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The New Afghanistan: Why are the Jihadists Rushing to Syria?

First Published: 2013-08-25

Since the war in Syria is complex, multidimensional and changeable on daily bases, it is hard to draw decisive conclusions. All the analyses remain speculations based on certain variables and therefore disable to provide holistic explanation, argues Armenak Tokmajyan.

Middle East Online [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Middle_East_%28magazine%29 ]

By the time, the war in Syria has become increasingly, albeit not surprisingly, complicated nexus of different conflicts labeled as the Syrian Civil War. Although the predominant thinking is that the ongoing conflict in Syria is a civil war, it is indeed hard to insist on this perspective. Although there is an organized armed opposition sustainably fighting forces of an acting government; although there is international support to both sides, this war cannot be merely described as civil war or internationalized civil war. One of the reasons behind this confusion is the involvement of foreign – regional or international – non-state actors by the side of government and the opposition alike. Lately the official involvement of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Syrian conflict raised important question whether the Syrian Military and the loyal forces are fighting the locally recruited rebels, or transnational radical groupings, or both? Evidently, this war is not solely a struggle for power in Syria, but an incompatibility of interests of various actors; many regional and international actors are playing on the Syrian chessboard and follow distinct interests. However, worth questioning about the factors and interests that motivate the radical groups, such as TTP, join the war in Syria. There are at least two explanations why the so-called jihadists hasten to Syria in order to fulfill their duty. The primary reason is the ideology; there is a motivation based on their own explanation of Islam which is also their ideology and doctrine. Secondly, there are political reasons mainly compressed in the notion of political opportunity.

With the new headquarter of TTP in Syria, the entire notion of revolution against the Syrian government changes. Mohammed Amin, the coordinator of the TTP base in Syria, reported to BBC that this base is to “monitor the jihad in Syria”. The term “Jihad”, which linguistically means to make an effort, is rather problematic to be used because there are hundreds if not thousands of varying interpretations. Moreover, the notion of jihad in the holy Quran is not abridged in a paragraph or a page; indeed, the understanding of the term originally derives from many Quranic Phrases which are written in advanced Arabic that makes it hard to understand and hence subject to different interpretations. Mohammed Sa’id Al-‘Ashmawi (1986), a specialist in comparative and Islamic law, gives an explanation of jihad which does not explain the behavior of the performing jihadists in Syria. He argues that the notion of jihad passed through different stages and changed its meaning accordingly. During the first phase, it stood for making moral effort by enduring discomfort for the sake of Allah (God). Because of certain incidents that occurred during the onset of Islam in the seventh century, Jihad adopted another meaning which incorporates with making financial effort. The former understanding is known as “the big jihad” whereas the second is “the small jihad” meaning that the former is relatively more important. Interestingly, none of the meanings is related to war. Howsoever, as Al-‘Ashmawi continues, the meaning of jihad became more amalgamate with war after the enemies of the new religion declared war to eliminate its followers. In spite of these developments, the urge to combat against the “enemies of Islam” was not absolute; it had its limitations and rules. According to these limitations, jihad can be interpreted as holy war initially when there is aggression against the Muslims. Moreover, a Quranic famous phrase states that God dislike the aggressors. Hence, Al-‘Ashmawi concludes that call for jihad is a call for self-defense against the aggressor and not aggression against the others.

If the most accepted jihad by God is the moral jihad; if the war of jihad is a defensive call to protect the Islam then the call for global jihad against the “west” or governments such as the Syrian is hardly considered as jihad. Indeed, most of the jihadist movements do not adopt this elucidation of jihad in Islam.

Most of them, including the TTP, are keener to the explanation of Abu Musab Al-Suri the author of “The Call to Global Islamic Resistance” (2004). This important book, which consists of 1600 pages, written in advanced level of Arabic Language and includes many citations, is an academic work that explains the ideological motivations of jihadists. This massive manuscript carefully analysis and explains the notion of jihad often using the same Quranic phrases as Al-‘Ashmawi. However, the conclusions are fascinatingly different not because the source is different but because jihadists’ understanding of these texts is different. As a result, their comprehension of politics in the “Islamic world” is significantly distinct. Initially, Al-Suri considers the entire “Islamic World” occupied by the “crusaders” either directly or indirectly (p.941). He also identifies which regimes are Kufar (out of the religious law) and therefore they are legitimate targets for jihadists. In short, all the regimes which do not implement the law of Allah are considered are encircled in this criterion (p. 961). Further, the war that Muslims should wage against the occupiers or their agents is not a matter of choice but it is a must.

