Register for free to join our community of investors and share your ideas. You will also get access to streaming quotes, interactive charts, trades, portfolio, live options flow and more tools.
Are you guys loving that merger now?…Im seeing monies taken away from investors in all sorts of creative ways lately. More so now than ever.
Depends on what the POG is in 2023. Could be >$5k
With the Delta problem around San Jose and a new Hemorrhagic outbreak in West Africa and high construction costs coming...
I don't see it going up soon.
Will keep an eye out for Q1.
Not for long.
You failed to point out that the second quarter production results are LESS than first quarter results.
I’ve been saying all along that the ROX merger was a very bad idea…..Now you have all this dilution and no production to go with it.
Oh the Irony!
Fortuna Silver Mines Reports Higher Q2 Gold, Silver Production; Raises 2021 Gold Output Forecast
7/20/21, 5:15 AM
05:15 AM EDT, 07/20/2021 (MT Newswires) -- Fortuna Silver Mines (FSM) late Monday reported Q2 production of 1.9 million ounces of silver and 31,048 ounces of gold, compared with last year's 1.3 million ounces of silver and 7,099 ounces of gold.
During the quarter, the company also produced 8.1 million pounds of lead and 11.8 million pounds of zinc. It produced 6.8 million pounds of lead and about 11 million pounds of zinc in the prior-year period.
Further, Fortuna increased its 2021 gold production guidance to a new range of 194,000 to 223,000 ounces from previous guidance, issued in January, for 2021 gold production of 178,000 to 202,000. The upgraded guidance follows the company's acquisition of Roxgold. Silver output in 2021 is still expected to range from 6.8 million to 7.6 million ounces.
http://www.mtnewswires.com
Yawn…..Gold at 1800 and Silver at 26…..It’s going to be a killer quarter for FSM….ROX is another story.
"Vancouver-based Fortuna, which has operations in Peru, Mexico and Argentina, has said the combined company would produce about 450,000 ounces of gold equivalent a year.
The companies said the transaction (Roxgold merger), is expected to close on July 2, creating a global premier growth-oriented intermediate gold and silver producer.
Bank of America analyst Michael Jalonen predicted in a note early this year another round of consolidation for the industry in 2021 among small to medium-size gold miners."
Gold is projected to go over $2300/oz by December 2021 as a result of inflation from the Federal Reserve printing money to stimulate the economy.
$2,3000 x 450,000 oz = $1,035,000,000 per year.
"For the full year 2020, the Company produced 7,133,717 ounces of silver and 55,349 ounces of gold or 11.3 million silver equivalent ounces."
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210628005838/en/Fortuna-and-Roxgold-shareholders-approve-business-combination-to-create-a-global-premier-growth-oriented-intermediate-gold-and-silver-producer
This Fortrox merger is a big bla. Just an excuse for the shorts to pile on.
It’s definitely being shorted
Short Interest Ratio (Days To Cover)
5.3
Short Percent of Float
10.77 %
Short % Increase / Decrease
32 %
Short Interest (Current Shares Short)
19,630,000
Shares Float
182,330,000
Short Interest (Prior Shares Short)
14,850,000
This one is oversold - gap to 6.30 needs filled - need Au to cooperate.
The ROX deal will benefit FSM three to five years out. People who bought shares expecting a big stock price increase from Lindero earnings will be SCREWED as they are already saying that it will cost 150,000,000.00 to get Segeula going, and we all know that it will likely be double that.
.....ROX is one Warlord away from disaster!
Metals are down because the Fed's mentioned they are not going to raise interest rates soon so people are refinancing their houses as well as inflationary pressures have somewhat subsided which was a driving force behind silver's up-trending movement. Electric vehicles still require silver as well as the long term inflation rate increasing over time. The ROX merger will benefit the company. We are seeing the bottom form right now with metals. Bullion dealers are projecting that silver could drop a little below $25.00 in the short term but has the potential to go up to $50.00 before December 2021 due to all of the economic pressures, Wall Street Silver, and the increasing awareness that precious metals have real value compared to fiat currency which is a depreciating asset as a result of inflation.
