AI
Sunday, March 21, 2010 5:13:44 AM
China: the coming costs of a superbubble
China may seem to have defied the recession and the laws of economics. It hasn't. When China's bubble bursts, the global impact will be severe, spiking US interest rates.
By Vitaliy N. Katsenelson / March 16, 2010
Denver
The world looks at China with envy. China’s economy grew 8.7 percent last year, while the world economy contracted by 2.2 percent. It seems that Chinese “Confucian capitalism” – a market economy powered by 1.3 billion people and guided by an authoritarian regime that can pull levers at will – is superior to our touchy-feely democracy and capitalism. But the grass on China’s side of the fence is not as green as it appears.
In fact, China’s defiance of the global recession is not a miracle – it’s a superbubble. When it deflates, it will spell big trouble for all of us.
To understand the Chinese economy, consider three distinct periods: “Late-stage growth obesity” (the decade prior to 2008); “You lie!” (the time of the financial crisis); and finally, “Steroids ’R’ Us” (from the end of the financial crisis to today).
Late-stage growth obesity
About a decade ago, the Chinese government chose a policy of growth at any cost. China’s leaders see strong gross domestic product (GDP) growth not just as bragging rights, but as essential for political survival and national stability.
Because China lacks the social safety net of the developed world, unemployed people aren’t just inconvenienced by the loss of their jobs, they starve; and hungry people don’t complain, they riot and cause political unrest.
Remember the 1994 movie “Speed”? A young cop (Keanu Reeves) had to save passengers on a bus that would explode if its speed dropped below 50 m.p.h. Well, China is like that bus with 1.3 billion people aboard. If the Communist Party can’t keep the economy growing at a fast clip, the result will be catastrophic.
To achieve high growth, China kept its currency, the renminbi, at artificially low levels against the dollar. This helped already cheap Chinese-made goods become even cheaper. China turned into a significant exporter to the developed economies.
Normally, if free-market economic forces were at work, the renminbi would have appreciated and the US dollar would have declined. However, had China let this occur, demand for its products would have declined, and its economy wouldn’t have grown at roughly 10 percent a year, which it did during the past decade.
The more China sold to the United States, the more dollars it accumulated, and thus the more US Treasuries it bought, driving our interest rates down. US consumers responded to these cheap goods and cheap home loans by going on a buying binge.
However, companies and countries that grow at very high rates for a long time will inevitably suffer from late-stage growth obesity. Consider Starbucks: In 1999, it had 2,000 stores and was adding 1.8 stores a day. In 2007, when it had 10,000 stores, it had to open 5.5 stores a day in a desperate bid to keep growth rates up. This resulted in poor decisions and poor quality – a recipe for disaster.
In China, political pressure for full employment has led to similar late-stage growth obesity. In 2005, China built the largest shopping mall in the world, the New South China Mall: Today it’s 99 percent vacant. China also built up a lavish district in a city called Ordos: Today, it’s a ghost town.
You lie!
All good things come to an end, and great things come to an end with a bang. When the financial meltdown erupted in 2008, US and global banks started dropping like flies. Countries everywhere suffered contraction.
Even China.
During the crisis, Chinese exports were down more than 25 percent, tonnage of goods shipped through railroads was down by double digits, and electricity use plummeted.
Yet Beijing insisted that China had magically sustained 6 to 8 percent growth.
China lies. It goes to great lengths to maintain appearances, including censoring media and jailing those who write antigovernment articles. That’s why we have to rely on hard data instead.
Steroids ‘R’ Us
Today the global economy is stabilizing, thanks to Uncle Sam and other “uncles” around the world. But the consumers of Chinese-made goods are still in debt, unemployment is high, and banks aren’t lending. You might think the Chinese economy would be growing at a lower rate. But no, it is growing again at nearly 10 percent, as though the financial crisis never occurred.
Though this growth appears to be authentic – electricity consumption is back up – it is not sustainable growth, because it is based on an unprecedented stimulus package and extraordinary government involvement in the economy.
