Foreign Correspondence

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Battling ISIS in Indonesia

"Indonesia turns to China as ethnic Uighurs join would-be jihadis"

By SIDNEY JONESJAN. 18, 2016


The attacks in Jakarta, Indonesia, on Thursday are believed to have been organized and funded by Bahrun Naim,
an Indonesian computer expert said to be in Syria. Credit Romeo Gacad/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

SINGAPORE — The attack that killed four civilians and four terrorists in central Jakarta last Thursday may be a harbinger of more violence to come. It certainly suggests that ISIS .. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda_in_mesopotamia/index.html?inline=nyt-org , which claimed responsibility, has already transformed the terrorism threat in Indonesia .. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/indonesia/index.html?inline=nyt-geo , after years of mostly foiled plots.

Indonesia, the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, has a tiny jihadist movement relative to its size. Many factors have kept radicalism in check: a stable, democratic government, little internal conflict, peaceful neighbors and tolerance for advocates of Islamic law. It also has an effective counterterrorism police unit, set up after the 2002 Bali bombings.

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The Bali bombings, which killed more than 200 people, marked the high point of terrorist capacity in Indonesia. The bombers were from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), trained on the Afghan-Pakistani border and funded by Al Qaeda. Although those attacks were carried out in the name of the global jihad, most JI members — like many other local extremist groups — were focused on avenging the deaths of Muslims in Christian-Muslim fighting in two areas of eastern Indonesia, Maluku and Poso. The groups involved in that struggle in the late 1990s and early 2000s laid the basis for the extensive network of jihadist cells that exists in Indonesia today.

With the arrests that followed the Bali attacks and the end of local wars, the jihadist movement weakened and fragmented. But it did not disappear. By the mid-2000s, JI decided violence was largely counterproductive and redirected its efforts toward rebuilding its membership through religious outreach and education. Other extremist groups, some of them splinters from JI, remained committed to jihad, but they lacked JI’s training regimen, indoctrination process and discipline. From 2010 until last week, out of dozens of attempted bomb attacks in Indonesia, not one bomb worked as intended, and three suicide attacks killed only the attackers themselves.

But then ISIS emerged, and suddenly there was the potential for Indonesian extremists to go to Syria and get military training, combat experience, ideological indoctrination and international contacts. What had become a low-level threat became more serious again.

Thursday’s attacks were reportedly organized and funded by Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian computer expert said to be in Syria. Last August, three men were arrested in Solo, in central Java, for planning to bomb a police post, a church and a Chinese temple on Mr. Naim’s instructions. (The temple was targeted as retaliation for Buddhist violence against Muslims in Myanmar.) In December, four more of Mr. Naim’s men were picked up for plotting attacks against senior police officials and Shiite institutions.

Even as terrorist activity has picked up in the last year, Indonesia has been shielded from its effects by the incompetence of would-be attackers, as well as police vigilance. In 2015, the total death toll from terrorism was just eight people; in 2014, it was four. The terrorists of the Solo plot, for example, apparently couldn’t figure out the right chemicals to make explosives. Last Thursday’s attacks could have been much deadlier had the perpetrators been better trained.

This weakness could lead Mr. Naim or other terrorists in the Middle East to send operatives back to Indonesia to instruct local extremists. And if the Jakarta attack did not cause the mass casualties its organizers were hoping for, the saturation news coverage it generated may turn that near-failure into a success of sorts, and encourage more attacks. Other ISIS sympathizers in Indonesia may want to strike in the hope of attracting similar attention. The rivalry between the two men who are said to be vying for the leadership of Indonesian fighters in Syria, Bahrumsyah and Abu Jandal, could blow back to Indonesia in the form of lethal competition among their supporters.

The need for more preventive measures has therefore become pressing. One necessity is plugging the holes in Indonesia’s anti-terrorism law, which at present does not ban membership in ISIS or similar organizations, or participation in terrorist-training camps abroad. Even when the Indonesian police know that individuals are actively recruiting for ISIS, they have few legal tools to stop them.

Another necessary step is to improve supervision and post-release monitoring of convicted terrorists. Pro-ISIS networks are able to disseminate information and contacts in Indonesian prisons, in part because almost every inmate has ready access to a smartphone. At any one time, some 300 individuals are either in prison or police custody awaiting trial on terrorism charges — many of them still in regular communication with peers on the outside. Dozens are released every year after serving their sentences, and the state authorities do not monitor them afterward.

The government must also develop a program for deportees who have been returned to Indonesia. So far some 200 Indonesians who tried to join ISIS have been sent back by Turkish authorities, some 60 percent of them women and minors, and if there ever was a target population for a deradicalization program, this is it. These people, often especially the women, have proved their determination to go to Syria or Iraq, and they may try to do so again. Their whereabouts are known, at least for the moment, and many need assistance because they sold everything before leaving. The Ministry of Social Affairs provides them temporary shelter, but no structured program assists them beyond that. The Indonesian government must work with local civil society organizations to draw these people into new social networks.

Finally, Indonesia needs to engage young, computer-savvy Indonesians to develop anti-ISIS messaging on social media and online, where Mr. Naim and other radical groups are actively spreading ISIS propaganda.

So far, the combination of Indonesia’s moderate majority, good police work and the incompetence of Indonesian extremists has kept the death toll from terrorist attacks low. But with ISIS now clearly present as a new threat, the government must urgently develop more programs to prevent its appeal from spreading.

