Thursday, September 21, 2017 8:01:24 AM
Rough explanation of {WHEN} YSYB will file.
Off-note: China's CPC & employees contracts RESTRICT & strictly make totally confidential all company communications to the public; unless currently in compliance; as DEFINITIVE MATERIAL STATEMENTS can only be released to the public by the Board of Directors officially. ( Otherwise, it's regarded as INSIDER INFO. )
That's why if not in current compliance, they will not & can not respond under threat of litigation & jail.
See 10/10/2007 et al, filing for more exact proofs of companies employees confidentiality contracts & CPC restrictions on confidentiality.
Undeniably & indisputably HOLD UP is Trump.
Since 2008, the last administration had a FINISHED BIT AGREEMENT with China that would have been done by now, if it wasn't for the drastic change of ideologies with the current administration, known by all worldwide.
Hedge Fund Raider's Ann Rand strategy is Trump's ( appointed ) Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross & Trump's TARIFF WAR ideology is stopping YSYB & all others from becoming current with compliance filings. Trump is busy negotiating TRADE WARS.
Obviously, it's common knowledge that:
QUOTE: "Wilbur Ross was a banker who specialized in leveraged buyouts & distressed businesses. In February 2017, Forbes magazine reported that Ross has a net worth of $2.5 billion. He is often called the "King of Bankruptcy" because of his experience in buying bankrupt raided companies for liquidating assets, primarily in the manufacturing & steel industries, & later selling them for a large profit after mostly liquidating their assets as Romney did exactly similarly with Hedge Fund Bain Capital."
Who loses from this raider looting strategy?
#1. Suppliers put out of business.
#2. Town & County & State & Federal TAXES REVENUES LOSSES.
#3. Thousands of employees devastated out of work without pay checks.
#4. Customers further denied all business.
#5. Community supported local businesses go bust after being forced to LOSE ALL CUSTOMERS.
#5. Communities LOSE ALL SERVICES without tax based business support.
#6. Livelihoods at destroyed, & welfare indigent services are overwhelmed.
#7. Federal Bail-Outs cost taxpayers tremendously more.
#8. Bankruptcies cost all taxpayers more when a select few cheat the system & further cheat the IRS with tax haven avoidance deception.
#9. Vulnerable people suffer going without needs & services & die, being just apathetic statistical history.
#10. Pressure is put on Congress & State Legislators for more Corporate Welfare taxpayer funded 'FREEBIES' to provide additional grants & zero taxes; all in an effort to manipulate government favorably funded interventions.
Emerging economy China MicroCap Start-Ups like YSYB are looking for a fair playing field, & worldwide acceptable norms that have been recognized by 160 other countries already, except the USA.
YSYB would have filed by now if it wasn't for Trump's TRADE WAR on FREE TRADE, WAR ON TRUTH, Paris Climate Change Agreement ("HOAX" beliefs) of indifference with complete incompetence of worldwide diplomacy. He hasn't even staffed most govt agencies yet, & put restrictions on 'Global Warming' & 'Climate Change' words not being used; as they were stripped from all websites. Most scientists quit because of this anti-science "Big Oil" Pro-business ANTI-REGULATIONS agenda.
It's NOT China or YSYB's fault for expecting fairness, as the previous administration already had with them.
DESIRE PROOF?
Brookings Institution 7/18/2017:
"Expect more process than progress at U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue."
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/18/expect-more-process-than-progress-at-u-s-china-comprehensive-economic-dialogue/
"This week, the United States is hosting the inaugural U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, co-chaired by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang. The dialogue serves as the principal forum for Washington and Beijing to address trade and investment issues. This week’s session is likely to produce agreement on a one-year action plan for tackling trade and investment impediments, building on the 100-day plan inked at President Trump’s April meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
However, to the consternation of some in the U.S. business community, the new action plan likely will be general and non-specific, focusing more on principles and shared commitments than concrete steps or detailed deliverables. More broadly, we do not expect either side will take steps at this dialogue that would alter the trajectory of bilateral trade and investment, dynamics that have been markedly stable to date this year. Trump’s approach thus far demonstrates broad continuity with that of his predecessors—encouraging further Chinese opening while refraining from steps that might undercut the bilateral economic relationship.
There are four primary reasons for restrained expectations surrounding the upcoming talks.
The United States will not make concessions on China’s priorities. The United States will not recognize China as a market economy, and will not entertain requests to loosen export controls on high-tech products or make it easier for Chinese firms to invest in the United States unless/until China takes reciprocal steps to improve market access for U.S. firms in China. The United States also is not prioritizing negotiation of a bilateral investment treaty with China amid the various competing priorities facing the U.S. trade representative, such as renegotiating NAFTA and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.
China does not feel pressure to cave to U.S. demands. The 100-day action plan produced only modest results—primarily opening the beef market in China to American products. Still, the Trump administration hailed the outcome, with President Trump praising the progress on Twitter, Secretary Ross hailing it as a “herculean accomplishment,”and Secretary Mnuchin stating that he “couldn’t be more pleased.” Privately, administration officials also have been signaling to Beijing that they understand that trade imbalances and market access challenges will take time to resolve. These private and public signals relieve pressure on Beijing to make near-term concessions and allows China to use processes—dialogues, roadmaps, and political commitments—to lend the appearance of constructive engagement in addressing longstanding irritants.
