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Cowtown Jay, your comparison shows a box filled in near the very top to "Show only changed modules". That's your problem. Uncheck that box.
Endpoint has not changed since the big change on July 22. But the wording has always been a little different than SWOV. It means the same thing as SWOV. Since there has been no change, it doesn't show the info unless you expand the category and then you can see no changes.
Primary Outcome Measures:
1. Time to ventilation or death in subjects with a baseline score of 5 or 6
Subjects in ordinal scores 5 or 6 at baseline with a CRP<150 mg/L at baseline and age<85 years, where the event is described as being in one of these two categories:
7. Hospitalized, on invasive mechanical ventilation or extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO); 8. Death.
Nice video. But IMO you are mistaken that a short squeeze is going on. This is clearly a meme stock at the moment, and the volumes represent the lemming-like pursuit of profits by the meme players (which by the way include major institutions now, and not just retail players). In my opinion, the current rise in the stock price is also being aided and abetted by the original short sellers themselves (at least the ones associated with the warrants -- see my prior posts).
You use "short volume" analysis in your video. The usefulness of this type of information has been completely discredited, and is actually disavowed by NASDAQ and others that supply this information. Please go to their website for their explanation of why this information can be extremely deceptive.
I accept that "short interest" (a different set of statistics) can be useful. But the stats that people are using for CLOV appear wrong and outdated. And even if they are correct, you have to adjust out things like warrants, convertible bonds, and convertible preferred stock -- all of which undermine the short squeeze theory for many stocks, including this one.
I am happy that you had a good day in the market. It was an incredible day for many meme stocks. The sad thing to me is that your expertise is being used to support a very short term price swing that is not based on any news or catalysts or any change in the underlying operations of the company. This is great for meme swing traders, but inexperienced traders could wind up losing their shirts. Especially in the options market. Please come back here on June 18 to report how you did.
Who would want to pretend there is a short squeeze?
Surprisingly enough, the shorts themselves in Clover's unusual situation. The warrant holders could easily have shorted the stock back at the time of the merger, and subsequently covered the stock by buying cheap shares as low as $6 to $7 since that time. In order to reproduce this money machine, they need to get the stock back above their $11.50 conversion price in order to generate another golden egg. Say the price gets to $13 a share. They can then short it and wait for it to fall below $11.50 again. If they are wrong and the stock goes higher, or stays at $13 forever, they still make a second profit -- because they will eventually convert their warrant at $11.50 to cover their short sale, and they will keep that profit. They never have to buy the stock higher in a short-squeeze scenario.
So the shorts have every reason to create a fake short squeeze scenario and do PR by using shills until they can short the stock again. They are not really motivated to let it run beyond $18, because the company can force them to convert at that level, and their "golden goose" would be "cooked". It's a lot easier, and more profitable for them to let the stock bounce between $13-$15 and $6-$7. If you are a swing trader (I am not) this is a perfect setup to make some money by following the unusual swings you may see in this stock.
No Short Squeeze Possible -- Reason 3
The latest Short Interest shown for Clover is 40,456,716 shares, which has increased somewhat from levels in March/April following the closing. This seems high relative to "shares outstanding" that are shown on some websites. But these shares outstanding are not fully indicative of actual shares outstanding.
For example, the combined Pro Forma at December 31, 2020 for the SPAC deal showed the combined company with 404,440,809 shares outstanding.
The March 31, 2021 Quarterly Report uses 376,170,5445 as the basic shares outstanding after the merger (compared with 88,330,996 as of December 31, 2020 before the SPAC merger). However, the 376 million figure excludes additional dilutive shares as noted in the footnote:
"Because the Corporation had a net loss in the three months ended March 31, 2021 and 2020, the Corporation’s potentially dilutive securities, which include stock options, restricted stock, preferred stock and warrants to purchase shares of common stock and preferred stock, have been excluded from the computation of diluted net loss per share, as the effect would be anti-dilutive. Therefore, the weighted-average number of common shares outstanding used to calculate both basic and diluted net loss per share attributable to common stockholders for these periods is the same."
More importantly, the 88 million figure for December 31, 2020 (pre-merger) was grossly incomplete. It excluded convertible preferred shares (convertible into 139,444,346 shares), common stock issued for warrants exercised pre-merger (7,205,390 shares), and convertible debt conversion (75,084,703 shares), so the December 31, 2020 equivalent diluted share equivalents were over 310 million shares. Plus other outstanding warrants and stock options. If anyone is using the 88 million figure to calculate short interest ratios, they are either grossly misinformed, or they are deliberately misleading.
