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[xe2dy]

% of NAS above 50, 150 & 200MA

[xe2dy]

Karl Denninger : 25 predictions for 2009


"Ok, so with that cheery backdrop, here you go with my predictions for 2009.... and I will prefix this by saying this is a list I hope proves to be entirely incorrect. Perhaps there really is a Unicorn that craps skittles even though I've yet to find it - this is one round of predictions I'm willing to take a zero score on come December 09."

* The economy will not recover in 2009. Job loss will continue through the year and unemployment will reach 8% in the "headline" statistic by the end of the year. U-6 (broad unemployment, or the closest to "real" unemployment without government "cooking") will top 15%. All the "talking heads" are predicting a turnaround in the second half of 2009. They will be wrong. Look at their records for 2008 - all of them were predicting closes at or above 1500 for the S&P 500. Why does CNBC continue to put people on the air who, if you listened to them, cost you 40% or more of your money?

* Deflation, not inflation, will become evident well beyond housing. Other capital goods beyond housing will see real price declines for the first time since the 1930s. Debt is inherently deflationary; the "hyperinflationists" will once again be shown to be wrong (how many years running will it be now?)

* Housing prices will continue to decline. I believe we're about halfway done with the price correction. Those who think we will turn this in 2009 are wrong - unless we get an all-on collapse in prices in early 2009, which I do not believe will occur. I've heard several claims we will have positive year-over-year home price changes in 2009. I'll take the other side of that bet.

* The Fed's attempt to "pump liquidity" will be shown to be an abject failure. We will see either a Treasury Market selloff or worse, severe instability in the dollar at some point in 2009.

* GDP will post a 12-month negative number and there is a decent shot that we will actually see an official depression print before the end of 2009, defined as a 10% decline peak-to-trough.

* The Stock Market has not bottomed although you may think it has for a few months. The annual range will be quite extreme; I would not be surprised at all to see 1,000 touched on the SPX in the first part of the year. I believe the SPX will at least touch 500 in the next 12-24 months and the current bottom will not hold. It is possible that we could see a crash to SPX 300 and DOW 3,000 some time this year, probably after the spring (when the "Obama Halo" wears off - if it isn't blown off by economic events first.) Yes, this means I am predicting a fifty percent swing in the SPX in 2009. Lots of money to be made as a trader if you're quick and good, but an absolute minefield if you're a long-term investor.

* Precious metals will not be a safe haven. The callers for $1600 and above on gold will be wrong, unless there is a major military conflict. I do not rate that probability as particularly high, but it is an event (along with a major terrorism incident - nuclear or biochemical - that would cause a rocket shot in Gold prices), so I am hedging that call. The risk of this sort of "response" to the economic crisis is, however, real, and will rise significantly going into 2010 and beyond. We'll revisit this one (a major war) next year.

* The Dollar will not collapse. This is not because we're in great shape or will truly recover, it is because the rest of the world is in worse shape than we are. Last year pundits were all calling for the dollar to collapse to 40 - it didn't happen. Now they're calling the dollar's strength a "Bear market rally." Nonsense; the simple truth is that while we're in bad shape the rest of the world is literally on the precipice of a full-on collapse. European banks are more-levered and less-transparent than our banks as just one example.

* The pound or euro - and perhaps both - will likely be where the FX dislocation initiates if it occurs. I see the potential for the pound and euro to both reach par with the dollar, although I'm not going to go that far out on the tree limb and predict it - yet. Needless to say that would rocket the Dollar Index but it won't be our strength that does it - it will be their weakness.

* The US Consumer will go from a negative savings rate to a seriously-positive one. I am predicting 4% in 2009 but it could go as high as 10%. The math on this is simple - the "consumerist legion of more" has run its course and all that's left is debt. It hurts and bad; expecting the American Consumer to cut off his other arm is just plain dumb. By the way this is a good thing in the longer term for America once the excess debt is forced out and defaulted through the system.

* Commercial Real Estate will effectively collapse and most commercial Real Estate REITs will be either insolvent or limping on life support. There will be calls for bailouts (which may be attempted; the calls are already starting to be heard) but it won't matter - a failed business is a failed business, bailout or no, and overcapacity must go away before sustainable business conditions can return.

* Along with the above, expect 10% of all retail stores to close, and that number could go as high as 20%. That's not going to be fun; there will be hundreds of malls that wind up literally shuttered across America. Stay away from most retailers and property groups as investments. Firms like SPG and VNO are levitating on the strength of their dividends (7-10% yields at present); I believe this is a sucker play; if retailer defaults force dividend cuts (and I believe they will) the commercial REITs will go straight into the toilet.

* Several states will get in serious financial trouble and outright default of one or more is possible in 2009. California leads this parade. But even if there is a default on a state basis, the effect will be highly localized, as county and municipal governments vary in their wisdom and budget process. The real pain comes in state-wide social and educational programs. Be very careful if you are in municipal bonds or thinking of getting back into them (I recommended they be dumped in 2007 - look at what has happened to the closed-end funds in 08! Aieeee!) as the default risk is VERY REAL. If you're buying individual issues and do the work to determine not only the risk of default but also the likely recovery if they do default there are some good deals out there - but only if you're doing the work. "Trust me" (as in buying funds, whether mutual funds or closed-end stuff) is very dangerous.

* Mortgages are not done. The story last year was "Subprime." This year's will be "ALT-A", "Option ARMs" and so-called "Prime". The Fed and Treasury know this, which is why they are playing games with "agency" debt in a desperate attempt to clear this market before the ticking nuclear devices go off. The amount of debt involved in these "bad deals" is vastly higher than that in the "subprime" space and if they fail to contain it (a near certainty) Round #2 of severe bank instability gets served up on us in the second half of 2009.

* If you want to refinance a mortgage you may get one brief shot at it with long rates around 4%. You're nuts to buy outright unless you intend to die in the home, but if you have a solid reason to be obtaining a mortgage or wish to refinance you will probably get the opportunity. This assumes the "buydown game" gets going before Treasuries dislocate; if you get the opportunity take it as it is likely to be fleeting. The few places in this country where homes wind up selling for 2.5x incomes (on average) and you have an opportunity to finance at 4% and change will be decent buying opportunities - if you're sure you can cash flow the note (e.g. your job and/or income stream is not in any danger of collapsing.)