Note all that cash which will be turned into shit with the ROX merger......The street knows this and hence the stock price shows it.
2021: Jan - March... Net Income: $26,402,000
https://www.fortunasilver.com/site/assets/files/5744/fortuna_q1_2021_fs_10may21.pdf
Going to be interesting when the board sees the support for the merger is not what what they thought it would be......ROX is one warlord away from disaster.
Folow-up. AJ Monte the former Silver pit trader was asked about this article, the possibility of no more paper traders. He hadn't read the article before being asked about it.
It came up, on a subscription service group zoom chat, so I can't post a link.
It came up because of very large option trades for $30 $SLV while it now at 25.78
his initial response was that if paper trading went away it would certainly increase the price.
But then he said the 8 banks who control and short it, would spend a lot on Lobbyists.
to prevent the change.
Then as to the options. He said that might be the banks themselves hedging.
He said 28-30 is the area they would defend. (resistance)
What I see is that a yes vote will channel all the profit from Lindero into developing the new ROX mine. This means the share price won’t do much for two more years.....I vote no.
Good news on Friday. Great news would be for them to dump the ROX deal. Anyhow this looks to run up to 9 shortly.
Thanks for the reply but I'm the wrong
'iron'
I wish I believed more in the gap closings on some of my
earlier trades.
Meaning going down to close. Never realized it was 80%
That's pretty good odds.
he has been picking under the radar stocks and is big on closing gaps.
So far I only lost money on one of them and that was because I went with a short term call option instead of long, and blew it on bad timing.
Last week's pick was $RIG at 3.87 with a target of 4.37
The target is the gap closure. And he says the price reverses when it hits as it is resistance. After that your on your own.
I didn't stay in that trade. Like FSM(silver), RIG follows a commodity (OIL). So I get itchy fingers because I can see it daily and can't wait for it.
Since he was talking bearish, I went to the sidelines, added $UVXY for a long on the VIX volatility.
Like the article you posted, go away in May, might be true again.
AJ Monte went out on a limb and said the markets have topped, but doesn't mean they can't go higher in price. Your article says the same, watching it closely to see if it rolls over.
Next Friday is the Jobs report and will be the biggest event of the week. I think jobs will be added big, but the Blue states are still paying people to stay home until September.
Although they are not staying home. They are partying away.
Roaring 20's.
I can't blame people for capitalizing on the job applicant shortage.
Getting top dollar. I did the same during Y2K.
Well then, how good are his weekly picks?
I'm no longer in FSM
A. J. Monte is former Chicago pit trader in Silver. He since has gone into charting the major indices and individual stocks. I have a payed subscription to a once per week stock pick. FSM was one of picks recently. He mentioned that he is no longer in FSM either.
On Friday nights he publishes a free video on the indices.
He works or is a subcontractor for Market Rebellion (the Najarian brothers outfit)
Market Rebellion channel
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgkP76aRwL1Kp_62qyQN_lA
A. J. Monte videos are in the Market Rebellion Channel
this weekend's video. He is calling for a decline this week in the markets.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVpC52WZKu4
Someone is paying these guys to write. Buying into their opinions is like listening to ‘scientists’ employed by the government. That said, some of the data they offer is useful.
These gold and silver writers don't get it right, most of the time.
The employees of banks who trade it, don't want to lose their jobs.
I am just hoping that the bitcoin collapse will make it a safer trade for gold and silver. Can you imagine if gold collapsed 40-50% in in two weeks?
China owns gold, they want it to go up in value, even if it's slow.
You would think that the price of bitcoin would go up, if China stopped all their bitcoin miners from adding supply. But it collapsed instead.
#FSM: The End Of Paper Gold & Silver Markets...?