In the midst of the financial crisis, in late 2008, Beijing fire-hosed a $568 billion stimulus into the Chinese economy. That’s enormous! As a percentage of GDP, it would be like a $2 trillion stimulus in America, nearly triple the size of the one Congress passed last year.
It gets even more interesting. Unlike Western democracies, whose central banks can pump a lot of money into the financial system but can’t force banks to lend or consumers and corporations to spend, China can achieve both at lightning speed.
The government controls the banks, so it can make them lend, and it can force state-owned enterprises (one-third of the economy) to borrow and to spend. Also, because the rule of law and human and property rights are still underdeveloped, China can spend infrastructure project money very fast – if a school is in the way of a road the government wants to build, it becomes a casualty for the greater good.
Government is horrible at allocating large amounts of capital, especially at the speed it is done in China. Political decisions (driven by the goal of full employment) are often uneconomical, and corruption and cronyism result in projects that destroy value.
To maintain high employment, China has poured money into infrastructure and real estate projects. This explains why, in 2009, new floor space doubled and residential real estate prices surged 25 percent. This also explains why the Chinese keep building new skyscrapers even though existing ones are still vacant.
The enormous stimulus has exacerbated problems that already existed, threatening to turn China into a less shiny but more drastic version of debt-riddled Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
What happens in China doesn’t stay in China. A meltdown there – or even a slowdown – would have severe consequences for the rest of the world.
It will tank the commodity markets. Demand for industrial goods will fall off the cliff. Finally, Chinese appetite for our fine currency will diminish, driving the dollar lower against the renminbi and boosting our interest rates higher. No more 5 percent mortgages and 6 percent car loans.
No shortcuts to greatness
We look at China and are mesmerized by its 1.3 billion people, its achievements of the past decade, its recent economic resiliency, and its ability to achieve spectacular results on the fly. But we have to remember that economic bubbles are usually just a good thing taken too far. The Chinese economy is no exception. Its long-term future may be bright, but in the short run we’ve got a bubble on our hands.
Everyone wants a shortcut to greatness, but there isn’t one. China has been trying to bend the laws of economics for a while, and with the control it exerts over its economy it may seem that it’s succeeded.
But this is only a temporary mirage, which must be followed by a painful reality. No, there is no shortcut to greatness – not in personal life, not in politics, and not in economics.
Vitaliy N. Katsenelson is a portfolio manager/director of research at Investment Management Associates in Denver. He is the author of “Active Value Investing: Making Money in Range-Bound Markets.”
---
Related Stories
China: the world’s next great economic crash
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2010/0121/China-the-world-s-next-great-economic-crash
China vs. America: Which government model will triumph?
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2010/0127/China-vs.-America-Which-government-model-will-triumph
---
© 2010 The Christian Science Monitor
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0316/China-the-coming-costs-of-a-superbubble
=====
India vs. China: Whose Economy Is Better?
Workers install scaffolding at a construction site in Suining, Sichuan province, China, on Jan. 25, 2010
Reuters
By Michael Schuman / Hong Kong Thursday, Jan. 28, 2010
In the inevitable comparisons that economists and businesspeople make between Asia's two rising giants, China and India, China nearly always comes out on top.
The Chinese economy historically outpaces India's by just about every measure. China's fast-acting government implements new policies with blinding speed, making India's fractured political system appear sluggish and chaotic. Beijing's shiny new airport and wide freeways are models of modern development, contrasting sharply with the sagging infrastructure of New Delhi and Mumbai. And as the global economy emerges from the Great Recession, India once again seems to be playing second fiddle. Pundits around the world laud China's leadership for its well-devised economic policies during the crisis, which were so effective in restarting economic growth that they helped lift the entire Asian region out of the downturn.
Now, however, India may finally have one up on its high-octane rival. Though India still can't compete on top-line economic growth — the World Bank projects India's gross domestic product (GDP) will increase 6.4% in 2009, far short of the 8.7% that China announced in mid-January – India's economy looks to be rebounding from the downturn in better shape than China's. India doesn't appear to be facing the same degree of potential dangers and downside risks as China, which means policymakers in New Delhi might have a much easier task in maintaining the economy's momentum than their Chinese counterparts. "The way I see it is that the growth in India is much more sustainable" than the growth in China, says Jim Walker, an economist at Hong Kong–based research firm Asianomics.
