tranche, was covered by one credit default swap issued by AIG Financial Products. The Class A-1 tranche was considered "supersenior" because it was ahead of two other tranches, both originally rated Aaa, which totaled $200 million. (The remaining debt $200 million worth of debt was rated Aa, a and Baa at closing.)
Put another way, Deutsche Bank did not bring Max 2008-1 to "the marketplace," where investors might consider buying the deal on its own merits. By normal standards, the "market" for this CDO never really existed. Nor did Deutsche sell the deal to AIG, which could have assumed both the risks and rewards of owning a huge CDO. (In all fairness, we do not know where the remaining 6%, or $400 million, of less-senior tranches ended up. Deutsche could have kept them in inventory to be stuffed into a yet another CDO.)
Almost all circumstances surrounding Max 2008-1 seem weird. We do not know much about the $5.4 billion Class A-1 tranche, except that it was never downgraded below its initial Aaa rating. Yet, according to Deutsche Bank, AIG and Maiden Lane III's accountants, the underlying value of Max 2008-1 collapsed within a matter of months. By the time that the government agreed to acquire the CDO at par, the Class A-1 tranche purportedly had a negative "mark-to-market" of $2.5 billion. (As noted earlier, accountants, both for AIG and the Fed, determined that that there was no market benchmark for valuing any of the CDOs.) So did AIG turn over $2.5 billion in cash collateral to Deutsche? No. It turned over $4 billion, as revealed in AIG's filing with the SEC, dated May 15, 2009.
Among the hundred plus CDO deals to which AIG extended credit protection, the only ones which received collateral postings in excess of the "negative market-to-market" were the two biggest: Max 2008-1 and Max 2007-1, as revealed in the SEC filing of May 15, 2009. Together, those two CDO tranches had a par value of $7.5 billion and a "negative market-to-market" of $3.5 billion at the time Maiden Lane III closed. But AIG had already turned over $5.6 billion in collateral to Deutsche Bank, $2 billion more than what anyone thought to be necessary.
Everything about Max 2008-1 suggests that the parties were not acting on an arms-length basis, that they had something to hide. A deal rated Aaa doesn't decline in value by 40% within months after closing and still retain its Aaa rating. (The more junior tranches received moderate downgrades on March 19, 2009.) A cash-strapped insurance conglomerate does not turn over $2 billion in excess cash collateral for no reason. AIGFP had unsuccessfully struggled for the better part of a year to establish an agreed-upon method for calculating the amounts of cash collateral postings on these credit default swaps. It seems more than a little odd that it would choose to expand this problem with a credit derivative more than twice the size of its next largest CDO exposure. And it seems especially odd that it would close such a deal in June 2008, one month after Moody's and S&P had downgraded AIG, and issued warnings that further downgrades could be coming.
What becomes obvious, after reviewing Max 2008-1, Max 2007-1, and TRIAXX 2006-2A, is that these deals never could have been done but for AIG's willingness to assume the lion's share of the credit risk.
TRIAXX 2006-2A was a $5 billion deal, of which AIGFP assumed $3.2 billion, or 64%, of the credit risk. AIGFP provided credit protection in three different tranches, all of which were rated AAA at closing. The sole underwriter and arranger for the $5 billion CDO, which closed in December 2006, was an outfit called ICP Securities LLC, a private firm owned by its employees. In retrospect, it seems remarkable that AIG would have assumed such a large exposure in a deal structured by a relatively small private company. Nonetheless, ICP was able to sell its deal into the marketplace, if that's the correct way to characterize it. Of the $3.2 billion in credit protection sold by AIG, $2.5 billion was purchased by Goldman Sachs, another $0.4 billion was acquired by an affiliate of Dresdner bank, and $.03 billion was acquired by a company of unknown origin, called CORAL Purchasing (Ireland) Limited. All of this information was disclosed by AIG to the SEC on May 15, 2009.
The Aaa ratings at TRIAXX 2006-2A remained in effect at the time AIG collapsed, and at the time the CDOs were sold at par to Maiden Lane III. Nonetheless, Goldman had demanded, and received about $1 billion in cash collateral postings prior to the date when the New York Fed took the exposure off of AIG's books. About a month after Maiden Lane III closed out its books for the year, on December 31, 2008, TRIAXX 2006-2A suffered a downgrade, to Caa.
Those eight-month-old public disclosures are very incomplete, but they reveal a lot. They indicate that these CDO deals were not, by any stretch of the imagination, conducted on an arms-length basis, and that the these transactions took forms that were designed to conceal the true economic interests of the parties. I'm always amazed by what people, especially people not from the financial world, don't know. Big banks are not like the Pentagon or the Coalition Provisional Authority. Billion dollar amounts do not just slip through the cracks. There is no way that the very top people at AIG and Deutsche Bank would not be thoroughly briefed about every aspect of a $5.4 billion credit default swap for a CDO called Max 2008-1.
The newly disclosed information, which reveals the redacted parts of AIG's May 15, 2009 filing, serves to confirm what we already realized. At AIGFP's CDO business, nothing was what it seemed.
---------------------
This article has been posted on many boards today. Many traders are expecting a big unwind of derivatws this week. The start of the Bank (deleveraging process of inflationary commodities). Many linked to housing in one way or another.
Danny Williams and Future Land Value
Does anyone think this guy is smart enough to realize that with land values starting to rise, and timber assets starting to rise, that 300 million less the severance issue is really a good number.
How long before ABWTQ says the value is now $400 million -- that's what I would do.
In terms of Future Land Value for ABWTQ
Cramer's comments for PCL and WY
---------------
Consistent with the pricing information provided last night on the entire timber and lumber industry.
Re: ABWTQ -- Quebec stumpage fees (if stumpage fees are going up in the US South), how do the Quebec fees compare.
-----------------
And Plum Creek Timber [PCL 36.17 -0.39 (-1.07%) ] will report whether land is appreciating or depreciating depending upon land sales.
Finally, on Friday Weyerhaeuser [WY 39.90 -0.58 (-1.43%) ] , another timber company that owns large tracks of land will report and should give us some insights into housing, especially shadow inventory versus new construction.
US Treasury Debt (US Housing) and China
Dylan Ratigan Video from earlier today
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31510813/#35150411
Not sure I agree with everything being said, because the issue is overall very complex. But they do reference US Banks, the Fed and Ponzi Scheme.
ABWTQ -- the trading of shares by mm's
From another board -- doom and gloom or true!
The greatest unwinding of the Fed-GS Ponzi market.29-Jan-10
...is beginning. Using easy Fed ZERO rate doillars, GS bought the market with the PPT, they were also buying derivatives, CDOs, MBS's...NOTHING has changed! As the markets were pushed higher..they made huge profits...bought more...markets higher still...even more profits...round and round Enron style. With huge leverage, they looked like geniuses...NOW comes PAYBACK time...big time. The spiral down will break them and their Ponzi scheme...they will need a huge bailout again before mid-year.
maxhubris
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Stock trading is a pyramid scheme 29-Jan-10 04:18 pm
No, it is NOT the same as an ongoing BID-ASK market for goods or services. Because goods and services provide a TANGIBLE BENEFIT to the end buyer. The same would be true were one to buy out the ENTIRE AMOUNT OF EXISTING SHARES because then one could tangibly run the entire business since one would then own it all. But a BID-ASK market for "just some shares" is nothing but a paper traded pyramid scheme. Because all the end buyer of "just some shares" ends up with is nothing really tangible. In theory, it is a percentage of a business. However, since one has no control vis a vis the running of the business when one owns "just some shares" then such % ownership is really meaningless. Neither can one really control which way the stock will go after one "invests" ones cash into shares. One cannot move the stock price up or down unless one owns a lot of shares and has a lot more cash. Thus, you are stuck at the mercy of "someone else" who can move the stock price up or down, and logic dictates that that "someone else" are the Fund Institutions who do have the large amount of both shares and cash to move stock prices up and down via the BID-ASK ongoing scheme. And thus, you must ask yourself why an institution would want to benefit you by moving their bids higher after you bought from them? Logic dictates that such institutions want to benefit only themselves AT YOUR EXPENSE.
Meaning, that since they cannot possibly benefit all of their clients, they will go out of their way to benefit their wealthiest few clients.
brucelunati...
Cramer had some interesting comments on PlumCreek Timber and International Paper tonight.
Not so much that the US housing crisis was over, just that the value in “land” was reaching a bottom OR had reached bottom. You will need to see the full interview for affect.
-------------------------------
Note on China growth story – over the past couple of days, the masses on CNBC have really pushed the idea that the China growth story is going to slow down. And this may in fact be true.
But maybe, what actually happens is that China slows down some, but the balance of trade shifts somewhat as well (ie with a stronger US currency, and all that goes with it).
If rates go up in 2010, is it really a bad thing, should the value of your home goes up by the same amount.
Which means the value of all mortgages go up too, even the ones deemed previously as “toxic”.
Example:
Sell for 20 cents on the dollar during the crisis, or 40 cents last year or 42 cents now – this issue is that if the value of land is increasing, then distressed mortgages have greater value now when compared to last year.
-----------------------
Note on China:
I always take with a grain of salt the Business News reported on CCTV – but it seems to me that certain parts of the China are very much expecting a continued growth story for the next few years, due to their perceived value for Tourism within the country.