Beside the generalized descriptions and explanations, Al-Suri approaches the Arab world directly. He insists that the Arab world (which is different than the Islamic world) is entirely corrupt by nonbeliever leaders who gave space for the foreign occupiers to invade their countries indirectly. In this manner, Syria (or more specifically Sham, because Al-Suri alike most of the jihadists does not recognize the Sykes-Picot Borders (1916) that also mapped the current borders of the Middle East) is a legitimate target for all Muslims to respond to the call of jihad and overthrow the nonbeliever government of Syria implementing Islamic Law instead. Furthermore, the Syrian key political and military leaders belong to the Alawite sect which is a denomination within the Shiism. This makes the puzzle further complicated because the jihadist groups that fight the Syrian government are predominantly Sunnites who consider Shiits as outers to the real Islam which makes them even more legitimate target than the other religions. Thus, this understanding of jihad empowers its believers to invade Syria regardless the borders or legitimacy of the government or the willingness of the local population. This trend explains the motivation of thousand infiltrators to Syria coming for instance from Arabian/Persian Gulf States, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Accordingly, the existence of these outsiders in the Syrian “civil war” is based on very deep and organized ideological factors which should not be cynically approached or rapidly labeled.

While reviewing some of Suri’s writings an interesting question arises. If Abu Musab considers the KSA, the holiest of the lands, as a country which hosts the “crusaders”, then why the compass is towards Syria and not towards KSA? I would argue that in order to understand this dilemma it is not sufficient to comprehend the ideological factors that motivates the jihadist groupings. In this case, the political factors appear rather crucial. Undoubtedly, the current environment in Syria is fertile for the proliferation of such transnational organizations. However, it is hard to believe that there is no orchestration behind the rapid increase of radicals who fight in Syria. Political opportunity in this context should be understood as those influential regional and international actors in the Syrian conflict that facilitate the arrival of these fighters. Currently, it is not secret anymore that states such as KSA and Qatar overtly support different factions within the Syrian opposition by supplying arms, financial means and combatants. Another factor which is not a secret either is the orchestrated transport for these fighters at least via Turkey and Jordan where American, British and Israeli secret services are very active. This narrative, reminds the KSA-US strong cooperation in supporting the Mujahidin in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion in 1979. Hence, Is US supporting the new mujahidin of Syria against a government which is backed by Russia?

Another supporting variable can be found when we reverse the equation. Thus, although Al-Suri considers KSA, Qatar or Palestine as invaded lands with corrupt authorities, there is no regionally and internationally sponsored political opportunity for different jihadist groups to start their activities. The list of states in the Arab World where the Jihadists cannot find any opportunity to perform, interestingly matches with the states that have good relationship with primarily US, UK and France. Gulf Cooperation Council member states, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are predominantly Muslim populated countries and enjoy relatively good relationship with US, UK and France. On the other hand, in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Libya the opportunity of jihad is wide open to the radical groups who are willing to implement the religious law which often ends up with a “never ending war”. Accordingly, the strong ideological factors that stimulate the Jihadists to wage a holy war in countries such as Syria cannot merely explain the situation. Therefore, in similar cases, tracing the map of political factors is vital to understand the movement of these groups. In other words, the appearance of these radical groups in some countries in The Middle East and North Africa, and and their inability in others is not solely an accident.

Since the war in Syria is complex, multidimensional and changeable on daily bases, it is hard to draw decisive conclusions. All the analyses remain speculations based on certain variables and therefore disable to provide holistic explanation. Accordingly, the upcoming developments will prove whether Syria will become a new Afghanistan as a new base of jihad. Indeed, the variables provided above show that the availability of the two factors – ideological motivation and political opportunity – make such an outcome likely. Moreover, the end of such a dangerous game cannot be previously determined. The ideological factors are very strict and do not change easily. In other words, such jihadist groups deeply believe in their “mission” and therefore will not step back easily. The political variables, however, might change over time. Nevertheless, since eliminating these kinds of organizations is an arduous task, the country will continue being subjected to terroristic acts and bombings. Consequently, in the foreseeable future it is hard to imagine Syria in negative or positive peace.

Armenak Tokmajyan is a Research Assistant at CMC Finland. MDP in Peace Mediation and Conflict Research. TAPRI Peace Research Institute.

http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=60877

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