India's edge is due to the different stimulus programs adopted by the two countries to support growth during the downturn. China implemented what Walker calls "the biggest stimulus program in global history." On top of government outlays for new infrastructure and tax breaks, Beijing most significantly counted on massive credit growth to spur the economy. The amount of new loans made in 2009 nearly doubled from the year before to $1.4 trillion – representing almost 30% of GDP. The stimulus plan worked wonders, holding up growth even as China's exports dropped 16% in 2009.
But now China is facing the consequences of its largesse. Fears are rising that Beijing's easy-money policies have fueled a potential property-price bubble. According to government data, average real estate prices in Chinese cities jumped 7.8% in December from a year earlier — the fastest increase in 18 months. The credit boom has also sparked worries about the nation's banking system. Many economists expect the large surge in credit to lead to a growing number of nonperforming loans (NPLs). In a November report, UBS economist Wang Tao calculates that if 20% of all new lending in 2009 and 10% of the amount in 2010 goes bad over the next three to five years, the total amount of NPLs from China's stimulus program would reach $400 billion, or roughly 8% of GDP. Though Wang notes that the total is small compared with the level of NPLs that Chinese banks carried in the past, she still calls the sum "staggering." Policymakers in Beijing are clearly concerned. Since December, they have introduced a series of steps to cool down the housing market and restrict access to credit by, for example, reintroducing taxes on certain property transactions and raising the required level of cash that banks have to keep on hand in an effort to reduce new lending.
India, meanwhile, isn't experiencing nearly the same degree of fallout from its recession-fighting methods. The government used the same tools as every other to support growth when the financial crisis hit – cutting interest rates, offering tax breaks and increasing fiscal spending – but the scale was smaller than in China. Goldman Sachs estimates that India's government stimulus will total $36 billion this fiscal year, or only 3% of GDP. By comparison, China's two-year, $585 billion package is roughly twice as large, at about 6% of GDP per year. Most important, India managed to achieve its substantial growth without putting its banking sector at risk. In fact, India's banks have remained quite conservative through the downturn, especially compared with Chinese lenders. Growth of credit, for example, was actually lower in 2009 than in 2008. As a result, economists see continued strength in India's banks. A January report by economic-research outfit Centennial Asia Advisors noted that based on available data, "there was no sign that domestic banks' nonperforming assets were deteriorating materially." Nor do analysts harbor the same concerns that India's monetary policies are sending prices of Indian real estate to bubble levels. "India's growth, though less stellar, does have the reassuring factor that the [risks of] asset price bubbles are less," says Rajat Nag, managing director general of the Asian Development Bank in Manila.
India maintained robust growth without Beijing's hefty stimulus in part because it is less exposed to the international economy. China's exports represented 35% of GDP compared with only 24% for India in 2008. Thus India was afforded more protection from the worst effects of the financial crisis in the West, while China's government needed to be much more active to replace lost exports to the U.S. More significantly, though, India's domestic economy provides greater cushion from external shocks than China's. Private domestic consumption accounts for 57% of GDP in India compared with only 35% in China. India's confident consumer didn't let the economy down. Passenger car sales in India in December jumped 40% from a year earlier. "What we see [in India] is a fundamental domestic demand story that doesn't stall in the time of a global downturn," says Asianomics' Walker.
The Indian economy is not immune to risks. The government has to contend with a yawning budget deficit, and last year's weak monsoon rains will likely undercut agricultural production and soften rural consumer spending. But rapid growth is expected to continue. The World Bank forecasts India's economy will surge 7.6% in 2010 and 8% in 2011, not far behind the 9% rate it predicts for China for each of those years. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, when speaking about his country's more plodding pace of economic policymaking, has said that "slow and steady will win the race." The Great Recession appears to have proved him right.
© 2010 Time Inc.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1957281,00.html?xid=rss-topstories#ixzz0inhtn6Ok
China may seem to have defied the recession and the laws of economics. It hasn't. When China's bubble bursts, the global impact will be severe, spiking US interest rates.