And with the movement of the population from Urban to Rural (more house building) is required and is expected to continue well into 2012, as High Speed rail service continues to be built.
I Agree (delayed MOR) -- I think the report will come out either on Monday or Tuesday.
Lumber futures up strong today -- I think just reflecting cash prices of $249 for the week.
Kind of an odd-pattern though. On March and on May Futures -- a two day island reversal pattern (is there even such a thing). Big Open Interest positions and a rising market to boot.
Tape painted at the end of the day on Tembec as well (by who else Goldman). See below.
Recent Trades - Last 10 of 50
Time ET Ex Price Change Volume Buyer Seller Markers
15:59:10 T 1.09 -0.02 100 65 Goldman 19 Desjardins K
15:58:53 T 1.06 -0.05 900 19 Desjardins 99 Jitney K
15:57:36 T 1.08 -0.03 1 2 RBC 36 Latimer E
15:55:21 T 1.08 -0.03 100 65 Goldman 99 Jitney K
------------------
Another Naked Short comment from another board tonight -- will post more as I see them.
Disclose your NAKED shorts Lloyd! 23 minutes ago
Stealing from the American taxpayers....
boatinginju...
-----------------
these Naked Short Comments are coming fast and furious on many bulletin boards. Hopefully the SSCCQ.pk guys observe.
It appears that some individuals are really out to drop the GS stock price. Probably the GS traders, themselves -- for cheap options.
Then again, I am hearing that Dylan Ratigan may do a "spot" on illegal naked shorting. imo, you need to combine with CDS, otherwise the issue really means nothing. Because together these two sadistic crimes allow for complete contol over a company's Bonds.
Re: Steelhead (o.k) - whatever (I am wrong)
http://www.secform4.com/insider-trading/1133521.htm
Steelhead -- I think they still own over 5.1 million shares (directly).
Steelhead Navigator Master L.P. - Portfolio Holdings (Majority Ownership).
The filing that is referred to is a different name. As I said before, unless they had a Legal Name Change that I do not know about. I think, Steelhead was a long-short hedge fund wrt Abitibi.
http://www.secform4.com/insider-trading/1385897.htm
Taking out stops?
Not sure if it means anything, but at exactly the same time, the bid on Tembec dropped. Sales at 1.06. Goldman was trying to bring it down the last couple of days.
Market is likely rigged by a computer algor. program.
AIG Bailout – isn’t the real truth that there were just too many houses, given the then current population.
That said, lumber, over supply situation, but also reflective of a large component of a house’s replacement cost.
-- Postings from another board that may help on the CDS aspect of ABWTQ. Who holds all of the "sold" mutual fund shares from last year. Cannot be all "retail" investors hoping to make a buck. MM's -- they can do anything on the Q's -- wild, wild, west.
----------------
Did GS Keep Collateral Paid To Them Plus Get 100% On $ For CDS's From AIG? 27-Jan-10 11:42 am
Goldman had Collateral on the CDS's Swaps with AIG. Meaning that if the value of the CDS's went down in value AIG had to give GS the difference to hold.
How much collateral did GS have from AIG? So, did GS get even more than 100% on the Dollar.
So is GS held 50% on the Dollar in Collateral and then get paid 100%. Their bet would have paid off by 150%.
watsyouthin...
Re: Did GS Keep Collateral Paid To Them Plus Get 100% On $ For CDS's From AIG? 27-Jan-10 11:45 am
I believe the government received those assets at 50% on the dollar in return for the payment at par. Those assets I believe are on the balance sheet of the government and have increased in value. I just don't believe enough to cover what was paid out.
tea_party_r...
Re: Did GS Keep Collateral Paid To Them Plus Get 100% On $ For CDS's From AIG? 27-Jan-10 12:00 pm
To my knowledg it has never been disclosed.
watsyouthin...
AIG bailout - The question that never gets asked 27-Jan-10 10:30 am
If government money was going to be used to "solve the crisis" why didn't Hank Paulson and his buddies even consider using the government money to pay the payments on the underlying defaulting mortgages and keep the credit default swap payouts from being triggered in the first place?
This would have kept the house from burning down at all and then the insurance policies would not even be required to pay off. We all know that the derivatives multiplied the problem many times over but keeping the mortgages current would have kept the payout to a minimum.
This whole manufactured "crisis" was a complete scam on the American people designed to multiply the profits of Wall Street banker bonuses.
gator009200...
Re: AIG bailout - The question that never gets asked 27-Jan-10 10:41 am
You could have still foreclosed on the people that weren't paying the mortgages but have the government make payments to the people that were holding the mortgages and expecting the payments.
If there are 100 insurance policies on a mortgage that defaults, the payout on the CDS is 100 times the underlying value of the mortgage.
gator009200...
Thanks Dav for all of your recent posts
I have read them all.
-----------------
I try to think of the ABWTQ situation from a logical perspective:
Article below deals with struggling Food Producers (Hogs) and Tyson Foods (Cattle). Note that the article says that demand was not necessarily falling due to the recession, yet hog prices have not doubled like crude this past year -- why (lumber, cotton etc.)
1. I always first assume that a decision was made in February 2004 by someone to game the stock market using commodity and currency derivatives -- charts (across wide sectors, currencies and exchanges) are just too perfect.
2. the objective was to “inflate” the economy in order to keep the 90’s boom going a little longer.
3. As Blankfein said, we thought we were doing the right thing – we are market makers, and that’s what we do.
4. housing prices were to go up along with crude, natural gas, gold, precious metals, and certain agricultural commodities / products
5. but not everything could go up by the same amount because certain “soft” commodities, including “electricity” were in a technical and fundamental over-supply situation from a 90's robust economy. So, bets and reverse derivatives were made accordingly.
6. As well, if everything went up – you would see 10% inflation – which was not what was wanted at the time.
7. I do not want to debate why crude and natural gas had to go up, but it just did, because N.American producers simply could not make money at the 90’s levels.
8. If the above is true, then this would likely be a misguided scheme that got carried away, because every industry relies heavily on “passing through” their higher or lower input costs through to the consumer in order to make money.
9. the “world factor” – by changing currency relationships and given that China, Japan and others “discount” to the USDX, we can systematically influence the balance of trade and cut out the “highest cost” producers
10. then comes the “ponzi” scheme part of it all. If I tell my two friends what I am doing, then they tell two friends, and so on and so on – then pretty soon (over a longer period of time, we have a crowded trade).
11. Everyone continues to make bets – then comes credit default swaps and illegal naked shorting.
12. If I know that I am gaming certain commodities in favor of others (CFTC rule changes and ENRON loophole), then I have a real casino to play at.
13. Interestingly, there are some small natural gas producers that are just starting to get some small naked short positions on them. And some others that are just discovering that they suddenly have an OTC stock symbol – when they are traded on other exchanges (why?).
Believe me, I could BK any small natural gas producer that is unhedged, by just simply playing around with their stock through CDS and illegal naked shorting, and then when it comes time to renew their financing – just say no.
Examples: GM, CIT, Calpine, SSCCQ.pk, ABWTQ, WAMUQ.pk. Think about it. BTW, both Smithfield and Tyson (producers) from a different sector were also heavily naked shorted – which is a way of gaming / controlling the bonds. If the bonds are high – equity – if the bonds are low – I get control of a larger percentage of a restructured company, plus I get my CDS.
If this is all part of the delveraging process, then the value to ABWTQ s/h in the future should be huge due to the unwind of "inflationary" derivatives built-up during this recent decade.
Maybe someone should call Duane Owens, and ask him about the naked shorts – he was previously advised about them and advised that the board of directors was looking into everything. I guess what we need to see is the BOD notes from Fall 2008 to see what was said by them.
------------------ Article (below)
How to Profit From Rising Food Prices
By Justin Rohrlich Jan 29, 2010 8:10 am
Bolster your portfolio while your grocery bill rises.
The spark that lit the gasoline was… are you ready for it?
The price of crab cakes.
It’s official: Food is expensive. This week, the USDA released a report that forecasts grocery-store and restaurant prices to increase 2.5% to 3.5% this year.
"Retail food price inflation in 2010 will rebound from the 2009 level toward a moderate level, slightly above the long-term historical average," the USDA said. “At supermarkets, meat, poultry, and fish prices are forecast to be higher this year, up 1.5% to 2.5%, compared to a 0.5% gain in 2009.”
While they’re not “riot-causing levels” says Ryan Krueger, founder and portfolio manager with Houston money management firm Curbstone Partners, who has a keen focus on the agriculture sector, he’s “never seen inventories this tight” and expects wholesale prices to continue to rise.
It’s one of the factors that has contributed to declining same-store sales at US supermarket chains like Supervalu (SVU), Safeway (SWY), and Kroger.
MarketWatch quoted a research note written by Janney Montgomery food analyst Jonathan Feeney:
"While food retailers continue to experience food retail price deflation, if the Food CPI stays at current levels, it will be inflationary by July 2010.”
Krueger points to major pork and beef producers Smithfield Foods (SFD) and Tyson Foods (TSN) as two examples of companies having a tough time in the current economy, cutting production to shore up their balance sheets as consumers spend less and less.