Bringing the data forward, there was issuance of common stock related to the PIPE investment and merger (146,373,904 shares, less reduction of previous Class B shares by 49,975,104 shares, and minor stock option adjustments. The convertible preferred and convertible debt above were in fact converted to new shares at the time of the merger. In total, there were 148 million Class A shares and 260 million Class B shares at the time of the merger, or 408 million equivalent Class A shares (each Class B share is convertible to 1 Class A share). So any short ratios should be measured against the 408 million shares. or perhaps 447 million shares if you count the outstanding warrants.
No Short Squeeze Possible -- Reason 2
"This prospectus relates to the offer and sale from time to time by us of up to 7,863,817 shares of Class B common stock reserved for issuance by us upon exercise of options to purchase Class B common stock held by former employees of Clover (as defined below) under Clover’s 2014 Equity Incentive Plan."
These stock options are held by former employees.
"As a result of the Mergers, among other things, all shares of Clover common stock reserved in respect of Clover stock options outstanding as of immediately prior to the effective time of the First Merger, were converted, based on the Exchange Ratio (as defined in the Merger Agreement) of 2.0681, into awards based on shares of Clover Health Class B common stock.We will not receive any proceeds from the sale of the Class B common stock covered by this prospectus other than proceeds from the exercise of the options whose underlying shares of Class B common stock are covered by this prospectus.Each outstanding share of Class B common stock is convertible at any time at the option of the holder into one share of Class A common stock."
I don't know the option conversion prices for these former employees. I expect they will be in the $10 a share range or less. More importantly, they are unlikely to be higher than $13, so these shares will become available to short sellers long before the stock climbs very high.
No Short Squeeze Possible -- Reason 1
"As of January 7, 2021, we [Clover] had warrants to purchase an aggregate of approximately 38,533,271 shares of our Class A common stock outstanding.These warrants will become exercisable at any time commencing on April 24, 2021, and the warrants will expire at 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on January 7, 2026, which is the fifth anniversary of the Closing, or earlier upon redemption or liquidation. The exercise price of these warrants is $11.50 per share. To the extent such warrants are exercised, additional shares of Class A common stock will be issued, which will result in dilution to the then-existing holders of Class A common stock and increase the number of shares eligible for resale in the public market."
It is very likely that the "short interest" in this stock identified previously is actually owned by the holders of the warrants. If the stock stays above $11.50 they can convert and use this newly created stock to cover their shorts. They never have to buy a single share to cover. No squeeze.
When the stock falls back below $11.50, they don't have to convert -- they can simply buy the stock cheap (below $11.50) to cover, assuming they shorted previously at a price above $11.50 (which they did). So they can continue doing this forever. Find some sheep to fleece and rinse and repeat. Yes, some day the company may actually make some money and really be worth more than $11.50 on a consistent basis. Good luck with that.
Max pain for May expiration has changed. With many investors exiting from May $17.50 call options yesterday, and our big player exiting from May $30 puts very late in the day yesterday, max pain for May expiration looks like it shifted from $17.50 to $20.00.
Given that shift, and the artificial nature of yesterday's drop from $20 to $18 (see my other post), there is a good chance of a quick rise back to the $20 price level before Friday close.
Possible explanation for yesterday's afternoon selling.
Not too long ago an investor loaded up with strange combos of 150,000 and 200,000 share blocks of stock plus calls plus puts in the same amounts over the course of a couple of days. Let's assume that the puts were bought along with the stock (ignore the calls).
Late in the afternoon yesterday, big call and put transactions in May and June 30's (3,000 contracts each)were executed.
So yesterday morning the stock rises to $20 and wants to go even higher (good for the stock our player owns), but the player wants to get out of the puts. So he drives the stock price back down yesterday afternoon, to increase the value of the $30 puts back to where he bought them or back to where he would be profitable overall, using some of the stock already purchased. We know it does not take all that much stock to do so. Once the price is down to a target point, or is about as far as the market allows, the player exits his May put position, and either rolls it to June, or exits the June position as well (it looks like a roll at the moment). The stock required to drive it down from $20 is sold at levels that were still profitable. The player had up to 300,000 shares of stock (or even more if necessary with May and June combined?) to sell to drive the price down and to help hold the line at $20 (or some other player was involved at $20). By breaking the psychology of investors at the $20 level, and driving the price down, the player picked up smaller investor selling on the way down (weak hands, stop losses) to help out with the plan.