* Those who have said that the corporate bond market is being "unreasonable" in its expectation for defaults will start to look like the jackasses they are. Actual default rates (not projections) on non-investment-grade debt will skyrocket starting in 2009 and there will be no sign of it turning around this year. If you're playing in this area of the market thinking that "the worst is behind us", I hope you like walking around bald as the haircuts handed out to folks like you will be especially severe and delivered with a straight razor.

* The calls for "more lending" to consumers and businesses will go exactly nowhere. The problem isn't credit availability - there's plenty of money available to lend if you are credit-worthy. Those who are being turned down now simply aren't credit-worthy when one looks at what they want to do with the money and what they're backing their repayment capacity with. The more "credit stimulus" is thrown into the economy (and there will be more) the worse the downturn will get.

* General Motors and Chrysler will fail to meet their targets and it will be labor that sinks the deal. At least one and probably both will wind up in some form of bankruptcy in 2009. The UAW is insane; Gettlefinger needs to be strung up by his genitals and pelted with rotten tomatoes by his union "brothers", and if they had a lick of sense they'd have already done it. They obviously don't. I give this mess six months tops, with Ford as the only possible survivor. The recent GMAC games show exactly how desperate they are; 0% 5 year loans to people with 620 FICO scores are flat-out insane and the default rates on those loans are going to wind up in economics textbooks five years hence.

* Protectionism and currency manipulation will rear their ugly heads in 2009, originating not here but in Asia as their economies go straight into the toilet. China and Japan are at severe risk here.

* Commodities will appear to be headed for a new bull market but this will turn out to be a false hope as demand continues to collapse. Attempts to manage oil output to prop up the price will fail. Several oil-producing nations will find themselves in serious economic trouble, with Russia being in the lead but by no means alone.

* Sovereign debt defaults will number at least three with many other nations on "watch" for same; we had one last year (Iceland.) Noise about a US "AAA" downgrade will continue. Highest on the list for probables are Russia, which needs oil at roughly double its current price - and stable - to be financially viable. Not going to happen in the near term.

* China will have its first large-scale rumbling of civil unrest as a consequence of collapsing export demand and thus employment. They'll manage to tamp it down - this year. Don't take a bet on that holding together longer-term. Those who think China will be "ok" are deluded; they have a horrifying overcapacity problem (debt-financed, of course) and there is no way for them to get out of it. They are truly going to "take it in both holes" down the road, but the worst of it won't be in 2009 - that is still a year or two in the future.

* Foreign uptake of Treasuries will be choked off - by necessity. It won't be because they want to screw the US (although they should have a long time ago, given our profligate and unsustainable habits), it will be because they will be forced to redirect their resources inward as their own economies collapse.

* "The City" (London to be precise, Britain generally) will be recognized as getting it "worse than we are" (in America.) This will be the first of many validations of my thesis "we're screwed, they're gang-raped."

* Things will get "revolting" in a number of nations. Not here in America. Yet. If we're lucky the American Sheep will wake up and stage some of that peaceful protest stuff I outlined above. If we're not so fortunate 2010 could be really bad.

In terms of recommendations its simple - rallies are to be sold, cash is to be raised and prudence is to be practiced in your own personal financial affairs. Don't get creative in all things finance, get stingy and prudent. Your personal financial survival could well depend on it.

http://market-ticker.org/

[xe2dy]

Kass: 20 Surprises for 2009

"Without further ado, here is my list of 20 surprises for 2009. In doing so, we start the new year with the surprising story that ended the old year, the alleged Madoff Ponzi scheme."

1. The Russian mafia and Russian oligarchs are found to be large investors with Madoff. During the next few weeks, a well-known CNBC investigative reporter documents that the Russian oligarchs, certain members of the Russian mafia and several Colombian drug cartel families have invested and laundered more than $2 billion in Madoff's strategy through offshore master feeders and through several fund of funds. There are several unsuccessful attempts made on Madoff and/or his family's lives. With the large Russian investments in Madoff having gone sour and in light of the subsequent acts of violence against his family, U.S./Russian relations, which already were at a low point, are threatened. Madoff's lawyers disclose that he has cancer, and his trial is delayed indefinitely as he undergoes chemotherapy.

2. Housing stabilizes sooner than expected. President Obama, under the aegis of Larry Summers, initiates a massive and unprecedented Marshall Plan to turn the housing market around. His plan includes several unconventional measures: Among other items is a $25,000 tax credit on all home purchases as well as a large tax credit and other subsidies to the financial intermediaries that provide the mortgage loans and commitments. This, combined with a lowering in mortgage rates (and a boom in refinancing), the bankruptcy/financial restructuring of three public homebuilders (which serves to lessen new home supply) and a flip-flop in the benefits of ownership vs. the merits of renting, trigger a second-quarter 2009 improvement in national housing activity, but the rebound is uneven. While the middle market rebounds, the high-end coastal housing markets remain moribund, as they impacted adversely by the Wall Street layoffs and the carnage in the hedge fund industry.

3. The nation's commercial real estate markets experience only a shallow pricing downturn in the first half of 2009. President Obama's broad-ranging housing legislation incorporates tax credits and other unconventional remedies directed toward nonresidential lending and borrowing. Banks become more active in office lending (as they do in residential real estate lending), and the commercial mortgage-backed securities market never experiences anything like the weakness exhibited in the 2007 to 2008 market. Office REIT shares, similar to housing-related equities, rebound dramatically, with several doubling in the new year's first six months.

4. The U.S. economy stabilizes sooner than expected. After a decidedly weak January-to-February period (and a negative first-quarter 2009 GDP reading, which is similar to fourth-quarter 2008's black hole), the massive and creative stimulus instituted by the newly elected President begins to work. Banks begin to lend more aggressively, and lower interest rates coupled with aggressive policy serve to contribute to an unexpected refinancing boom. By March, personal consumption expenditures begin to rebound slowly from an abysmal holiday and post-holiday season as energy prices remain subdued, and a shallow recovery occurs far sooner than many expect. Second-quarter corporate profits growth comfortably beats the downbeat and consensus forecasts as inflation remains tame, commodity prices are subdued, productivity rebounds and labor costs are well under control.

