They can convert their loans in smaller multiples but they still have a problem when the daily trading volume averages under 1 million shares/day. They'd have a hard time selling their converted shares without driving down the pps. Most of these loans have not been converted, which indicates to me that they're still betting on the company's eventual success. As I said, however, this would be the area I'm most concerned about as a shareholder. If they can complete GLF, and I believe that's their highest priority, these loans should become more manageable. So far, management has done a pretty good job keeping the lenders in check.
I know the textbook definitions but they are meaningless when the terms are redefined within a contract. The contract definitions, not the textbook definitions, are legally binding. Here's how these terms are defined in the Definitive Funding Agreement...
Consequently, the payments are reduced proportionately as warrant shares are converted and they can more accurately be described as based on 20% of PNTV gross margin and 20% of subsidiary profits. As for...
Some of that toxic debt is being used to pay off other toxic loans as they become due. Surprisingly, to date, only a small percentage of these loans have actually converted to shares.
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