Class action lawsuit in US District Court District of Columbia
It seems this class action lawsuit is now dead, and these notice papers are now kindling...
Correct me if I'm wrong.

Havoc5

Another interesting Jury instruction

You may consider only the evidence admitted in the case. The evidence consists of
the sworn testimony of witnesses, exhibits admitted into evidence, and facts stipulated to by
the parties.
Statements and arguments of the lawyers are not evidence. They are intended only to
help you to understand the evidence. Similarly, the questions of the lawyers are not evidence.
If anyone describes the evidence you have heard differently from the way you
remember it, it is your memory that should control during your deliberations.
You must rely on your own recollection of the testimony and on any notes you may
have taken during the trial.
There are two types of evidence which you may properly use in reaching your verdict.
One type of evidence is direct evidence. Direct evidence is when a witness testifies
about something they know by virtue of their own senses-something they have seen, felt,
touched, or heard. Direct evidence may also be in the form of an exhibit where the fact to be
proved is its present existence or condition.
The other type of evidence is circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is
evidence which tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of other facts. There is a simple
example of circumstantial evidence which is often used in this courthouse.
2
Case 1:13-cv-01053-RCL Document 240 Filed 11/01/22 Page 2 of 11
Assume that when you came into the courthouse this morning the sun was shining and
it was a nice day. Assume that the courtroom blinds were drawn and you could not look
outside. As you were sitting here, someone walked in with an umbrella which was dripping
wet. Then a few minutes later another person also entered with a wet umbrella. Now, you
cannot look outside of the courtroom and you cannot see whether or not it is raining. So you
have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of facts which I have asked you
to assume, it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that it had been raining.
That is all there is to circumstantial evidence. You infer on the basis of reason and
experience and common sense from one established fact the existence or non-existence of
some other fact.
Circumstantial evidence is of no less value than direct evidence; for, it is a general
rule that the law makes no distinction in the weight to be given to either direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence. You are to decide how much weight to give any evidence.
The party who makes a claim has the burden of proving it. This burden of proof
means that the plaintiffs must prove every element of their claim by a preponderance of the
evidence.
To establish an element by a preponderance of the evidence, the party must show
evidence that produces in your mind the belief that the thing in question is more likely true
than not true. The party need not prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard
of proof in criminal cases, or to an absolute or mathematical ce1iainty.
If you believe that the evidence is more likely true on an issue the plaintiffs had to
prove, then your finding on that issue must be for the plaintiffs. If you believe that the
evidence is evenly balanced on an issue the plaintiffs had to prove, then your finding on that
issue must be for the defendants.

Havoc5

From the Jury instructions

A verdict for or against the Class Action Plaintiffs will also be a verdict for or against
the W.R. Berkley Plaintiffs.
If you award damages to the Class Action Plaintiffs, the amount of damages awarded
to the W.R. Berkley Plaintiffs will be determined automatically based on their holdings of
Fannie Mae preferred shares, Freddie Mac preferred shares, and Freddie Mac common shares
as a percentage of the number of shares in each Class.
As I mentioned before, a plaintiff alleging a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing must prove that the alleged breach caused them financial harm. In this case,
plaintiffs argue that FHFA breached the implied covenant by agreeing to the Net Worth Sweep,
and they argue that the Net Worth Sweep harmed them by effectively eliminating the dividend
rights that came with their shares, thereby eliminating some of the value that those shares held
before the Net Worth Sweep. If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged
breach occurred and it caused the alleged financial harm, you must decide what amount of
damages to award to compensate plaintiffs for that harm. You must make that determination
separately with respect to each class of plaintiffs.
9
Case 1:13-cv-01053-RCL Document 240 Filed 11/01/22 Page 9 of 11
A party that is harmed by a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is entitled to damages calculated in an amount that would place it in the same position it would
have been in had the breach not occurred, sometimes called "expectation damages." In this case,
plaintiffs allege that they purchased shares that were supposed to come with dividend rights, and
that as a result of the Net Worth Sweep, they ended up with shares that effectively did not come
with dividend rights and thus were less valuable. Thus, if you find that defendants breached the
implied covenant, then plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages equal to the loss in the value of
their shares that they prove was caused by the Net Worth Sweep. Plaintiffs bear the burden of
proving that measure of damages with reasonable certainty. That means although plaintiffs do
not need to prove the amount of damages with mathematical certainty, they also may not rely on
mere speculation, and they must prove that the damages they seek are a reasonable estimate of
any actual damages they suffered.
You may not award any punitive damages in this case. That means that you may not base
any monetary award on a desire to punish defendants, to prevent their conduct from being
repeated in the future, or to warn others not to engage in such conduct. Any monetary award that
you make in this case must be calculated solely to provide fair compensation to plaintiffs for any
actual injuries that you find they sustained, and on no other basis.
The fact that I have instructed you about the proper measure of damages should not be
considered as my suggesting which party is entitled to your verdict in this case, or that any of
plaintiffs are entitled to any damages award at all. Instructions about the measure of damages are
given for your guidance only if you find that a damages award is in order.
Under Virginia law, which applies to the claims of the Freddie Mac common and junior
preferred shareholders, if you decide to award damages to those plaintiffs in any amount, you
may award prejudgment interest at the rate of 6% per year and fix a date from which interest is to
begin. Prejudgment interest is permitted by statute and is designed to compensate the plaintiffs
for the loss sustained by not having the value they were entitled to have at the time they were
entitled to have it. If you decide that an award of prejudgment interest is necessary to make the
Freddie Mac junior preferred and common shareholders whole, it is within your discretion to
choose the date from which that interest should begin, at any point from the date that the injury
(if any) to the Freddie Mac junior preferred and common shareholders occurred to the date of the
trial.
You are not being asked to determine any award of prejudgment interest for junior
preferred shareholders of Fannie Mae because such interest (if any) will be assessed by the Court
as a matter of Delaware law on any damages you may award.
Before I excuse you to deliberate, I want to discuss a few final matters with you. During
your deliberations, you must consider the instructions as a whole. All of the instructions are
Case 1:13-cv-01053-RCL Document 240 Filed 11/01/22 Page 10 of 11
important. You must not ignore or treat any single instruction or part of an instruction differently
than the other instructions.