That's my theory of the buzz saw we ran into yesterday afternoon. If correct, the stock should bounce back quickly.
I apparently misspoke about the risk of selling puts. I was simply guessing that the puts were sold to help finance the corresponding stock investment, and that the calls were bought to offset a put risk.
Sorry if I confused anyone other than myself.
Not likely. With a potential buyout lurking around, there is too much risk on those sold puts. Who would want to "break even" at a $100 a share buyout price, when you can buy a really cheap call as insurance? Let's see: 200,000 shares times $70 a share missed out on = $14 million vs. 2,000 call contracts equals 200,000 X $1.36 = $272,000.
It wouldn't even have to be a buyout. A big BARDA purchase order at the time of the EUA (before June expiration) could drive this stock towards $100.
Most of us think this would be a screaming buy at $50 with just an EUA in hand. Those calls would still be a really cheap insurance policy against those puts.
Just to clarify. There was a trade yesterday for 150,000 shares and equivalent May $30 calls and puts. There is a trade today for 200,000 shares and equivalent June $30 calls and puts. In addition, there is a trade today for 2,000 more May $30 call contracts.
For both trades, I think the strategy is to buy the shares and sell the puts, and then buy the calls as insurance against the stock price rising above $30 and driving the puts sold "negative".
For the May trade, I was guessing that the trader was betting that the high between now and May expiration was going to be in the $20-$22 range. That way, he keeps most of the premium he grabbed when he sold the puts, and gets into HGEN cheap on a net cost basis. If the stock goes over $30, he loses his premium, and has the calls to protect him on the upside. Effectively buys into HGEN at current pricing. No harm, no foul.
For the June trade, where we may have an EUA, and the stock may be much higher, he is still covered by the same setup. But now we see an additional 2,000 May (not June) call contracts at $30. I'm guessing these were sold! These may have been added in as a sale to grab the premium as a partial offset to the overall deal. The trader is betting that it is unlikely we will go over $30 by May expiration, so he can keep the premium.
I like the way this guy/gal trades (these guys/gals if there is a copycat).
I see it now as a June put. I misread your post. Thought you were talking about May.
I did not see that put trade on my source. If it exists, it is probably like the trade yesterday I mentioned in passing in my post just before yours. In that post, there was a June call trade that also may be involved, but I don't know the timing.
Regarding the 200,000 share block. Can someone check the timing on that compared with possible 2,000+ call contracts executed today for May expiration 30's and another 2,000+ for June expiration 30's? I'm thinking someone may have sold May and bought June, with the expectation that there will be no EUA by May expiration.
The shares may be involved as the option writer MM is trying to cover the risk associated with the purchase of the June calls.
There was another big trade yesterday possibly involving 150,000 shares that did not move the selling price, along with 1,500 $30 put contracts (sold as a monetary offset to the stock costs?) and 1,500 $30 call contracts (bought cheap to cover the upside risk on the puts?) in May.
Looks like one or more hedge funds are getting involved in a substantial way.
With regard to the MiTT vs ITT issue, I suspect Humanigen management was never informed of possibly better ITT results at the time the study results were unblinded to them on a weekend that they then published on Monday.
If you look at the adjustments, the first 22 patients eliminated were at hospitals that ran out of control, and the CRO determined that those patients (both Lenz and placebo) did not get even minimum care standards. In the preprint it said something to the effect that this adjustment occurred during the blinded period. Strange phrasing suggestive of what I am theorizing above.
Then an additional 11 were eliminated due to lack of supervision. Again, this seems like a CRO adjustment before the data were released/unblinded, and it is probable that Humanigen also may not have been fully aware of the reasons behind this adjustment at the time of the MiTT announcement.
Finally, the last 8 patients deleted were due to being randomized but not dosed. This was the main reason Humanigen management explained later for the MiTT adjustments, although I think they may have lumped the other 11 "unsupervised" patients with this answer on the theory that their dosing was suspect and not confirmed by adequate supervision.
Given all this, it is possible that the CRO did not bother to do ITT stats at that time, because they could not in good conscience support them. Humanigen was probably told that the MiTT stats reflected dropping two sites that would severely distort results, and were completely untrustworthy for FDA submission, and that other patients were dropped due to non-dosing (a common adjustment, and a minor one in quantity) or unsubstantiated dosing (don't know if this is common).