5. The U.S. stock market rises by close to 20% in the year's first half. Housing-related stocks (title insurance, home remodeling, mortgage servicers and REITs) exhibit outsized and market-leading gains during the January-to-June interval. Heavily shorted retail and financial stocks also advance smartly. The year's first-half market rise of about 20% is surprisingly orderly throughout the six-month period, as volatility moves back down to pre-2008 levels, but rising domestic interest rates, still weak European economies and a halt to China's economic growth limit the stock market's progress in the back half of the year.

6. A second quarter "growth scare" bursts the bubble in the government bond market. The yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury note moves steadily higher from 2.10% at year-end to over 3.50% by early fall, putting a ceiling on the first-half recovery in the U.S. stock market, which is range-bound for the remainder of the year, settling up by approximately 20% for the 12-month period ending Dec. 31, 2009. Foreign central banks, faced with worsening domestic economies, begin to shy away from U.S. Treasury auctions and continue to diversify their reserve assets. By year-end, the U.S. dollar represents less than 60% of worldwide reserve assets, down from 2008's year-end at 62% and down from 70% only five years ago. China's 2008 economic growth proves to be greatly exaggerated as unemployment surprisingly rises in early 2009 and the rate of growth in China's real GDP moves towards zero by the second quarter. Unlike more developed countries, the absence of a social safety net turns China's fiscal economic policy inward and aggressively so. Importantly, China not only is no longer a natural buyer of U.S. Treasuries but it is forced to dip into it's piggy bank of foreign reserves, adding significant upside pressure to U.S. note and bond yields.

7. Commodities markets remain subdued. Despite an improving domestic economy, a further erosion in the Western European and Chinese economies weighs on the world's commodities markets. Gold never reaches $1,000 an ounce and trades at $500 an ounce at some point during the year. (Gold-related shares are among 2009's worst stock market performers.) The price of crude oil briefly rallies early in the year after a step up in the violence in the Middle East but trades in a broad $25 to $65 range for all of 2009 as President Obama successfully introduces aggressive and meaningful legislation aimed at reducing our reliance on imported oil. The price of gasoline briefly breaches $1.00 a gallon sometime in the year. The U.S. dollar outperforms most of the world's currencies as the U.S. regains its place as an economic and political powerhouse.

8. Capital spending disappoints further. Despite an improving economy, large-scale capital spending projects continue to be delayed in favor of maintenance spending. Technology shares continue to lag badly, and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD Quote - Cramer on AMD - Stock Picks) files bankruptcy.

9. The hedge fund and fund of funds industries do not recover in 2009. The Madoff fraud, poor hedge fund performance and renewed controversy regarding private equity marks (particularly among a number of high-profile colleges like Harvard and Yale) prove to be a short-term death knell to the alternative investments industry. As well, the gating of redemption requests disaffects high net worth, pension plan, endowment and University investors to both traditional hedge funds and to private equity (which suffers from a series of questionable and subjective marking of private equity deal pricings at several leading funds). Three of the 10 largest hedge funds close their doors as numerous hedge funds reduce their fee structures in order to retain investors. Faced with an increasingly uncertain investor base, several big hedge funds merge with like-sized competitors in a quickening hedge fund industry consolidation. By year-end, the number of hedge funds is down by well over 50%.

10. Mutual fund redemptions from 2008 reverse into inflows in 2009. The mutual fund industry does not suffer the same fate as the hedge fund industry. In fact, a renaissance of interest in mutual funds (especially of a passive/indexed kind) develops. Fidelity is the largest employer of the graduating classes (May 2009) at the Wharton and Harvard Business Schools; it goes public in late 2009 in the year's largest IPO. Shares of T. Rowe Price (TROW Quote - Cramer on TROW - Stock Picks) and AllianceBernstein (AB Quote - Cramer on AB - Stock Picks) enjoy sharp price gains in the new year. Bill Miller retires from active fund management at Legg Mason (LM Quote - Cramer on LM - Stock Picks).

11. State and municipal imbalances and deficits mushroom. The municipal bond market seizes up in the face of poor fiscal management, revenue shortfalls and rising budgets at state and local levels. Municipal bond yields spike higher. A new Municipal TARP totaling $2 trillion is introduced in the year's second half.

12. The automakers and the UAW come to an agreement over wages. Under the pressure of late first-quarter bankruptcies, the UAW agrees to bring compensation in line with non-U.S. competitors and exchanges a reduction in retiree health care benefits for equity in the major automobile manufacturers.

13. The new administration replaces SEC Commissioner Cox. Upon his inauguration, President Obama immediately replaces SEC Commissioner Christopher Cox with Yale professor Dr. Jeffrey Sonnenfeld. The new SEC commissioner recommends that the uptick rule be reinstated and undertakes a yearlong investigation/analysis into the impact of Ultra Bear ETFs on the market. Later in the year, the administration recommends that the SEC be abolished and folded into the Treasury Department. Dr. Sonnenfeld returns to Yale University.

14. Large merger of equals deals multiply. Economies of scale and mergers of equals become the M&A mantras in 2009, and niche investment banking boutiques such as Evercore (EVR Quote - Cramer on EVR - Stock Picks), Lazard (LAZ Quote - Cramer on LAZ - Stock Picks) and Greenhill (GHL Quote - Cramer on GHL - Stock Picks) flourish. Goldman Sachs and Citigroup announce a merger of equals, but Goldman maintains management control of the combined entity. Morgan Stanley (MS Quote - Cramer on MS - Stock Picks) acquires Blackstone. Disney (DIS Quote - Cramer on DIS - Stock Picks) purchases Carnival (CCL Quote - Cramer on CCL - Stock Picks). Microsoft (MSFT Quote - Cramer on MSFT - Stock Picks) acquires Yahoo! (YHOO Quote - Cramer on YHOO - Stock Picks) at $5 a share.

15. Focus shifts for several media darlings. Though continuing on CNBC, Jim "El Capitan" Cramer announces his own reality show that will air on NBC in the fall. At the time his reality show premieres, he also writes a new book, Stay Mad for Life: How to Prosper From a Buy/Hold Investment Strategy. Dr. Nouriel Roubini continues to talk depression, but the price of his speaking engagements are cut in half. He writes a new book, The New Depression: How Leverage's Long Tail Will Result in Bread Lines. "Kudlow & Company's" Larry Kudlow proclaims that it's time to harvest the "mustard seeds" of growth and, in an admission of the Democrats' growing economic successes, officially leaves the ranks of the Republican party and returns to his Democratic roots. Yale's Dr. Robert Shiller adopts a variant and positive view on housing and the economy, joining the bullish ranks, and writes a new book, The New Financial Order: Economic Opportunity in the 21st Century.

