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Syria Is Not Kosovo

By JAMES P. RUBIN
Published: September 4, 2013

LONDON

AS the United States Congress debates intervention in Syria, the precedent of NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign in Kosovo is being cited to justify using military force against the government of Bashar al-Assad.

The United States should respond militarily to Mr. Assad’s use of chemical weapons to murder his own citizens. Yet as a matter of law and policy, the Kosovo war is no precedent for airstrikes against Syria.

It’s true that Russia and China were opposed to a United Nations Security Council resolution to authorize the use of force in Kosovo in 1999, and they are opposed to such a resolution on Syria [ http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/syria/index.html ] today. But that is where the similarity ends.

Indeed, before the Kosovo war started, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had extensive discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, in which he acknowledged the necessity of using military power to convince the Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic to stop his slaughter of Kosovar Albanians and to agree to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. (Mr. Ivanov hoped the threat of force would be sufficient for Mr. Milosevic to back down. When the Serbian leader didn’t and the air war started, Russia publicly opposed NATO’s war but later cooperated closely with the United States to convince Mr. Milosevic to capitulate.)

Today, by contrast, Moscow is vehemently opposed to America’s proposed airstrikes against Syria, won’t even admit Damascus used chemical arms and is even reportedly providing Damascus crucial intelligence about America’s military’s preparations.

America’s approach to policy making has also been markedly different this time around.

Over the last two years, President Obama has argued that vital American interests are not jeopardized by Syria’s civil war. Although Mr. Obama began by calling for Mr. Assad to leave power, his administration has done little or nothing to make that happen. Only recently did Washington begin a modest training program for the Syrian opposition that has reportedly yielded some limited benefits to opposition forces.

In the case of Kosovo, President Bill Clinton explained from the very beginning that America had a stake in ensuring stability in Europe and preventing genocidal attacks against hundreds of thousands of innocent Kosovar Albanians. The United States then advanced a strategy of diplomacy backed by force by securing support from virtually all the European countries and most of the world to establish a just peace in which the rights of Serbs and Kosovar Albanians would be protected.

Working jointly with representatives from Europe and Russia, the United States forged an agreement that the Kosovar Albanians signed and Mr. Milosevic rejected. Only then, as a last resort, was an air campaign launched against Serbia. And 78 days later, the Milosevic regime gave up. NATO then deployed peacekeepers, and America convinced the Kosovo Liberation Army to disarm.

This strategy worked because it relied on the legitimacy of the United Nations and NATO to secure a peaceful, democratic future for a region at war. Today, after more than a decade, Serbs and Kosovars are beginning to reconcile; the leaders of Serbia and an independent Kosovo recently signed an accord to resolve remaining political and legal disputes.

Such an outcome in Syria is doubtful. The United States and Europe are at odds with Moscow, the Security Council is deadlocked, NATO has stayed on the sidelines, and the Arab League has been ineffectual. There is no strategy to achieve a stable endgame in which peacekeepers would be deployed and rebels would be disarmed, and the promised Geneva peace conference has been delayed indefinitely.

As a matter of international law, Kosovo is no precedent either. As spokesman for the State Department in 1999, I was asked for a legal justification for the use of force. Frustrated by vague appeals to “the principles of international law,” we eventually prepared a statement reciting Serbia’s numerous violations of United Nations resolutions, the extreme danger to civilians, the risks to NATO countries of a wider war and the unity of Europe, and then declared that as a result we believed there was “a substantial and legitimate grounds for action internationally.” In a court of international law, the case for Kosovo was weak. But in the court of international opinion, it was strong. History’s verdict on Kosovo has been that it was legitimate but not strictly legal.

If and when America strikes Syria, Washington’s case under international law will be far shakier than it was 14 years ago. There is no United Nations resolution. A regional organization like NATO is not conducting the airstrikes. Two permanent members of the Security Council are dead-set against intervention. And the British Parliament has voted to stay out.

A vote of support from Congress would place Mr. Obama on firmer ground as a matter of American constitutional law and give him the domestic political backing Mr. Clinton never enjoyed during the Kosovo war.

But to win the vote, the Obama administration would be wise not to emphasize the Kosovo analogy. Instead, administration officials should admit that what they define as American interests in Syria are not based on a moral duty to prevent the slaughter of civilians. Nor is the goal to damage the Assad regime because of its strategic military alliance with Iran and Hezbollah.

Mr. Obama should stick to the issue of weapons of mass destruction, despite the inevitable echo of Iraq. By using chemical weapons against innocent men, women and children, Mr. Assad has breached one of the oldest international laws — the 1925 protocol banning the use of poison gas — to which Syria is a party. Although there are no enforcement mechanisms authorizing force in that treaty, much of the world would likely accept that a limited use of military force aimed at Syria’s chemical weapons capability is a legitimate and proportionate response to such a blatant violation.

And although it is not certain, airstrikes should be sufficient to deter the Assad regime from using chemical weapons again.

James P. Rubin, an assistant secretary of state for public affairs during the Clinton administration, is a scholar in residence at the Rothermere American Institute at Oxford University.

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Related

Split Senate Panel Approves Giving Obama Limited Authority on Syria (September 5, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/world/middleeast/divided-senate-panel-approves-resolution-on-syria-strike.html

Obama Faces Barrier in His Own Party on Syria (September 5, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/world/middleeast/obama-faces-barrier-in-his-own-party-on-syria.html

Related in Opinion

Editorial: The Stakes in Congress (September 5, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/the-stakes-in-congress.html

Op-Ed Columnist: The Era of Disbelief (September 5, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/blow-the-era-of-disbelief.html

Op-Ed Columnist: The Right Questions on Syria (September 5, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/kristof-the-right-questions-on-syria.html

Op-Ed Contributors: What Sir William Would Do in Syria (September 5, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/what-sir-william-would-do-in-syria.html

Room for Debate: Can Iran Help the U.S. in Syria?
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/09/04/can-iran-help-the-us-in-syria

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© 2013 The New York Times Company

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/syria-is-not-kosovo.html

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