Humanigen would have tended to err on the side of data that could be supported ("under-promise and over-deliver", so to speak), and 54% was good enough for an announcement and an approval. Since that time, the ITT stats were calculated, and mentioned as a throw-away to help silence the critics, IMO. If the ITT stats were in fact provided at the time of unblinding, Humanigen may have felt they were too distorted, and did not want to get a black eye defending an overstated number that they knew would cave in.
I would be interested to know if dropping results from complete sites before the blinded study is ended is an accepted practice by the FDA, if anyone knows? One reason I ask is that a competitor dropped almost all its sites (including many sites that were "recruiting" for months along the way), and based its results on a bunch of new sites added to the trial a month or two before the trial end. I have wondered if they found hospitals with a standard of care that did not include rem and/or dex so that their drug would look better.
Wrong. You should probably read the announcement.
"To finance the Acquisition as well as general working capital, Metro One is raising $3.5 million of financing in the form of puttable Simple Agreements for Future Equity ("Safes") from institutional investors and family offices.
The Safes are to convert into common stock of the Company following the conversion of all outstanding Series A Convertible Preferred Stock ("Preferred Stock") into common stock ("Common Stock", and collectively with the Safes, the Preferred Stock, and any other Company securities, the "Securities") of the Company in a transaction that the Company intends to undertake later this year (the "Preferred Conversion" and the resulting capitalization immediately following the Safe conversion and the Preferred Conversion calculated on an as-converted to Common Stock basis, without duplication, the "Company Capitalization").
In addition, as part of the Acquisition consideration, Metro One has agreed that upon the Preferred Conversion it will issue Common Stock equivalent to 8% of the Company Capitalization for the benefit of certain creditors of Royal App, to issue Common Stock in an aggregate amount up to 2% of the Company Capitalization to Everest Corporate Finance as partial compensation for the Acquisition, as well as to issue equity incentives to certain employees. Pending the issuance of 8% of the Company Capitalization, a trustee for certain creditors of Royal App will have a lien on certain Shelfy assets for the benefit of such creditors."
Food for thought - Bad and Good
This company is not in my wheelhouse, but I spent a few hours looking at it for fun and for a friend.
First, The Bad News:
The shell company Metro One Telecommunications (WOWI) essentially went out of business in 2008. In March of 2009 it deregistered its stock, and suspended normal SEC reporting. It was allowed to because it had less than 300 shareholders (actually only 202). They moved to the Pink Sheets, where it remains. I don't know what happens if it goes over 300 shareholders. It has not operated or filed SEC reports since then. The 6.2 million shares of common reported is from 2008, but was accurate then, and also apparently now (per phone call reported by others here).
Missing from that, however, is 1,000 shares of convertible preferred Series A shares originally purchased at $10,000 each and convertible into common stock at $1.78 a share. That would result in an additional 5.6 million shares.They can't be sold without being converted.
Also, the preferred shares were to receive dividends of $400 per year (times 1,000 preferred shares). Any accrued and unpaid dividends are convertible into common shares at $1.78. If dividends have not been paid over the years, it could result in a balance due of $5.2 million or so, convertible into 2.9 million shares. This balance due could be used to "fund" the warrants (see below) in a restructuring, which would need $3.5 million, leaving a net due of $1.7 million, convertible into 955,056 more shares beyond the warrant-related shares.
Also, the 1,000 shares received warrants to purchase another 350 shares (at $10,000 each) also convertible into common at $1.78 each. This represents an additional 2 million shares -- potentially. The existing preferred stock does not require any more funding, so it is likely it will be converted (the company says this is the immediate plan in its PR) into common stock so that it could be sold at the discretion of the holders. The warrant-related preferred shares might get cancelled out in the forthcoming recapitalization, or maybe not. They could be funded by the dividend payments that might be in arrears (see above).
Then there are the new investors, who hold "SAFE" investments that are convertible to common for their $3.5 million. My guess is that they will get at least 15 million shares, so that they will have voting control over the prior holders. That would be at 23.3 cents a share, which is still well above recent share prices.
Then there are the debt holders of Royal App, who will get 8% of the overall new common (2.4 million shares?) and Everest Corporate Finance (probably related to the Chairman -- see below) will get 2% of the new common (600,000 shares?)for engineering the deal, plus certain employees will get some common stock (undefined -- perhaps 500,000 shares, but could be a lot more (2.5 million? considering how low the stock price is). But now the new investors might want 4 million more shares to stay at over 50% for a controlling interest. That would imply a buy-in price of 20 cents a share or so, still not unreasonable.
