Judge Linn wrote separately, explaining that he joined the result “only because [he was] bound by the sweeping language of the test set out in Mayo.” Linn Op. 1. In his view, “this case represents the consequence—perhaps unintended—of that broad language in excluding a meritorious invention from the patent protection it deserves and should have been entitled to retain.” Id. 2. Unlike the panel, he acknowledged Diehr, the Supreme Court’s endorsement of it in Mayo, and its applicability to this case. Id. 2-3. Nonetheless, he concluded that the language of Mayo, though unnecessary to the decision, seemed to compel a finding of ineligibility, id. 3—even while he made it emphatically clear that “Sequenom’s invention is nothing like the invention at issue in Mayo,” and there was “no reason, in policy or statute” to deny it eligibility. Id. 4-5
Reverse every natural instinct and do the opposite of what you are inclined to do, and you will probably come very close to having a perfect golf swing.
Ben Hogan