By Vitaliy N. Katsenelson / March 16, 2010
Denver
The world looks at China with envy. China’s economy grew 8.7 percent last year, while the world economy contracted by 2.2 percent. It seems that Chinese “Confucian capitalism” – a market economy powered by 1.3 billion people and guided by an authoritarian regime that can pull levers at will – is superior to our touchy-feely democracy and capitalism. But the grass on China’s side of the fence is not as green as it appears.
In fact, China’s defiance of the global recession is not a miracle – it’s a superbubble. When it deflates, it will spell big trouble for all of us.
To understand the Chinese economy, consider three distinct periods: “Late-stage growth obesity” (the decade prior to 2008); “You lie!” (the time of the financial crisis); and finally, “Steroids ’R’ Us” (from the end of the financial crisis to today).
Late-stage growth obesity
About a decade ago, the Chinese government chose a policy of growth at any cost. China’s leaders see strong gross domestic product (GDP) growth not just as bragging rights, but as essential for political survival and national stability.
Because China lacks the social safety net of the developed world, unemployed people aren’t just inconvenienced by the loss of their jobs, they starve; and hungry people don’t complain, they riot and cause political unrest.
Remember the 1994 movie “Speed”? A young cop (Keanu Reeves) had to save passengers on a bus that would explode if its speed dropped below 50 m.p.h. Well, China is like that bus with 1.3 billion people aboard. If the Communist Party can’t keep the economy growing at a fast clip, the result will be catastrophic.
To achieve high growth, China kept its currency, the renminbi, at artificially low levels against the dollar. This helped already cheap Chinese-made goods become even cheaper. China turned into a significant exporter to the developed economies.
Normally, if free-market economic forces were at work, the renminbi would have appreciated and the US dollar would have declined. However, had China let this occur, demand for its products would have declined, and its economy wouldn’t have grown at roughly 10 percent a year, which it did during the past decade.
The more China sold to the United States, the more dollars it accumulated, and thus the more US Treasuries it bought, driving our interest rates down. US consumers responded to these cheap goods and cheap home loans by going on a buying binge.
However, companies and countries that grow at very high rates for a long time will inevitably suffer from late-stage growth obesity. Consider Starbucks: In 1999, it had 2,000 stores and was adding 1.8 stores a day. In 2007, when it had 10,000 stores, it had to open 5.5 stores a day in a desperate bid to keep growth rates up. This resulted in poor decisions and poor quality – a recipe for disaster.
In China, political pressure for full employment has led to similar late-stage growth obesity. In 2005, China built the largest shopping mall in the world, the New South China Mall: Today it’s 99 percent vacant. China also built up a lavish district in a city called Ordos: Today, it’s a ghost town.
You lie!
All good things come to an end, and great things come to an end with a bang. When the financial meltdown erupted in 2008, US and global banks started dropping like flies. Countries everywhere suffered contraction.
Even China.
During the crisis, Chinese exports were down more than 25 percent, tonnage of goods shipped through railroads was down by double digits, and electricity use plummeted.
Yet Beijing insisted that China had magically sustained 6 to 8 percent growth.
China lies. It goes to great lengths to maintain appearances, including censoring media and jailing those who write antigovernment articles. That’s why we have to rely on hard data instead.
Steroids ‘R’ Us
Today the global economy is stabilizing, thanks to Uncle Sam and other “uncles” around the world. But the consumers of Chinese-made goods are still in debt, unemployment is high, and banks aren’t lending. You might think the Chinese economy would be growing at a lower rate. But no, it is growing again at nearly 10 percent, as though the financial crisis never occurred.
Though this growth appears to be authentic – electricity consumption is back up – it is not sustainable growth, because it is based on an unprecedented stimulus package and extraordinary government involvement in the economy.
In the midst of the financial crisis, in late 2008, Beijing fire-hosed a $568 billion stimulus into the Chinese economy. That’s enormous! As a percentage of GDP, it would be like a $2 trillion stimulus in America, nearly triple the size of the one Congress passed last year.