“They’re having an awful time,” he says. “With US demand this slow, entire herds are being liquidated because they’ve become unaffordable. Their costs are not going down, and while sales aren’t necessarily plunging, per se, they are certainly sluggish, to say the least.”
Krueger explains that food shortages and subsequent price increases are due to global circumstances -- not just a weak US economy.
Take a look at some of his findings:
Farming land is becoming a global scarcity.
From 1980 to 2005, 31 countries went from net food exporters to importers.
Since 2001, almost 6 million hectares of arable land in China alone have disappeared.
As nations develop, farming land gets plowed over (consider our own Silicon Valley was once a fruit farm).
World population continues to grow by 80 million people per year (equivalent of adding another Mexico to the globe every year).
Population is expected to grow from 6 billion to 9 billion over the next four decades, while farming soil per capita declines from two-thirds of an acre to less than half an acre.
Fresh water demand and usage is growing, but supply is not.
There is no more fresh water on Earth today than there was 1 million years ago... yet today, 6 billion people share it.
Average US household uses 150 gallons of water per day compared to 13 gallons globally.
Saudi Arabia will soon import 100% of its food because it's about to run out of water.
Agriculture consumes 70% of the world’s water supply; many developing nations use 90% of available fresh water for agriculture.
Krueger says these factors contribute to a very tight market for food worldwide -- and an opportunity for investment. The numbers are astounding.
“It takes six pounds of grain to make a pound of chicken. It takes more than 12 pounds of grain to make a pound of beef,” he explains. “By the time enough grain and cattle are produced for one hamburger, about 2,400 liters of water have been used. If you are an American male reading this, on average you will eat the same amount of meat this weekend that is eaten per person in China in one year.” …….
In terms of the MM trading on this stock
Thought these comments may be of interest:
Banks have killed active trading of individual stocks 28-Jan-10 12:18 pm
in several ways.
1. Blank pools have brought fewer orders to the exchanges
2. Too many fake equity prop bets. There has been a dilutution of money across a wide range of casino bet choices which have decreased the potential volume for buying actual equities. There is no shortage of choices to invest in, more likely too many.
3. With thinner trading manipulation by MMs becomes endemic and people/traders either cannot get the trades they want or they are squeezed by the MM, who is inserting himself into both sides of a trade, for a large premium.
4. Lakc of trust. People are understanding that the stock and commodity markets are not free markets and that price is absolutely determined by a very select group of criminals. Who wants to deal with that?
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Re: Banks have killed active trading of individual stocks 28-Jan-10 03:32 pm
Object is to take as much of the Middle Class's money as possible. Thru their 401K's, Taxes and Stock Trading.
That is the Governments purpose today is to transfeer all of the Americans Wealth to the Bankers and elites and to make them Debt Slaves.
Our Constitution was to protect us from this but the Government and Banks ignore it.
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Re: Banks have killed active trading of individual stocks 28-Jan-10 12:35 pm
Very true, well said..
Killing individual investors/traders was one of their (big brockerage houses/banks) motto..
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This was just posted on another board
In relation to Paulson and Geithner and their relationship with GS:
its all about naked short selling 11 minutes ago
dont kid yourself
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As in previous posts on that same board going back months (sometimes written daily):
Illegal Naked Shorting = Credit Default Swaps.
If GS and the rest of Wall Street "gamed the system" with inflationary vs. deflationary commodities and bet against housing, then in the fall 2008 when Lehman went down GS and others should have bought-back the reverse side of their hedges. But they couldn't cause they were still long gold and crude.
imo, they totally screwed up the market.
As Lloyd B said in his testimony -- we are market makers -- we thought we were doing the right thing.
Oh boy -- are these guys on Wall Street totally screwed if some e-mails start leaking out on this.
Link for ABH being a Long-Term Naked Short Company
http://www.nyse.com/regulation/memberorganizations/Threshold_Securities.shtml?date=20071105
Here is the link that shows that ABH was a preverbial naked short from its "merger date" (Oct 29, 2007) to October 23, 2008. Just pick your date.
Looks to me like every SEC / FINRA illegal naked shorting rule was broken on this one.
You should see the data for GM (early 2009) and for CIT (late 2009). Holy cow -- I cannot believe the blatent abuse by the mm's and broker-dealers.
imo, lots of people should be in jail right now.
More Illegal Naked Shorting Articles Below
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/11/goldman-accused-of-naked-short-selling.html
http://www.deepcapture.com/tag/goldman-sachs/
Could there be a share deal with Abitibi and say Tembec?
If there is a deal with Tembec, it could be very interesting as far as a major share price rise for ABWTQ. Note below, Tembec’s management had some out of the money options expire worthless recently at a post re-capitalization price of $229 to $306 per share.
Example: Tembec – 100,000,000 million o/s shares – I use Tembec, because they have their annual s/h meeting over the next few days. Merger Annoucement next week?
Wayzata Investment Partners 21,541,076 commons shares
Trilogy Capital, LLC 15,515,387 common shares
Bear Stearns & Co. Inc. 15,035,913 common shares **
Varde Management L.P. 10,353,123 common shares
Restructuring Capital Ass.LP 10,082,955 commons shares
Bear Stearns bought out by J.P. Morgan
Estimated Adj cost base was about $7.50 per share for the above (I think).
Tembec – heavily naked shorted and prior to re-capitalization plan had over one million undelivered shares as of their recapitalization date – technically those shares should have been bought up – which meant the bonds should have gone up as the hedges were unwound.
See undelivered naked shorts for BOW and ABY, effective Oct 29, 2007. If shares re-delivered, hedged bonds would have also had to rose – which the B/H (or mm’s or other parties) did not want.
Apparently with all the heat on GS, there is a big movement behind the scenes with the unions and retail bondholders to tie GS to some of the distressed debt investors in say, CIT, GM, SSCCQ. I guess the real question is did these distressed debt holders acquire their shares / debt (or other hedge) legally or illegally.
In a recent filing, Abitibi identified a LT b/h (corporate raider – distressed debt buyer) – I found this filing a little odd (out of place).
Here are the final trades for Tembec today – Note Goldman, yet again on the bid.
Recent Trades - Last 10 of 19
Time ET Ex Price Change Volume Buyer Seller Markers
15:57:35 T 1.20 0.00 3 2 RBC 36 Latimer E
13:26:24 T 1.20 0.00 100 65 Goldman 2 RBC K
13:14:56 T 1.16 -0.01 48 36 Latimer 79 CIBC E
13:10:16 T 1.19 -0.01 1,000 85 Scotia 85 Scotia K
12:07:04 T 1.20 0.00 100 65 Goldman 36 Latimer K
12:05:53 T 1.20 0.00 100 65 Goldman 36 Latimer K
11:33:55 T 1.17 -0.03 2,000 19 Desjardins 1 Anonymous K
11:29:22 T 1.20 0.00 1,000 19 Desjardins 19 Desjardins K
11:29:22 T 1.20 0.00 2,000 19 Desjardins 36 Latimer K
11:29:22 T 1.19 -0.01 1,000 19 Desjardins 9 BMO Nesbitt K
Tembec Inc. (TMB) As of January 25th, 2010
Filing Date Transaction Date Insider Name Ownership Type Securities Nature of transaction # or value acquired or disposed of Unit Price
Jan 25/10 Jan 25/10 Brumm, James Direct Ownership Options 52 - Expiration of options -99 $229.110
Jan 19/10 Jan 12/10 Rochon, Jacques Direct Ownership Options 52 - Expiration of options -175 $306.850
Jan 19/10 Jan 12/10 Dumas, Michel Direct Ownership Options 52 - Expiration of options -467 $306.850
Jan 19/10 Jan 12/10 Lopez, Jim Direct Ownership Options 52 - Expiration of options -339 $306.850
Jan 19/10 Jan 12/10 Tremblay, Richard E. Direct Ownership Options 52 - Expiration of options -88 $306.850
Jan 19/10 Jan 12/10 Ouellet, Yves Direct Ownership Options 52 - Expiration of options -82 $306.850
Jan 19/10 Jan 12/10 Patel, Mahendra A. Direct Ownership Options 52 - Expiration of options -175 $306.850
Jan 18/10 Jan 12/10 Pelletier, Yvon Direct Ownership Options 52 - Expiration of options -175
Jan 18/10 Jan 12/10 Dottori, Paolo G. Direct Ownership Options 52 - Expiration of options -58
Jan 12/10 Jan 12/10 Norris, Stephen J. Direct Ownership Options 52 - Expiration of options -93 $306.850
Let’s assume Tembec assets only worth $100 per share—less current LT debt, due to permanent closures and other stranded assets (not including future bio-mass projects), then what kind of a value do you put on Abitibi,
Say $180 – then s/h at 5% = $9.00 per share (upon a recapitalization). That’s some big coin. But then according to Abitibi filings, Fairfax is expected to convert its LT to shares – so residual value must be worth more than $10 per share.
------------------
As an aside – Patheon – was also advised by Goldman Sachs, same as Abitibi (and too was also heavily naked shorted under – struck a deal with JLL Partners out of New York.
Note that Patheon is TSE listed (same as Tembec), but also trades in New York in the OTC market. IMHO – some more Canadian Companies (Quebec Based, including Bombardier) are either in, or were in similar circumstances.