Havoc5

And in the end.... the jury will have no choice.
Commons/preferred to be sacrifice on the alter of imminent domain...
Odds everyone???

Alright, spooky night!!
Havoc5

I saw a blurb on television of Biden saying his next focus was to fix housing.

Oh brother!

Fifth Circuit Remand Order released today - Here's a cut and paste

-Havoc5


United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
___________
No. 17-20364
___________
Patrick J. Collins; Marcus J. Liotta; William M.
Hitchcock,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Janet Yellen, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury;
Department of the Treasury; Federal Housing Finance
Agency; Sandra L. Thompson, Acting Director of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency,
Defendants—Appellees.
____________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:16-CV-3113
____________________________
Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Stewart, Dennis,
Elrod, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson, Costa,
Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, and Wilson,
Circuit Judges.
J U D G M E N T
This cause was considered on the record on appeal and was argued by
counsel.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 4, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Case: 17-20364 Document: 00516294675 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2022
No. 17-20364
2
IT IS ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the cause is
REMANDED to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance
with the opinion of this Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party bear its own costs
on appeal.
Haynes, Circuit Judge, joined by Stewart, Dennis, Graves, and
Costa, Circuit Judges, dissenting.
Case: 17-20364 Document: 00516294675 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/26/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
No. 17-20364
Patrick J. Collins; Marcus J. Liotta; William M.
Hitchcock,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Janet Yellen, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury; Department
of the Treasury; Federal Housing Finance Agency;
Sandra L. Thompson, Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:16-CV-3113
Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Stewart, Dennis,
Elrod, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson, Costa,
Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, and Wilson,
Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam, joined by Owen, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith,
Elrod, Southwick, Higginson, Willett, Ho, Duncan,
Engelhardt, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges:
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 4, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Case: 17-20364 Document: 00516294676 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2022
No. 17-20364
2
This court’s en banc decision, found at 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019),
returns to us on remand from the Supreme Court. See Collins v. Yellen,
141 S. Ct. 1761 (2020). We REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with the Supreme Court’s decision.
In Collins, the Court affirmed our holding that the statutory “for
cause” removal provision applicable to the Director of the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (“FHFA,”)1, which limited the President’s authority over
this Executive Branch principal officer, unconstitutionally violates the
separation of powers. 141 S. Ct. at 1783-87. In pertinent part, however, the
Court vacated and remanded other portions of our prior decision.
It is unnecessary to recount the Court’s reasoning aside from relevant
conclusions that differed from this court’s disposition. First, the Court
determined that the “Third Amendment” to agreements between the FHFA
and Treasury Department, which affects the Plaintiff-shareholders’ rights,
bore no constitutional infirmity in its inception. Second, the Senate-
confirmed FHFA Directors who implemented the Third Amendment during
the pendency of the parties’ longstanding dispute “were properly
appointed[]” even though the President’s power to remove them remained
constrained. Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the constitutional removal
defect, the Court held, did not render “any of the actions taken by the FHFA
in relation to the third amendment [] void.” Id.
Importantly, however, the latter conclusion “does not necessarily
mean . . . that the shareholders have no entitlement to retrospective relief.”
Id. at 1788. “[T]he possibility that the unconstitutional restriction on a