16. The Internet becomes the tactical nuke of the digital age. The Web is invaded on many levels as governments, consumers and investors freak out. First, an act of cyberterrorism occurs that compromises the security of a major government (similar to the attacks this year emanating from the Chinese military aimed at the German Chancellery) or uses DoS against media and e-commerce sites. Second, a major data center will fail and will be far worse than the 1988 Cornell student incident that infected about 5% of the Unix boxes on the early Internet. Third, cybercrime explodes exponentially in 2008. Financial markets will be exposed to hackers using elaborate fraud schemes (such as liquidating and sweeping online brokerage accounts and shorting stocks, then employing a denial-of-service attack against the company). Fourth, Storm Trojan reappears. (Same as last year.)

17. A handful of sports franchises file bankruptcy. Three Major League Baseball teams fail in the middle of the season and seek government bailouts in order to complete the season. The Wilpon family, victimized by Madoff, sells the New York Mets to SAC's Steve Cohen. The New York Yankees are undefeated in the 2009 season, and Madonna and A-Rod have a child together (out of wedlock).

18. The Fox Business Network closes. Racked by large losses, Rupert Murdoch abandons the Fox Business Network. CNBC rehires several prior employees and expands its programming into complete weekend coverage. Two popular CNBC commentators "go mainstream" and become regulars on NBC news programs.

19. Old, leveraged media implode. The worlds of leverage and old media collide in a massive flameout of previous leveraged deals. Univision and Clear Channel go bankrupt. The New York Times (NYT Quote - Cramer on NYT - Stock Picks) teeters financially.

20. The Middle East's infrastructure build-out is abruptly halted owing to "market conditions." Lower oil prices, weakening European economies and a broad overexpansion wreak havoc with the Middle East's markets and economies.

Doug Kass is the author of The Edge, a blog on RealMoney Silver that features real-time shorting opportunities on the market.

http://www.thestreet.com/story/10455209/3/kass-20-surprises-for-2009.html

[xe2dy]

One heck of a post by Chichi2 ...

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=34488603

[xe2dy]

SPX th'ks to TP

[xe2dy]

Thank you, brother. And a Merry Christmas to you too!

[frenchee]

Merry Christmas Ed!

[xe2dy]

The Obama-Biden Plan

http://change.gov/agenda/economy_agenda/

Scroll down to Section 4, Small Business and think TNA.

[xe2dy]

Post at FSLR regarding Obama cranks up the green revolution

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=34341592

[xe2dy]

Current portfolio:

















Watch List

[xe2dy]

Link to Sectors post by Chichi2

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=34319138

[xe2dy]

INVESTOR SENTIMENT

http://www.sentimentrader.com/

[xe2dy]

Current portfolio:

[xe2dy]

•• CoT Data Charts thru Dec 12th ••

Th'ks to Bullwinkle

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=34174332

Info on understanding COT

http://www.321gold.com/editorials/chan/chan060205.html

[xe2dy]

Th'ks FPJ, :)


Charts th'ks to Teaparty...






http://xtrends.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default

http://slopeofhope.com/index.htm

[frenchee]

Hi Ed,

Here's a refinement of my SPX chart.

[xe2dy]

Collection of $SPX charts...





th'ks to frenchee


th'ks to Teaparty

[xe2dy]

Link to TT thread regarding UNG options / strategy

http://www.traders-talk.com/mb2/index.php?showtopic=98666

[xe2dy]

Link to charts of 3X ETFs by 1Best

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=33906027

[xe2dy]

Link to spielchekr's smudge charts.

http://www.traders-talk.com/mb2/index.php?showtopic=98350

[xe2dy]

Interesting similarities using IYB's SS

http://www.traders-talk.com/mb2/index.php?showtopic=98294

[xe2dy]

Charts by spielchekr

http://www.traders-talk.com/mb2/index.php?showtopic=98090

[xe2dy]

$NYHL th'ks to TREND1



http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=33608484

[xe2dy]

Inverse TRINQ



"I inverted the TRINQ ($ONE:TRINQ) to keep it pointing in same direction as price. IE when the inverse goes up price goes up. You can see that in most of the instances the 50 day TRINQ led price. And it did on all lasting bottoms. Check out the divergence we have going on now. Suggest higher although in late 2000 it would have bit you in the butt." StillLearning

[xe2dy]

Current portfolio:









All subject to change at either stop loss or profit taking. :)

[frenchee]

$SPX Big-Picture Chart

[xe2dy]

TP's SPX "Wet Dream" :)



http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=33525073

[xe2dy]

Liquidity trap

In monetary economics, a liquidity trap occurs when the nominal interest rate is close or equal to zero, and the monetary authority is unable to stimulate the economy with traditional monetary policy tools. In this kind of situation, people do not expect high returns on physical or financial investments, so they keep assets in short-term cash bank accounts or hoards rather than making long-term investments. This makes a recession even more severe, and can contribute to deflation.

In normal times, the monetary authority (usually a central bank or finance ministry) can stimulate the economy by lowering interest rate targets or increasing the monetary base. Either action should increase borrowing and lending, consumption, and fixed investment. When the relevant interest rate is already at or near zero, the monetary authority cannot lower it to stimulate the economy. The monetary authority can increase the overall quantity of money available to the economy, but traditional monetary policy tools do not inject new money directly into the economy. Rather, the new liquidity created must be injected into the real economy by way of financial intermediaries such as banks. In a liquidity trap environment, banks are unwilling to lend, so the central bank's newly-created liquidity is trapped behind unwilling lenders.

The liquidity trap theory applies to monetary policy in non-inflationary depressions. The theory does not apply to fiscal policies that may be able to stimulate the economy.
Contents

Macroeconomic dynamic

Since at very low interest rate, the slope of the money demand function Pr tends to infinity at the limit, when we calculate the marginal effect on output Y with respect to R we will see that the slope tends to zero in the limit:

Pr → infinity, Ry = -Py / Pr → 0

Therefore, monetary policy (increasing the money supply) will be ineffective stimulating production. Instead, fiscal policy might be more effective since it will push the IS curve to higher levels of production.