This is a political year in China, with the 19th Party Congress slated for autumn. The Party Congress is a once-every-five-year event at which the top leadership turns over. President Xi will certainly remain in place, but there is much uncertainty and political jockeying over all other senior positions. In this environment, no senior Chinese official will want to invite any appearance of capitulation to U.S. pressure, given the negative effect such a perception would engender for his/her standing within the Chinese leadership. “Stability” is the watchword for the year in terms of China’s macroeconomic policies and performance and its structural policies. There will almost certainly not be any important policy announcements at the dialogue, such as broad opening of the many still-closed sectors in the economy. Whether the new political line-up moves faster on reform likely will not be known until after the National People’s Congress in March 2018. 2017 is not a promising year to negotiate reforms with China.
A potential U.S. decision on steel tariffs will cast a cloud of uncertainty over the talks. It is unlikely that the steel decision will be announced before the dialogue begins, but the expectation of U.S. action on steel will affect the meeting. In reality, the United States imports very little steel from China (less than five percent of steel usage); the major exporters to the United States are Canada, Mexico, South Korea, and others. Still, China’s large excess capacity and exports to other parts of the world market are problematic and worthy of discussion between the two sides. However, these are not problems that can be solved by American tariffs, which will hurt mostly U.S. allies and U.S. firms and workers in industries that use steel, while having only a small, indirect effect on China. Any significant tariffs on steel could signal a more protectionist U.S. stance, which would affect China directly, and likely lead to a hardening of China’s positions vis-à-vis the United States.
While the upcoming economic dialogue may not produce detailed deliverables, trade and investment between China and the United States continues to grow. Through May, according to the most recent U.S. data, American merchandise exports to China increased 17 percent from the year before, while imports grew eight percent. China’s economy is growing much faster than the U.S. economy, and the Chinese market remains important for some U.S. industries. If those trends continue, the big trade imbalance between the two countries will decline in the long run. The healthy growth of U.S. exports to a fast-growing Chinese market is one reason to tread lightly with protectionist measures that would invite retaliation.
In the short run, however, the imbalance continues to widen. The bilateral imbalance has increased five percent so far this year (our exports may be growing rapidly, but from a low base). In this complex environment, the Trump administration probably will continue the policy of the last two presidents—cajoling China to open up more, but avoiding harsh measures that would impede the economic relationship." End quote. - Brookings.
https://uschinadialogue.georgetown.edu/responses/resolve-the-u-s-china-bilateral-investment-treaty-a-win-win-for-u-s-china-economic-relations
"Resolve the U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Win-Win for U.S.-China Economic Relations"
"The year 2016 perhaps challenged many core assumptions about the forces of globalization and interstate economic integration. For U.S.-China economic relations, this election year and its reverberations will have significant bilateral consequences. In the United States, a tide of nationalist populism carried Republican candidate Donald Trump all the way to the White House on an America-first platform; Trump proposed to make America “great again” by bringing back manufacturing jobs and re-negotiating “unfair” trade deals with other nations. Trump harshly criticized China on the campaign trail, citing the bilateral trade deficit and Beijing’s currency manipulation as critical economic threats to the United States. On the other side of the Pacific, President Xi Jinping dedicated a considerable portion of 2016 trying to soften the decline of Chinese economic growth. Uncertainty surrounding the Chinese economic “New Normal” growth trajectory and tightening anti-corruption controls seem to have caused significant capital flight, resulting in massive growth of Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States and other countries. On the surface, the economic outlook for U.S.-China relations appears rather bleak.
Yet, although many of President-elect Trump’s statements on China strongly resonated on Twitter with the American electorate, they do not fully reflect the recent trends of U.S.-China economic relations and the opportunities presented. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, American exports to China in October 2016 exhibited 11.3% year-on-year growth, suggesting a decreasing trade deficit. Moreover, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the United States have skyrocketed in recent years; in 2016 alone, Chinese firms surpassed $32 billion in M&A deals in the United States. Chinese companies like Dalian Wanda and its 2016 acquisition of Legendary Entertainment have steadily increased their visibility and influence on American consumers. Similarly, American companies like Disney with its opening of a Shanghai theme park have aggressively courted the growing Chinese middle class. Thus, the facts behind the U.S.-China economic relationship actually portray a deepening of bilateral trade and investment linkages. But as the relationship deepens, how can both countries ensure the establishment of a more fair and transparent process?
In 2017, the United States and China must seek to resolve and implement the U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (B.I.T). With the hyper growth of Chinese FDI in the United States, a B.I.T. will allow the United States and China to fully capitalize on the momentum of continued economic integration. A B.I.T. will help equalize the playing field for American and Chinese corporations. At present, Chinese law restricts market access for foreign investors in numerous sectors, including banking, telecommunications, and broadcast media production. As a result, American companies are unable to participate in the growth of these sectors while their Chinese counterparts can dually invest domestically and in the less-restricted United States. This is simply unfair for American investors looking to compete globally.
American corporations are not alone in their frustrations with the U.S.-China B.I.T. investment process. Corporate executives and government officials from China have voiced strong concerns over a perceived lack of transparency and fairness for Chinese investment deals in the United States. The primary complaint targets an American inter-agency institution known as CFIUS, or Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. CFIUS responsibilities include vetting foreign investments in the United States for potential national security threats; given the close relationship between the People’s Liberation Army and some Chinese companies like Huawei, the growth of Chinese FDI has inspired intense “national security” scrutiny over prominent Chinese deals. A B.I.T. would more clearly standardize the criteria for FDI screening and reduce the effect of partisan politics on the definition of a “national security threat”, particularly given the frequent political portrayal of China as an economic adversary.