Computer-driven trading raises meltdown fears
By Jeremy Grant in London
Published: January 25 2010 23:06 | Last updated: January 25 2010 23:06
An explosion in trading propelled by computers is raising fears that trading platforms could be knocked out by rogue trades triggered by systems running out of control.
Trading in equities and derivatives is being driven increasingly by mathematical algorithms used in computer programs. They allow trading to take place automatically in response to market data and news, deciding when and how much to trade similar to the autopilot function in aircraft.
Analysts estimate that up to 60 per cent of trading in equity markets is driven in this way.
Concerns have been highlighted by news that NYSE Euronext, the transatlantic exchange operator, has fined Credit Suisse proprietary trading arm for the first time for failing to control its trading algorithms. In the Credit Suisse case, its system bombarded the NYSE’s systems with hundreds of thousands of “erroneous messages” in 2007, slowing down trading in 975 shares.
The case was far from isolated, say traders. CME Group, the Chicago-based futures exchange, is investigating a case this month where a trader in “mini” S&P Index futures contracts “inadvertently traded approximately 200,000 contracts as both buyer and seller”.
EDITOR’S CHOICE
FT Trading Room: Exchanges news and analysis - Sep-09
Lombard: Man Group; Qinetiq; M&B - Jan-15
Last year, the London Stock Exchange suffered a three-hour outage after its trading system collapsed under the strain of a huge volume of orders. Some traders blamed the spike in volumes from algorithmic trading.
Frederic Ponzo, managing partner at GreySpark Partners, a consultancy, said: “It is absolutely possible to bring an exchange to breaking point by having an ‘algo’ entering into a loop so that by sending them at such a rate the exchange can’t cope.”
Regulators say it is unclear who is monitoring traders to ensure they do not take undue risks with their algorithms.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed new rules that would require brokers to establish procedures to prevent erroneous orders.
Mark van Vugt, global head of sales at RTS Realtime Systems, a trading technology company, said: “If a position is blowing up so fast without the exchange or clearing firm able to react or reverse positions, the firm itself could be in danger as well.”
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010.
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Re: Glitch in the Machine? 25-Jan-10 09:10 pm
All orders into the markets should have to be entered manually. The frauds simply take billions from the Fed discount window and then unleash their high frequency computers on the public every day. The public is so clueless they're being plundered every day. Remember, GS just admitted it uses computers and algorithms "capable of manipulating markets."
traderpro20...
---------------
Re: You can be sure if SEC restricts short sales 24-Jan-10 12:05 pm
Dark pools are a mechanism to allow unlimited short sales at the bid. They are an unregulated stock laundering operation.
Example:
I sell fake stock that does not exist from one account in an unregulated dark pool. I buy it with another account and never demand delivery. Then I dump that digital stock on the real market at the bid.
That is how it works. And no I don't really do that. But that is what is going on and why all transactions must take place on a regulated exchange.
Rating :
Smokeskull
ABLE (an Arbitrager?) -- it will be interesting to see
Why do investment banks arbitrage? A lot of reasons:
Examples:
1. majority of times for a takeover (or a merger of two equals (Abitibi and Bowater). If you watched the trading leading up to the announcement, it was obvious to most.
2. sell lumber producers buy crude and natural gas producers (sell Abitibi et. al, buy EnCana, Canadian Natural Resources, Chevron).
3. trading or ponzi schemes (dark pools and illegal naked shorting, which GS has been widely accused of). Combine that with the fact that GS was the king in all commodity trading since 2002 -- and you may have a huge winner.
4. to make a point?
Given that ABLE has an office located in France and given that Tembec recently announced that it intends to sell two facilities in France -- my money remains on a merger (share deal with Tembec).
Given the recent announcements on Friday from Abitibi and the Unions, it would not surprise me to see a merger announcement soon.
Didn't Tembec recently use Abitibi facilities for their excess Black Liquor -- why would you ever want to help out a true competitor, unless it was for Big Dollars -- the trading on this stock (in or out of BK) just doesn't make any sense when compared to MTLQQ, SSCCQ, CPNLQ etc.
http://www.natexisblr.us/en/about.html
http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/November2009/27/c5609.html
Cash Prices rose to about $249 this week.
Random Lengths Framing Lumber Composite Price - by Month
Jump to: Description of items included in the current Framing Lumber Composite Price
Jump to: Previous Framing Lumber Composite Price formula, used from September 1994 through March 2003.
This section is updated monthly. Last update: January 15, 2010.
The framing lumber composite price is designed as a broad measure of price movement in the lumber market. The composite formula was revised in April 2003, and the new formula was used to calculate the composite from January 1995 to March 2003. The composite price is a weighted average of 15 key framing lumber prices. Prices are $ per thousand board feet. Spreadsheet/Database Label: LCBM
NOTE: © The Random Lengths Framing Lumber Composite Price is protected by Random Lengths copyrights.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Yearly
Avg
1995 387 389 366 342 322 298 337 333 352 326 330 338 343
1996 334 353 359 372 422 415 408 448 449 427 465 434 407
1997 442 449 439 463 450 433 435 419 399 384 385 375 423
1998 365 381 374 374 336 337 351 361 332 337 346 356 354
1999 379 391 398 401 428 465 487 411 395 364 391 390 408
2000 393 392 387 361 333 337 310 293 297 283 289 278 329
2001 271 292 307 330 408 371 331 340 315 281 291 284 318
2002 303 323 345 330 319 308 314 298 285 281 271 276 304
2003 284 300 284 283 279 303 302 336 375 325 338 327 311
2004 341 376 382 431 456 423 426 473 432 373 355 376 404
2005 382 420 422 404 386 401 380 360 396 366 359 365 387
2006 382 379 369 367 354 326 313 296 292 278 275 288 327
2007 295 287 282 287 287 306 302 289 276 263 262 267 284
2008 249 244 239 251 279 268 267 282 272 234 224 213 252
2009 198 199 195 208 198 222 238 239 236 235 245 251 222
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Random Lengths Structural Panel Composite Price - by Month
Jump to: Description of items included in the current Structural Panel Composite Price
Jump to: Previous Structural Panel Composite Price formula, used from January 1993 through June 1998.
This section is updated monthly. Last update: September 25, 2009.
The structural panel composite price is a broad measure of price movement in structural panel markets. The composite formula was revised in July 1998, and the new formula was used to calculate 1997 results. The revised composite is a weighted average of 11 key panel items. Prices are $ per thousand square feet. Spreadsheet/Database Label: PAMN
NOTE: © The Random Lengths Structural Panel Composite Price is protected by Random Lengths copyrights.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Yearly
Avg
1997 238 252 255 242 244 251 246 255 265 254 277 253 252
1998 247 262 254 271 267 273 318 366 336 283 297 282 288
1999 299 320 352 345 383 422 448 371 351 284 313 308 350
2000 305 324 348 337 303 277 256 250 259 246 251 230 282
2001 227 229 232 249 320 297 278 277 251 230 235 225 254
2002 235 259 274 264 243 247 240 253 243 244 238 236 248
2003 245 263 253 259 267 319 376 440 537 555 528 356 367
2004 427 554 573 598 533 455 397 485 465 343 329 387 462
2005 396 449 447 396 382 391 366 353 488 484 368 381 408
2006 389 372 369 357 326 320 293 291 271 260 269 266 315
2007 271 272 268 287 295 322 331 323 306 298 309 294 298
2008 278 276 279 286 320 316 304 315 316 288 270 255 292
2009 251 257 247 242 242 248 263 281 278 258 270 275 259
Price forecast for 2010 - Estimated to average $305
Price forecast for 2011 - Estimated to average $370
Price forecast for 2012 through 2020 - Estimated to average $640 or higher depending on Pine Beetle, Asian Longhorn Beetle and Cap & Trade.
Estrader75 -- this may answer your concern
Point 4A (I believe)
http://www.bowater.com/uploadedFiles/Menus/Investors/AbitibiBowater_Human_Ressources_and_Compensation_Committee_Charter_April28_2009.pdf
Hope the mm coffers are full too.
It almost seems like whatever deal (negotiated in the back room, of course) with Tembec, or another third party or Fairfax is done.
From an accounting standpoint, management just doesn't seem to know how to manage their input costs or their currency hedges.
If they previously got BK court approval -- talked about with them since BK (and even prior to that with Finance), they could have:
1. crystalized their "gain on foreign exchange" related to any Abitibi US debt for plants in Canada.
Example: 1.07 now 0.95 (earlier this week 0.97).
As their operating income rises, the cost of servicing their overall debt rises. It's almost like they just take the market price, because if they guess wrong the finance guys lose their jobs.
It was previously recommended to them to "sell forward" their lumber sales back in May 2007 for 2 years using a fixed price floor.
It was previously recommended to them to sell forward their pulp sales for 2 years using a fixed price floor.
I think they should do the same with pulp now -- as the Cdn dollar falls their operating income would rise.
As pulp prices keep rising, more shut-in plants will come on line, stabilizing the price for some period of time.
imo, there are so many ways to increase their operating income for many years to come.
I just wished they had some better guys in Finance, who knew how to read commodity prices both for inputs and outputs. Because, as managers they failed all of their stakeholders, imho (BH'ers included).