So I estimate there may be as many as 32 to 34 million shares of common outstanding after the recapitalization process (with a risk as high as 38 million shares). The fact that investors may be lured in with the 6 million common stock figure from 2008 is one reason the SEC might put a halt on trading this stock (i.e., not enough disclosure about the Preferred and SAFE holders' positions). Yes, my assumptions are wild-ass guesses, but they are more likely and closer to the actual figures than using the 2008 common shares, reconfirmed in this forum by a phone call that did not ask the right questions.
As to the value of the assets of the company, you can be wildly optimistic, or you can be realistic. Wildly optimistic says that you use an asset value based on a price level some idiot private investors used when they put money into the company in a late financing round with a "$48 Million Valuation" -- before the company went bankrupt!
Realistic is the fact that the bankruptcy court had an auction, and the winning bidder spent only $2.4 million plus 8% of the common stock of the new company to acquire it. Assuming the new company at best might be worth $20 million (the amount already invested to create and market the software before Royal APP went bankrupt), the 8% could be worth $1.6 million at most in the minds of the creditors. So only a $4 million payment for the assets of the company in its current state. And that was the best offer at the bankruptcy auction. Add the additional $1 million the investors put in for working capital. That totals $5 million maximum "value" in the assets.
A $5 million value spread over 32 to 34 million shares would imply a share price of about 15 cents. But that's before the good news below.
The Good News:
Metro One may have cash in the bank. The company never filed for bankruptcy, because they closed down operations before they ran out. We don't know if they pissed it away in the last 12 years, or at least kept it in an interest bearing account, or used it to pay the preferred dividends of $400,000 per year. In the last financial statement for June 2008, they had net "cash" of $8 million, with some modest expected further closing costs and maybe $2 million of IRS disputes. This is primarily because of the buy-in by the two largest investors of $10 million for the 1,000 preferred shares (originally 220, then 780 shares upon conversion of a convertible debt loan) near the end of the business. They also sold their patent portfolio for $8 million after things were closed down.
If they do have cash, the business may be able to get back on its feet without another near-term raise with corresponding dilution. Even more important, it may have allowed the existing shareholders in Metro One to demand a bigger share of the combined company, resulting in fewer shares being allocated to the new investors. That might knock the existing total common shares back into the 25 million range, which would be helpful.
Metro One had tax-loss carry forwards of over $100 million (federal) and almost $150 million state. The state ones may have mostly expired over time, but the federal one may still be there. If so, it may have value. Metro One also had tax credits of $3.6 million that were due to expire in 2008 through 2027 (incl some with no expiration). These, too, may have a value.
Most importantly, the buyout of the bankrupt Royal App and the merger into the shell non-operating company(Metro One)is being orchestrated by Elchanon (Nani) Maoz, the founder of Everest Special Situations Fund, a preferred stock holder of Metro One, who is also the Chairman of the new combined company. He had previously been involved with Metro One when its business died -- as a director on the board and as the second largest investor, so he knew it was an available shell.
He is also a self-promoting distressed situation specialist. You can buy his book here: https://www.amazon.com/Special-Situations-Nani-Maoz/dp/B08BVWTF8Y/ref=sr_1_14?dchild=1&keywords=special+situations&qid=1619980936&s=books&sr=1-14
The key point is Nani Maoz has investors involved that he does not want to disappoint, and he has a reputation to uphold. He is an Israeli fundraiser for what is now essentially an Israeli company, even if domiciled technically in the USA. The software company did have some big customers. (It would be interesting to check to see if these customers are still using the software.) Maoz's funds may also have invested in Royal App, so he may be more informed as to what he is getting into.
Bottom line, he is probably not a pumper and dumper. He really wants to build the new company he just created. It has been put together like a SPAC (a SPAC that took 12 years to come to fruition!).
I will not be investing in this company -- it's outside my wheelhouse, but it could be an interesting speculation.