Economists' perspectives

In the 1989 film Batman, the Joker drops millions of dollars upon the citizens of Gotham City, passing by the Gotham Central Bank as he does so, in a literal illustration of Friedman's perspective.

Milton Friedman suggested that a monetary authority can escape a liquidity trap by bypassing financial intermediaries to give money directly to consumers or businesses. This is referred to as a money gift or as helicopter money. The term helicopter money is meant to portray the image of a central banker dropping money on people from a helicopter. Political considerations make it difficult for a monetary authority to grant the money gift, because individuals and firms not receiving free money will exert political pressure. The monetary authority must act covertly to give gift money to specific individuals or firms without appearing to give money away. During the Great Depression in the United States, the Federal Reserve offered to buy any gold at a price well above current market prices. This was essentially a money gift to gold holders. In Japan in the 1980s, the Bank of Japan began buying newly-issued common stock and bonds as a hidden money gift to firms.

John Maynard Keynes is usually seen as the inventor of the liquidity-trap theory. In his view, financial actors fear the possibility of suffering capital losses on non-money assets and thus hold money (liquid assets) instead. For example, the fear of default on loans can inhibit lenders from lending except to extremely credit-worthy customers. These fears are most likely after a financial crisis such as that associated with the Stock Market Crash of 1929. Further, if nominal interest rates are extremely low, there is no place for them to go but up. That implies that bond prices will likely fall in the near future, causing capital losses.

Neoclassical schools of economics which hold that economic agents make decisions based on real rather than nominal values contend that monetary efforts to lower nominal risk-free rates have no significant impact on the nominal interest rates charged by banks. A bank will not lend unless it can charge a (nominal) interest rate which is at least equal to the rate of inflation during the loan period. In an environment where banks are prohibited or discouraged by law from charging high rates of interest on loans, banks will be more reluctant to lend, since doing so would result in receiving a low (and possibly negative) real rate of return on investment. Unlike Keynesian theory, which claims that "liquidity traps" arise from fear or a hoarding mentality among banks, neoclassical theories argue that liquidity traps of this form do not exist and that monetary efforts to lower rates will have little, if any, effect on the quantity of real goods produced.

Note that even if the expected inflation rate is zero, nominal interest rates charged for loans will never fall below zero. Negative interest rates would imply banks paying borrowers to take loans. Furthermore, the liquidity advantages of holding money in an uncertain environment will set a non-zero, positive lower bound on the rate at which any agent will be willing to lend.

Japan's liquidity trap

It has been suggested that the Japanese economy in the 1990s suffered from a "liquidity trap" scenario.[1] This diagnosis prompted increased government spending and large budget deficits as a remedy. The failure of these measures to help the economy recover, combined with an explosion in the Japanese public debt suggest that such a fiscal policy, may not have been adequate. (Much of the government spending followed a stop/go pattern and involved spending on unneeded infrastructure.) Nobel Prize winning American economist Paul Krugman suggests that what was needed was a central bank commitment to steady positive monetary growth, which would encourage inflationary expectations and lower expected real interest rates, which would stimulate spending.

Austrian Critique

Economists of the Austrian school challenge the idea that Japan experienced a liquidity trap, instead contending it suffered from the bust portion of a business cycle brought on by monetary inflation, which could only be cured by allowing the bust to liquidate the malinvestments made during the boom. Austrians contend that busts are necessary corrections to booms and that artificial credit expansion or other government interference will only make the bust longer or delay an even bigger bust. Thus, they blame Japan's rigorous government interference in the market for causing the bust to last throughout the decade.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liquidity_trap

http://www.traders-talk.com/mb2/index.php?showtopic=97034

[xe2dy]

$VIX by hiker at TT

[xe2dy]

TICK chart th'ks to traderpaul at TT



"In a bull market the tick stays above 400. In a bear market she stays below the 400 line.....Notice i did not use any trend lines to influence my chart reading.....You have to be a chartist to get the message of this chart." traderpaul


http://www.traders-talk.com/mb2/index.php?s=45252222f6e68f639e251bf299d48f91&showtopic=96449

and more tick ...

http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=30583547

[xe2dy]

SPX monthly +

[xe2dy]

Nice chart from selecto...

"Time to drag this one out again. Targets depend on where one places the top of the pole.
They are targets off the formation, not necessarily reversal points."

http://www.traders-talk.com/mb2/index.php?showtopic=95111



Added these...

[xe2dy]

Long term FLS

[xe2dy]

Videos from Leavitt Brothers

http://leavittbrothers.blogspot.com/

[xe2dy]

John Mauldin

My Dad used to tell me there is no accounting for standards when looking at something that seemed odd. Today, we have faulty standards for accounting that are ripping apart the fabric of the world's economy. How can a security that has a high probability of full repayment be downgraded from AA to junk levels? What we will explore today tell us a lot about why we are in the crisis state of affairs. Since I wrote you last Friday, the financial landscape of the world has changed even more. And what will happen this weekend will change it even more. And our kids will be paying for it for a long, long time. At the end I offer a few thoughts on the events, and if there is time my thoughts on the new short covering rules. All in all, it should make for an instructive and interesting letter. We'll jump right in with no "but first."

I was invited to an invitation only presentation to a room of chief executives of a number of small Texas banks made by Rich Berg of Performance Trust Capital Partners this week (http://ptcp.performancetrust.com). He graciously gave me permission to go over the main points of his presentation. I think you will find it eye-opening to say the least. You probably have seen Rich, as he is all over the media lately.

Let's jump back 18 months. I spent several letters going over how subprime mortgages were sold and then securitized. Let's quickly review. Huge Investment Bank (HIB) would encourage mortgage banks all over the country to make home loans, often providing the capital, and then HIB would purchase these loans and package them into large securities called Residential Mortgage Backed Securities or RMBS. They would take loans from different mortgage banks and different regions. They generally grouped the loans together as to their initial quality as in prime mortgages, ALT-A and the now infamous subprime mortgages. They also grouped together second lien loans, which were the loans generally made to get 100% financing or cash-out financing as home owners borrowed against the equity in their homes.