In conclusion, a B.I.T. between the United States and China will be an economic win-win for both countries. If President-elect Trump is determined to get “fairer” deals with China, then he should prioritize the implementation of the U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty during his presidency. For President Xi, a BIT will help mitigate the public and political skepticism that Chinese companies face when investing in the United States. Furthermore, a B.I.T. will allow China to reduce the economic criticism it faces for heavily restricting market sector access. By standardizing the rules and regulations for bilateral investment, the United States and China can continue to deepen economic integration and build greater transparency."
END QUOTE.
Clay Garner is a senior at Stanford University majoring in East Asian Studies with a focus on media and politics. 1/2017 ~ Georgetown University.
From The Diplomat:
""Sino-American Trade: What Comes Next"
"A full-scale trade war now seems less likely than it did when Trump was elected, though it is still possible."
"Now that U.S. President Donald Trump has settled into office and has opened lines of communication with China, anxious observers are still awaiting grand gestures in U.S.-China economic relations. Although he has been restrained in this arena so far, we can expect his administration to take more significant action for several reasons. Not only did Trump promise during the campaign to challenge Chinese trade practices by levying punitive tariffs and labeling Beijing a currency manipulator, but his election arguably signaled that a critical mass of both workers and businessmen favor recasting Sino-American ties.
Indeed, the longstanding, positive consensus on U.S.-China business relations has been supplanted by a far less forgiving outlook on the American side. China was granted permanent normal trade relations status (PNTR) and acceded to WTO membership in 2000-2001, and in the ensuing years its economy has grown at a remarkable annual pace of between 6.5 percent and 14 percent. Meanwhile, American manufacturing has shed five million jobs and the trade deficit has skyrocketed. In 2016, China accounted for more than 21 percent of U.S. imports and only 8 percent of its exports, reflecting a $347 billion merchandise trade deficit, just below 2015’s record-high $367 billion deficit. And while there is no consensus on the number of American jobs lost due to U.S.-China trade since 2000 — estimates range from zero to 3.4 million — several mainstream economists now agree that this trade has spurred significant job losses in some industries.
In recent years, critics from across the political spectrum have accused China of a host of protectionist sins: steel dumping, currency manipulation, cyber espionage, weak enforcement of intellectual property agreements, and overregulation of foreign enterprises. These charges are exacerbated by China’s unique status among trading states. Although it wields tremendous economic power as the world’s second-largest economy, it is a WTO-classified “developing nation” with hundreds of millions living in poverty and a per capita GDP far below those of the developed economies. WTO rules allow developing nations to levy higher tariffs; meanwhile, the U.S. has some of the world’s lowest tariffs and no value-added tax (VAT).
Trump’s Actions So Far
Trump began his presidency with a flourish by withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and stating that he would negotiate superior bilateral trade agreements. Beyond this initial gesture, however, his early decisions have been relatively cautious. In March, he initiated studies of the trade deficit, promising that “we are going to get these bad trade deals straightened out.” More recently he has tasked the Commerce Department with investigating the national security implications of steel and aluminum imports.
Meanwhile, executive branch agencies continue to act on issues that predated Trump’s presidency. Early in March, for example, the Commerce Department announced that a Chinese telecommunications equipment company would pay a $1.19 billion fine for shipping equipment to Iran and North Korea — the largest civil penalty ever levied in an export control case. And as trade law expert Bill Perry has been documenting at the U.S.-China Trade War blog, American companies continue to file anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases against Chinese producers of many industrial products. “With a sympathetic Trump Administration and a very sympathetic Wilbur Ross as the new Secretary of Commerce,” notes Perry, “more cases are going to be filed against China and numerous other countries.”
President Trump and President Xi Jinping did not ink any major agreements when they met in Mar-a-Lago, far from the prying eyes of the beltway elite, but they did establish a working relationship. This was no small feat, as Trump had earlier tweeted that the meeting with Xi would be “a very difficult one.” The two sides agreed to establish a new comprehensive dialogue for bilateral negotiations, which by all appearances will supplant the Obama-era Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). They also agreed on a surprisingly short “100-day” framework for trade talks with the general objective of increasing U.S. exports and reducing the bilateral trade deficit. The Chinese side was open to this initiative because of the effects of the trade balance on China’s money supply.
Trump has since walked back his persistent claim against China’s monetary policies. As recently as February, he called the Chinese “grand champions at manipulation of currency,” but shortly after the summit he stated that his administration would not label China a currency manipulator. This turnabout may have grown in part from Trump’s desire to seek Beijing’s cooperation on North Korea, but it is also true that market forces in recent months have made it harder to defend the charge of currency manipulation.
Although China did devalue the RMB for many years in order to encourage exports and protect its workers, slowing growth has made the RMB less attractive on the currency markets, and China’s central bank has been propping it up in response to capital outflows. The U.S. Treasury Department’s latest biannual report on foreign exchange policies says as much, noting that China “engag[ed] in one-way, large-scale intervention to resist appreciation of the RMB for a decade” but has more recently “sought to prevent a rapid RMB depreciation that would have negative consequences for the United States, China, and the global economy.”
Trump has not yet taken a stand on the U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which has been under negotiation since 2008. Proponents worry that the BIT will be yet another casualty to the anti-globalization trend, but Trump may very well support its completion and ratification in the interest of job growth. If ratified, the treaty could significantly enhance Chinese investment in the US while also removing some of the barriers now facing American investors and businesses in China. Chinese companies put a record $45 billion into the United States in 2016, while American businesses put $75 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) into China in 2015. We can assume that these numbers would increase with BIT ratification, though if the Trump administration takes a tough posture toward China in other areas, the remaining BIT negotiations will surely be far more difficult. At present, the administration is prioritizing the trade deficit, but the BIT could become a part of Trump’s long-term dealings with China, especially if they can come to terms on market access for American companies.