ABWTQ -- GM Canadian Conflict of Interest Court Filing
We will need to consider all legal parties acting on behalf of Bondholders, Abitibi-Bowater -- or their subs, as welll as other legal entities hired to handle BK procedings for clear and potential Conflicts of Interest.
See article below
Former GM auto dealers launch class action lawsuit against GM Canada and national law firm
TORONTO, Jan. 21 /CNW/ - A class action lawsuit seeking $750 million in damages on behalf of 215 Canadian GM auto dealers terminated in connection with last year's auto bailout was launched today in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
The lawsuit claims that General Motors of Canada Limited, a subsidiary of its U.S. parent, General Motors Company, breached franchise laws in connection with the agreements which GM obtained from the dealers it selected for elimination as part of the federal bailout.
Also named in the suit is Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP (CBB), a Canadian law firm which had been retained in advance to represent Canadian dealers in a GM restructuring or bankruptcy. The claim alleges that CBB failed to disclose to the dealers that it was simultaneously acting for the Canadian Government in the GM auto bailout. The Canadian Government insisted that GM scale back its dealership network as a condition of its multi-billion dollar bailout funding. The bailout was the largest government subsidy given to a corporation in Canadian history.
The suit alleges that after GM presented a termination package to the affected dealers, CBB told them to consult their individual lawyers in the limited time which they had to respond to the package. Unable to negotiate as a group, and without group legal counsel, the vast majority of dealers signed back the termination package as presented by GM rather than risking GM filing for a formal insolvency proceeding as GM threatened to do if the dealers rejected the offer. The dealers had between two and four business days to accept the package which was offered.
David Sterns, one of the lawyers for the lead plaintiff, stated "these dealers include some of the best in the country. The offer they were handed gave them a fraction of what their businesses were worth, but they had no collective representation and precious little time".
The claim states that the dealers "were the only significant stakeholders in the GM auto bailout which were denied a voice in the restructuring." Regardless, it is claimed that many of the dealers have a right under provincial franchise laws to cancel the agreements.
GM avoided a formal insolvency proceeding in Canada, unlike in the United States where its parent company reduced its dealership network through a formal Chapter 11 filing.
The representative plaintiff, Trillium Motor World Ltd., brought the action under Ontario's Class Proceedings Act, 1992. The claim seeks court certification to represent all 215 similarly affected dealers in Canada. The members of the class include automotive dealerships in every province of Canada.
A copy of the court filed statement of claim is available at: www.sotosllp.com.
For further information: David Sterns at dsterns@sotosllp.com or John Sotos at jsotos@sotosllp.com, Sotos LLP (416) 977-0007,
Wall Street Derivatives -- $531 Trillion Dollar Problem
The $531 Trillion Dollar Derivatives Time Bomb *
Wise Up Journal / Sovereign Independent - Sept/Oct issue, page 12
01.09.2009
By Gabriel O’Hara
Titanic Derivatives
What are derivatives? Some investors describe them as “dormant economic weapons of mass destruction”. They essentially are large leveraged bets on top of stocks, bonds and commodities. Money can be made within months or seconds by betting if a stock will go up, down or even remain the same. With no credit rating you can place a bet worth double your account balance. Big time investors get greater leverage with these instantaneous loans.
The New York Times, Oct 8th 2008: “The derivatives market is $531 trillion, up from $106 trillion in 2002?. This market is setup with odds similar to a racetrack. Trillions are won and lost (transferred) every second. But unlike a racetrack the big players have ultimate control. Their trillions can make stocks move. A 4% up swing in a stock can cause a derivative bet to rise more than 100% in value or vice versa. A low performing stock that rises only 6% a year could actually have many 3, 6 or 9 percent swings weekly or monthly (some stocks daily). There are billions to be made over and over again by the people that control billions and trillions thus the markets. A grand game approved by the top.
The globe’s GDP is at $60.1 trillion. The globe’s total financial assets were reported as $167 trillion in 2006. A few trillion lower today no doubt. The highly volatile derivatives market is worth noting because it dwarfs the entire world’s GDP and total financial assets combined.
Alan Greenspan, the former long-term chairman of the central bank of the United States, constantly double-spoke over his career. He made statements that the current unchanged derivatives market is the best thing since sliced-money and occasionally he gave dire warnings. On May 9th 2003 the New York Times published the following: “Mr. Greenspan, as he has done in the past, praised derivatives, saying their benefits materially outweighed the risks and had insulated the financial system from the stock market crash and economic downturn.” New York Times, Oct 8th 2008: “Mr. Greenspan warned that derivatives could amplify crises because they tied together the fortunes of many seemingly independent institutions. ‘The very efficiency that is involved here means that if a crisis were to occur, that that crisis is transmitted at a far faster pace and with some greater virulence,’ he said.” With double-speak Greenspan can always be “right” in his autobiography. Historians can choose if he was one of the “experts” giving warnings or they can put the blame on him. Quite often the qualified “experts” that helped crash a system are the ones in charge of building the next system.
The $531 trillion dollars derivatives market contains a mind-boggling amount of high-risk credit in the hands of a small few that could completely finish off the collapse of the current global economy (for a new global replacement). New York Times, May 9th 2003: “he detailed the potential dangers to financial markets if a big derivatives dealer had to exit the market. In his speech, delivered to the conference by satellite, Mr. Greenspan said that a single dealer accounts for about a third of the global market in both interest rate and credit derivatives, and a few dealers account for more than two-thirds.”
Playing with people’s lives
The span between the green-cash haves and have-nots grew larger under Greenspan. The majority of people around the world rely on the economy for their livelihoods. But what runs the integrated global economy? Credit!
Greenspan is not one of the minority with trillions of dollars, and trillions more in credit, tied in derivatives. His work was benefiting the dominant minority of the market. Those who own the gold get others to make their rules. If everything runs on money and you own the money, it’s easy to run things.
The new financial system is currently being openly discussed, if not already fully constructed on paper. Have no doubt that the paid “experts” will be given plenty of corporate and government media time sprouting how wonderful the new system will be for the ordinary man while saying enough bad things about the old system to keep us happy or they might even put the blame on the “greedy public”. A few bank employees (bank managers) have already been scarified in the media. Of course, the real economic managers, the top bank owners, will create the new system. The same people that profited from the sheering of the current system. The trillion dollar banking families of the globe don’t want to end their river of wealth, making easy money from the public, which means the World Bank and the European Central Bank don’t what that either. The current system would be updated with desired regulations (a better game for a few) and new banking language that the general public don’t understand, like with any good con. However, not until after some turmoil as turmoil is needed for large-scale changes to be accepted.
As the EU Commission President, Manuel Barroso, said, “the kind of occasion where the crisis calls in to question all certainties and minds are more open to change, these are very special moments.” A spokesperson for the upcoming system, Gordon Brown, said all that the nation bankrupting bailouts and social chaos are “the difficult birth pangs of a new global order” and the expert’s “task now is nothing less than making the transition to a new internationalism,” reported by the Daily Mail on Jan 27th 2008. This is what happens when people desire to be managed.
Who runs what?
What did Milton Friedman, a Nobel Prize winning economist, have to say about the track record of the central bank in the United States? He said, “the Federal Reserve definitely caused the Great depression by contracting the amount of currency in circulation by one-third from 1929 to 1933.” Contracting or inflating the money supply are only two tools among many utilised by central banks to direct economies.
No individual running the European Central Bank are elected by the public, they are hand picked, and no EU institution has authority over the decisions of the ECB. The ECB is an independent corporate entity. Article 106.2 of the EU’s 1992 Maastricht treaty states, “the ECB shall have legal personality”. Article 107 says the ECB and national central banks are totally independent from member state governments and “any other body” including the EU. It even forbids “the community of institutions and bodies” and “any government of a Member State or from any other body” from instructing or advising the ECB and national central banks. Article 108.2 allows the ECB to publish or withhold any or all information on decision-making. As we all know, the ECB have the “EXCLUSIVE right to AUTHORIZE the issue of bank notes within the Community.”
Although acquitted, the European Central Bank President, Jean-Claude Trichet, was on trial with eight others for his part in signing off official accounts during a time of fraud at one of France’s biggest banks (Credit Lyonnais) which resulted in a €31 billion Euro bailout. The “right” kind of people always seems to get picked for the top.
On June 25th 2007 while everyone was happy with the booming economy the Telegraph published that the Bank for International Settlements’, the ultimate bank of all central banks, 77th annual report talked of a coming global depression. The people behind this bank don’t have crystal balls. They are the movers and shakers that make things happen. Great depressions (great for some) create fantastic discounts for those with credit and bust those “nasty” competitors, especially the many small family run competitors. Since Sept 2007 billions of national emergency funds have been injected in to the global financial markets keeping buyers for the large sellers. Bank stocks lost almost 50% of their value by Dec 2007. The 6 o’clock news did not tell people about the credit crash until late 2008. Wait until the derivatives bubble - in the hands of a small few - pops, then we’ll have a brand new global financial architecture and it certainly won’t be good for the people if we allow the crisis creators to build it.
Removal of control over people’s livelihoods and lives is needed for once.