Typically, a RMBS would be sliced into anywhere from 5 to 15 different pieces called tranches. They would go to the ratings agencies, who would give them a series of ratings on the various tranches, and who actually had a hand in saying what the size of each tranche could be. The top or senior level tranche had the rights to get paid back first in the event there was a problem with some of the underlying loans. That tranche was typically rated AAA. Then the next tranche would be rated AA and so on down to junk level. The lowest level was called the equity level, and this lowest level would take the first losses. For that risk, they also got any residual funds if everyone paid. The lower levels paid very high yields for the risk they took.

Then, since it was hard to sell some of the lower levels of these securities, HIB would take a lot of the lower level tranches and put them into another security called a Collateralized Debt Obligation or CDO. And yes, they sliced them up into tranches and went to the rating agencies and got them rated. The highest tranche was typically again AAA. Through the alchemy of finance, HIB took subprime mortgages and turned 96% (give or take a few points depending on the CDO) of them into AAA bonds. At the time, I compared it with taking nuclear waste and turning it into gold. Clever trick when you can do it, and everyone, from mortgage broker to investment bankers was paid handsomely to dance at the party.

Will we ever forget Charlie Prince's line, the CEO of Citigroup, saying that "As long as they are playing music, you have to get up and dance?" just a few weeks before the market imploded? Apart from having his rhythm being proven totally horrendous and overseeing an implosion which cost Citigroup tens of billions, it was a great statement of the zeitgeist of the financial world at the time.

The key word here is model. The ratings agencies used data supplied by the investment banks on what the likely default rates would be. It was something like taking an open book test where you get to write the questions. And since home values had only gone up, default rates were low. And of course, the data was from an ear when bankers lent money actually expecting to get paid back.

Inside a RMBS

Let's look at a RMBS. As Berg points out, when you are buying a mortgage backed security, there are really only three questions you need to know the answers to:

* How many mortgages will default?
* How much will I get back on a defaulted loan?
* How much credit enhancement is there in the security?

Let's set the table by looking at a few terms and definitions. Using his example, let's take a mortgage where the home was originally appraised for $400,000 and there is a $300,000 mortgage on the home. Let's assume a default and the bank takes back the home. If they sell the home and recover $240,000 that means they lose $60,000. This is called a 20% severity. If they sold and recovered $150,000 it would be said to have a 50% severity.

Next, let's look at how the rating agencies come up with the AAA rating. First they model the expected losses, with emphasis on the word model. If they figure that worst case that 8% of the loans default at a severity of 50%, then the security would lose 4% of its value. To get an AAA rating you have to have at least two times the coverage of the "modeled" loss. In this illustration, that means that 92% of the loans would be put into the AAA tranche. An A rating assumes a coverage of more than 1 times but less than 2. B means you expect to get your money back and if they model that you will get below 100% back then the rating would be at junk levels.

Now, this next fact is important. All ratings assume a par value of 100. The rating of these bonds has nothing to do with price. After the presentation, Rich sat down with me and pulled up an actual mortgage backed security that was being offered that day on his screen. It was once a AAA rated Alt-A security. If I remember correctly it was a 2006 vintage security.

As of the latest reporting, a little over 5% of the mortgages were over 60 days past due or in foreclosure. In this security, there are no toxic option ARMS. The numbers of mortgages in this security that are in trouble are rising. S&P has downgraded that AAA tranche to BBB, which of course means its value is going down.

And sure enough, the offered price of the security is 70 cents on the dollar, or 70% of the original par value. Now remember, this particular AAA bond will only start to lose money after the lower tranches take up the first 8% of losses. Thus, this bond can be said to have an 8% credit enhancement.

Pricing in Financial Armageddon

Now, let's stress test that loan. For the AAA portion of the loan to lose money, that would mean that 16% of the loans would have to default with a severity of 50% losses. Could that happen? Sure.

But let's look at what buying that loan at 70 cents on the dollar does for the new owner. First, you are getting a much higher yield (interest rate) because you are buying the security at a lower valuation. But something else even more interesting happens.

Even though the security sold at 70 cents, it still gets all of the first of the proceeds of the home owners who pay their mortgages, up to 92% of the original value in the security. How many loans would have to default in order to make the buyer at 70 cents lose money? Remember, we already had credit enhancement of 8%. But at 70 cents, we just "bought" or priced in another 30%. Let's think Armageddon and that 50% of the mortgages default and they only recover 50% of the loans. That would only be a total loss of 25% to the entire collateral of the deal, but it would mean that the new investor still get all of my 70 cents plus another 13% back! The proud new owner could get up to 92% of the monies paid. Even in a pretty bad scenario, you get more than you paid for the security.

Let's walk through the math. Let's say the original security was $100 million (which would be a very small RMBS). The AAA tranche would have cost $92 billion. If you have it at 70 cents on the dollar you paid approximately $64 billion. In my Armageddon scenario above, the security loses 25% or $250 million. The lower rated tranches are completely wiped out losing $8 billion. Your tranche loses the remaining $17 billion which means you get $75 billion and you only paid $64 billion.

So, how bad would things have to get to lose money on this security? If I am doing the math right, 72% of the loans would have to default with a severity of 50% before your investment of $64 billion was impaired by even so much as 1 dollar. If that happened, it would be Armageddon.

So, why is it rated BBB? Because the rating is over the entire tranche and it is made at a par price of 100. The rating is not affected by the current price. As of today, assuming that even double the number of mortgages currently delinquent default with a 50% severity, your returns over the life of the security would be well over 12%. You would get back $92 million for your $64 billion dollar investment along with interest payments.

The reason this presentation was being made to banks and institutions? Because if you are a bank, you can generally only get prime plus 2% on a loan you make. But if you buy this security with your capital, you can make prime plus 6%. That is a large difference to a bank. Performance Trust has sold billions of this type of paper to banks and institutions.

If this is such a good deal, then why isn't everyone hitting the bid? Because these securities are very difficult to analyze. It is time consuming. You need to analyze every loan and develop your own valuations. You simply can't trust the ratings, as they are measuring something completely different.

And the real truth is that many of the various RMBS securities will in fact be totally wiped out or lose a great deal. Many are seeing default rates of 30% or more. You have to be very careful when you walk through this minefield. And in a time of crisis, it is not clear what the new rules will be. What if the government forces lenders to re-set mortgages at some loss level? What if the housing crisis gets worse? On the other hand, what if the government comes in and buys up all the bad mortgages in an attempt to stop the erosion in the home markets. The level of uncertainty in these times makes people a lot more cautious.