The conclusion is that unless the BIS has an ulterior motive to trigger a chaotic financial reset of some sort, it is a case of regulators not understanding the market consequences of their actions.
https://www.zerohedge.com/commodities/end-paper-gold-silver-markets
The End Of Paper Gold & Silver Markets
Tyler Durden's Photo
BY TYLER DURDEN
SATURDAY, MAY 22, 2021 - 09:20 AM
Authored by Alasdair Macleod via GoldMoney.com,
https://www.goldmoney.com/research/goldmoney-insights/the-end-of-paper-gold-and-silver-markets
This article looks at the likely consequences of the Bank for International Settlements’ introduction of the net stable funding requirement (NSFR) for bank balance sheets, insofar as they apply to their positions in gold, silver and other commodity markets.
If they are introduced as proposed, banks will face significant financing penalties for taking trading positions in derivatives. The problem is particularly important for the London gold market, as described in last week’s article on this subject. Therefore they are likely to withdraw from providing derivative liquidity and associated services.
This article delves into the consequences of the NSFR leading to the end of the London forward markets in gold and silver. Replacement demand for physical metal appears bound to rise, and an assessment is therefore made of available gold not tied up in jewellery and industrial uses. An analysis of gold leasing by central banks, leading to double ownership of physical gold, is included.
The conclusion is that unless the BIS has an ulterior motive to trigger a chaotic financial reset of some sort, it is a case of regulators not understanding the market consequences of their actions.
https://assets.zerohedge.com/s3fs-public/styles/inline_image_mobile/public/inline-images/Breather%20%281%29.gif?itok=-Wy5at7a
Introduction
Last week I explained why as they stand the new Basel 3 regulations will make it uneconomic for banks to continue to run bullion trading desks. The introduction of the net stable funding requirement (NSFR) means that mainland European banks, of which ten are LBMA members including the Swiss, will have to comply with the new regulations from the end of June, and all UK banks, in effect the entire banking membership of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) will have to comply by the year-end. There are 43 LBMA members listed as banks, and on Comex there are currently 17 with long and 27 with short positions in the Swaps category, which represent bullion bank trading desks in the dominant futures contracts. So being similar, the Comex numbers must broadly replicate those operating in London. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if the LBMA’s banking membership ceases dealings in unallocated bullion, then very few will continue to deal on Comex — the LBMA crowd having ceased taking trading positions.
We are discussing not gold or silver but their derivatives. But there is a problem borne out of the LBMA’s insistence that it involves bullion, albeit unallocated, and not derivatives. The distinction could be important, depending on how the UK regulator applies the NSFR rules. This is because in the calculation of required stable funding, gold consumes 85% of available stable funding while gold liabilities contribute no available stable funding at all. The effect is to impart a negative factor into a bank’s overall net stable funding calculation, making unallocated gold trading hopelessly uneconomic in terms of deployment of total funding capital. The alternative, which does not appear to be under the LBMA’s consideration, is to admit that the whole unallocated gold trading business has nothing to do with gold bullion but is in fact gold derivatives; in which case capital funding penalties under the NSFR would be broadly limited to imbalances between derivative liabilities and derivative assets.
Consequently, it appears that an allocation backstop of 85% of available stable funding (ASF) must be swallowed in the case of gold, which does not appear to be the case if the LBMA confesses to the paper charade.
There are in London, in effect, two markets conflated into one, but they must not be confused. The unallocated market, otherwise known as dealing for forward settlement, is the product of bank credit expansion, not as the LBMA claims, physical metal whose bar origins, weights and fineness are not recorded for convenience’s sake. Perhaps the LBMA would like to let us know where they think it’s all stored; it’s certainly not in LBMA vaults, where after deducting headline figures for custodial gold the float reduces to as little as a few hundred tonnes. Unsurprisingly, the Bank for International Settlements lists these transactions as over-the-counter derivatives for statistical purposes, so we know how they are regarded by the international regulator.
Physical gold held on behalf of customers is never recorded on bank balance sheets. If a bank owns physical gold in its own vault, an independent vault, or allocated to it by another bank acting as custodian with its own vaulting facilities then that appears as an asset on its balance sheet. In that case, it can hedge out the price risk with a matching liability for a zero price-haircut within Basel 3 rules. But this has nothing to do with the NSFR calculation.