Key numbers to keep in mind:
2008/2021 Common Stock 6,233,326
2008/2021 Preferred Stock 1,000
Preferred convert to common 5,617,978
Warrants convert to common 1,966,292
Unfunded dividends (net of wts) 955,056
Subtotal Pre-Deal Common 14,772,652
New Common -- new investors 15,000,000 (guess @ $0.233 valuation)
New Common -- Royal creditors 2,500,000
New Common -- Everest/Maoz 600,000
New Common -- Employees--Low 500,000
More New Common for Employees 2,000,000
Total Common After Deal(Low) 32,272,652
Total Common After Deal(High)34,272,652
Adjust to no warrants converted
and for reduced shares for new
investors 25,000,000
In all of these scenarios, the stock will be closely held after the fact. Out of the 6.2 million base common shares, the top two investors (who own the preferred shares and the warrants) also owned 1.275 million shares as of June 5, 2007, and were buying up more shares during 2007-2008 (at least 600,000 more shares). If they continued to buy during the past 12 years, they may have nearly all the shares by now! GLTA
The volume is the tell. But not in a good way. 74 million shares trade, and the stock is only up 16%. My my, what could be going on? Algos and sheep fleecing, in my opinion. I have already stated that warrant holders (20 million shares, or even 40 million shares) may start selling short again once the stock price goes over $11.50 (their exercise price for the warrant). It's a "free" trade. If the stock goes down, they can buy the stock lower than $11.50 to cover their short -- then keep their warrant to do it again and again. If the stock goes up, they simply cover by using their warrant at $11.50. For this to work many times, they need to let and/or help the stock get back above $11.50 again so they can repeat the fleecing once again.
So, slimhere, are you new to Clover?
I have no investment one way or the other in Clover. It may be a good company with a good chance of beating its way through what I have described. But it will be a tough battle. Just be aware of where the battlefields are when you invest.
I had similar issues with the "short squeeze advocates" on Kempharm. No one had done their homework, and the short interest was out of date and not available for a squeeze. Again I had no interest in KemPharm and just tried to warn people that there were "short squeeze" touts that they should ignore. In that particular case, I thought KemPharm was a good company with good prospects, but it was just not eligible for a short squeeze.
Why short volume doesn't equal short interest -- from the horse's mouth (FINRA):
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/information-notice-051019
Key quote: "As discussed below, the data: (1) does not include any trades that are not publicly disseminated, (2) is not consolidated with exchange data, and (3) does not—and is not intended to—equate to short interest position information."
The article explains all the reasons why short volume is mostly useless information. Enjoy!
The CLOV short interest is an illusion. Of the 40 million short shares being pointed to, the first 20 million were very probably associated with warrants back when the stock was trading at $13.00 and above. There will be no short squeeze of this short interest, since the short sellers can simply buy the stock at $11.50 a share and cover the short sale with the newly created stock.($1.50 difference was some of the warrant holders cost for the warrant.)
There is another 20 million of warrants outstanding that are also at $11.50 that may be involved in some way that I do not understand at the moment. But the key point is that the holders of these warrants can also buy new shares at $11.50, so if they are part of the short interest, they cannot be squeezed. So there is a possibility that there is no real net short interest at all.
Not going to investigate further, however, because I have no interest in this company. Huge stock volume transactions and gigantic options volumes today. Sheep getting fleeced. A lot of foolishness once again.
Please remember that you have to subtract convertible debt, convertible preferred, and warrants from short interest, because most of these holders have already sold short the shares they are entitled to convert into -- they did it at the time they bought the convertible debt or preferred, for example, if it made sense at the time (it almost always does). Warrant holders do it all the time if the stock goes over their conversion price, which happened here. They don't have to convert the warrant by the way, if the stock again goes lower -- they can just buy lower and cover (as may be going on here) and hold on to the warrant in case it becomes more valuable in the future. They can keep doing this over and over, using the warrant as a baseline to work against. Short when its high, then cover when the stock is low, or cover with warrant if the stock never goes lower again.
Not sure where they failed. Their Press Release stated:
BURLINGAME, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- Humanigen, Inc. (Nasdaq:HGEN) (“Humanigen”), a clinical stage biopharmaceutical company focused on preventing and treating an immune hyper-response called “cytokine storm” with its lead drug candidate lenzilumab™, today announced that it has priced its underwritten public offering of 5,000,000 shares of its common stock at a public offering price of $18.50 per share, resulting in gross proceeds to Humanigen of approximately $92.5 million, before deducting underwriting discounts and commissions and offering expenses. The offering is expected to close on or about April 5, 2021. Humanigen also granted the underwriters a 30-day option to purchase up to an additional 750,000 shares at the public offering price, less underwriting discounts and commissions.
What was wrong with this? Or was the failure in one of the 8K prospectus filings?
Warning to CDMO investors here on the board. If Humanigen does get an early buyout, any contract to supply Humanigen may be cancelled or not be replaced when it expires as the new BP buyer uses its own resources.
