You raise some interesting points, and I generally agree that Tavan Togloi will dictate the success or failure of an investment in MMC.
That being said, there are some significant differences to note between 2013 and today.
1. In the middle of 2013, management hadn't taken the company into bankruptcy yet (that would still be 3 years down the road). Therefore, it's understandable that there would be a discount today to account for management ineptitude and self-dealing (another $6.6M check cut to OJ for services rendered in the first half of 2017).
2. In 2013, MMC's proven and probable reserves were higher, both on a total basis (481mT versus 391mT) and a HCC basis (376mT versus 341mT), so it stands to reason that the company would be worth less today.
3. In the first half of 2013, MMC generated $15.5M of operating profit and $34.2M of operating cash flow. In the first half of 2017, MMC generated a whopping $72.1M of operating profit, but only $28.4M of operating cash flow. That's pathetic, especially considering that price played a much larger factor in MMC's 2017 revenues than it did in 2013 (suggesting that we should have seen much better profitability since price should have largely dropped to the bottom line). This doesn't help dissuade folks like me from thinking that MMC is run for the benefit of OJ, and not for the benefit of all shareholders.
4. Finally, at the midway point of 2013, MMC had $129M of cash on its balance sheet and $934M of debt. In 2017, MMC had $6M of cash and $532M of debt (including perpetual notes). While the net debt position is better in 2017, the ratios look far worse (0.14 cash/debt in 2013 versus .01 in 2017).
All in all, we might be fortunate that the stock isn't trading even lower at this point in time. I can't emphasize enough how poor interim 2017 results were in such a benign coking coal pricing environment. What happens when the pricing worm turns and the company is still run this poorly?