Clearly, unless the NSFR calculation is amended at the last moment, following its introduction the character of bullion markets will become markedly different. Gone will be roughly $600bn of paper gold, while presumably some of the paper demand released will migrate to physical metal. There is also the question of how outstanding imbalances will be resolved. This article assesses the consequences.
Unknown motives and politics
It is difficult to understand why the Financial Stability Board, under whose aegis the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has produced Basel 3, seems intent on destroying derivative markets for gold, silver and also for other commodities. That will be the consequence of the introduction of the NSFR calculation in these markets. As the supreme authority overseeing fiat currencies, the Bank for International Settlements, which oversees the FSB, has no love for gold. One can explain the desire to do away with it: as the riskless form of money, it has been at the centre of monetary affairs for ever and the desire to do away with it must be overwhelming for neo-Keynesian modernists. But if that is the case, then it will be a serious misjudgement, because as this article reveals, the consequence of withdrawing paper supply is likely to drive the gold price significantly higher, along with silver and a host of other important commodity prices. Furthermore, this delayed act, first published in 2014, now comes at a time of rapidly rising commodity prices, reflecting the unprecedented acceleration of global money-printing in 2020, which ironically proves the importance of sound money — gold.
Already, tight, gold silver and commodity markets cannot accommodate a migration out of defunct paper into physical metals and energy without massive price rises to defuse the unsatisfied demand unleashed by this action. Perhaps the regulators at the FSB know this. If they do, then we can only conclude it is a deliberate attempt at a reset of all commodity markets. Bank corruption, particularly in precious metals has been rife: major banks have been regularly fined and continue to manipulate and spoof these markets, fines being seen as little more than a cost of doing business. These are systemic risks a regulator should address. But to assume the FSB is shutting down these paper markets to curb this behaviour exhibits a touching faith in its altruism.
Another popular theory is of an even wider financial reset. The BIS is coordinating research into central bank digital currencies, which if adopted cuts out the commercial banks altogether. In theory, it would allow central banks to more effectively target stimulus and do away with the destabilising cycle of bank credit. The ultimate aim could be to demote and then remove commercial banks from the financial system entirely, in which context the closure of derivative markets by regulatory means makes some sense.
Quantifying gold derivatives
We know from the Bank for International Settlements’ statistics that at the end of the second half of 2020, gold forwards and swaps totalled $530bn, which at the then price of $1898 was the equivalent of 8,685 tonnes of gold in paper form. But other than a triannual survey, the next being due in 2022, according to the BIS this figure is culled from dealers, mainly banks, in only twelve jurisdictions. With respect to commodities and foreign exchanges, these twelve jurisdictions have been found to capture roughly 80% of the total, so grossed up the gold tonnage rises to an equivalent of 10,806.
The LBMA positions are just part of the BIS total. The LBMA only records monthly settlements in London (Loco London) reported by the four clearing members that own and operate London Precious Metals Clearing Limited. They deal solely with LBMA members. The daily average settlement for December 2020 was recorded at 18.9 million ounces, or 588 tonnes. This is only one eighteenth of the BIS figure quoted above. The first thing to note is that daily settlements are not the same thing as outstanding obligations. Furthermore, the BIS statistic includes swaps and forwards not recorded in London nor, for that matter, are they necessarily settled through the LPMCL. But even taking these factors into account the difference between the BIS and LBMA figures still need further explanation.
In an analysis for Hardman & Co published in January 2020, Paul Mylchreest identified two other sources of turnover not included in the LBMA figures: trade between LBMA members and non-members, and central banks dealing in unallocated gold.
Now let us assume that the new Basel regulations have the effect of bringing unallocated bank trading in gold to an end. From the value of outstanding OTC contracts recorded by the BIS adjusted for the trends of its triannual surveys, we can take it to be about 10,800 tonnes. Assuming LBMA members on their own account run relatively minor net positions in the context of this enormous figure, we can assume this outstanding balance is mostly split between central banks, other non-LBMA users of the unallocated market, and OTC trades recorded in other centres.