----------------
If the words 'inflate' or 'die' were used back in 2002 and 2004 by Wall Street -- then have we yet to really see the unwinding of their derivatives.
Last time I checked Gold was still at over 1,000 dollars per ounce (5 fold over how many years).
And Crude was still above $75 per barrel. Highs were about 5 fold over how many years.
And the Grains?
--------
Lumber, Cotton, Cooca, Electricity, Cattle, Pork Bellies etc. were up how many fold over the same time period.
Domestic Commodities vs. World Commodities vs. Currencies (inflation vs. deflation).
Market Makers or Manipulaters
More Recent Dylan Ratigan Videos that "tell it like it is".
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31510813/#34942272
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31510813/#34961935
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31510813/#34981390
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31510813/#34981665
-----------------------
Comments from GS Bulletin Board
What was GS doing w/a program that manipulates the market? 17-Jul-09 07:38 pm
*************
Rating :
(2 Ratings)
Rate it:
jjameszr01
GOLDMAN were robbing MILLION EVERYDAY from NYSE now 17-Jul-09 01:58 pm
they have the regulators adjust the regulations to futher hide thier activities
"The Exchange has filed with the SEC to implement the decommissioning of the DPTR requirement following the July 10, 2009 trade date. Accordingly, the last required submission of the DPTR will be on July 14, 2009, which is the second business day after the last trade date for which the DPTR is required.
Go read the entire Zerohedge article; what this means, in short, is that the ability of people (like you and I) to see the fact that a handful of banks, most specifically Goldman Sachs, constitute the majority of NYSE trading volume - and they're trading for their own book, not for customers, will no longer be disclosed.
This "back and forth trade" between a handful of institutions is nothing more than the old "pump and dump" game that has been played in the OTC market forever - and almost always screws the individual investor.
This is no different than you and I selling a house back and forth between us repeatedly, each time at a higher price. We both appear to be geniuses as we're both making a "profit", right?
Well, no. One of us is destined to take a horrifying loss if we do not find a sucker to make the final transaction with.
The embedded scam is that real gains require real parties at interest and not a closed system of a couple of guys passing an asset back and forth in a transparent attempt to "bait" someone else into becoming the sucker to offload that asset to.
The parallels to the housing bubble are not coincidence. There is no "value" being created nor is there any actual value appreciation taking place when people pass an asset back and forth at ever-higher prices. Only when there are lots of parties participating on their own, organically, does a market truly exist and does value align with price. Otherwise the so-called "price" is nothing other than a cheap parlor trick.
Zerohedge has been documenting this game now for months as Goldman in particular has come to represent an outrageously large percentage of the entire NYSE volume.
The problem of course is that, at least on paper, market manipulation, irrespective of what form of parlor trick you choose to use, is a serious violation of the law. Of course these violations of the law have been ignored for so long that nobody seems to care any more, but the fact remains that should the public come to believe that the NYSE has turned into nothing more than a gigantic pump-and-dump scheme operated by a handful of banks trading between themselves with publicly-guaranteed funds the consequences could be catastrophic.
So rather than stop it, the NYSE is doing what all good robber barons do - they're obscuring the data so nobody can see it any more.
"... Goldman received 13 billion from the AIG bailout and "borrowed" 10 billion more from the American taxpayers. pretending to be a Bank with no customers GS use our tax money and 15 times leverage to manipulate any and all financial markets,They took that 23 billion and drove up the price of a barrel of oil from 30 to 70 and then cashed out. It's very easy to make money when Goldman takes the profits and bills the taxpayer for the losses. It's called wealth redistribution. Paulson did everything he could to protect Goldman including letting Goldnman's biggest competitors fail and handing Goldman 10 billion to run up prices in the markets. Since AIG was Goldman's insurer Paulson made sure AIG didn't fail, so Goldman would receive their money.
For a listing of mm's (ABLE)
try this link.
http://www.alphatrade.com/techSupport/marketMakers.html?page=a
Thanks for all of your input, fellow posters.
Been in and out for the past 10 days or so. I suspect that will be the same for the next few weeks. Will post when I can.
Note: Abitibi Bonds -- given Dav's assessment that not much has traded over the past few months, it wouldn't surprise me if the FINRA Bond Summary is 100% misleading.
As an example, there have been two times since BK that FINRA (early in the morning), before their computers have been updated, they have actually showed most bonds trading closer to par 85 to 97 (I think).
Tried to print, once, then the site updated and the numbers reverted back to what everyone sees.
Note: Naked shorting -- lot's more info on it -- including some on what Wall Street calls "Terminal Shorts". Topic came out when CIT and GM were heavily naked shorted prior to BK, even though the Illegal Naked Shorting Rules were changed. Abitibi is the last big remaining Naked Shorter company that has yet to come out with their POR.
Note: Newsprint demand should be increasing slightly over the next few weeks due to cobverage of Haiti and the Olympics. Still hearing that 7.2 million tonnes is the bottom. But 7.8 million tonnes for North America will be it -- which means that the export market will have to increase. I think realistically -- 4 plants (AB and Bowater) will need to close. But, only some of those assets will be completely stranded (ie close to the grid and water) for other future requirements.
Note: website for Equity Committee -- great idea. I think that if you can draw people to it -- ie. a lot of mutual funds that sold during the past year, plus other s/h of naked short companies -- you have the potential for a 100 Billion dollar lawsuit against the following parties (SEC, FINRA, NYSE, IRROC (formerly Market Regulation Services in Canada -- that has suggested that the Abitibi algorithim trading was really taking place in the United States -- despite having a listing in Canada. They essentially washed their hands on the illegal naked shorting issue. It is really important that as of certain trading dates the Canadian stock symbol traded over one million shares daily -- and then suddenly it switched to very low volume in Canada, but onver one million shares on the NYSE. A lot of buy 10,000 shares in Canada, but sell 99,000 shares in the US (ABY) to keep the prices the same during 2007 and 2008.
Add to the list above, all of the accounting firms for Abitibi that have essentilly performed formal Audits that obvioulsy mis-stated the number of shares outstanding. And other information that investors rely on.
New Fraud and Error Standards Extend Auditor's Role -- Detecting Fraud and Error" in the August 2004 issue of CA Magazine. Essentially Abitib's Auditors screwed up big time.
Then Add to the list all of the Management that Dave listed in an earlier post this week, plus Frank (Montreal office -- I will try to find his last name). Then add Wayne Harvey becuase he signs off on all of the SEC filings -- which are obviously not 100% correct if you consider the "share information" under naked shorting. 870 million dollars stolen from Abitibi -- due to naked shorting, plus "gaming of the systems" wrt the Bonds -- meant that Financing options were more limited -- just as CIT, GM and Calpine.
Just think the Naked Shorting issue all started with rumors of two Big-Name ENRON traders losing their shirts and their respective fortunes when the company went BK, then they went to Goldman Sachs and told them all about the Naked Shorting and the ENRON LOOPHOLE.
So then they went after Calpine and Naked Shorted over 50% of their stock, because they were angry that Calpine, Dynegy and Duke all lived to tell another tale.
That's for now.
PS -- I still feel that either Tembec or another Company is going to buy Abitibi on a shhare deal and that's why the stock has been traded by the mm's the way it has.
PS2 -- think soft commodities (Pork Bellies -- SFD, Cotton, Electricity Prices - Calpine, Cattle fUTURES -- ALL IN RELATION TO A POSSIBLE UNWIND in inflationary-deemed commodities such as gold, crude, etc.
PS3 -- think dollar strategy for Abitib -- Should they realize thei Translation on Foreign Exchange now -- I say they already blew it a 97 cents Canadian to 1.00 US.
PS4 -- if their Pension fund has come back to 75% -- then cash out leave in Cash and say he you go -- we will give you the other 30% in new stock. At some point -- paying 90 top strategists to manage your Pension Plan doesn't pay for itself -- then lt them go (ie. costs of management outweigh returns). Isn't the gain from 46% to 72 or 80 or whatever it is good enough. Take all the money and cash out -- and just ssay we screwed up on the remaing 30%.
Lumber Prices from Friday
Cash apparently moved to $225
January Futures (delivery January 30th ish), expired around $229
March Futures $249 ish
Other softs (Cattle, Hogs, etc. other than cotton) generally rose
Maybe Haiti will be a boon for lumber -- talk in the markets is that outer months could hit $300 by the end of February.
Lumber daily and weekly charts look generally positive. Gaps remain in the low $200's.
--------------
See Link for potential changes to CFTC Commodity Trading Rules -- also higher margin requirements announced this week may affect.
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/story/82393.html?storylink=omni_popular
Also BB comments on article (below)
* market manipulation? What a silly thought (g)
Jean N. - Friday at 9:42 AM
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission seeks to establish a limit on how many contracts an investor could have across all regulated markets in which oil and natural gas are traded. This would broaden the limits that existed before 2001, since it would apply not only to contracts for future delivery of oil, but also to markets that involve the physical delivery of oil and natural gas.
That's important, because several Wall Street firms got involved not only in the speculative futures market but also in the physical markets, giving them tremendous potential for market manipulation. Morgan Stanley, as a player in the physical market, controls an estimated 15 percent of the home-heating oil supply in New England. Goldman Sachs owns shares of companies that own pipelines and refineries.