Policy Options
The Trump administration is most likely to act in those industries most adversely affected by globalization and China’s trade practices, such as steel, textiles, and clothing. The American textile industry has lost 366,000 jobs since 2000, while primary metals have lost 265,000 jobs in the last two decades — 62 percent and 42 percent of their respective workforces. U.S. aluminum production has dropped 77 percent since 2000, while in the same period China’s share of the world aluminum market has risen from around 11 percent to just over 50 percent.
The administration has many reasons to address this imbalance, including national security: only one North American aluminum smelter can now produce the kind of high-purity aluminum needed for major defense platforms like the F-35 stealth fighter. China’s overproduction and exporting of state-subsidized steel has already fueled a minor trade war in which the United States, European Union, Japan, South Korea, and China have levied tit-for-tat tariffs for the past year or so. It is worth noting that some of Trump’s trade advisers and lawyers have experience in U.S.-China steel cases, which is one more reason to expect continued U.S. action in this sector.
The administration may also seek adjustments in the automobile trade, where the deck is clearly stacked in Chinese manufacturers’ favor. China levies a 25 percent tariff on cars and requires foreign automakers to grant at least 50 percent ownership of their China ventures to Chinese entities. By contrast, America’s auto tariff is only 2.5 percent, and foreign car companies face no such ownership requirements. Because of these and other factors, one-quarter of cars sold in America are imported compared with only 5 percent of those sold in China. The U.S. government does protect the domestic truck industry through a 25 percent tariff, but even without this heavy tax Chinese producers like Great Wall, Kawei, and Higer would have a hard time competing with long-established American and Japanese brands. The Ford F-Series truck has been the top-selling vehicle in America for 35 years, and American truck consumers demonstrate a remarkably high level of brand loyalty.
It is now clear that Trump’s campaign promise of a 45 percent tariff on Chinese goods was essentially a headline-generating statement of principle. Nevertheless, some protectionist measures are possible. Although Congress passes most tariffs, the president can also do so if he invokes the vague statutory powers granted in a time of war or a national emergency. He also has the power to levy short-term tariffs across all imports, or he can target a specific industry via the terms of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 if such imports may threaten national security. Judging from the administration’s actions so far, Trump may very well implement Section 232 to reduce imports of aluminum and steel from China and elsewhere. Trump can also borrow ideas from his predecessor, as the former administration of U.S. President Barack Obama took many actions against China in the WTO and elsewhere.
It remains to be seen whether tougher American trade measures will amount to an aggregate domestic economic gain or whether they will help only a small number of workers in specific industries. When Obama backed 25-35 percent safeguard tariffs on Chinese tires in 2009, the results were mixed. In the short term, Chinese imports decreased and American tire companies expanded their production. But tire imports from other nations also increased, and China quickly retaliated against U.S. auto parts and chicken.
Free trade proponents see such protectionist ideas as reckless and, ultimately, most painful for low-income consumers. They further point out that automation has hurt more American workers than have trade policies, as evidenced by the five-fold increase in labor productivity that has accompanied the steel industry’s downsizing since the early 1980s. Moreover, some goods are particularly inappropriate for tariffs. Clothing imports are so popular among American consumers that tariffs are less politically viable than other kinds of trade restrictions. And if China-made clothing is restricted, then producers from Vietnam and Bangladesh will surely step into the breach.
The administration will likely get better results if they stress reciprocity in response to discriminatory economic policies, such as China’s market access restrictions on foreign companies. If the Trump administration seeks to even the playing field in certain industries, then they must accept that Beijing will retaliate against punitive actions. Chinese state media have been working overtime to emphasize the joint benefits of Sino-American trade, and they have promised to fight any harsh American measures. The Beijing-based Global Times warnedthat China will respond in kind to such actions, including canceling orders for Boeing airplanes, iPhones, and agricultural products, and even cutting the number of Chinese students in the United States.
This last point is no minor issue. The more than 300,000 Chinese students now enrolled in American universities contribute 10 billion dollars to the United States economy annually, and they are a significant boon to cash-strapped universities seeking full-tuition-paying foreign students. Beijing has proved willing to wield its economic power against other trading partners, most recently South Korea. It is not too difficult to imagine them doing much the same to the United States.
A full-scale trade war now seems less likely than it did when Trump was elected, though it is still possible. Such a conflict would have far-reaching ramifications, not least because Sino-American economic ties are so extensive and have helped solidify trans-Pacific peace and stability for the last quarter century. The inevitable rise in consumer goods prices could contribute to a global economic downturn. Even if one side could weather a trade war better than the other, both would be hurt. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was not far off the mark when he suggested, “Any sober-minded politician clearly recognize[s] that there cannot be conflict between China and the United States because both will lose.”
Joe Renouard teaches at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Nanjing, China. He is the author of Human Rights in American Foreign Policy: From the 1960s to the Soviet Collapse. - Diplomat 4/2017.
http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/sino-american-trade-what-comes-next/
End quote.
So, it's easily seen that since 2007-8 when China listings started, negotiations would have been signed by now, as China & USA BIT agreements were FINISHED, according to BOTH sides as of 2016, except for a signature.
Deeper research shows even more on this, & makes understanding conglomerate YSYB even more clearer.
Bottom line takeaway: It's NOT CHINA or YSYB's fault. China has been to the negotiating table in agreement already! So have 160 other countries, EXCEPT THE USA.
Presently China NOW has 133 BIT agreements (IN FORCE) around the world. (160 signed, but renegotiated.)
Presently the USA has only 42 BIT agreements around the world. ( Trump is TERMINATING THEM! )
As a 5% YSYB owner-shareholder, I support YSYB!