There are Alt-A RMBS like the one mentioned above that are probably not worth even 70 cents on the dollar. These things are marked to a market that is frozen. Everything gets lumped into the same basket and it all has to be marked to market by the new accounting rules called FASB 157. The institution selling the above mentioned security is being forced to do so, either because they are in financial trouble or they are not allowed to hold BBB securities in their portfolios and by law are required to sell. And in times of crisis, the selling price is not that of normal times.

Ratings to Collateral to Ratings: A Vicious Cycle

What's a recipe for a perfect financial storm? Let's make a massive amount of bad loans and get them on the books of most of the major financial institutions because they are rated investment grade. Then let's have the loans start to go bad. Throw in some general panic as everyone tries to sell the loans. No one is buying.

Let's make a new rule that you have to mark your illiquid securities to the last price paid by someone desperate to sell. That means that many institutions now have to mark their capital down and that means those pesky rating agencies must by their own rules mark down the ratings of the institutions which of course means that it costs them more to raise capital at a time when they can't get it which means they get lower ratings and so on. It becomes a vicious cycle.

In the early 80's, every major US bank was bankrupt because they had loaned Latin American countries far more than their capital they had on their books. The Latin American countries defaulted. If the US banks had been forced to mark to market, they would have all gone down taking the US economy along with them. So, the Fed simply allowed them to carry the loans at book value, offering liquidity and allowing the banks to buy time to make enough money to eventually write off the loans.

The current mark to market rule, while nice in theory, works in normal times. But it has the unintended consequence of making things worse in crisis times. Why should an institution have to write down a security which over time is going to pay back the lion's share or more of its value just because a severely stressed institution was forced to sell that security at a very low price in a time of crisis?

Yes, there needs to be transparency and we as investors need to know what is on the books of the companies that we invest in. But it is somewhat like my bank asking me to mark to market my home and pricing my loan daily based on that new price. If my neighbor loses his job and sells his home at auction, does that mean my home is now worth less two years from now. Maybe an even better analogy, if I am renting that home to a very good tenant, does my neighbor's price impair my income?

I was, and am, a fan of mark to market pricing. But we need to think through what a market price is. Not all things can be easily marked to market. This is doubly true when "market price" is a nebulous index of mortgage securities which may or not have a fundamental relationship with an illiquid security on the books of an institution which has no intention of selling, especially in a time of credit crisis.

It is one thing to require that you mark your stocks or bonds to market values. It is another thing entirely to require all mortgage backed securities, which are extremely complex things, can be very different one from another and which require a lot of time and effort to value, to be priced as though they are all the same.

FASB 157 needs to be amended this week. If Congress can create a new Resolution Trust Corp in a week, the surely the accounting board, with the suggestion of Treasury, can figure out a better way to price illiquid securities.

This Too Shall Pass

I know that you probably are reeling from all that has happened the past few months and especially the past two weeks. Lehman and Mother Merrill gone? We the people own AIG? Fannie and Freddie? A new housing bailout which will cost hundreds of billions? The Fed creating whole new programs to provide liquidity? Did you notice they loaned some $250 billion this last week to banks all over the world? Stopping short selling?

Want to see in graph form how bad it got and what spooked Paulson, Bernanke and company to act so quickly? Look at these graphs from my friends at Casey Research (http://www.caseyresearch.com/crpmkt/crpSolo.php?id=119&ppref=JMD119ED0908A). 30 day commercial paper went to 5% from 3% a week ago. The market was literally freezing. And the amount of paper issued is in free fall. Commercial paper is the life blood of the financial and business world. Without it commerce will soon grind to a halt.

It simply takes your breathe away. As President Bush said today, it does not help to find who is at fault today, we have to figure out how to get out of this mess. It is going to cost the taxpayers a lot of money. While I think the losses on AIG will be rather minor in the grand scheme of things, if you add up Fannie and Freddie and a new RTC, coupled with the stimulus package, you can easily get to $500 billion, and that is probably a low number.

For such a price, we had better get a new regulatory scheme which requires reduced leverage. Want to get really mad? Up until 2003, all investment banks were allowed only 12 to 1 leverage. Then in 2004, the SEC basically gave five banks (and only five banks) the ability to lever up 30 or even 40 to 1. Bet you can guess the five banks. Bear, Lehman, Merrill, Morgan and Goldman. Three down.

As Barry Ritholtz wrote: "So while the SEC runs around reinstating short selling rules, and clueless pension fund managers mindlessly point to the wrong issue, we learn that it was the SEC who was in large part responsible for the reckless leverage that led to the current crisis." (Don't get me started on blaming the short sellers. Let's not blame the people who leveraged up their companies 40 to 1 with bad investments.)

We absolutely must move credit default swaps to a regulated exchange, no matter how much investment banks and hedge funds scream. Must be done. Do it now. Real rules about writing mortgages, although now that losses are in the hundreds of billions, underwriting rules are already becoming quite restrictive.

And while we are at it, a thorough revamping of the rating agencies and the rules they use should be at the top of someone's list.

John Mauldin
[e-mail]

[xe2dy]

Very Nice SPX by RD



http://www.traders-talk.com/mb2/index.php?showtopic=93414

[xe2dy]

Spielchkr's Bottom Spotter

[xe2dy]

Ten Commandments

Posted on Saturday, March 29, 2008 at 09:16PM by Registered Commenter Option Addict


Here is a compilation of my Ten Commandments of Trading. In my sole opinion, these are the "fundamentals" of becoming a successful trader. Look these over and feel free to comment at will. Keep in mind this took a couple hours to compile, so be nice.

1. Thou shalt have a trading plan

If you don't have a plan, get one. What is your approach? What are your rules? These are questions that you need to answer before you can title yourself a trader. Creating a plan gives you something to follow, an outline of where you want to be, and what is required in between.

2. Thou shalt not trade with emotion

This includes, fear, greed and lack of discipline. There is no room for it in this equation. Find a way to get a better handle on it, and/or walk away from it. I can tell you from experience that you will have an impossible time being successful at trading when making emotional decisions.