President’s power to remove a Director of the FHFA could have [inflicted
compensable harm] cannot be ruled out.” Id. at 1789. The Court went on,
1 12 U.S.C. §§ 4512(a), (b)(2).
Case: 17-20364 Document: 00516294676 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/26/2022
No. 17-20364
3
very briefly, to sketch possible causes and consequences of such harm, along
with the Federal Defendants’ denials of any such harm. Id. The Court
accordingly remanded the action for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion.
After this court heard oral argument on questions surrounding
retrospective relief, it became clear that the prudent course is to remand to
the district court to fulfill the Supreme Court’s remand order. And that is
what we do.
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme
Court’s decision.
Case: 17-20364 Document: 00516294676 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/26/2022
No. 17-20364
4
Haynes, Circuit Judge, joined by Stewart, Dennis, Graves and
Costa, Circuit Judges, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s decision to remand
this case back to the district court to decide all the remaining issues in the
first instance. On the issue of harm, the Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged the federal parties’ argument that the President “retained the
power to supervise the Third Amendment’s adoption . . . because FHFA’s
counterparty to the Amendment was Treasury—an executive department
led by a Secretary subject to removal at will by the President.” Collins v.
Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1789 (2021) (quotation and brackets omitted). It then
instructed that “[t]he parties’ arguments should be resolved in the first
instance by the lower courts.” Id. (emphasis added).
Nothing in this language precludes this court from deciding the harm
issue. Indeed, we could easily do so in light of our previous conclusion that
“the President, acting through the Secretary of the Treasury, could have
stopped [the Net Worth Sweep] but did not.” Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d
553, 594 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc). As we also noted, President Trump later
selected an acting Director as well as a new Director and never filed anything
in this court opposing the Net Worth Sweep or its effects. Id. He certainly
could have picked different Directors who would carry out a different vision,
if he sought that.1
Because the Shareholders have not pointed to sufficient facts to cast
doubt on our previous conclusion, we should resolve this case on the above
grounds. In other words, I think we should modify the district court’s
judgment by granting declaratory relief in the Plaintiff’s favor, stating that
1 It is important to remember that claims for relief must have plausibility. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Case: 17-20364 Document: 00516294676 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/26/2022
No. 17-20364
5
the “for cause” removal provision as to the Director of the FHFA is
unconstitutional. In all other respects, we should affirm. Because the
majority opinion fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.
Case: 17-20364 Document: 00516294676 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/26/2022
United States Court of Appeals
FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
LYLE W. CAYCE
CLERK
TEL. 504-310-7700
600 S. MAESTRI PLACE,
Suite 115
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
April 26, 2022
Mr. Nathan Ochsner
Southern District of Texas, Houston
United States District Court
515 Rusk Street
Room 5300
Houston, TX 77002
No. 17-20364 Collins v. Yellen
USDC No. 4:16-CV-3113
Dear Mr. Ochsner,
Enclosed is a copy of the judgment issued as the mandate and a
copy of the court’s opinion.
Sincerely,
LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk
By: _________________________
Shawn D. Henderson, Deputy Clerk
504-310-7668
cc: Mr. Brian W. Barnes
Mr. Jeffrey Michael Bayne
Mr. Howard N. Cayne
Mr. Charles Justin Cooper
Mr. Chad Flores
Mr. Ian S. Hoffman
Mr. Robert J. Katerberg
Ms. Katharine M. Mapes
Mr. Scott Lawrence Nelson
Mr. Peter A. Patterson
Mr. Dirk Phillips
Mr. Gerard J. Sinzdak
Mr. Mark Bernard Stern
Mr. David H. Thompson
Ms. Asim Varma
Ms. Abby Christine Wright
Case: 17-20364 Document: 00516294686 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2022
Ms. Elizabeth Wydra
Case: 17-20364 Document: 00516294686 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/26/2022

Thompson said she's not even sure conservatorship will end during her tenure.
Mel 2.0
Courts seem to be impotent.
Let's see what Lamberth does...

Yes, me too. Seems any narrative can be crafted.

En Banc Opinion is out.