We have no idea what the central bank position is at any one time, but it would be surprising if they took long positions. Instead, they can be expected to attempt to bolster market confidence in fiat currencies, and in particular the US dollar by selling gold. And by shorting paper gold, they also would seek to encourage physical supply by shaking out weak holders in ETFs. That being the case, not only has the central bank cohort no reason to be long of gold derivatives, but if they have positions, they are almost certainly short. The only likely exception is when a central bank which has leased gold sold into the market might hedge the price risk of not getting it back.
The ending, therefore, of London’s forward settlement market would remove an artificial supply of gold, which we can estimate to be the equivalent of over 10,800 tonnes of gold. To this we should add the net short Swap position on Comex, comprised of bullion bank trading desks, which is currently 486 tonnes. From the main sources of derivative supply, we can therefore see roughly 11,300 tonnes of paper gold supply being withdrawn from the markets if the bullion bank cohort ceases trading in derivative gold. We should now examine the position of central banks further.
Central bank leasing — yet to be resolved
In 2002, Frank Veneroso, a respected analyst, concluded that central banks had leased anything between 10,000—16,000 tonnes of gold at that time — the upper figure being about half of global central bank gold reserves at that time. He gave his reasoning at a speech in Lima on 17 May that year. Central bank leased gold was being sold into the market for dollars, which as part of a carry trade were being reinvested by banks in US Treasury bills and the like, the cost of finance being a gold lease rate of one or two per cent, for a yield of six or seven. Veneroso concluded that much of the gold was repurposed into jewellery and had effectively disappeared from the market.
Between the 1980s and the turn of the millennium, gold had been in a bear market, so the general public, including investing institutions, were either genuine sellers (which was in limited physical quantities) or hedging and speculating on the short side using derivatives. This enabled the bullion banks to hedge out the price risk on gold that would have to be eventually returned to central banks by going long for forward delivery relatively cheaply. But at the time of Veneroso’s speech, gold was $325, having risen from about $255 over the previous fourteen months.
Conditions were changing from a long-established bear market, which favoured gold leasing activity, into the beginning of a new bullish phase. Leasing and even undeclared sales then became a tool for central banks to supply physical liquidity to the gold market, either to rescue bullion banks from being badly squeezed or simply to suppress the price.
The leased gold might not have always left the vaults of central banks in the main gold dealing centres, as Veneroso assumed. However, during the period covered by Veneroso’s analysis, I regularly lunched at The Banker’s Club opposite the Bank of England’s rear entrance in Lothbury. On most days, security vans could be observed entering and leaving the Bank’s premises, transporting physical gold to and from the Bank’s vaults. So perhaps Veneroso was right about physical being sold and delivered into the market, at least to some degree.
In March 2008 gold breached $1,000 for the first time. It would have been impossible for central banks to recover their leased gold by then, because Chinese and Indian demand was beginning to suck physical gold out of Western markets at an alarming rate, in any case significantly faster than any replacement by available mine and scrap supplies. It might appear that leased gold could then have been returned to central banks during the 2012—2015 bear market, but again, Chinese and Indian demand continued to absorb most of the available physical released by any ETF sales and other sources of physical supply.
Alternatively, there would have to have been substantial selling of Western-owned stockpiles, and there is no evidence of that. The best one can say is that in some years, notably 2013, there was some ETF liquidation, but not in the quantities required to resolve the leasing problem. By way of confirmation, in 2014 I was told by one of the large Swiss refiners that they were working double shifts seven days a week turning 400-ounce LBMA bars into 1 kilo 9999 bars, the new Chinese standard. Some of the LBMA bars arrived in a poor condition and obviously had not been touched for decades, scraped out from the darkest recesses in deep-storage vaults. Furthermore, customers from the Middle East were submitting LBMA bars for refining into the new 1 kilo standard and taking them back to be re-vaulted in that form. Not only did this indicate that they were aligning themselves with China’s growing gold presence, but they were definitely not selling. Clearly, the 40% decline in the gold price between September 2011 and December 2015 led to substantial unrecorded increases in physical demand, cleaning out Western vaults. It would not have been possible for central banks to regain their leased gold.