Sidney Jones is director of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict in Jakarta.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/battling-isis-in-indonesia.html

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What the Jakarta attack tells us about the fight against terrorism

By John Blaxland

Updated January 15, 2016 08:54:49


Photo: "The response from the Indonesian police and security authorities
appears to be as professional as one could expect." (Reuters: Beawiharta)

The explosions and killings in downtown Jakarta yesterday are a grim and depressing reminder of the determination of violent
extremists. But they also show how much has changed - for the better - in the fight against them. John Blaxland writes.

The explosions and killings in downtown Jakarta on Thursday January 14, 2016 have captured the headlines, raising fresh concerns about the reach of the so-called Islamic State, or Daesh. Choosing to attack at a Starbucks café popular with wealthy Indonesians and expats, and striking close to embassies, UN offices and government buildings, the attackers appear deliberately to have intended to spread fear amongst local authorities and those associated with the West. Similarly, the targeting of Indonesian police officers - who have proven so effective in cracking down on violent extremism in Indonesia in recent months and years - appears also to have been a deliberate part of the plan. Undermining the effectiveness and resolve of the police would have to be a high priority for any emergent extremist group seeking to expand its influence and reach.

This all seems so grim and depressing. But contrasting recent events with those of the last decade or more point to a number of relatively positive developments. First, there has been a dearth of such incidents in Indonesia for some time now. There have been tip offs and hints of such attacks often enough, but they have tended to be pre-empted or otherwise neutralised. In addition, the terrorist attacks of the past tended to focus on major hotels, embassies or crowded and larger venues. Back then, unconstrained by effective surveillance, dramatic and devastating acts of barbarity were relatively easy to accomplish. This time, major institutions were not attacked directly. It appears such plotters now find it harder to gain ready access to such places without being screened out.

Earlier terrorist attacks also tended to involve massive explosions. With easier access to the right ingredients, more substantial blasts could be generated and more ostentatious targets could be attacked with relative impunity. The Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, for instance, as well as the various hotel and Australian embassy bombings in Jakarta involved large explosives intended to kill and maim large numbers. The ones reported on Thursday seem relatively light, resulting in more deaths among the perpetrators of these violent acts than anyone else.

The response from the Indonesian police and security authorities appears to be as professional as one could expect under the circumstances, too. Their conduct demonstrates how they have made significant progress in the last decade and a half. Close collaboration with Australian police, notably through the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), which was established with close Australian involvement, has undoubtedly played a constructive role in this regard.

The Indonesian authorities also have been proactive in banning extremist groups like Daesh and arresting those identified as being involved. Similarly, Indonesian Government efforts to monitor and contain travel to and from the Daeshist heartland in Syria have been of a high order.

The Snowden revelations, which exposed sophisticated eavesdropping techniques, undoubtedly harmed bilateral Indonesian-Australian relations. But perhaps the gravest damage was the way they made it much harder for security authorities in either country to detect and monitor the terrorists' chatter in the lead up to the launching of attacks. In recent years, until Snowden's revelations, collaboration enabled relatively prompt and effective responses which led to the arrest and incarceration of scores of would-be violent extremists and the spoiling of numerous other plots. While Snowden's fans may protest, the fact remains that, since his revelations, violent extremists have been far more security savvy. The job of detecting them has become considerably more difficult.

On the other hand, for such would-be terrorists to conduct their planning, they have had to act with far greater discretion. In turn, this discretion, arising from concern about monitoring, has constrained their ability, it appears, to act on a grander scale.

So while we should commiserate with those affected and empathise with our neighbours and friends in Indonesia, we should also take heart that the efforts of the Indonesian authorities are paying dividends – as are Australia's efforts at the working level to foster greater collaboration.

That said, the terrible events on Thursday remind us of the need for vigilance and for continuing to press in to Indonesia to collaborate closely with them, as well as other neighbouring countries. That collaboration is necessary to mitigate the risks associated with those who go to fight with groups such as IS and seek to return home, fired up with a bloodthirsty zeal. This also applies to the growing number of home-grown extremists, often at the margins of society who are fired up by the wild rants of the zealots of death.

In considering how to respond, Australia should remember that megaphone preaching is invariably unwelcome. A quiet and respectful engagement will help foster greater capability and enhance collaboration for the mutual security benefit of us all. Australia still has much to offer to assist in honing police and intelligence capabilities. After all, Australia and Indonesia have common concerns and security challenges.

Conversely, we Australians sometimes find it hard to think we have much to learn from Indonesia. Yet on the matter of how to respond to and handle the growth of such extremist behaviour, we should closely and respectfully consult with our neighbours and friends. They understand the nature of the challenge and how to respond as well as anyone. In fact, it is worth remembering that Indonesia is the largest predominantly Muslim country in the world and a remarkably bustling and relatively successful democracy. Yet Indonesian Islam is distinct from and more accommodating of otherness than the violent jihadist Islam associated with groups such as Daesh. Understanding how Indonesia differentiates between legitimate expression of faith and the toxic manifestations embraced by fringe elements in society is an area where we could all learn more.

John Blaxland is a senior fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in the Bell School of Asia pacific Affairs,
College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. Follow him on Twitter: @JohnBlaxland1.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-15/blaxland-what-the-jakarta-attacks-tells-us-about-terrorism-today/7090290