Working on uploading.

Havoc5

Proposed order for Lamberth entered today.
Gathering up the class lists.






-Havoc5

En Banc Audio link

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/17/17-20364_1-19-2022.mp3

Link to listen live to En Banc

Click on this link to listen live to an oral argument: En Banc Courtroom. (Note, this link is active only during the hearing.)

https://5thcircuit.streamguys1.com/enbanc

Starts 9:00AM in New Orleans (CST)

Another Watt!

Thanks Navy,

And I see Collins En Banc is coming on the 19th.

-Havoc5

Judge denies as moot CFPB motion for EN BANC

This may be due to the court initiating EN BANC review on it's own prior.



No such similar order for Collins v. Yellen.

Thoughts?

Havoc5

Both CPFB and Collins calendared for Jan 19th.



Havoc5

Sorry, I've been offline all weekend.

I think Ano has made a good analysis of the CFPB and coming dual EN BANC hearing facts.

I hope we get some traction from Friday too.

Havoc5

Collins v. Yellen EN BANC scheduled

https://investorshub.advfn.com/uimage/uploads/2021/12/4/fwkjhScreenshot_20211204-115321_Chrome.jpg

Same date for CFPB case as well:

18-60302 CFPB v. All American Check Cashing "Case Tentatively Calendared for Argument"

Class action update so far:





Havoc5

Guido2,

Try this:

Filedropper link

Havoc5

Collins reply briefs look a lot like the original arguments.



Bhatti reply brief from FHFA and Treasury have been submitted, but not viewable by the public it seems.

Havoc5

Court reply briefs tomorrow from Bhatti and Collins.

Judge Atlas case in Southern District

Case info:


Last docket entry so far:


-Havoc5

Guido2,
Looks like you found it,good.
Didn't have time to post.

5th Circuit Appellant Brief is out...











Interesting recusal opening.
"For Cause" Watt inflicted harms is the jist.

Havoc5

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals accepts Bhatti briefing schedule:





-Havoc5

Alito, for cripes sake!

Interesting.. CFPB vs All American Checking has the exact same court schedule.

Havoc5

Collins dates from Pacer:

Next date July 26th.

Yes, as Gorsuch writes in the opinion.

Let's hope the lower court follows relief precedence for Article 2 violations to highlight the issue.

Courts moving fast...

https://investorshub.advfn.com/uimage/uploads/2021/6/24/wuonjUSCA_Notice.JPG

Case Name: Patrick Collins v. Steven Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S
Case Number: 17-20364
Document(s): Document(s)

Docket Text:
COURT DIRECTIVE ISSUED requesting letter briefs of not more than five pages, addressing how the case, when remanded to the en banc court, should proceed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Collins v. Yellen, 2021 WL 2557067 (June 23, 2021). The letter briefs are due by 1:00 p.m. on July 2, 2021. [9604174-2] A/Pet Supplemental Brief due on 07/02/2021 for Appellants Patrick J. Collins, William M. Hitchcock and Marcus J. Liotta.. E/Res Supplemental Brief due on 07/02/2021 for Appellees Mark A. Calabria, Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Department of the Treasury, Federal Housing Finance Agency and Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury.. [17-20364] (SDH)

This part bugs me. Another escape hatch for the government?

"The lower courts may also consider all issues related to the federal parties’ argument that the doctrine of laches precludes any relief. The federal parties argue that Treasury was prejudiced by the shareholders’ delay in filing suit because, for some time after the third amendment was adopted, there was a chance that it would benefit the shareholders. Ac-cording to the federal parties, the shareholders waited to file suit until it became apparent that the third amendment would not have that effect.The shareholders respond that laches is inapplicable because they filed their complaint within the time allowed by the statute of limitations, and they argue that their delay did not cause prejudice because it was “mathematically impossible” for Treasury to make less money under the Third Amendment than under the prior regime. Reply Brief for Collins et al. 4–5 (emphasis deleted). We decline to decide this fact-bound question in the first instance."

That's how I read it too. "Go back and ask for a takings."

Seems like years more litigation, not?

What a disappointment for the SC.

Agreed

Who is selling?

New SC Opinions date set for 24th.

-Havoc5

Like watching paint dry...
.

With only ~20% of the cases decided >50% through the term, these Judges need to get off their robes and start adjudicating without an eye on politics.

March 9th will be 90 days on Collins.

-Havoc5

Hahaha Yes, if DOJ can rig Collins in the SC, then we truly are in a banana republic.

New Charlie opinion

Charlie G. opinion tweet