* Re: market manipulation? What a silly thought (g)
Lou - Friday at 10:20 AM
Swaps and derivatives need to be regulated ... what is being proposed is a small step but at least it's a step in the right direction.
* Re: market manipulation? What a silly thought (g)
Drew 'Beaners' Klein - Friday at 10:27 AM
Nobody closes the barn door after the herd has left like the CFTC...way to go boys!
* Re: market manipulation? What a silly thought (g)
apprenticeII - Friday at 10:30 AM
If it is a broad spectrum of commodities including energy; it could stiffle trading. Commodity prices could drop dramaticly.
ABWTQ -- stuff that mm's don't want you to know
GATA urges SEC, CFTC to probe Goldman trading program
Submitted by cpowell on Tue, 2009-07-07 20:35. Section: Daily Dispatches
4:37p ET Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Dear Friend of GATA and Gold:
GATA today urged the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission to investigate the Goldman Sachs Group Inc. computer trading program that, according to a federal prosecutor, the bank acknowledges can be used to manipulate markets.
GATA's complaint referred to the Bloomberg News story dispatched to you yesterday --
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a_6d.tyNe1KQ)
-- reporting the arraignment in U.S. District Court in New York of a former Goldman Sachs employee accused of stealing the program. The prosecutor, Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph Facciponti, was quoted as telling the court: "The bank has raised the possibility that there is a danger that somebody who knew how to use this program could use it to manipulate markets in unfair ways."
In letters to the SEC and CFTC, GATA wrote: "The assistant U.S. attorney's comment can be construed to suggest Goldman Sachs considers its own manipulation of markets to be fair, while such manipulation by others would be unfair. The court proceeding described in the Bloomberg News story would seem to impugn all markets in which Goldman Sachs trades."
GATA asked each commission "to investigate Goldman Sachs' trading program urgently and report its findings publicly."
The text of GATA's letters is appended.
CHRIS POWELL, Secretary/Treasurer
Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee Inc.
* * *
GOLD ANTI-TRUST ACTION COMMITTEE INC.
7 Villa Louisa Road, Manchester, Connecticut 06043-7541
July 7, 2009
Gary Gensler, Chairman
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
3 Lafayette Centre
1155 21st St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20581
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F St. N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549
Dear Chairman Gensler / Dear Chairman Schapiro:
I'm enclosing a copy of a report distributed July 6 by Bloomberg News Service about the U.S. government's prosecution of a former employee of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. involving the purported theft of a Goldman Sachs computer trading program. The report quotes Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph Faccipointi as saying in U.S. District Court in New York City: "The bank has raised the possibility that there is a danger that somebody who knew how to use this program could use it to manipulate markets in unfair ways."
If the report quotes the assistant U.S. attorney correctly, and if he was characterizing Goldman Sachs' position correctly, then Goldman Sachs claims to have possession of a computer trading program that can manipulate markets. The assistant U.S. attorney's comment can be construed to suggest Goldman Sachs considers its own manipulation of markets to be fair, while such manipulation by others would be unfair.
The court proceeding described in the Bloomberg News story would seem to impugn all markets in which Goldman Sachs trades. On behalf of the Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee Inc., I ask your commission to investigate Goldman Sachs' trading program urgently and report its findings publicly.
Thanks for your consideration.
With good wishes.
CHRIS POWELL
Secretary/Treasurer
ABWTQ.PK -- SSCCQ.PK (SH to fight BK Plan)
Shareholders to fight Smurfit Stone bankruptcy plan
Wed Jan 13, 2010 9:38pm EST
Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation
SSCCQ.PK
By Tom Hals
WILMINGTON, Del., Jan 13 (Reuters) - Shareholders of bankrupt Smurfit Stone Container Corp (SSCCQ.PK) are preparing to fight the packaging company's proposed reorganization plan, according to legal and financial sources involved in the case, likely by attacking its failure to appraise the business.
The equity holders have formed an ad hoc committee and hired David Rosner of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman to represent them.
The group has also hired Israel Shaked, the managing director of the Michel-Shaked Group in Boston, to value the company's business, something Smurfit has yet to do.
Rosner could not be reached for comment. Both Shaked and Smurfit declined to comment.
The group believes that Smurfit, one of the world's largest recyclers of paper and a leading paper packaging manufacturer, could be worth enough money to provide some recovery for shareholders. The company, which filed for bankruptcy in January 2009, has proposed wiping them out.
Smurfit unveiled its plan in December, which proposes paying secured lenders in cash and giving unsecured claim holders equity in the company.
The Chicago-based company plans to issue new common shares that would be traded on the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq market. Current shareholders would be wiped out.
Trading levels for Smurfit bonds, which are just above stock in terms of recovery, indicate investors expect do not yet expect a recovery for shareholders, although they are near that level, said Kevin Starke, senior vice president of CRT Capital Group in Stamford, Connecticut.
In December, a judge denied equity holders' request to have their own official committee in the bankruptcy. Such a committee would allow the group to speak as one and would require Smurfit to pay many of the fees for hiring legal and financial professionals.
During the hearing on the committee request, Mark Hootnick, an investment banker with Moelis & Co, testified that the business was highly cyclical and that it was in a "heck of a trough" when it filed for bankruptcy.
Starke said some of Smurfit's projections in its plan left it vulnerable to a challenge from the equity group, including its outlook for price increases for its products and its treatment of pension costs.
He said Smurfit could give an estimate of the company's worth before the hearing on its disclosure statement on Jan. 29.
"They leave themselves open to a successful challenge of adequacy if they don't have the valuation done," he said.
Smurfit has 159 manufacturing facilities in North America. It had 21,250 employees when it filed for bankruptcy.
Shares of Smurfit closed 1.35 percent lower at 36.5 cents in pink sheet trading. The stock has risen from a low of 2 cents around the time of the company's bankruptcy filing to more than $1 in October.
The case is In re Smurfit Stone Container Corp, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware, No. 09-10235.
(Reporting by Tom Hals; Editing by Richard Chang)
Follow to the next page…….
UPDATE 1-Smurfit Stone gets more time for reorganization
Thu Jan 14, 2010 1:30pm EST
STOCKS
Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation
SSCCQ.PK
WILMINGTON, Del., Jan 14 (Reuters) - A bankruptcy judge on Thursday extended for four more months the exclusive right of packaging company Smurfit Stone Container Corp (SSCCQ.PK) to file a plan of reorganization, over the objection of investment funds.
Smurfit Stone filed for bankruptcy a year ago along with more than 20 subsidiaries.
The funds that objected, Aurelius Capital Management and Columbus Hill Capital Management, sought to end the bankruptcy protection of a single subsidiary, a financing structure known as Finance II.
The two funds hold 62 percent of the $200 million of notes issued by Finance II, which has no operations or employees and was set up mainly for tax purposes. The funds have argued that the subsidiary will have a greater recovery if it were liquidated rather than remained part of the reorganization.
Judge Brendan Shannon overruled the objection and said many of the funds' arguments will be heard again on Jan. 29, when the court will hear their request to convert the Finance II bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 liquidation.
A hearing on the company's disclosure statement, which must be approved so it can send its plan of reorganization to creditors, will be heard the same day.
The case is In re Smurfit Stone Container Corp, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware, No. 09-10235.