There was, perhaps, further circumstantial evidence of the leasing problem, when Germany decided to withdraw her earmarked gold from the New York Fed’s vaults. The desire to do so was publicly justified on the basis that Germany’s gold no longer needed to be stored abroad, because the threat of a Soviet invasion had been removed by the collapse of communism. But given that the suppression of gold involved leasing and gold swaps in significant quantities in order to maintain the dollar’s credibility, was the true reason nothing to do with Soviet presence but that the Bundesbank suspected its gold was being used for this purpose without its permission?
The Bundesbank’s first action was to request to inspect its gold, a request that was flatly refused. Following that refusal, the decision was taken to begin a process of repatriation. Why it was partial is not entirely clear but could be explained if the Bundesbank suspected it wasn’t actually there. There would be nothing to be gained by demanding the return of all of it, but a partial return might at least enable the New York Fed to find some gold from elsewhere and avoid a public crisis. It turned out that after a series of meetings it was agreed to repatriate only 300 tonnes of Germany’s gold over a period of seven years. In fact, it was returned three years early. The Netherlands also sought, and obtained, 122.5 tonnes of her gold repatriated from New York. Austria arranged for the repatriation of some of its gold from London. While some of these repatriations were in the wake of public demands, they were never important enough to trigger them on their own. But they are consistent with substantial quantities being leased and assessments by the central banks repatriating national gold stocks that they are better secured on their own territory.
Since the days, as Veneroso put it, when central bank gold ended up adorning Asian women, leasing procedures, being targeted at providing liquidity and at supressing the gold price, will have changed. Wherever possible, leased gold need not leave the Bank of England’s or the New York Fed’s vaults. A ledger entry, or book entry transfer confirming it is at the disposal of the lessee is all that’s required, and for the payment for the sale of leased gold to be arranged through the appropriate channels. And from there it can be reassigned by another book entry transfer. We saw this in action when GLD, the gold ETF, ended up with the Bank of England recorded as a sub-custodian holding some 70 tonnes of gold last August precisely in these conditions.
In a leasing contract, ownership remains with the lessor. When arranging gold leasing, we can be sure that in recent times the Bank of England will have comforted lessors that their gold never leaves the Bank of England’s vault, so there’s no need to worry about repossession. This would be an operational justification for continuing leasing activities to offset physical shortages in the market. But the question over how much leased gold that has left the Bank of England and the New York Fed in the past remains unresolved, but it is likely to be in significant quantities with Veneroso’s lower estimate perhaps a bare minimum.
The true quantity of monetary gold
It is commonly stated that the above-ground gold stock is 200,000 tonnes. While that may be a reasonable approximation, most of it is not monetary gold in any sense of the definition and is not therefore its monetary supply.
The statist definition of monetary gold is physical bullion held as part of a central bank’s declared monetary reserves. According to the IMF the current total of all such monetary gold is 35,244 tonnes, though as we have seen from the foregoing paragraphs it is unlikely to be all there or unencumbered. But to this we must add gold bullion hoarded and stored by all other parties on the assumption that it is either a more stable store of monetary value than fiat or an insurance against fiat currencies losing purchasing power. It must be in a form immediately available for monetary purposes, being in bar or coin form. Of an estimated 200,000 tonnes of above ground gold, it is generally assumed that 60% is used for other purposes, mainly jewellery but also some industrial purposes, leaving 80,000 tonnes of monetary gold conforming with our definition. After subtracting official monetary gold from the total, we are left with 44,756 tonnes.
In October 2014 I published an article explaining why China had considerably more gold in storage than her declared reserves, and I estimated that by 2002, when the Chinese government removed the ban on personal ownership and opened the Shanghai Gold Exchange, the state could have acquired up to 25,000 tonnes. Much of this gold would have been leased gold sold into the London market. (Veneroso’s statement about ending up adorning Asian women could not have been true for Chinese women, because they were not permitted to own gold until 2002 and Indian imports were severely restricted for some of the relevant time).