Semper Fi!
GLTA.
Off-note: China's CPC & employees contracts RESTRICT & strictly make totally confidential all company communications to the public; unless currently in compliance; as DEFINITIVE MATERIAL STATEMENTS can only be released to the public by the Board of Directors officially. ( Otherwise, it's regarded as INSIDER INFO. )
That's why if not in current compliance, they will not & can not respond under threat of litigation & jail.
See 10/10/2007 et al, filing for more exact proofs of companies employees confidentiality contracts & CPC restrictions on confidentiality.
Undeniably & indisputably HOLD UP is Trump.
Since 2008, the last administration had a FINISHED BIT AGREEMENT with China that would have been done by now, if it wasn't for the drastic change of ideologies with the current administration, known by all worldwide.
Hedge Fund Raider's Ann Rand strategy is Trump's ( appointed ) Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross & Trump's TARIFF WAR ideology is stopping YSYB & all others from becoming current with compliance filings. Trump is busy negotiating TRADE WARS.
Obviously, it's common knowledge that:
QUOTE: "Wilbur Ross was a banker who specialized in leveraged buyouts & distressed businesses. In February 2017, Forbes magazine reported that Ross has a net worth of $2.5 billion. He is often called the "King of Bankruptcy" because of his experience in buying bankrupt raided companies for liquidating assets, primarily in the manufacturing & steel industries, & later selling them for a large profit after mostly liquidating their assets as Romney did exactly similarly with Hedge Fund Bain Capital."
Who loses from this raider looting strategy?
#1. Suppliers put out of business.
#2. Town & County & State & Federal TAXES REVENUES LOSSES.
#3. Thousands of employees devastated out of work without pay checks.
#4. Customers further denied all business.
#5. Community supported local businesses go bust after being forced to LOSE ALL CUSTOMERS.
#5. Communities LOSE ALL SERVICES without tax based business support.
#6. Livelihoods at destroyed, & welfare indigent services are overwhelmed.
#7. Federal Bail-Outs cost taxpayers tremendously more.
#8. Bankruptcies cost all taxpayers more when a select few cheat the system & further cheat the IRS with tax haven avoidance deception.
#9. Vulnerable people suffer going without needs & services & die, being just apathetic statistical history.
#10. Pressure is put on Congress & State Legislators for more Corporate Welfare taxpayer funded 'FREEBIES' to provide additional grants & zero taxes; all in an effort to manipulate government favorably funded interventions.
Emerging economy China MicroCap Start-Ups like YSYB are looking for a fair playing field, & worldwide acceptable norms that have been recognized by 160 other countries already, except the USA.
YSYB would have filed by now if it wasn't for Trump's TRADE WAR on FREE TRADE, WAR ON TRUTH, Paris Climate Change Agreement ("HOAX" beliefs) of indifference with complete incompetence of worldwide diplomacy. He hasn't even staffed most govt agencies yet, & put restrictions on 'Global Warming' & 'Climate Change' words not being used; as they were stripped from all websites. Most scientists quit because of this anti-science "Big Oil" Pro-business ANTI-REGULATIONS agenda.
It's NOT China or YSYB's fault for expecting fairness, as the previous administration already had with them.
DESIRE PROOF?
Brookings Institution 7/18/2017:
"Expect more process than progress at U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue."
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/18/expect-more-process-than-progress-at-u-s-china-comprehensive-economic-dialogue/
"This week, the United States is hosting the inaugural U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, co-chaired by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang. The dialogue serves as the principal forum for Washington and Beijing to address trade and investment issues. This week’s session is likely to produce agreement on a one-year action plan for tackling trade and investment impediments, building on the 100-day plan inked at President Trump’s April meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
However, to the consternation of some in the U.S. business community, the new action plan likely will be general and non-specific, focusing more on principles and shared commitments than concrete steps or detailed deliverables. More broadly, we do not expect either side will take steps at this dialogue that would alter the trajectory of bilateral trade and investment, dynamics that have been markedly stable to date this year. Trump’s approach thus far demonstrates broad continuity with that of his predecessors—encouraging further Chinese opening while refraining from steps that might undercut the bilateral economic relationship.
There are four primary reasons for restrained expectations surrounding the upcoming talks.
The United States will not make concessions on China’s priorities. The United States will not recognize China as a market economy, and will not entertain requests to loosen export controls on high-tech products or make it easier for Chinese firms to invest in the United States unless/until China takes reciprocal steps to improve market access for U.S. firms in China. The United States also is not prioritizing negotiation of a bilateral investment treaty with China amid the various competing priorities facing the U.S. trade representative, such as renegotiating NAFTA and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.
China does not feel pressure to cave to U.S. demands. The 100-day action plan produced only modest results—primarily opening the beef market in China to American products. Still, the Trump administration hailed the outcome, with President Trump praising the progress on Twitter, Secretary Ross hailing it as a “herculean accomplishment,”and Secretary Mnuchin stating that he “couldn’t be more pleased.” Privately, administration officials also have been signaling to Beijing that they understand that trade imbalances and market access challenges will take time to resolve. These private and public signals relieve pressure on Beijing to make near-term concessions and allows China to use processes—dialogues, roadmaps, and political commitments—to lend the appearance of constructive engagement in addressing longstanding irritants.