3. Thou shalt embrace losing

A trader has to fight a lot of expensive enemies within himself. It is inevitable, it is going to happen, therefore you should plan for it. If I know I am going to lose, I will try and make it easier on myself in anticipation. Please do not judge the success of a trader by the win loss percentage they have. It's not about winning or losing; it's about making money.

4. Thou shalt know how to control losses
As a trader, you will have many losing trades. The idea is that if you keep them small, you give your winners a chance to outpace them. If you can successfully do this, you will be a profitable trader. Identify places on a chart that you know prices should not go in order to take your loss (broken support/resistance for example).

5. Thou shalt not turn a trade into an investment

If you didn't chuckle after you read this rule, then perhaps you need to revisit rules 1,2,3 and 4 again. Have you turned a trade into something longer in duration than expected? Do you remember why you did this? Sure...it was because the stock went against me and I figured "It will come back." When you feel the need to stay in a trade until you are right, something is wrong. Know where you are getting out before you get in. STICK TO THE PLAN!

6. Thou shalt remember: Tips are for waiters

Jesse Livermore said it best..."The fruits of your success will be in direct ratio to the honesty and sincerity of your own effort in keeping your own records, doing your own thinking and reaching your own conclusions" He goes on to further state..."The average man doesn't wish to be told that it is a bull or a bear market. What he desires is to be told specifically which particular stock to buy or sell. He wants to get something for nothing. He does not wish to work. He doesn't even wish to have to think." Wouldn't you agree? It is so easy to take the stock pick from someone assuming they have done all the work for you. Truth is, they probably know less than you. This includes commentary you listen to on the television, something you've read on a website, or discovered on this crappy blog. My point is... do your own research, trade your own trades, and be original in your analysis and activities.

7. Thou shalt repeat after me "A gain is not a gain until you sell"

Kenny Rogers said "You never count your money when you're sitting at the table." That profit is not realized, so don't mentally take inventory of it until the trade is closed and you have realized that gain. This will create emotion, and you will stay in trades for the numbers rather than the logical reasons.

8. Thou shalt not know too little about too much

I guess it is hard not to in your position. You are learning to trade. But you need to try to differentiate what you know, and what you are learning. You also must remember that the basics are called basics for a reason. They are the foundation we stand on. Next time you overrule a trend because of a candle formation, or something silly like that, remember that discipline trumps conviction. No matter how strongly you feel that the "*Double Bottom Outside Inverted Triangle Reversal Pattern" will result in a failure of the beautiful uptrend the stock has been trading in, you must defer back to the principles of discipline when you trade. Discipline will allow you to trade tomorrow, whereas the gut feeling of a new trader will send you to the poor house later today.

*- This is not an actual pattern, so please don't e-mail me and ask where to learn more about it. Just think of it as an exaggeration of a funny role we have all played.

9. Thou shalt trade with the trend

It takes a trader a long time to learn all the lessons of all his mistakes. They say there are two sides to everything. But there is only one side to the stock market; and it is not the bull side or the bear side, but the right side. Try to pick a style that you can easily adapt to a changing market. At times the "motion of the ocean" will differ and different approaches are warranted. It is at these times you need to be able to recognize the changes and adapt accordingly.

10. Thou shalt take the easy opportunities

You don't need to trade everything. There are opportunities that present themselves everywhere and everyday in this market. Just remember two things: Number 1: Its not necessary to play every move, its only necessary to have a high winning percentage on the trades you choose to make. Number 2: Don't go for the trades that don't totally jump out at you as an easy analysis. I call these the "Easy Trades." The trades where you are not 100% sold and convinced of what is going to happen, stay away from them.

http://www.optionaddict.net/blog/2008/3/30/my-ten-commandments.html

[xe2dy]

UNG charts ...

[xe2dy]

Opinion from Arbman ...

"I think the last pilar of strength, the tech, is also coming down, the recession is only beginning. In recessions the stocks decline 35% on the average apparently, I think I read that somewhere I can't remember. so far, the market only priced in a slow down until about 1250-1260 or so, then from 1440 top where the dismal Q3-Q4 outlook started to become evident.

We can probably say 35% down for the actual recession odds (2 qtrs contraction in GDP); or from the slow down highs, it would be 1065 minimum. Now, after the market goes down there and bounces well off to 1200s or so, it will become evident that a depression will follow (or 4qtrs of contraction in GDP), it essentially means another 35% from the bounce into the spring of 2009, say from the 1225 highs (15%), 900 or so some time in 2010...

This is how you would priced in $1.6T of projected losses in loans, the money has to come out of somewhere, either you pay them now or you sell as much Treasuries instead --rotation into the bonds eventually like in 2003. Somehow, a couple trillion dollars worth of paper will have to change hands to settle all of the accounts, then we begin all over again..." Arbman

http://www.traders-talk.com/mb2/index.php?s=71f8569a2add6df1205b0d13df68ac54&showtopic=93129

[xe2dy]

ACORE and Renewable Energy NEWS

http://www.acore.org/news/

Note: I noticed that UNG, TAN and FAN all moved down sharply last June or July. Apparently this was due to Congress' inability to resolve the question of extending alternative fuel tax breaks. December 31 st is when the current tax breaks expire and if that happens then there should be a better long term buy point for at least TAN and FAN in the near future.

Renewable Energy

http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/home

[frenchee]

Hi Ed,

Noticed you like UNG too. Stop on by my UNG board when time permits. #board-9806

See ya,

[xe2dy]

UNG, TAN, FAN, FLS +

[xe2dy]

FLS, GE, ESLR +

[euterpe1]

XE,

Just went back to that gold chart...wow, talk about TA working. Right at support while busting through the lower BB. Too bad, I did not see it last Sunday.

[xe2dy]

Dow Jones World +

[xe2dy]

Th'ks FPJ 4 FIB. GLD / USD + here...












Links for SPOT GOLD quote

http://www.kitco.com/charts/livegold.html

http://www.usagold.com/live.html

HEADLINES:

http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=GLD

[frenchee]

The Mathematical Magic of the Fibonacci Numbers

http://www.mcs.surrey.ac.uk/Personal/R.Knott/Fibonacci/fibmaths.html

[xe2dy]

Another fine SPX chart by Teaparty...

[xe2dy]

Nice SPX chart by vitaminm