The CYDY EUA attempt will fail due to a variety of factors (bad study, bad statistics, etc) But there may be an underlying effect that should be investigated. CYDY has sliced and diced the data to show a 14-day mortality benefit that is very large, on a patient population that is very small. They are hoping that the FDA will ignore the fact that 28-day mortality benefit is only modest. They go on to admit that their dosing may be inadequate for the full 28 day study (dosing was at day 0 and day 7) and that they may need additional doses (such as Day 14 and Day 21) The FDA will, of course, say fine, give us a study that shows your revised dosing and has enough patients to meet statistical significance. Maybe eventually CYDY will sell their drug as "we can keep you alive on vent for as long as you want as long as you keep on dosing and paying for it". The interesting thing is that if you look very carefully at the Thwaite chart (almost impossible to actually do) there appeared to be a signal that CC5L is in fact highly elevated in critical patients. Lenzilumab possibly helps with that, too. The government is studying our drug Lenzilumab in criticals, although it is not a Phase 3 study. However, I believe CYDY's drug will eventually have to beat any results that Lenz is able to achieve. If they can help with critical patients, more power to them. But they have to prove it, which they have not done. Add to that their terrible management, lack of capital, and flaky study designs and flaky study results, and you have a recipe for disaster.
They did not have the top line results back then. With an EUA within sight. The wind is in our sails and I am an optimist. :)
The underwriter "shoe" is probably already "sold"!! I just read the underwriting portion of the prospectus under "Stabilization" and it allows the underwriter to sell short (regular) and sell short "naked" ahead of the offering!! The regular shorts would be the amount up to the shoe amount (i.e., the extra shares the underwriter can elect to take beyond the 5 million). The "naked" shorts would have to be covered by open market purchases to cover. So the underwriter probably has already sold short plenty in the low $20's, and gets to cover the shoe amount at $18.50. For any naked shorts, he has to cover in the open market, which will help keep the price above the $18.50 level. So price gets "stabilized" up to where they shorted it from. OMG! Welcome to OMG! land, people.
I don't think the underwriter will dump any shares that they may buy. If they did that, their reputation would be ruined. Their investors who bought higher than what they are selling for would be pissed, either directly at them for selling (if they know it's them) or indirectly because they were sold "bad merchandise" that is now worth less. Companies selling stock would become aware of the dumping and know they were betrayed by the underwriter. So the underwriter loses its customers on the selling side and it loses potential customers wanting to sell stock. Talk about killing your own business!
What they want is shares that they can sell at a higher price, so that they get both the commissions and the extra margin. To do that, they wait for orders at higher prices, then buy these extra shares to sell to them. Otherwise, they don't buy the shares and destroy their business. Also, why would they buy just to turn around and sell for lower prices at a loss?
Welcome! All of us (with one or two exceptions) have our fingers crossed.
Some issues with Kiniksa's Mavrilimumab study, which you should read at clinicaltrials.gov.
1. There are/were 588 patients split into 6 groups of study, so about 100 per group unless they weighted more to one part of the study. This is way under-powered for statistical significance, and way below what FDA is demanding these days. This means an all new study has been required.
2. The groups getting the Mavri drug were getting (in one dose) from 1/3 to 1/2 the amount of drug that HGEN is providing in total (3 doses over 24 hours). Since safety was based on these dosage levels, they will have to stick with them, or do an all new safety study first.
3. Half (?) the patients in their study were already on ventilators (but less than or equal to 48 hours). HGEN is not competing in this arena (too difficult to show good results -- the patients are already too inflamed, too sick, etc.) HGEN is a prophylactic treatment that you are supposed to take before you get really sick, even though it is for hospitalized patients with less than 94% oxygen levels. The cytokine storm has not yet arrived for HGEN patients.
4. The Mavri drug goes after a different part (the receptor) of the GM-CSF protein, unlike HGEN and others in the GM-CSF field.
5. The following study seems to question whether the Kiniksa drug (KPL301, formerly CAM3001 as mentioned in the study) can be effective without ongoing infusions of the drug:
https://jlb.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/JLB.3MA0918-347R
It raises several other serious questions about whether a receptor-based drug will be successful.
I am not a scientist, so my reading of that article/study may be wrong.
KMPH has 11% short interest, not 71%. Don't believe me? Read the recent "Fourth Quarter and Full Year" announcement. In it, they describe shares outstanding. There is a lot, over 28 million, because they converted all their convertible debt, and convertible preferred, and many (but not all) warrants to common stock in the last few months. Those transactions are detailed in the same announcement.
Then go to Nasdaq.com and look up KMPH short interest. Divide one by the other and see how you have been scammed. Let this be a lesson to do your damned due diligence.