This is a political year in China, with the 19th Party Congress slated for autumn. The Party Congress is a once-every-five-year event at which the top leadership turns over. President Xi will certainly remain in place, but there is much uncertainty and political jockeying over all other senior positions. In this environment, no senior Chinese official will want to invite any appearance of capitulation to U.S. pressure, given the negative effect such a perception would engender for his/her standing within the Chinese leadership. “Stability” is the watchword for the year in terms of China’s macroeconomic policies and performance and its structural policies. There will almost certainly not be any important policy announcements at the dialogue, such as broad opening of the many still-closed sectors in the economy. Whether the new political line-up moves faster on reform likely will not be known until after the National People’s Congress in March 2018. 2017 is not a promising year to negotiate reforms with China.
A potential U.S. decision on steel tariffs will cast a cloud of uncertainty over the talks. It is unlikely that the steel decision will be announced before the dialogue begins, but the expectation of U.S. action on steel will affect the meeting. In reality, the United States imports very little steel from China (less than five percent of steel usage); the major exporters to the United States are Canada, Mexico, South Korea, and others. Still, China’s large excess capacity and exports to other parts of the world market are problematic and worthy of discussion between the two sides. However, these are not problems that can be solved by American tariffs, which will hurt mostly U.S. allies and U.S. firms and workers in industries that use steel, while having only a small, indirect effect on China. Any significant tariffs on steel could signal a more protectionist U.S. stance, which would affect China directly, and likely lead to a hardening of China’s positions vis-à-vis the United States.
While the upcoming economic dialogue may not produce detailed deliverables, trade and investment between China and the United States continues to grow. Through May, according to the most recent U.S. data, American merchandise exports to China increased 17 percent from the year before, while imports grew eight percent. China’s economy is growing much faster than the U.S. economy, and the Chinese market remains important for some U.S. industries. If those trends continue, the big trade imbalance between the two countries will decline in the long run. The healthy growth of U.S. exports to a fast-growing Chinese market is one reason to tread lightly with protectionist measures that would invite retaliation.
In the short run, however, the imbalance continues to widen. The bilateral imbalance has increased five percent so far this year (our exports may be growing rapidly, but from a low base). In this complex environment, the Trump administration probably will continue the policy of the last two presidents—cajoling China to open up more, but avoiding harsh measures that would impede the economic relationship." End quote. - Brookings.
https://uschinadialogue.georgetown.edu/responses/resolve-the-u-s-china-bilateral-investment-treaty-a-win-win-for-u-s-china-economic-relations
"Resolve the U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Win-Win for U.S.-China Economic Relations"
"The year 2016 perhaps challenged many core assumptions about the forces of globalization and interstate economic integration. For U.S.-China economic relations, this election year and its reverberations will have significant bilateral consequences. In the United States, a tide of nationalist populism carried Republican candidate Donald Trump all the way to the White House on an America-first platform; Trump proposed to make America “great again” by bringing back manufacturing jobs and re-negotiating “unfair” trade deals with other nations. Trump harshly criticized China on the campaign trail, citing the bilateral trade deficit and Beijing’s currency manipulation as critical economic threats to the United States. On the other side of the Pacific, President Xi Jinping dedicated a considerable portion of 2016 trying to soften the decline of Chinese economic growth. Uncertainty surrounding the Chinese economic “New Normal” growth trajectory and tightening anti-corruption controls seem to have caused significant capital flight, resulting in massive growth of Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States and other countries. On the surface, the economic outlook for U.S.-China relations appears rather bleak.
Yet, although many of President-elect Trump’s statements on China strongly resonated on Twitter with the American electorate, they do not fully reflect the recent trends of U.S.-China economic relations and the opportunities presented. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, American exports to China in October 2016 exhibited 11.3% year-on-year growth, suggesting a decreasing trade deficit. Moreover, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the United States have skyrocketed in recent years; in 2016 alone, Chinese firms surpassed $32 billion in M&A deals in the United States. Chinese companies like Dalian Wanda and its 2016 acquisition of Legendary Entertainment have steadily increased their visibility and influence on American consumers. Similarly, American companies like Disney with its opening of a Shanghai theme park have aggressively courted the growing Chinese middle class. Thus, the facts behind the U.S.-China economic relationship actually portray a deepening of bilateral trade and investment linkages. But as the relationship deepens, how can both countries ensure the establishment of a more fair and transparent process?
In 2017, the United States and China must seek to resolve and implement the U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (B.I.T). With the hyper growth of Chinese FDI in the United States, a B.I.T. will allow the United States and China to fully capitalize on the momentum of continued economic integration. A B.I.T. will help equalize the playing field for American and Chinese corporations. At present, Chinese law restricts market access for foreign investors in numerous sectors, including banking, telecommunications, and broadcast media production. As a result, American companies are unable to participate in the growth of these sectors while their Chinese counterparts can dually invest domestically and in the less-restricted United States. This is simply unfair for American investors looking to compete globally.
American corporations are not alone in their frustrations with the U.S.-China B.I.T. investment process. Corporate executives and government officials from China have voiced strong concerns over a perceived lack of transparency and fairness for Chinese investment deals in the United States. The primary complaint targets an American inter-agency institution known as CFIUS, or Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. CFIUS responsibilities include vetting foreign investments in the United States for potential national security threats; given the close relationship between the People’s Liberation Army and some Chinese companies like Huawei, the growth of Chinese FDI has inspired intense “national security” scrutiny over prominent Chinese deals. A B.I.T. would more clearly standardize the criteria for FDI screening and reduce the effect of partisan politics on the definition of a “national security threat”, particularly given the frequent political portrayal of China as an economic adversary.
In conclusion, a B.I.T. between the United States and China will be an economic win-win for both countries. If President-elect Trump is determined to get “fairer” deals with China, then he should prioritize the implementation of the U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty during his presidency. For President Xi, a BIT will help mitigate the public and political skepticism that Chinese companies face when investing in the United States. Furthermore, a B.I.T. will allow China to reduce the economic criticism it faces for heavily restricting market sector access. By standardizing the rules and regulations for bilateral investment, the United States and China can continue to deepen economic integration and build greater transparency."