That China had accumulated substantial undeclared bullion stocks was confirmed to me anecdotally by experienced China watchers. If we treat that as part of our estimate of monetary gold, and make an allowance for Russia, of perhaps an unrecorded 5,000 tonnes, monetary gold in the hands of everyone else appears to amount to only 15,000 tonnes.
But this figure will have been bolstered by central bank leasing activity, perhaps even doubled, with leased gold appearing to have two or even more owners, and the actual possession being in undeclared Asian hands. It is in this context that the threat to derivative trading from Basel 3 must be viewed. Not only will paper supply estimated at 11,300 tonnes equivalent in unregulated and regulated markets be threatened with removal, but there is an additional unknown figure of central bank leasing and swaps to be unwound. Obviously, there is significant guesswork involved, but if the numbers outlined herein have the slightest validity, the ending of gold derivative markets, if it is permitted to go ahead, will create a major gold crisis, of which the BIS regulators seem blissfully unaware.
Silver
The mechanics behind dealing in the LBMA silver market are the same as for unallocated gold. The LPMCL settlement system is the same, providing access only to LBMA members. The basis of calculating the net stable funding requirement is the same, so silver derivatives suffer from the same balance sheet disincentives. The principal difference is no silver is vaulted at the Bank of England, nor, so far as we are aware, in the vaults of any other Western central bank.
In terms of demand, it is also primarily an industrial metal, and is mostly consumed. According to the Silver Institute, of a total annual demand of roughly a billion ounces that is forecast in the current year, 253 million ounces is identified as investment demand and a further 150 million ounces as ETF/ETP demand. Bizarrely, the report estimates there will be a fall in ETF demand, when it is already rising. And of the supply, only 18.5% is from recycling.
The BIS figure for outstanding silver OTC derivatives is included in “Other precious metals” at $64bn. The same NSFR treatment for all commodity derivatives, including energy, involves an estimated $858bn’s worth. Not only is the introduction of the NSFR disruptive of precious metal markets, but it also threatens to disrupt wider commodities at a time when their prices are already increasing rapidly as a consequence of falling purchasing powers for fiat currencies.
Nice pop today on higher than avg vol too.
May $6 calls up 79% today, at the moment.
That must be it. I just got in this on Monday’s 1st Q report. A little disappointed in the action this week. Of course, Au/Ag haven’t been much help.
Short term target
target $7.70 gap fill
Should be a 10.00 stock except they are buying ROX.....ROX i
Fortuna Reports First Quarter 2021 Financial Results
May 10, 2021 7:11 AM ETGlobeNewswireFortuna Silver Mines Inc. (FSM)
Q1: 2021-05-10 Earnings Summary
EPS of $0.14 beats by $0.05 | Revenue of $117.80M (148.00% Y/Y) misses by $500.00K
(All amounts expressed in US dollars, tabular amounts in millions, unless otherwise stated)
VANCOUVER, British Columbia, May 10, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Fortuna Silver Mines Inc. (FSM) (TSX: FVI) (“Fortuna” or the “Company”) today reported record first quarter 2021 net income of $26.4 million, adjusted net income1 of $27.5 million, and adjusted EBITDA1 of $60.8 million.
Jorge A. Ganoza, President and CEO, commented, “Our record financial performance in the first quarter reflects the combination of strong operating performance at San Jose and Caylloma, Lindero's first full quarter of contribution to sales, and favourable metal prices." Mr. Ganoza added, “As Lindero continues to ramp up we are pleased with the progress made in Q1 considering the challenges we continue to face in the context of COVID-19 related restrictions. We remain on track to meet our consolidated guidance of 178,000 to 202,000 ounces of gold and 6.8 million to 7.6 million ounces of silver.”