It gets even more interesting. Unlike Western democracies, whose central banks can pump a lot of money into the financial system but can’t force banks to lend or consumers and corporations to spend, China can achieve both at lightning speed.
The government controls the banks, so it can make them lend, and it can force state-owned enterprises (one-third of the economy) to borrow and to spend. Also, because the rule of law and human and property rights are still underdeveloped, China can spend infrastructure project money very fast – if a school is in the way of a road the government wants to build, it becomes a casualty for the greater good.
Government is horrible at allocating large amounts of capital, especially at the speed it is done in China. Political decisions (driven by the goal of full employment) are often uneconomical, and corruption and cronyism result in projects that destroy value.
To maintain high employment, China has poured money into infrastructure and real estate projects. This explains why, in 2009, new floor space doubled and residential real estate prices surged 25 percent. This also explains why the Chinese keep building new skyscrapers even though existing ones are still vacant.
The enormous stimulus has exacerbated problems that already existed, threatening to turn China into a less shiny but more drastic version of debt-riddled Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
What happens in China doesn’t stay in China. A meltdown there – or even a slowdown – would have severe consequences for the rest of the world.
It will tank the commodity markets. Demand for industrial goods will fall off the cliff. Finally, Chinese appetite for our fine currency will diminish, driving the dollar lower against the renminbi and boosting our interest rates higher. No more 5 percent mortgages and 6 percent car loans.
No shortcuts to greatness
We look at China and are mesmerized by its 1.3 billion people, its achievements of the past decade, its recent economic resiliency, and its ability to achieve spectacular results on the fly. But we have to remember that economic bubbles are usually just a good thing taken too far. The Chinese economy is no exception. Its long-term future may be bright, but in the short run we’ve got a bubble on our hands.
Everyone wants a shortcut to greatness, but there isn’t one. China has been trying to bend the laws of economics for a while, and with the control it exerts over its economy it may seem that it’s succeeded.
But this is only a temporary mirage, which must be followed by a painful reality. No, there is no shortcut to greatness – not in personal life, not in politics, and not in economics.
Vitaliy N. Katsenelson is a portfolio manager/director of research at Investment Management Associates in Denver. He is the author of “Active Value Investing: Making Money in Range-Bound Markets.”
---
Related Stories
China: the world’s next great economic crash
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2010/0121/China-the-world-s-next-great-economic-crash
China vs. America: Which government model will triumph?
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2010/0127/China-vs.-America-Which-government-model-will-triumph
---
© 2010 The Christian Science Monitor
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0316/China-the-coming-costs-of-a-superbubble
=====
India vs. China: Whose Economy Is Better?
Workers install scaffolding at a construction site in Suining, Sichuan province, China, on Jan. 25, 2010
Reuters
By Michael Schuman / Hong Kong Thursday, Jan. 28, 2010
In the inevitable comparisons that economists and businesspeople make between Asia's two rising giants, China and India, China nearly always comes out on top.
The Chinese economy historically outpaces India's by just about every measure. China's fast-acting government implements new policies with blinding speed, making India's fractured political system appear sluggish and chaotic. Beijing's shiny new airport and wide freeways are models of modern development, contrasting sharply with the sagging infrastructure of New Delhi and Mumbai. And as the global economy emerges from the Great Recession, India once again seems to be playing second fiddle. Pundits around the world laud China's leadership for its well-devised economic policies during the crisis, which were so effective in restarting economic growth that they helped lift the entire Asian region out of the downturn.
Now, however, India may finally have one up on its high-octane rival. Though India still can't compete on top-line economic growth — the World Bank projects India's gross domestic product (GDP) will increase 6.4% in 2009, far short of the 8.7% that China announced in mid-January – India's economy looks to be rebounding from the downturn in better shape than China's. India doesn't appear to be facing the same degree of potential dangers and downside risks as China, which means policymakers in New Delhi might have a much easier task in maintaining the economy's momentum than their Chinese counterparts. "The way I see it is that the growth in India is much more sustainable" than the growth in China, says Jim Walker, an economist at Hong Kong–based research firm Asianomics.