END QUOTE.
Clay Garner is a senior at Stanford University majoring in East Asian Studies with a focus on media and politics. 1/2017 ~ Georgetown University.
From The Diplomat:
""Sino-American Trade: What Comes Next"
"A full-scale trade war now seems less likely than it did when Trump was elected, though it is still possible."
"Now that U.S. President Donald Trump has settled into office and has opened lines of communication with China, anxious observers are still awaiting grand gestures in U.S.-China economic relations. Although he has been restrained in this arena so far, we can expect his administration to take more significant action for several reasons. Not only did Trump promise during the campaign to challenge Chinese trade practices by levying punitive tariffs and labeling Beijing a currency manipulator, but his election arguably signaled that a critical mass of both workers and businessmen favor recasting Sino-American ties.
Indeed, the longstanding, positive consensus on U.S.-China business relations has been supplanted by a far less forgiving outlook on the American side. China was granted permanent normal trade relations status (PNTR) and acceded to WTO membership in 2000-2001, and in the ensuing years its economy has grown at a remarkable annual pace of between 6.5 percent and 14 percent. Meanwhile, American manufacturing has shed five million jobs and the trade deficit has skyrocketed. In 2016, China accounted for more than 21 percent of U.S. imports and only 8 percent of its exports, reflecting a $347 billion merchandise trade deficit, just below 2015’s record-high $367 billion deficit. And while there is no consensus on the number of American jobs lost due to U.S.-China trade since 2000 — estimates range from zero to 3.4 million — several mainstream economists now agree that this trade has spurred significant job losses in some industries.
In recent years, critics from across the political spectrum have accused China of a host of protectionist sins: steel dumping, currency manipulation, cyber espionage, weak enforcement of intellectual property agreements, and overregulation of foreign enterprises. These charges are exacerbated by China’s unique status among trading states. Although it wields tremendous economic power as the world’s second-largest economy, it is a WTO-classified “developing nation” with hundreds of millions living in poverty and a per capita GDP far below those of the developed economies. WTO rules allow developing nations to levy higher tariffs; meanwhile, the U.S. has some of the world’s lowest tariffs and no value-added tax (VAT).
Trump’s Actions So Far
Trump began his presidency with a flourish by withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and stating that he would negotiate superior bilateral trade agreements. Beyond this initial gesture, however, his early decisions have been relatively cautious. In March, he initiated studies of the trade deficit, promising that “we are going to get these bad trade deals straightened out.” More recently he has tasked the Commerce Department with investigating the national security implications of steel and aluminum imports.
Meanwhile, executive branch agencies continue to act on issues that predated Trump’s presidency. Early in March, for example, the Commerce Department announced that a Chinese telecommunications equipment company would pay a $1.19 billion fine for shipping equipment to Iran and North Korea — the largest civil penalty ever levied in an export control case. And as trade law expert Bill Perry has been documenting at the U.S.-China Trade War blog, American companies continue to file anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases against Chinese producers of many industrial products. “With a sympathetic Trump Administration and a very sympathetic Wilbur Ross as the new Secretary of Commerce,” notes Perry, “more cases are going to be filed against China and numerous other countries.”
President Trump and President Xi Jinping did not ink any major agreements when they met in Mar-a-Lago, far from the prying eyes of the beltway elite, but they did establish a working relationship. This was no small feat, as Trump had earlier tweeted that the meeting with Xi would be “a very difficult one.” The two sides agreed to establish a new comprehensive dialogue for bilateral negotiations, which by all appearances will supplant the Obama-era Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). They also agreed on a surprisingly short “100-day” framework for trade talks with the general objective of increasing U.S. exports and reducing the bilateral trade deficit. The Chinese side was open to this initiative because of the effects of the trade balance on China’s money supply.
Trump has since walked back his persistent claim against China’s monetary policies. As recently as February, he called the Chinese “grand champions at manipulation of currency,” but shortly after the summit he stated that his administration would not label China a currency manipulator. This turnabout may have grown in part from Trump’s desire to seek Beijing’s cooperation on North Korea, but it is also true that market forces in recent months have made it harder to defend the charge of currency manipulation.
Although China did devalue the RMB for many years in order to encourage exports and protect its workers, slowing growth has made the RMB less attractive on the currency markets, and China’s central bank has been propping it up in response to capital outflows. The U.S. Treasury Department’s latest biannual report on foreign exchange policies says as much, noting that China “engag[ed] in one-way, large-scale intervention to resist appreciation of the RMB for a decade” but has more recently “sought to prevent a rapid RMB depreciation that would have negative consequences for the United States, China, and the global economy.”
Trump has not yet taken a stand on the U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which has been under negotiation since 2008. Proponents worry that the BIT will be yet another casualty to the anti-globalization trend, but Trump may very well support its completion and ratification in the interest of job growth. If ratified, the treaty could significantly enhance Chinese investment in the US while also removing some of the barriers now facing American investors and businesses in China. Chinese companies put a record $45 billion into the United States in 2016, while American businesses put $75 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) into China in 2015. We can assume that these numbers would increase with BIT ratification, though if the Trump administration takes a tough posture toward China in other areas, the remaining BIT negotiations will surely be far more difficult. At present, the administration is prioritizing the trade deficit, but the BIT could become a part of Trump’s long-term dealings with China, especially if they can come to terms on market access for American companies.