Naked Short Data for SSCC and SSCCQ.PK listed below – notice the similarities with ABY, BOW, ABWTQ.PK
PRE-BK
SETTLEMENT DATE
CUSIP SYMBOL QUANTITY (FAILS) DESCRIPTION PRICE
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20080509 832727101 SSCC 1745372 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.38
20080512 832727101 SSCC 49928 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.20
20080513 832727101 SSCC 50211 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.27
20080514 832727101 SSCC 49905 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.24
20080515 832727101 SSCC 49995 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.75
20080519 832727101 SSCC 33738 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 6.08
20080521 832727101 SSCC 16333 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 6.32
20080523 832727101 SSCC 33058 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 6.18
20080527 832727101 SSCC 16658 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.97
20080529 832727101 SSCC 15621 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 6.50
20080530 832727101 SSCC 21042 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 6.89
20080602 832727101 SSCC 21688 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 6.73
20080616 832727101 SSCC 21173 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.75
20080625 832727101 SSCC 11359 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 4.65
20080627 832727101 SSCC 89108 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 4.30
20080630 832727101 SSCC 16795 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 4.33
20080703 832727101 SSCC 212583 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 3.89
20080708 832727101 SSCC 11940 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 4.61
20080710 832727101 SSCC 57581 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 4.60
20080724 832727101 SSCC 55631 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.52
20080729 832727101 SSCC 11375 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.13
20080801 832727101 SSCC 10239 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.71
20080811 832727101 SSCC 43220 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.06
20080812 832727101 SSCC 47308 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.41
20080905 832727101 SSCC 15246 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 6.10
20080908 832727101 SSCC 41312 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 6.48
20080912 832727101 SSCC 93665 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 6.80
20080919 832727101 SSCC 44343 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.85
20080922 832727101 SSCC 55009 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 6.22
20080923 832727101 SSCC 51670 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.59
20080924 832727101 SSCC 33087 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.91
20080925 832727101 SSCC 55966 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.75
20080926 832727101 SSCC 32421 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.76
20080929 832727101 SSCC 37234 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 5.52
20080930 832727101 SSCC 32057 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 4.55
20081003 832727101 SSCC 21475 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 3.96
20081006 832727101 SSCC 13716 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 3.79
20081007 832727101 SSCC 324274 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 3.68
20081010 832727101 SSCC 314749 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 2.44
20081022 832727101 SSCC 18800 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 1.15
20081028 832727101 SSCC 451185 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 1.00
20081029 832727101 SSCC 46447 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.97
20081113 832727101 SSCC 35058 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.88
20081128 832727101 SSCC 271110 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.52
20081204 832727101 SSCC 90087 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.48
20081209 832727101 SSCC 121270 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.45
20081210 832727101 SSCC 28133 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.46
20081212 832727101 SSCC 28391 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.38
20081216 832727101 SSCC 20077 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.37
20081217 832727101 SSCC 19777 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.38
20081218 832727101 SSCC 102858 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.34
20081224 832727101 SSCC 16629 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.27
20081226 832727101 SSCC 43500 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.24
20081230 832727101 SSCC 25438 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.27
20090107 832727101 SSCC 37601 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.43
20090109 832727101 SSCC 734219 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.40
20090112 832727101 SSCC 23370 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.38
20090113 832727101 SSCC 171251 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.35
20090114 832727101 SSCC 15612 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.35
20090120 832727101 SSCC 11437 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.06
20090121 832727101 SSCC 6459370 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.05
20090122 832727101 SSCC 187749 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.04
20090126 832727101 SSCC 30000 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.06
20090129 832727101 SSCC 219751 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.05
20090202 832727101 SSCC 1196021 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.03
Effective BK
SETTLEMENT DATE
CUSIP SYMBOL QUANTITY (FAILS) DESCRIPTION PRICE
20090205 832727101 SSCCQ 29695 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.03
20090225 832727101 SSCCQ 13345 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.02
20090227 832727101 SSCCQ 116354 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.02
20090302 832727101 SSCCQ 116354 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.02
20090306 832727101 SSCCQ 299262 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.03
20090318 832727101 SSCCQ 91590 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.03
20090319 832727101 SSCCQ 16590 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.04
20090327 832727101 SSCCQ 11153 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.04
20090423 832727101 SSCCQ 17368 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.09
20090424 832727101 SSCCQ 24628 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.09
20090427 832727101 SSCCQ 24628 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.08
20090428 832727101 SSCCQ 27851 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.08
20090508 832727101 SSCCQ 80177 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.10
20090512 832727101 SSCCQ 14673 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.10
20090518 832727101 SSCCQ 30000 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.09
20090528 832727101 SSCCQ 10000 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.08
20090605 832727101 SSCCQ 14584 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.09
20090617 832727101 SSCCQ 81670 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.19
20090619 832727101 SSCCQ 23580 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.18
20090622 832727101 SSCCQ 19279 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.20
20090630 832727101 SSCCQ 145523 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.16
20090702 832727101 SSCCQ 2475 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.18
20090706 832727101 SSCCQ 12496 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.18
20090708 832727101 SSCCQ 1797 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.16
20090709 832727101 SSCCQ 2797 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.14
20090710 832727101 SSCCQ 4897 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.15
20090713 832727101 SSCCQ 4598 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.14
20090717 832727101 SSCCQ 531 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.14
20090720 832727101 SSCCQ 2849 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.13
20090722 832727101 SSCCQ 3967 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.11
20090723 832727101 SSCCQ 17680 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.12
20090724 832727101 SSCCQ 7524 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.14
20090727 832727101 SSCCQ 36734 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.15
20090729 832727101 SSCCQ 5258 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.17
20090730 832727101 SSCCQ 3319 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.15
20090731 832727101 SSCCQ 3319 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.16
20090803 832727101 SSCCQ 8000 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.15
20090805 832727101 SSCCQ 10321 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.18
20090806 832727101 SSCCQ 10000 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.20
20090807 832727101 SSCCQ 4000 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.19
20090810 832727101 SSCCQ 1 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.20
20090814 832727101 SSCCQ 5708 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.25
20090817 832727101 SSCCQ 2000 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.23
20090818 832727101 SSCCQ 8395 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.23
20090819 832727101 SSCCQ 22117 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.22
20090820 832727101 SSCCQ 402092 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.23
20090824 832727101 SSCCQ 513 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.24
20090825 832727101 SSCCQ 5008 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.25
20090826 832727101 SSCCQ 5000 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.29
20090827 832727101 SSCCQ 5000 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.38
20090828 832727101 SSCCQ 10000 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.41
20090831 832727101 SSCCQ 51919 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.52
20090901 832727101 SSCCQ 86844 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.56
20090902 832727101 SSCCQ 98919 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.51
20090903 832727101 SSCCQ 355539 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.51
20090904 832727101 SSCCQ 68132 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.55
20090908 832727101 SSCCQ 74179 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.50
20090909 832727101 SSCCQ 72011 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.52
20090910 832727101 SSCCQ 50787 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.54
20090911 832727101 SSCCQ 73038 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.54
20090914 832727101 SSCCQ 44640 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.53
20090915 832727101 SSCCQ 46350 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.50
20090916 832727101 SSCCQ 46290 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.47
20090917 832727101 SSCCQ 46656 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.52
20090918 832727101 SSCCQ 47349 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.55
20090921 832727101 SSCCQ 47479 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.55
20090922 832727101 SSCCQ 44612 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.52
20090923 832727101 SSCCQ 66041 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.51
20090924 832727101 SSCCQ 60405 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.52
20090925 832727101 SSCCQ 60442 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.50
20090928 832727101 SSCCQ 54094 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.46
20090929 832727101 SSCCQ 76794 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.45
20090930 832727101 SSCCQ 86699 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.46
20091001 832727101 SSCCQ 72874 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.46
20091002 832727101 SSCCQ 91442 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.36
20091005 832727101 SSCCQ 62917 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.35
20091006 832727101 SSCCQ 98072 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.32
20091007 832727101 SSCCQ 69577 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.32
20091008 832727101 SSCCQ 69394 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.34
20091009 832727101 SSCCQ 69394 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.38
20091013 832727101 SSCCQ 74001 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.45
20091014 832727101 SSCCQ 65100 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.45
20091015 832727101 SSCCQ 50417 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.75
20091016 832727101 SSCCQ 50417 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.73
20091019 832727101 SSCCQ 88437 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.90
20091020 832727101 SSCCQ 59649 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.99
20091021 832727101 SSCCQ 60447 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.92
20091022 832727101 SSCCQ 77717 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.89
20091023 832727101 SSCCQ 54413 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.88
20091026 832727101 SSCCQ 55213 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.80
20091027 832727101 SSCCQ 52113 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.78
20091028 832727101 SSCCQ 102917 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.63
20091029 832727101 SSCCQ 144734 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.57
20091030 832727101 SSCCQ 50417 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.69
20091102 832727101 SSCCQ 850 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.63
20091103 832727101 SSCCQ 17187 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.67
20091104 832727101 SSCCQ 7484 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.58
20091116 832727101 SSCCQ 1877 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.53
20091119 832727101 SSCCQ 1610 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.48
20091120 832727101 SSCCQ 1610 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.48
20091123 832727101 SSCCQ 1768 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.58
20091125 832727101 SSCCQ 700 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.60
20091127 832727101 SSCCQ 3200 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.59
20091130 832727101 SSCCQ 9619 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.53
20091201 832727101 SSCCQ 5526 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.51
20091202 832727101 SSCCQ 526 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.20
20091204 832727101 SSCCQ 209590 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.29
20091207 832727101 SSCCQ 150426 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.43
20091208 832727101 SSCCQ 46825 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.39
20091209 832727101 SSCCQ 203999 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.37
20091210 832727101 SSCCQ 33463 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.34
20091211 832727101 SSCCQ 61130 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.09
20091214 832727101 SSCCQ 49063 SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP 0.24
Potential for Equ.Com.
Maybe the reference under Bowater was for Steelhead. It was my understanding that they were the lead in the Calpine Case.
Yahoo business reports similar information as far as Direct and Indirect Insider -- see below
2009-01-15
Sale 2009-01-16
3:55 pm AbitibiBowater Inc.
ABH
STEELHEAD PARTNERS LLC
JOHNSTON JAMES MICHAEL
KLEIN BRIAN KATZ
(See footnotes) 72,165 $0.6299 $45,457 5,263,374
(Indirect) View
And then have appeared to sell most of their remaining indirect shares during 2009, with the potential of some sales in 2010.
--------------------------
2008-12-04-
-2008-12-05
Sale 2008-12-05
5:46 pm AbitibiBowater Inc.
ABH
STEELHEAD NAVIGATOR MASTER, L.P.
(10% owner) 335,000 $0.4679 $156,750 5,194,652
(Direct) View
Can anyone tell me what is an indirect s/h is -- "see footnotes" was referenced, but I could not bring it up under SEC Form 4.
I still like my option idea with them -- if they were a true hedger, which we know most hedgers were not (Enron Loophole etc.)
-----------------
PS Any one catch Santelli's rant on Fast Money tonight -- just about tells the true story every time on the Banks. He is long the dollar.