India's edge is due to the different stimulus programs adopted by the two countries to support growth during the downturn. China implemented what Walker calls "the biggest stimulus program in global history." On top of government outlays for new infrastructure and tax breaks, Beijing most significantly counted on massive credit growth to spur the economy. The amount of new loans made in 2009 nearly doubled from the year before to $1.4 trillion – representing almost 30% of GDP. The stimulus plan worked wonders, holding up growth even as China's exports dropped 16% in 2009.
But now China is facing the consequences of its largesse. Fears are rising that Beijing's easy-money policies have fueled a potential property-price bubble. According to government data, average real estate prices in Chinese cities jumped 7.8% in December from a year earlier — the fastest increase in 18 months. The credit boom has also sparked worries about the nation's banking system. Many economists expect the large surge in credit to lead to a growing number of nonperforming loans (NPLs). In a November report, UBS economist Wang Tao calculates that if 20% of all new lending in 2009 and 10% of the amount in 2010 goes bad over the next three to five years, the total amount of NPLs from China's stimulus program would reach $400 billion, or roughly 8% of GDP. Though Wang notes that the total is small compared with the level of NPLs that Chinese banks carried in the past, she still calls the sum "staggering." Policymakers in Beijing are clearly concerned. Since December, they have introduced a series of steps to cool down the housing market and restrict access to credit by, for example, reintroducing taxes on certain property transactions and raising the required level of cash that banks have to keep on hand in an effort to reduce new lending.
India, meanwhile, isn't experiencing nearly the same degree of fallout from its recession-fighting methods. The government used the same tools as every other to support growth when the financial crisis hit – cutting interest rates, offering tax breaks and increasing fiscal spending – but the scale was smaller than in China. Goldman Sachs estimates that India's government stimulus will total $36 billion this fiscal year, or only 3% of GDP. By comparison, China's two-year, $585 billion package is roughly twice as large, at about 6% of GDP per year. Most important, India managed to achieve its substantial growth without putting its banking sector at risk. In fact, India's banks have remained quite conservative through the downturn, especially compared with Chinese lenders. Growth of credit, for example, was actually lower in 2009 than in 2008. As a result, economists see continued strength in India's banks. A January report by economic-research outfit Centennial Asia Advisors noted that based on available data, "there was no sign that domestic banks' nonperforming assets were deteriorating materially." Nor do analysts harbor the same concerns that India's monetary policies are sending prices of Indian real estate to bubble levels. "India's growth, though less stellar, does have the reassuring factor that the [risks of] asset price bubbles are less," says Rajat Nag, managing director general of the Asian Development Bank in Manila.
India maintained robust growth without Beijing's hefty stimulus in part because it is less exposed to the international economy. China's exports represented 35% of GDP compared with only 24% for India in 2008. Thus India was afforded more protection from the worst effects of the financial crisis in the West, while China's government needed to be much more active to replace lost exports to the U.S. More significantly, though, India's domestic economy provides greater cushion from external shocks than China's. Private domestic consumption accounts for 57% of GDP in India compared with only 35% in China. India's confident consumer didn't let the economy down. Passenger car sales in India in December jumped 40% from a year earlier. "What we see [in India] is a fundamental domestic demand story that doesn't stall in the time of a global downturn," says Asianomics' Walker.
The Indian economy is not immune to risks. The government has to contend with a yawning budget deficit, and last year's weak monsoon rains will likely undercut agricultural production and soften rural consumer spending. But rapid growth is expected to continue. The World Bank forecasts India's economy will surge 7.6% in 2010 and 8% in 2011, not far behind the 9% rate it predicts for China for each of those years. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, when speaking about his country's more plodding pace of economic policymaking, has said that "slow and steady will win the race." The Great Recession appears to have proved him right.
© 2010 Time Inc.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1957281,00.html?xid=rss-topstories#ixzz0inhtn6Ok
Greensburg, KS - 5/4/07
"Eternal vigilance is the price of Liberty."
from John Philpot Curran, Speech
upon the Right of Election, 1790
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