And by the way, there is never a short squeeze for companies that have convertible debt, or convertible preferred, or warrants, because those guys short the hell out of the stock when its price is above their conversion price (which has been $6.50 a share for most of those instruments). And they never have to buy stock in the open market to cover their shorted shares (ie, the short squeeze). Why not? Because they simply convert their instruments into new stock, and provide that stock to cover. KMPH debt and warrant holders have been doing that for months, shorting the stock and converting their instruments at $6.50 a share.
The current short interest is very likely held by the holders of the remaining warrants.
I have no interest in this company. I like it, and I think it will prosper. I just wish the short squeeze idiocy would go away.
The Tocilizumab articles are probably shown to demonstrate that existing rheumatoid arthritis drugs that focus on reducing IL-6 only provide minimal improvements, and still leave a lot of patients dead or on ventilators. Here are two quotes from the first paper: "Overall, 596 (29%) of the 2022 patients allocated tocilizumab and 694 (33%) of the 2094 patients allocated to usual care died within 28 days" and "Among those not receiving invasive mechanical ventilation at baseline, patients allocated tocilizumab were less likely to reach the composite endpoint of invasive mechanical ventilation or death (33% vs. 38%)".
Please do not post computer-generated clickbait reports that have no real relevance to the world around us. Please do not read them if someone posts them, because they will turn you into a brain-dead zombie. Please do not post in response to them!
Come on guys, a computer is writing these reports from a collection of unrelated stuff and some standardized rules.
You cannot be an investor if you read these things.
I would not be too nervous about this Chinese company's "trial". 588 patients enrolled in Brazil in 3 weeks ending Feb. 22, top line data readout in a few days or hours after last 14-day patient treatment, placebo arm with 47% mortality rate in 14 days says the trial sites were awful, their drug was given for 14 straight days, then the readout was at 14 days, with no followup if their patients reverted without more meds or died later, etc, etc.
It says that they sold slightly less than 1.8 million shares for about $36 million from January 1 through March 5 (for the ATM). It is possible another $5 million was raised yesterday with that big buy near the close that did not change the price of the stock much. However, Cantor may have been in a blackout period yesterday before the announcemens.
March 22/23 looks like it to me. Soonest probably 18th. I sure hope they are busting their butts on the data analysis.
That CYDY market cap should be closer to $1.8 billion after today's drop (not reflected in your numbers). Check back tomorrow, it should be below $1.5 billion and falling.
HGEN is around $880 million and climbing. Looks like they will be getting the big BARDA purchase order as well, since CYDY has now been delayed. BARDA has too much pressure to act to wait around for CYDY to keep changing its studies.
Two problems going after vented patients. First, vented patients are often too far gone for much of anything to help. It will be difficult to prove in a study (CYDY results so far are not much more than random, unless they "fix" the study). However, they may still be able to show some benefit, and if they do, more power to them. They do have some much bigger competition investigating that end of the market. Second, vaccines and Lenz will be reducing the number of people on vents, so their market market is about to shrink to a miniscule amount by the time they ever get an approval.
In addition, CYDY will find it difficult to get an EUA without much more invested in proving out their manufacturing capability, quality control, statistical accuracy, etc, etc. They are not ready to do this, as far as I can tell.
Humanigen has now put out a Press release confirming an advance video webinar on Monday, March 8th in conjunction with the Roth Conference fireside chat with Humanigen on March 16th.
Just to be clear about the upcoming Roth chat. It wasn't a typo. It was supposed to be today. Humanigen has been scheduled for the 16th at 1:00 PM for the Roth, but there has been an "overlay" for 9:00 AM today March 5th when you sign in. That overlay now says 9:00 AM March 8th, or Monday morning. I had emailed Investor Relations last night about all the discrepancies. The only response was to refer me to the link that is mentioned above. Subsequent emails trying to pin down the overlay issue were completely ignored.
Some people speculated that it was going to be recorded today, but shown on March 16th as scheduled. If so, why post the overlay info? More likely Roth is trying to jump the queue and get ahead of Wainwright, who will have a chat on March 9th. Or Humanigen "owes it" to Roth and their investors from last September, where Roth was the co-manager of the $72 million raise.
So if you want to listen in, I would doublecheck on Monday morning for sure. It still could be another mistake, but who would do that?
Nomis Bay manager is probably taking his fees off the top and reinvesting the money back into HGEN in his personal account. He has been involved in this company way longer than any of the rest of us.