Policy Options
The Trump administration is most likely to act in those industries most adversely affected by globalization and China’s trade practices, such as steel, textiles, and clothing. The American textile industry has lost 366,000 jobs since 2000, while primary metals have lost 265,000 jobs in the last two decades — 62 percent and 42 percent of their respective workforces. U.S. aluminum production has dropped 77 percent since 2000, while in the same period China’s share of the world aluminum market has risen from around 11 percent to just over 50 percent.
The administration has many reasons to address this imbalance, including national security: only one North American aluminum smelter can now produce the kind of high-purity aluminum needed for major defense platforms like the F-35 stealth fighter. China’s overproduction and exporting of state-subsidized steel has already fueled a minor trade war in which the United States, European Union, Japan, South Korea, and China have levied tit-for-tat tariffs for the past year or so. It is worth noting that some of Trump’s trade advisers and lawyers have experience in U.S.-China steel cases, which is one more reason to expect continued U.S. action in this sector.
The administration may also seek adjustments in the automobile trade, where the deck is clearly stacked in Chinese manufacturers’ favor. China levies a 25 percent tariff on cars and requires foreign automakers to grant at least 50 percent ownership of their China ventures to Chinese entities. By contrast, America’s auto tariff is only 2.5 percent, and foreign car companies face no such ownership requirements. Because of these and other factors, one-quarter of cars sold in America are imported compared with only 5 percent of those sold in China. The U.S. government does protect the domestic truck industry through a 25 percent tariff, but even without this heavy tax Chinese producers like Great Wall, Kawei, and Higer would have a hard time competing with long-established American and Japanese brands. The Ford F-Series truck has been the top-selling vehicle in America for 35 years, and American truck consumers demonstrate a remarkably high level of brand loyalty.
It is now clear that Trump’s campaign promise of a 45 percent tariff on Chinese goods was essentially a headline-generating statement of principle. Nevertheless, some protectionist measures are possible. Although Congress passes most tariffs, the president can also do so if he invokes the vague statutory powers granted in a time of war or a national emergency. He also has the power to levy short-term tariffs across all imports, or he can target a specific industry via the terms of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 if such imports may threaten national security. Judging from the administration’s actions so far, Trump may very well implement Section 232 to reduce imports of aluminum and steel from China and elsewhere. Trump can also borrow ideas from his predecessor, as the former administration of U.S. President Barack Obama took many actions against China in the WTO and elsewhere.
It remains to be seen whether tougher American trade measures will amount to an aggregate domestic economic gain or whether they will help only a small number of workers in specific industries. When Obama backed 25-35 percent safeguard tariffs on Chinese tires in 2009, the results were mixed. In the short term, Chinese imports decreased and American tire companies expanded their production. But tire imports from other nations also increased, and China quickly retaliated against U.S. auto parts and chicken.
Free trade proponents see such protectionist ideas as reckless and, ultimately, most painful for low-income consumers. They further point out that automation has hurt more American workers than have trade policies, as evidenced by the five-fold increase in labor productivity that has accompanied the steel industry’s downsizing since the early 1980s. Moreover, some goods are particularly inappropriate for tariffs. Clothing imports are so popular among American consumers that tariffs are less politically viable than other kinds of trade restrictions. And if China-made clothing is restricted, then producers from Vietnam and Bangladesh will surely step into the breach.
The administration will likely get better results if they stress reciprocity in response to discriminatory economic policies, such as China’s market access restrictions on foreign companies. If the Trump administration seeks to even the playing field in certain industries, then they must accept that Beijing will retaliate against punitive actions. Chinese state media have been working overtime to emphasize the joint benefits of Sino-American trade, and they have promised to fight any harsh American measures. The Beijing-based Global Times warnedthat China will respond in kind to such actions, including canceling orders for Boeing airplanes, iPhones, and agricultural products, and even cutting the number of Chinese students in the United States.
This last point is no minor issue. The more than 300,000 Chinese students now enrolled in American universities contribute 10 billion dollars to the United States economy annually, and they are a significant boon to cash-strapped universities seeking full-tuition-paying foreign students. Beijing has proved willing to wield its economic power against other trading partners, most recently South Korea. It is not too difficult to imagine them doing much the same to the United States.
A full-scale trade war now seems less likely than it did when Trump was elected, though it is still possible. Such a conflict would have far-reaching ramifications, not least because Sino-American economic ties are so extensive and have helped solidify trans-Pacific peace and stability for the last quarter century. The inevitable rise in consumer goods prices could contribute to a global economic downturn. Even if one side could weather a trade war better than the other, both would be hurt. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was not far off the mark when he suggested, “Any sober-minded politician clearly recognize[s] that there cannot be conflict between China and the United States because both will lose.”
Joe Renouard teaches at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Nanjing, China. He is the author of Human Rights in American Foreign Policy: From the 1960s to the Soviet Collapse. - Diplomat 4/2017.
http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/sino-american-trade-what-comes-next/
End quote.
So, it's easily seen that since 2007-8 when China listings started, negotiations would have been signed by now, as China & USA BIT agreements were FINISHED, according to BOTH sides as of 2016, except for a signature.
Deeper research shows even more on this, & makes understanding conglomerate YSYB even more clearer.
Bottom line takeaway: It's NOT CHINA or YSYB's fault. China has been to the negotiating table in agreement already! So have 160 other countries, EXCEPT THE USA.
Presently China NOW has 133 BIT agreements (IN FORCE) around the world. (160 signed, but renegotiated.)
Presently the USA has only 42 BIT agreements around the world. ( Trump is TERMINATING THEM! )
As a 5% YSYB owner-shareholder, I support YSYB!
Semper Fi!
GLTA.
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