First Quarter 2021 Highlights
Record sales of $117.8 million, an increase of 148% from the $47.5 million reported in the same period in 2020 (“Q1 2020”), due to higher realized prices and sales volumes for all metals at all mines, notably sales from the Lindero Mine of $36.9 million
Record net income of $26.4 million or $0.14 per share, an increase of $30.9 million and $0.17 per share, from the $4.5 million net loss or $0.03 loss per share reported in Q1 2020
Record adjusted net income1 of $27.5 million compared to $2.2 million net loss in Q1 2020
Record adjusted EBITDA1 of $60.8 million compared to $15.9 million reported in Q1 2020
Free cash flow from ongoing operations1 of $17.4 million compared to $14.2 million reported in Q1 2020, the current quarter was impacted by a $16.2 million increase in trade receivables due to timing of collections
As of March 31, 2021, the Company had cash and cash equivalents of $145.7 million, an increase of $13.8 million from December 31, 2020
Silver and gold production of 1,913,755 ounces and 34,355 ounces, respectively
AISC1,2 per silver equivalent ounce of payable silver sold of $13.52 and $18.50 for the San Jose Mine and Caylloma Mine, respectively, and AISC1 per ounce of gold sold of $1,055 for the Lindero Mine
Announced a business combination transaction with Roxgold Inc. on April 26, 2021: creates a low-cost intermediate global precious metals producer with extensive brownfields and greenfields organic growth potential and led by highly experienced management
First Quarter 2021 Results
Sales for the three months ended March 31, 2021 were $117.8 million, an increase of 148% from the $47.5 million reported in Q1 2020. Silver and gold prices increased 61% and 12%, respectively. The Lindero Mine recognized sales of $36.9 million from 21,297 ounces of gold ounces sold. San Jose sales were $58.0 million, an increase of 50% from the $38.7 million reported in Q1 2020 due to increases in the prices of silver and gold and a 3% and 5% increase in the volume of silver and gold ounces sold, respectively. Sales from the Caylloma Mine were $25.4 million, a 92% increase from the $13.2 million reported in Q1 2020 due to higher metal prices and a 22%, 17%, and 21% increase in the volume of silver, zinc, and lead sold, respectively.
Operating income for the three months ended March 31, 2021 was $40.4 million, an increase of $38.6 million compared to Q1 2020. The increase was due primarily to higher silver and gold prices, and Lindero’s contribution to mine operating income of $11.7 million.
Net income for the three months ended March 31, 2021 was $26.4 million, a $30.9 million increase over the $4.5 million net loss reported in Q1 2020. The effective tax rate for the quarter was 34%.
Adjusted EBITDA for the three months ended March 31, 2021 was $60.8 million, an increase of $44.9 million compared to $15.9 million reported in Q1 2020. The increase reflects Lindero's contribution to adjusted EBITDA of $19.6 million as well as higher EBITDA at San Jose and Caylloma.
Free cash flow from ongoing operations for the three months ended March 31, 2021 was $17.4 million compared to $14.2 million in Q1 2020. Free cash flow was impacted by a $16.2 million increase in trade receivables during the quarter, due primarily to timing of collections on provisional sales.
As of March 31, 2021, the Company had cash and cash equivalents of $145.7 million, an increase of $13.8 million from December 31, 2020. The Company’s $120.0 million credit facility remains fully drawn as of March 31, 2021 and is set to expire on January 26, 2022. The Company expects to conclude renewal of the facility in the second quarter of 2021.
https://seekingalpha.com/pr/18309019-fortuna-reports-first-quarter-2021-financial-results
#FSM: Any dips below $6.30 is a low-risk buying opportunities....
https://fortunasilver.com/
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4413691-fortuna-silver-industry-leading-earnings-growth-fy2021
Followers
|
48
|
Posters
|
|
Posts (Today)
|
0
|
Posts (Total)
|
433
|
Created
|
09/19/11
|
Type
|
Free
|
Moderators |
Volume | |
Day Range: | |
Bid Price | |
Ask Price | |
Last Trade Time: |